

THE GENESIS OF RUSSOPHOBIA IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

Few matters can be of greater importance at the present day than the establishment of mutual trust and toleration between the Soviet Union and English-speaking peoples. It is my hope that the present study of the origins and early development of Russophobia in Great Britain may in some slight measure foster such sympathy. The story is one of the disruption of cordiality and the growth of hostility between Russia and the United Kingdom at a time when the basic foreign policies of the two nations were, if not identical, at least complementary. It is to be hoped that relatively trivial disagreements will not again perpetuate a lack of mutual understanding and thus induce insuperable fear and hatred.

In spite of the fact that the period comprehended by the study is only a quarter century, with the heart of the problem falling into little more than a decade, its scope should not appear to be unduly narrow, since it includes a careful survey of Anglo-Russian relations and of British policy toward Russia between 1815 and 1841, which has nowhere appeared in print, and an analysis of Anglo-Russian commercial relations, as well as a chapter in the intellectual biography of Great Britain.

This study is based upon both manuscript and printed sources. Manuscripts in the Public Record Office included all the correspondence of the foreign office with the British embassy in St. Petersburg and with the Russian embassy in London between 1815 and 1841, other materials, chiefly minutes and memoranda, from the files of the foreign office and the embassy in St. Petersburg, selected portions of the correspondence with the British missions in Paris, Constantinople, and Teheran, and certain private papers particularly those of J. A. D. Bloomfield, Earl Granville, and Stratford Canning. Of the British Museum Additional Manuscripts the Sir Robert Wilson, Macvey Napier, Broughton, and Auckland papers were the most useful. The Urquhart papers now in the library of Balliol College were of capital importance. Printed sources included, in addition to standard historical works, many of the biographical and autobiographical materials with which nineteenth-century British history is replete and almost equally numerous more or less monographic studies. Those which furnished useful evidence are cited in footnotes, as are also the parliamentary papers which were drawn upon for economic statistics and for evidence with regard to the circulations of newspapers. No good purpose would be served in repeating in the bibliography what would necessarily be an incomplete list of such titles. Hence the bibliography is limited to two types of printed sources:

1 publications in English dealing with Russia prior to 1842;

2 germane articles in scholarly journals. It is my hope that each is reasonably complete.

I have worked through the files of all the major British periodicals of the period, including six leading newspapers. The labor entailed was reduced by the expedient of using Palmer's Index for the *Times* and then making that journal in turn an index of the others. It is possible that some significant articles may have escaped me, but it seems unlikely since it is characteristic of newspapers that they all deal with all the major questions of the day and hence the topics, though not the attitudes, of their columns are nearly identical. Early in the work the validity of this method was tested with wholly satisfactory results. When the pages of the *Times* were bare of material on Russia, so were those of other papers.

I regret that I was unable to consult the files of the Russian embassy in London and of the foreign office in St. Petersburg. But the reports of the American ministers in London substantiated purely British sources, and it seems unlikely that the dispatches of the Russian emissaries would have altered the picture in significant fashion though they might probably have provided much corroborative evidence.

The notions which underlay the investigation and my conception of how the problems of the historical study of the interaction of policy and opinion may be met are fully explained in the first chapter. The conclusions which I reached are summarized in the final one.

This study of Russophobia has been carried on at intervals for more than fifteen years. My interest in the problem was first stirred by B. H. Sumner, Esq., formerly of Balliol, now Warden of All Souls College, while I was a candidate for the degree of B.Litt. at Oxford, and discussion of part of the subject was presented as partial fulfillment of the requirements of that degree. I returned to the problem some years later when I prepared my doctoral dissertation at Harvard under the direction of Professor W. L. Langer. In its present form the study is a thorough revision of the Harvard thesis. For their great assis

tance I am very much indebted to both Messrs. Sumner and Langer. Professors Michael Karpovich, David Owen, A. D. Nock, and E. A. Whitney of Harvard, and W. T. Jones of Pomona College have given me very useful counsel with regard to several portions of the manuscript. I owe a great debt, of a nature not directly connected with the manuscript, to the late Dean of Balliol, F. F. Urquhart, Esq., who regarded with a kindly tolerance my early efforts to do justice to the youthful years of his father, and to the late Professor R. B. Merriman of Harvard, who more than anyone else taught me to love and helped me to understand the history of England. My mother, my father, and my wife have all helped me with stylistic problems and with proofreading. To all of them and to many others whose influence is less clearly identifiable, I offer my sincere thanks.

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THE GENESIS OF RUSSOPHOBIA IN GREAT BRITAIN

I. POLICY AND OPINION - RUSSOPHOBIA

Russophobia is a paradox in the history of Great Britain. Within the United Kingdom there developed early in the nineteenth century an antipathy toward Russia which soon became the most pronounced and enduring element in the national outlook on the world abroad. The contradictory sequel of nearly three centuries of consistently friendly relations, this hostility found expression in the Crimean War. Yet that singularly inconclusive struggle is the sole conflict directly between the two nations; theirs is a record of peace unique in the bellicose annals of the European great powers. And in the three primary holocausts of modern times, in which among the major powers Great Britain alone escaped defeat, her victory thrice depended on the military collaboration of Russia. Why then did Russophobia become a persistent British sentiment?

A ready answer to this question - one of peculiar interest at a moment when as in the years after 1815 Russia and Great Britain are testing the nature of an uncertain future - is not far to seek. Anglo-Russian hostility, it would appear, was the fruit of competitive imperial ambitions which in the nineteenth century transformed into neighbors in the colonial world two powers hitherto remote. The extra-European roots of the Crimean War and of several other crises which were resolved pacifically apparently substantiate the hypothesis. Antagonism, it seems, was the normal situation in recent times and alliance exceptional. Only at moments when imperial rivalry was transcended by a common menace of major proportions could the perennial conflict be set aside. Thus the conditions of Anglo-Russian intercourse during the century and a half since the Industrial and French Revolutions inaugurated the worldembracing phase of European civilization appear to explain British Russophobia.

Such a facile resolution of the paradox, however, is delusive. It takes no account of the fact that Russophobia evolved at a moment when colonial competition was more potential than actual, when the apposite policies of the two governments were complementary in purpose though not in appearance. In brief the situation was this. The principal scene of rivalry during the germinal third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century was the Near East. The decline and incipient disintegration of the Ottoman empire induced apprehension lest the tsar be the chief heir of the sick man of Europe. It was feared in England that Russia's control of the Straits would endanger Britain's Levantine trade, her naval power in the Mediterranean, and her position in India. It might even upset the European balance of power. In the face of such putative perils, the United Kingdom generally pursued a policy designed to preserve the independence and the territorial integrity of Turkey. This was, however, also the aim of Russia's policy. Her statesmen realized that the other powers, particularly Austria and Great Britain, would not acquiesce in her possession of Constantinople. They doubted her ability to win the war which her seizure of the Straits, however desirable, would entail, and they judged that the prize would not be worth its cost. Hence they concluded that Russia's interests would be served best by the preservation of a weak Turkey which they could coerce at need but which would deny control of the Straits to some other, potentially less friendly, power. All this is demonstrated by the evidence of Russian archives. It is also apparent that Russia's purposes were frequently and honestly imparted to British statesmen and made known to the British press. In neither quarter were the Russian assurances accepted without serious reservations and frequently they were wholly discounted.¹ There were, no doubt, other areas and other aspects of their relations with regard to which the two powers were not in entire accord, but the Near Eastern problem was the preeminent element in their rivalry. It does not satisfactorily explain Russophobia. Thus there arises a second question, one less easily answered and more profound. Why were Russia's protestations not accorded at least a suspension of disbelief?

This problem is sharpened by the fact that during much of the period in question Great Britain's policy was, in the main, more provocative than Russia's. British nationals labored in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in Afghanistan and Persia, as well as in Constantinople, Syria, and Egypt, far more efficaciously than did their Russian counterparts, and it was the British, not the Russian, sphere of influence which advanced. British statesmen insisted that their own aims were defensive, but had the Russians appealed to the criterion of deeds rather than words, which their British contemporaries applied against them, an impartial judge must probably have rendered a verdict in their favor. It is to a full resolution of the foregoing paradox that the present study is directed, to an explanation of the gen

esis of British Russophobia and its rapid development to maturity between 1815 and 1841 at a time when the aims of the major foreign policies of the two nations were basically harmonious.

The heart of the matter will be found to lie in the interaction of policy and opinion. That the two phenomena are generally associated admits of no doubt. Yet in comparatively few historical studies has their relation been accorded a central position. Hence, while an exhaustive analysis of the nature of either foreign policy or public opinion is by itself a fit subject for a full length treatise, it seems appropriate to consider now certain of the problems which must be faced and of the methods which may be pursued in an investigation of the present character.

Policy requires little comment. Its elucidation, particularly with regard to foreign affairs, is a standard phase of historical work. Concepts and methods are familiar. Provided the requisite sources are available, no unusual difficulties are presented and reasonably positive results may be expected. Appropriate attention will be paid to the relations of Great Britain and Russia, particularly since Anglo-Russian intercourse during this period has nowhere been surveyed in its entirety.

Opinion, both individual and public, offers, in contrast, several grave problems. It is intangible and elusive. Its role is uncertain. Isolated it signifies little and its relation to event is problematic. Its study may lead to only qualified judgments. Yet close analysis indicates that it is ever a fundamental element in human affairs.

All public policy depends ultimately upon opinion, since the agents of the state can seldom observe directly the data upon which their decisions are based. They must be guided necessarily by their own experience and education, by the reports of subordinates, the advice of associates, the instructions of superiors, by the ideas and the prejudices of their countrymen, which they may or may not share, in other words, by opinion in many of its manifestations. Thus, whether the term be taken to denote events themselves or a scholar's reconstruction of them, opinion, often unrecognized, is the very substance of history.

In its individual aspects opinion has not lacked attention, as it fits readily into the classic forms of historical writing. It always plays a great role in the determination of events and here it will be accorded due consideration.

It is the amorphous entity called public opinion which seems to be a stumbling block. While not altogether passed by, this latter aspect of opinion has less frequently enjoyed historical examination, probably because of its inherent ambiguities. It may be suggested, however, that its complexities and uncertainties are sometimes more formidable in appearance than in reality. If its analysis cannot attain the precision achieved by other forms of historical writing or lead to equally positive conclusions, may it not be that different criteria for its evaluation are not only permissible but even mandatory?

An amalgam of the myriad opinions of the multitude, the nature of public opinion is at all times largely a matter of estimate, in short, an opinion itself. To measure it, a number of gauges have been devised in the twentieth century. In the nineteenth there were no such meters and later techniques cannot now be applied. Yet this handicap is not insurmountable. Statesmen are rarely baffled by opinion. They constantly make pragmatic judgments with regard to its nature and force. May their attitude not indicate a suggestive method for historical study, though the latter remain a more comprehensive undertaking? History after all has often been defined as past politics.

Men in public life recognize that their tenure of office and their responsibility for policy depend upon the approbation, temporary and tacit at least, of a generous segment of the body politic. They listen carefully to the many voices in the public chorus, blatant or surreptitious, known and unidentified. Their policy is commonly harmonious with the dominant strains. This is not infrequently the case in a despotic as well as in a free polity. Thus some clues to the character of opinion may be obtained from the nature of the policies pursued. And substantiating evidence may at times be found in the papers of men of affairs, in estimates which they happen to have reduced to writing. It is, furthermore, a characteristic of public opinion, particularly with regard to foreign affairs, that in moments of decision its dissonances tend to be resolved into unison, or at least into a less complex polyphony. At such times there is relatively little doubt about the nature of the music. And these are the crucial moments for the historian as well as for the statesman.

Policy thus tends to reflect the opinion both of the public and of the holders of responsible office. In the case of British Russophobia there survives evidence, of one sort or another, which is adequate for a pragmatic evaluation. Since just such a judgment underlay policy, its ready character and necessarily qualified nature render it none the less accurate. Indeed these qualities make it a truer de-

scription, not of the background against which policies were formulated and events occurred, but of the very atmosphere which supported their life. Even if no quasi-mechanical connection between policy and opinion can be shown to have existed, opinion was, as always, an integral part of the drama, for without it there would have been no policy.

There remain, however, further difficulties. It may be objected that the procedure just sketched can provide few clues to the diverse and unnumbered stimuli which generate opinions and to the relative force exerted in the determination of policy by the judgment of statesmen and by the sentiment of citizens. In short neither the origins nor the efficient role of public opinion will be demonstrated. Since these are important considerations, such criticisms are serious. But they rest in fact on an oversimplification of the fashion in which opinion operates.

In all but the simplest situations human conduct is the consequence of many, disparate impulses. Although some may be antithetical, commonly several are sympathetic and complementary. Action is the resultant of various stresses, but it bears no certain relation to the known activating elements and may assume an unpredictable and illogical form. A statesman himself may be unable to judge accurately the relative importance of the various considerations which determine his decisions, particularly when several dispose toward the same course. Likewise few readers can measure justly the force which a given document or publication may exert on their thought or conduct. No one can describe all the roots of his own ideas. Thus in the realm of opinion an overly sharp picture is necessarily suspect. There must be many qualified judgments and a considerable degree of incompleteness. Yet satisfactory results will be found to be obtainable in the case of Russophobia, both with regard to its origins and to its relation to policy.

It must be remembered, furthermore, that men of affairs remain members of the general community. Their opinions tend to be molded by the same forces which shape public opinion. In such cases it may be both impossible and futile to set the two aspects of opinion apart and to assign a value to each. Nor need there be worry lest some sentiment remain undetected. Opinion is of little consequence when it fails to induce significant action. In brief, it is the pragmatic calculus of the statesman, a canvas replete with grays and lacking in sharpness of detail, that constitutes the true picture. In spite of all difficulties, a pragmatic delineation lies within the grasp of the historian, at least in the case of Russophobia. He need and should demand no more.

The foregoing remarks may seem to imply that the points of view and the papers of men in public life constitute the alpha and omega of the study of opinion. This is, of course, not the case. The statesman's approach to opinion is merely the best illustration of the character which an analysis of such a subject as Russophobia may or, indeed, should assume. All significant groups within the population and all major media for the expression of opinion require due attention. Every effort must be made to ascertain the roots and the force of the opinions of all significant individuals and groups. There must be allowance for such factors as the exigencies of party politics, biases derived from commercial, religious, social, or professional affiliations, the fortuitous concatenation of events, organized and unorganized propaganda, as well as for the course of official policy. Of great importance are the stereotypes of things Russian which developed in Great Britain, the well-worn molds into which, as Mr. Walter Lippmann has so well shown, ideas with regard to remote and unfamiliar objects tend to fall at all times and in all societies.² Here the accident of personality may easily assume decisive importance. The task, in short, is the compilation of a chapter in the intellectual biography of a nation. As with all such narratives there are problems of emphasis and interpretation, but also moments when the evidence is ample for definitive characterization.

Each of the many modes in which opinion finds expression, letters, speeches, books, pamphlets, periodicals, and newspapers, as well as government documents, has its special value. Newspapers are perhaps the single richest source. The frequency of their publication and their general dependence upon public favor render unlikely their total disregard of any important element in the formation of public sentiment. Since they are the primary medium through which opinion becomes articulate, it may be assumed that at least one organ reflected, if it did not actually generate, the opinion of each significant segment of the community. Their circulation figures are a rough index to the number of their readers and thus in some degree to the relative weight of the notions which they set forth. The frequency with which a subject is discussed indicates the approximate urgency which it enjoys. The character of the language employed shows the intensity of feeling and the presumed familiarity of the reader with the topic at hand. Newspapers have one other peculiar merit. Their articles tend to be

brief, facilitating exact quotation, and thus lending a desirable flavor beyond the reach of paraphrase or summary.

Several of the periodicals of nineteenth-century Britain, notably the *Edinburgh Review* and the *Quarterly Review*, enjoyed an esteem now seldom won by any serial publication. Not infrequently their pages contained pronouncements which were recognized to be semiofficial in character. Few really trivial or ephemeral matters sullied their columns. No question of great moment failed to receive attention. Thus as an index to public sentiment they are a highly valuable supplement to the newspaper press.

Books and pamphlets are more specialized. The latter are for the most part admittedly propagandist in purpose and thus some indication of the intensity of popular sentiment. Their authorship, when ascertainable, may provide clues to the motives underlying propagandist activity. Books are likewise an indication of the interest which a topic enjoys and illuminate the state of general knowledge, especially when they are not fictional in nature. From both books and pamphlets significant shadings may be added to the panorama of opinion.

Letters, speeches, and government documents all possess special merits too various to be catalogued here. The types of data, often of great utility, which they contain will be readily apparent. Like each of the other categories they contribute to a pragmatic evaluation of the climate of opinion which is the aim of the whole study.

Of such nature are the problems and the materials involved in a historical analysis of policy and opinion. It is time to turn to British Russophobia, a topic of extraordinary interest at a moment when the relations of the USSR with English-speaking lands may well be the key to the future of mankind.

(1) Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East - the Crimea* (London, 1936), passim, partic. chaps. 2-5.

(2) Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1929),

II. ENGLAND AND RUSSIA PRIOR TO 1815

Serious Anglo-Russian hostility began in 1791. The notion that Russian expansion might be a serious threat to British interests surprised both parliament and the nation when in that year the government presided over by the younger Pitt requested supply for a naval mobilization. They asserted that Russia must be induced to restore the fortress of Ochakov, guarding the estuary of the Dnieper and Bug Rivers, which she had recently captured at a great cost in war with the Ottoman empire. Had Pitt been more astute, he might have anticipated profound opposition to his new and unexpected policy, for not since the Crusades had England played a major role in the affairs of Eastern Europe, and she had virtually ignored the partition of Poland in 1772.¹ Behind Pitt's proposal, indeed, lay more than two centuries of almost uninterruptedly amicable political relations and consistently expanding commercial intercourse.

England and Russia first came into direct contact in 1553 when a modest voyage of exploration, inspired by Sebastian Cabot, found, not a northeast passage to the Orient, but a welcome refuge in the White Sea. To Richard Chancellor, who commanded the sole ship which survived the stormy passage, it appeared that he had found a strange land ruled over by a savage potentate. Yet even such paltry success led to the formation in 1555 of the Muscovy Company, first of the great British joint-stock trading organizations. In the reign of Elizabeth, English merchants pushing across Russia and the steppes of Central Asia as far as Bokhara developed a profitable trade, although the route failed to afford easy access to India and China. The English market easily absorbed Russian furs, tallow, hides, flax, hemp, tar, and caviar. Ivan the Terrible made overtures for an alliance which Elizabeth courteously declined. In the collections of Hakluyt and Purchas there became accessible to English readers some slight information about a hitherto unknown land.²

During the seventeenth century, Anglo-Russian intercourse developed slowly. Commerce increased and further books dealing with Russia were published in England. In his *Brief History of Muscovia*, John Milton assembled the scant facts which were available in 1640. Other works appeared with increasing frequency and completeness. In 1698 Peter the Great visited England, occupying John Evelyn's house in Deptford while he studied naval architecture. The prevailing belief that Russia was not civilized can hardly have been diminished by the riotous behavior of the imperial party, which so damaged his house that Evelyn claimed £350 compensation from the English government. Upon Bishop Gilbert Burnett the tsar made a most unhappy impression.³

In the eighteenth century the depletion of English forests made large importation of timber for ship-building necessary, a major portion of the vital commodity coming from the ports on the Baltic littoral recently conquered by Russia. Thus Great Britain came to dominate Russia's foreign commerce, and, when American independence entailed the loss of a nationally controlled supply of timber, Anglo-Russian trade became an essential element in British naval power.⁴ Yet the relations of the two states were not very intimate, in spite of the fact that the European military and diplomatic alignment ordinarily made them both the allies of Austria. In the Seven Years' War they were on opposing sides and in 1780 Russia participated in the League of Armed Neutrality which embarrassed British policy during the American Revolution. Nonetheless these antagonisms were incidental to international politics and Russia did not appear to threaten British interests. Presumably a characteristic British estimate was that made by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1782. Russia, it stated innocently, was a *very large and powerful kingdom of Europe*. Her people were portrayed as a race of brutal, vicious, drunken savages, and her government as a complete despotism. There was no hint that she would soon be of vital interest and concern to many Englishmen.⁵

Only members of the cabinet and a few diplomatists knew that Pitt's proposal in 1791 was the carefully considered expression of a comprehensive political purpose. In order to preserve for England a dependable supply of grain and timber, and at the same time to satisfy an exigent Prussian ally, he had determined to substitute Poland for Russia as the political and economic complement of Great Britain. The complicated arrangements which underlay the scheme provided that Prussia should obtain Danzig and Thorn, that Austria should be compensated at Turkish expense, and that Poland should retain unimpeded access to the outside world by way of the Bug River and the Black Sea. Turkey would be propitiated by the restoration of Ochakov, and, in the last analysis, Russia would pay for Prussian ambition. The consequence of this deal might well have been an accord between Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain which would have profoundly affected the course of the French Revolution.

Pitt expected that the threat of coercion would induce Russian acquiescence, but he was willing to run the risk of war, though for greater stakes than Ochakov. The arguments in favor of the plan were maturely considered by the cabinet and judged to be decisive, but its justification, the preservation for England of free access to Polish grain and timber, lay in the fruit of a long-term policy which, by its very nature, could not yet be revealed.⁶

There ensued a heated debate, in both houses of parliament and before the bar of public opinion. Some Whigs argued that Ochakov was valueless and that Russia did not threaten Turkish integrity, while others maintained that the possession of additional Turkish territory would soon bring about the disintegration of the Russian state. Several speakers considered the Russian trade to be of such value to Great Britain that war against her would be disastrous, but others argued that under no circumstances could Russia become so powerful as to injure England. The Whig arguments were vivid, forceful, and ingenious, but unavailing. Tory party discipline sufficed to secure the adoption by both lords and commons of a resolution which pledged the moneys necessary for the naval mobilization.

Pitt's purpose was defeated, however, by a strong manifestation of public opinion. The criticism enunciated by a series of pamphlets prepared apparently in collusion by a group of Whig politicians and Russian partisans, perhaps with the collaboration of the Russian embassy, was supplemented by a series of public meetings held in the principal cities of the realm. While the sentiments expressed by these media were probably not an accurate reflection of the opinion of the nation, the severity of the opposition induced Pitt to abandon his undertaking. He could not risk war on an issue over which the country was divided.⁸

Politically inconclusive, the episode affords, nonetheless, a luminous picture of English opinion with regard to Russia. Both the debates of parliament and the pamphlets exhibit great ignorance. Few Englishmen had ever heard of Ochakov, and even Pitt had been forced to depend upon the testimony of a Dutch expert as to whether the fortress actually commanded the Dnieper Liman and thus the commerce of the Bug and Dnieper rivers. England was not ready to imperil a flourishing trade in order to scotch a generally unrecognized Russian menace. Yet the affair is significant, for it provoked the first expression of almost all the notions - even the menace to India - which excited English apprehension during most of the nineteenth century. The tocsin was rung but the nation did not answer its call.

If the events of the nineteenth century were to disclose the error in Pitt's major premise - fear lest Great Britain become totally dependent upon Russia for vital commodities - amity between the two powers was not rapidly restored. When Russia soon joined with Prussia and later with Austria in effecting the complete suppression of a reforming Poland, the partitions were not again ignored in England. Although the greater menace of France discouraged British intervention, in parliament Burke, Fox, Jenkinson (later Earl of Liverpool), the future Earl Grey, and many others all vigorously condemned Russia. The Annual Register remarked:

The virtues of the Poles, overborne by injustice and a combination of despots, contrasted with the polluted triumphs of the French republic, awakened throughout Europe a generous sympathy with that noble nation and indignation against their oppressors. A subscription for their relief and support, set on foot in the metropolis, and which was carried on with unexampled rapidity and success, afforded to the Poles the consolation that their misfortunes were not beheld with insensibility by their neighbors and that with whatever unconcern their struggle against despotism and ambition was viewed by sovereign princes, had they been able to continue their resistance, they would have met with all that support from the generosity of Britons which it was in their power to bestow.⁹

The youthful Thomas Campbell wrote:

Hope, for a season, bade the world farewell And freedom shrieked as Kosciusko fell!¹⁰

It was against this background of events and emotions that there first appeared in the English bookshops a considerable number of books which might at last dispel English ignorance with regard to Russia. William Tooke, formerly chaplain of the English churches at Cronstadt and St. Petersburg, published a translation of a French biography of Catherine II, a three-volume *View of the Russian Empire*, and a *History of Russia*. Several accounts of travels in various sections of Russia appeared in rapid succession. The greater scope of the articles on Russia in successive editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* appears to measure more than its own increasing maturity, although even in 1810 the article was merely a compilation of the evidence derived from books of travel.

Unquestionably more widely read than either travel books or encyclopedias was the first historical novel in the English language, *Thaddeus of Warsaw*. Jane Porter wrote when the struggle for the birthright independence of Poland was no more and her novel was dictated by a fervent sympathy

*with calamities which had scarcely ceased to exist.*¹¹ The sympathies of her readers must have been stirred by the heroic struggle of the last of the Sobieskis, and their indignation aroused over the devastation of a fertile land and the persecution of a noble people. Nine editions were published between 1803 and 1810.

During the two stormy decades which separated the third partition of Poland and the Congress of Vienna, Anglo-Russian relations became merely one thread in the tangled skein of European politics. Russia could still supply grain and timber in exchange for English manufactures, but such commercial considerations were of little account. Now hostile and then again friendly, the policies of both governments were dictated by the exigencies of their relations with Napoleon. They were allied in the second and third coalitions. There were a second League of Armed Neutrality and rumors of a Russo-French attack upon India. Finally the campaign of 1812 reversed the alliances yet again. Russia and England were the nucleus of the coalition which defeated Napoleon. In essence the period was an eventful but evanescent interlude in the evolution of Anglo-Russian intercourse.

A few dramatic events contributed an enduring tradition to the stereotype of Russia which was gradually forming in England. The conflagration of Moscow and the tragic rout of the Grand Army stirred imaginations and came to be enshrined in many more or less literary compositions. The narratives of participants - lucky French survivors, Englishmen who were attached to the Russian army - received the avid attention of English reviewers for many years. Anthologies still include some of the verse which the tragedy inspired. Alexander and the Russian army were heroes of the wars against Napoleon. A visit to Moscow came to be a necessary part of a tour in Russia. But the same qualities which won for the subject its literary recognition militated against its influence upon English opinion with regard to Russia. It was a heroic chapter in European politics, incidental in Anglo-Russian relations.

During the eighteenth century, then, Russia had emerged as a significant force in British life. Between the two nations there had developed a flourishing commerce vital to each. Normally they were political partners, although in Poland Russia had played a villainous role. And with regard to Ochakov she had been depicted as a serious danger to British interests. Englishmen were no longer wholly uninformed about the geographic, social, and political conditions of the empire of the tsars. In this new knowledge there was much which seemed uncongenial. Such was the preface to the story of Russo-phobia.

(1) Cf. Annual Register for 1772 (London, 1773), p. 2

(2) A. J. Gerson, "The Organization and Early History of the Muscovy Company," and E. V. Vaughan, "English Trading Expeditions into Asia under the Authority of the Muscovy Company," both in Studies in the History of English Commerce in the Tudor Period (New York, 191*), passim.

(3) Eugene Schuyler, Peter the Great (3 vols., New York, 1884), I, 299-310; T. B. Macaulay, History of England (ed. by C. H. Firth, London, 1913-1915), VI, 3784-3798.

(4) R. G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power (Cambridge, 1926), passim.

(5) Encyclopaedia Britannica (2nd ed., London, 1782), IX, 6896 ft

(6) Dietrich Gerhard, England und der Aufstieg Russlands (München, 1933), passim.

(7) William Cobbett, ed., The Parliamentary History of England, XXIX, 31-96, 164-249, 434-449, 617-636, 684-703.

(8) G. B. Hertz, British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1908), pp. 150-209; Gerhard, pp. 341-368.

(9) Annual Register for 1795 (London, 1807), pp. 16, 17.

(10) Thomas Campbell, "The Pleasures of Hope," pt. I, lines 381-382.

(11) Jane Porter, Thaddeus of Warsaw (Philadelphia, 1883), p. v.

III. THE AFTERMATH OF VIENNA

English Russophobia was primarily a product of the forces which determined events in England and upon the continent in the years after Waterloo. Although the legacy of the eighteenth century influenced its growth, the course of English political and economic development in the first decades of peace, the intellectual atmosphere in which Romanticism and Utilitarianism flourished, the purposes and prejudices of English and continental statesmen, and the evolution of the Concert of Europe all proved to be more significant. They were the elements of the soil in which it waxed.

In England the end of a quarter of a century of hostilities revealed a sick social order and a people in large measure at war with itself. At a moment when the unemployment and the sharp commercial depression attendant upon the demobilization of the armed forces and the suspension of governmental expenditures for military purposes were creating serious economic problems, a generation of statesmen who had received little education in economics readily ignored the evils produced by the still unrecognized industrial revolution. The measures adopted to preserve order were conceived inevitably in terms of the interests and the outlook of the ruling aristocracy. Although France had been defeated, Jacobinism still appeared to be dangerous, and the same policy of repression which had successfully suppressed its first manifestations inspired the legislation which dealt with the present discontents. In 1817 the writ of *habeas corpus* was suspended, the right of assembly restricted, and the press muzzled. The influence of the landowning classes secured the passage of the Corn Law, which protected English agriculture from continental competition, if it aggravated proletarian misery. The income tax was repealed, and newspapers were required to submit to the so-called tax on knowledge. The dominant tone of English thought appears superficially to have been quite in harmony with the reaction progressing on the continent.

Yet under the surface there were signs which announced a more liberal age. Jeremy Bentham had already become the guiding spirit of the group of radicals who were preparing the Utilitarian program. Even the affair of Peterloo did not induce a further suspension of *habeas corpus* in 1819. The illicit organizations of workers were only half-heartedly suppressed. Richard Carlile and William Cobbett were able to continue the publication of their unstamped cheap periodicals. Byron may have been ostracized from polite society, but his poetry was universally popular. Castlereagh's coffin was hissed by the mob outside Westminster Abbey, and Canning inherited his governmental positions. Many other instances might be cited of the liberal undercurrent of the years after the restoration of peace. The organization of society and the foundations of thought were being altered; an agrarian oligarchy was giving way perceptibly to an industrial democracy, reaction to liberalism.

The changes in the way of life of the British nation, whether in the political, the economic, or the intellectual sphere, exerted only an indirect influence upon their intercourse with Russia, for the problems which slowly found a solution were primarily domestic in nature. There was evolved a new relationship between political and economic classes and a new social and aesthetic consciousness, which could have but an incidental bearing upon the international position of the country. But if opinion plays a part in the determination of policy, even indirect and subtle influences may be of great consequence. It seems to be clear, for instance, that while English commercial intercourse with Russia resumed in 1815 much the form it had borne in the last years of Catherine II,¹ the joint struggle against Napoleon, the conflict of policy at Vienna, and the common membership in the Quadruple Alliance were complicating factors which made impossible a return to the political relationship of the eighteenth century. The progressive revolution in industrial and commercial methods was drawing constantly tighter the economic bonds between the two nations. English knowledge of conditions in Russia advanced correspondingly and the influence upon policy of general intellectual currents became more cogent. An essential foundation for an understanding of Russophobia, the salient features of the English scene deserve analysis.

In the political sphere, the Tory party enjoyed in 1815 virtually complete power, based more upon the prestige of victory in war than upon a beneficent domestic policy. The invigorating influence of Pitt was largely spent, and the internal policies of the last decade had been negative in character, while undisputed power had fostered the formation of factions within the party. There were the reactionaries, headed by Lord Chancellor Eldon, the moderates, led by Prime Minister Liverpool and Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, and the progressives, of whom Canning and Huskisson were the most prominent. Their relative political influence fluctuated, but the control of affairs tended slowly to pass into

the hands of the more liberal men. The basic philosophy of the party was negative. Dedicated to the maintenance of the royal prerogative, it resisted change, trying to meet disorder with repression and to allow social and economic ills to cure themselves. United in resistance to the growing demand for political reform, its members were divided on the other major issue, Catholic emancipation. It was devoted to the interests of the agricultural classes whom it represented. In foreign affairs Castlereagh attempted to preserve peace and order by a system of conferences between sovereigns, but, more liberal than most of his continental associates, and indeed than many of his party at home, he opposed the growing reaction and found himself driven rather unwillingly toward the isolation of Great Britain. His successor, Canning, broke openly with the now thoroughly repressive Holy Alliance and placed England among the liberal states of Europe. In both foreign and domestic politics the position of the Tories was thus essentially sterile; there was little in their philosophy which disposed them to regard with anything but favor the autocratic regime in Russia.² Until Canning's accession to office the breach between England and the Holy Alliance did not become patent, and although Castlereagh resisted Alexander's desire to intervene in Spain, no major divergence of interest had appeared in the relations of the two countries.

Of the groups in opposition to the Tories, the Whigs enjoyed the greatest parliamentary strength. Led, even dominated, by the Russell and Cavendish oligarchs, they had preserved their traditional distrust of the royal prerogative, but their long exclusion from office and the many defections from their ranks had deprived them of a positive program and a pregnant philosophy. The mantle of Charles James Fox had fallen on Earl Grey. Thus the recrudescence of popular interest in Reform, which he had been advocating vainly for twenty years, and the progressive disintegration of the Tory coalition, were slowly winning for the party an increasingly powerful position, in spite of the apathy of most of its leaders. The long-continued political impotence had deprived it equally of a policy in foreign affairs. The tradition of friendship with Russia had been hallowed by the memory of Burke's and Fox's opposition to Pitt's Ochakov armament, but these precedents were derived from a distant past. Under greatly changed conditions, they could hardly dictate any settled policy toward Russia, either hostile or friendly. In the sphere of political economy, the Whigs were disposed, in part perhaps from motives of party advantage, to favor the growing demand for freer trade. The *Edinburgh Review*, for instance, was the most persistent advocate, in the press, of the reciprocal reduction of the high tariffs which hampered foreign trade. But if the principles of the party were in reality little more democratic than those of the Tories, the traditional opposition to the prerogative, albeit aristocratic in origin, was more nearly consonant with a liberal than with an absolutist political creed. Thus, in spite of their past cordiality, the Whig tradition and philosophy made the party basically less sympathetic to Russia than the Tories.

More active than the Whigs, both intellectually and politically, were the various groups of men who, however diverse in origin and ideal, may be considered together here, since they were disposed to cooperate and even to coalesce into an amorphous political party. The major elements of the radical bloc were led by the coterie of philosophers who looked for guidance to Jeremy Bentham, and by the Westminster proletarian politicians of whom Francis Place was the most influential. It is true that Bentham had won recognition in Russia before he had acquired honor at home, and that Alexander had requested his cooperation in drafting a code of Russian law.³ Nevertheless after 1815 both groups of radicals were far more interested in the reform of the political and economic institutions of England than in her foreign relations. Their concern with Russia was incidental, and had they been entrusted with the conduct of government, their foreign policy must have been designed to preserve general peace, in order that domestic reforms might proceed unhampered by the threat of war or the unproductive expenditure of an army and a navy. Their early advocacy of the principle of the freedom of trade gained them the favor of the new bourgeois and industrial classes, and, as a logical corollary, associated them with the more active exponents of international comity. But their general philosophy, whether it derived from the Utilitarianism of Bentham or the empirical methods of Place, was antipathetic to an absolutist and reactionary ideology. Essentially democratic in its implications it belongs clearly on the liberal side of the dichotomy which divided the political order of the early nineteenth century. Possibly its adherents were more likely to ignore the Holy Allies than to inaugurate a crusade against them, but certainly there was little in the institutions or policies of Russia which could merit the approbation of the radicals.

At a time when a severely restricted franchise was in force, the number of Englishmen who may be described as politically inert greatly exceeded the active members of all political parties. Doubtless

some of the unenfranchised were well informed on political questions and played a part in the game of politics, but in view of the prevailing illiteracy, it seems certain that many more were cognizant of political developments only in times of crisis. Their knowledge of Russia must have been slight, and their disposition toward her negative. If she did not appear yet to threaten English security, there was little about her which evoked English admiration.

Among these several broad schools of political thought the Benthamite philosophy alone was a positive force. The Tories rested on their political power and their prestige, the Whigs, conscious of their past glories, were only beginning to realize that the growing desire for Reform would enable them to regain control of the government, but the radicals had a distinct and coherent program based on a new and pregnant philosophy. Yet in no one of these party ideologies was a particular attitude toward Russia inherent as a logical or even as a pragmatic corollary. The policy of each must apparently be determined by the logic of events and by national considerations. There is little evidence that English patriotism, English pride of race, was less intense, though it may at the time have been less vociferous, than that of peoples whose national independence had not been so hallowed by time. The loss of the American colonies induced in many minds serious doubts about the value of colonial enterprise, but the territorial gains in the settlement at Vienna were inspired by considerations of empire. From such roots, quite independent of party politics or philosophies, were a policy and opinion with regard to Russia most likely to spring.

Equally transcending party lines and hardly less influential than imperial sentiment were other currents in the contemporary intellectual stream. Under the stimulus of the Methodist movement, evangelical religion was again becoming a dominant force in the life of the nation. The British and Foreign Bible Society, founded in 1804, had rapidly expanded its activities and already enjoyed a very large and influential membership. The associated Russian Society had been established late in 1812, with the support and patronage of Alexander, and must have formed a bond between the two nations which found favor in the eyes of many of the English members.⁴ Fostered by the various evangelical groups, an active humanitarian sentiment secured the abolition of the slave trade, first within the British Empire, and then in 1815 in all the states which adhered to the Act of Vienna. Efforts were now being made to alleviate other human misery, that of the new industrial world is the worker, of penal convicts, and of Negro slaves. If their inspiration, partly religious, partly sentimental, was quite alien to the calculating hedonism of the Benthamite philosophy, in practice there was virtual identity of purpose. Neither school of thought was sympathetic to the autocratic regime of Russia the corrupt judicial system, political secret police, arbitrary and cruel punishments, and serfdom.

The influence exerted upon English thought with regard to Russia by the heterogeneous mixture of philosophic, aesthetic, religious, and emotional concepts comprehended in Romanticism, is not easily determined. In its restricted sense, that *Weltanschauung* implied no particular political creed; it is not credible that Scott, or Carlyle, desired the actual resurrection of medieval society. Nevertheless, in the nineteenth century, certain political implications were inherent in Romanticism much as, at an earlier time, democratic theories were implicit in protestantism. In essence, a condemnation of the restraint which the neoclassical ideal placed upon individual self-expression, the philosophy was easily and frequently extended beyond the limits of the arts and became a revolt against authority in general. Wordsworth played a small part in the early drama of the French Revolution and later bewailed the *Extinction of the Sea World Venetian Republic*. Campbell was horrified by the fall of Kosciusko and the suppression of Poland. Byron, after exciting general sympathy for the Greeks, won a martyr death at Missolonghi, and many lesser men emulated his exploits.

The Romantic instincts of the ordinary Englishman could enjoy only vicarious satisfaction. From the sordid atmosphere of industrial England there was little opportunity to escape, but a plethora of travel literature invited his imagination to share with the fortunate few their adventures in the wildest and most inaccessible parts of the world. That the opportunity was widely indulged, the continued appearance of a *huge bulk of hotpressed paper, brilliant type, and luculent pictures, price six guineas*,⁵ affords incontestable evidence. Hardly an issue of the *Edinburgh* or the *Quarterly* failed to include at least one prolix discussion of a recently explored corner of the earth, and many numbers contained three or four such articles. The market for books of travel must have been nearly unlimited and publishers eager to accept manuscripts of the most trivial description, padded with inconsequential gossip, inaccurate information, biased judgment, and devoid of all literary distinction. The total blindness of one author seems to have made his impressions of Russia exceptionally interesting.⁶ The chief worth of most of this library of trash is its undeniable evidence that the removal of the barriers entailed

by the Napoleonic wars enabled English men and women of the most varied interest and experience to gratify a national *Wanderlust*.

Yet embedded in the mass of this literature was much information, more or less accurate, about regions of the world heretofore virtually unknown. There became available to statesmen, businessmen, editors, and to the public a greatly increased knowledge of conditions in Russia, in the Near East, and especially in Central Asia. Of some of these regions, notably the central portions of the Russian and Turkish empires, a comparatively small number of such specialists as statesmen, the diplomatic corps, and merchants engaged in the Baltic and Levantine trades had been well informed already. Since they enjoyed the reports of more or less secret investigators, their knowledge continued to be greater than that possible for the layman. The latter, however, now had placed at his disposal many detailed accounts of areas and institutions which had been unknown. There were, for example, many descriptions of the majestic palaces of St. Petersburg and the exotic buildings of Moscow, and of the precise conditions of the life of a serf. Although there was a corresponding increase in the information available to the specialist about such remote regions as Central Asia, it remained little more complete or reliable than that presented to the public.

For the present purpose, this increased knowledge of distant and barbarous lands and peoples is of extreme significance. It was the raw material from which were forged positive opinions about Russia and her potential challenge to the political and economic position of Great Britain. So long as the empire of the tsars remained an acknowledged mystery, its threat could not become more substantial than it had been when Pitt tried vainly to convince the nation of the importance of Ochakov.

Equally significant is the nature of the information now presented to the public. It was full enough, for instance, to make familiar such names as Khiva and Samarkand, but not adequate to teach many even moderately well-informed readers that the barren steppes and rugged mountains of Central Asia formed a natural barrier more formidable than an opposing army. As Lord Salisbury noticed many years later, most Englishmen had little appreciation of the many miles of wilderness which separated the Russian and Indian frontiers. But not only was the information now presented to the English public still very incomplete, it was also imparted chiefly by men who wished to demonstrate a particular thesis. Those who wrote for the public a narrative of their travels in Central Asia were almost without exception men who suspected, before they visited that region, that Russia was a serious threat. A reading of their books suggests that the facts of which they wrote, if not also those which they discovered, were selected to demonstrate that thesis.⁷

It is not easy to determine the degree to which the English *Wanderlust* and the avid reception of travel books were manifestations of Romanticism. They were perhaps only the nineteenth-century form of the persistent human desire to fathom the unknown. Yet they appear to be consistent with the essential nature of the Romantic movement, and to have been more than usually prevalent at this time, on the continent as well as in England.

There can be less doubt that the adulation of national freedom was a spontaneous and natural extension of the basic, Romantic concept of individual self-expression. But it was accidental that Poland and Greece should have been two particularly appealing stimuli of this semi-emotional feeling, and unfortunate that Russia must be portrayed as an enemy of freedom. Nevertheless, the political implications of Romanticism were liberal and the polity of the tsars inevitably must have excited antipathy in the minds of those Englishmen who were sympathetic to the general intellectual currents of the early nineteenth century. The Romantic movement, actually quite in harmony with the English tradition of individual and national freedom, belongs both in its essential and in its incidental character among the factors which disposed Englishmen to condemn Russia. It played a part in the transfer to her of the hostility which France had so long excited.

Of a very different character from such intellectual movements as Romanticism and Evangelicalism, but no less pregnant in English history, were the economic forces which were transforming the material basis of the national existence. Because the revolution in industrial methods continued unabated, the restoration of peace created several complicated problems, which had a direct bearing upon Anglo-Russian relations. For example political strength enabled the agricultural classes to prolong by means of the Corn Law of 1815 the quasi-monopoly of the domestic market to which the conditions of war had made them accustomed.⁸ England thus voluntarily deprived herself of a potentially large and profitable trade in grain with the lands lying south of the Baltic Sea. Since Russian territories in Poland and the Ukraine were among the most fertile of these areas, the English policy implied a

volte-face in Anglo-Russia affairs. No longer could the friendship of the two states be fostered by the full exploitation of a mutually profitable commercial intercourse.

Similar and equally cogent were the arguments adduced by another commercial group which had gained a like monopoly from the conditions of war. The lumber merchants who had an interest vested in North America convinced parliament that the maintenance of British naval supremacy required a safe supply of timber and hence a tariff which gave great preference to the produce of imperial forests.⁹ As in the case of corn, it was the Baltic region against which discrimination was made; another one of Russia's chief products was excluded from the English market.

In the heated discussions which attended the enactment of these protective tariffs many cogent arguments were brought forward which had little international import. Their possible influence upon Anglo-Russian relations was virtually ignored, but it is worthy of note that the policies were adopted in spite of much indignant protest. It is clear that they were not conceived with the conscious intent to injure Russia.¹⁰

The influence of economic forces in this period appears to have derived much more from the general situation than from any of its particular phases. Government was concerned with alleviating the acute distress caused by the unaccustomed rapidity and severity of the fluctuations of business. Although changes in economic policy were ably advocated in the years of depression, parliament was content with the enactment of measures designed to prevent disorder and did little to cure the basic economic maladjustments. Nevertheless, the interests of a small group, or the exigencies of a particular trade did sometimes play a decisive part in the determination of policy, foreign no less than domestic. Since the commercial relations of Great Britain with Russia were certainly one of the considerations which influenced the formulation of a policy toward that country, that trade requires attention in some detail.

The most notable characteristic of the commerce between England and Russia in the years after the defeat of Napoleon is the large balance in favor of Russia. In spite of the tariffs which greatly reduced the English import of corn and timber, of the major countries, with the single exception of France, Russia exported to the United Kingdom a considerably larger value of goods than she imported thence. In the years between 1814 and 1822 the total Anglo-Russian trade fluctuated between £3'023'381 in 1816 and £6'168'583 in 1820. The total foreign commerce of the United Kingdom, during the same years, varied greatly also, amounting to a minimum of £71'617'586 in 1816, a maximum of £100'438'711 in 1818, and £81'390'120 in 1820, the year in which Russian trade reached its peak.¹¹

Trade with Russia constituted about 7 per cent of the total of English foreign commerce. After 1820 the value of Britain's imports from Russia rose slowly, while her exports fluctuated, but at no time prior to 1831 did they reach a figure as high as that of 1820. Russia enjoyed a very important position in British foreign trade, for the United States was the only country which did a larger business in both exports and imports. Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands all imported more goods from Britain than did Russia, but their exports to her were much smaller.¹²

Comparable Russian commercial statistics are not available for the first decade of peace, but there is no reason to suppose that conditions changed significantly during that period. In the years between 1827 and 1831, 40 per cent of Russia's imports came from England and 48 per cent of her exports were sent thither, this trade being more than five times that of the leading competitor, the Hanseatic towns.¹³

Certain details demonstrate even more conclusively the vital importance to England of Anglo-Russian commerce. Forty-five per cent of her exports of cotton yarn and more than 22 per cent of those of British refined sugar were sent to Russia in 1817. Imports from Russia were highly specialized. Tallow and flax each constituted more than a quarter of the total, while hemp and linseed accounted together for most of the third quarter. In these and in the other commodities which she sold to England, Russia enjoyed a quasi-monopoly in the British market.

Thus the economic well-being of both Britain and Russia was dependent in significant measure upon the maintenance of their harmonious relations, for England dominated Russia's whole foreign trade and could not easily have found compensatory opportunities for the sale of those commodities for which the Russian market was the chief outlet, nor for the supply of several vital commodities which she imported from Russia. These considerations were commonly present in the minds of both statesmen and publicists in England.

One of the most unfortunate results of the commercial regulations accepted by parliament in 1815 was their influence upon the policies of other nations, particularly the United States and Russia. The latter, for instance, met the English decision to give to her own subjects a virtual monopoly of the corn and timber markets by a tariff designed to favor the growth of industrial enterprises in Russia. Thus, although the restoration of Anglo-Russian amity in 1812 had been followed by the resumption of trade between the two countries, which rapidly reached proportions equal to those of the years before the Treaty of Tilsit, the Russian government showed no inclination to negotiate such a commercial convention as that in force before 1786. No serious effort was made to reestablish the commercial status quo ante bellum in which the special privileges accorded Anglo-Russian trade had fostered the political amity of the two states.¹⁴

On the contrary, it became apparent that the merchants - almost all of them English - who conducted the trade must submit to many galling restrictions. They were driven unwillingly to write themselves into the Russian merchant guilds as foreign guests and to subject themselves to the regulations established for Russians, regulations so severe that as long as there had remained some chance of a restoration of the old privileges, they had preferred a cessation of trade to an acquiescence in the new arrangements.¹⁵

After the restoration of general peace, the promulgation of a new Russian tariff was not long delayed. Lord Walpole, the English minister, had known in 1814 that such a measure was contemplated and had expressed a belief that it would not be unfair to Great Britain. Later that year he was forced to report rumors of the formulation of a policy similar to that established by the British navigation acts, and that "a most marked hostility to Gt. Br., and absurd jealousy of her Commercial System prevail." The Russians, he said, flattered themselves that they could establish their own mercantile system and were even suggesting that imports be allowed only in Russian ships.¹⁶ The fantastic nature of such a proposal hardly needs comment; there was virtually no Russian merchant marine. Castlereagh, fully appreciating the difficulties of the British traders, instructed Walpole to continue his attempts to induce the Russian government to grant some alleviation.¹⁷

Finally published in 1816, the new tariff contained a long schedule of commodities which were totally excluded from Russia, and a still longer one of those which were subject to a very heavy duty. There was considerable hostile comment in London,¹⁸ but no official protest. Difficulties, largely those of reconciling the Russian and the Polish economic systems, led in 1818 to a considerable modification of the rates.¹⁹ But British satisfaction over the lowered import duties was soon lessened by a 50 per cent increase in the rates imposed upon the exports of hemp, flax, tallow, potash, and other commodities, upon which Great Britain was particularly dependent.²⁰

A completely new tariff schedule was promulgated in 1820. The generally lower rates were greeted in London with rejoicing, the *Times* even suggesting that Alexander showed thereby his truly liberal sympathies.²¹ Included in the new regulations, however, was a distinction, which appeared to English minds to be purely arbitrary and intentionally discriminatory, between sugars partially refined by different methods. The rates imposed upon several commodities which came from England, particularly common earthenware, tin plate, and certain grades of cotton cloth, were greatly increased.²² In response to petitions from British merchants, Castlereagh ordered the British envoy to protest to the Russian government against the discrimination in sugars, but persistent representations were unavailing. If some hope of modification was held out, reference was made to English preferential treatment of colonial timber, and when Palmerston became foreign secretary in 1830, the matter was still being discussed.²³

The deleterious effects of the restrictions imposed upon Anglo-Russian trade by both governments were clearly demonstrated in the investigations to which the well-known petition from the merchants of London to the house of commons gave rise in 1820. The petition - the first important move in the battle for free trade - led to the appointment of select committees of both houses of parliament to consider the state of English trade, particularly that in timber. One of the major concerns of the committees was the influence which an alteration of the timber duties might have upon Anglo-Russian trade. There was a strong consensus among the witnesses, many of them merchants engaged in the Baltic trade, that the high tariff imposed on foreign timber had rendered that business profitless, both for the producer and for the merchant. Since, at least in years of normal harvest, the corn laws had interdicted the importation of the other great commodity of Russia, lack of exchange, it was argued, seriously impeded Russian purchases of British manufactures. The Russian preference for English goods alone kept the trade alive, although a large but indeterminate part of it followed the circuitous

route through the great German fairs. All the witnesses thought that an increase in British imports of Russian lumber, attendant upon a reduction of the duty, would be balanced by increased imports into Russia of British manufactures. Even more important than the actual change, it was suggested, would be the gesture of friendship which might induce the Russian government to lower its rates on British goods.²⁴

No less inimical to cordial relations than the restrictions placed by Russia upon English imports was the fashion in which her customs system was administered. The inefficiency and corruption of Russian officials were unanimously attested by the travelers whose books were slowly constructing in English minds a tangible conception of the Russian empire. The picture was not belied by the experience of merchants. Cargoes were forfeited for technical violations of obscure regulations and rates were changed with little warning, the importer being denied the privilege of reexport when he found that the new duty made his intended transaction profitless. Far too often the good offices of the consuls failed to secure redress and the services of the foreign office had to be enlisted.²⁵ Undoubtedly such misunderstandings are an inseparable concomitant of international trade, but they appear in this case to have been particularly vexatious and cannot have engendered cordial sentiments. From a comprehensive consideration of the commercial relations of Russia and England during the years after the restoration of peace in 1815, there emerges inescapably the judgment that a potentially great and profitable trade was seriously impeded by artificial restrictions.

An analysis of the political aspects of Anglo-Russian relations reveals a comparable latent tension. The major questions were those implicit in the full restoration of peace after the upheaval of the preceding quarter century and in the preservation of the settlement which was designed at Vienna. In spite of the traditions of British policy, Castlereagh and Wellington did not lightly discard Britain's continental entanglements. The heritage of Paris and Vienna was the foundation upon which British policy was built.²⁶

Castlereagh had been the chief architect of the Quadruple Alliance and had learned by personal experience the value of direct negotiation. It is at least a tenable thesis that he understood better than any of his contemporaries the conditions under which an effective concert of Europe might be substituted for the rivalry which had dominated international politics in the past. But if, as the genius of the conferences of statesmen which until his death in 1822 held the concert together, he continued to build upon the plans of Pitt which had inspired the reconstruction of Europe at Vienna, he inherited also his great preceptor's distrust of Russia.²⁷ The memory of Alexander's attempt at the Congress to acquire a hegemony over eastern Europe remained fresh, in spite of the tsar's more conciliatory behavior after Waterloo.

The details of the struggle over the disposition of Saxony and Poland are well known and in themselves of little present significance, but the means by which the ambitions of Russia and Prussia were circumvented are important. England and Austria, with the aid of France, threatened war in order to secure a compromise arrangement. Castlereagh and Metternich came to realize that their purposes were at least complementary, and there grew out of the imbroglio an informal entente, based upon the common interests of the two states and the reciprocal respect of their ministers. Save for a brief interval in 1820, when Castlereagh opposed Austrian intervention in Naples, the cooperation endured until Castlereagh's death, though it came to rest more upon a desire to resist the growth of Russian influence - in the Near East, more than in Poland - than upon the broader base of a common, political outlook.²⁸

That the quarrel at Vienna between Great Britain and Russia had been centered in the disposition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was adventitious. Castlereagh's general scheme of a European settlement implied the restoration, so far as possible, of the old legitimate order and the reconstruction of a general balance of power with special safeguards against French aggrandizement. Any considerable augmentation of Russia's resources, either territorial or other, must consequently have excited his opposition; so far as he was Pitt's heir, he must have resisted Russian expansion toward Constantinople even more vehemently than he did Alexander's desire to become king of a reconstituted Poland. It was Alexander's ambition which determined the specific application of a latent, more generalized antagonism. Had it been some other territory which he desired to unite in personal union with Russia, he would not have revived in English minds memories and emotions which the common struggle against Napoleon had scotched.²⁹

The heritage of Vienna and Paris constituted no more than the foundation of British policy toward Russia; the form of the superstructure remained to be determined. Considerations of the Quadruple

Alliance and the concert of Europe made for cordial relations; the latent hostility, nurtured by the conflict over Poland, was an opposing influence. So broad was the scope of the problems treated at Vienna that all current aspects of Anglo-Russian intercourse had necessarily been involved, and there could be no issue which was quite untouched by the negotiations of the Congress. An appraisal of Russia and her conduct must be influenced, even though insensibly, by those contradictory forces and a policy remain uncertain until some change in Russia or in England should indicate its required course.

It was Castlereagh who determined British policy. His prolonged visits to the continent and his personal acquaintance with its statesmen gave him an influence in their councils which was quite without parallel. His position at home had hardly more precedent; the effective leader of the cabinet, he was enabled by his incomparable knowledge of international affairs, no less than by his skillful management of the commons and his friendship with the Prince Regent, to conduct the business of the foreign office with little reference to the views of his colleagues. Liverpool followed events carefully and made suggestions and criticisms which were sometimes useful, but the policies were those of the foreign minister. Bathurst was an able assistant on some occasions, and Canning, during those periods when he was in the cabinet, watched the progress of events with a care that might have given him some influence had he not come to recognize Castlereagh's great ability and transcendent knowledge. Wellington, when he joined the government in 1818, had even more prestige than Castlereagh, and an acquaintance with continental affairs hardly less complete, but he had long appreciated the extraordinary skill of the latter and had cooperated in bringing his policies to fruition.³⁰

The Prince Regent played a part in English affairs which was at odds with ordinary practice. He had a real interest in politics, particularly in foreign policy. If he respected the abilities and trusted the judgment of his minister, he had through his Hanoverian government a means of receiving information about the continent and of communicating with his brother sovereigns unimpeded by the conventions of the British constitution. But since Count Munster, the Hanoverian agent, cooperated loyally with Castlereagh and on occasion even acted as his deputy, the Hanoverian connection was not an embarrassment at this time. The Regent's attitude toward Russia, as toward many other matters, was complicated by his family problems. When Alexander and his official suite visited London in 1814, they made the fatal blunder of showing sympathy for the Princess of Wales, and their conduct even afforded grounds for a belief that their intrigues had prevented the betrothal of the Crown Princess Charlotte and the Prince of Orange. The Regent's personal prejudices were thus antipathetic to Russia. On the other hand, in his official capacity he was a member of the trade union of princes, and not desirous of engaging in hostilities with a brother sovereign. His influence was nugatory.³¹

The partiality for the Whig leaders which was exhibited by the Russian royal visitors was equally tactless and stupid. While they may have hoped to fortify the traditional amity derived from Fox and Burke, the value of the connection was nullified by the prolonged failure of the Whigs to gain office, and the intrigue served only to exasperate the Tories. The other opposition groups were interested almost exclusively in domestic reforms. Politically impotent, they did not pretend to influence foreign policy.

An analysis of the personalities and conditions of the political scene shows that the policy of England toward Russia depended upon Castlereagh. He dominated the ministry and formulated his policies virtually unaided. Within the Tory ranks his authority was unchallenged; elsewhere there was no significant force.

Castlereagh's primary tenet with regard to European affairs was his belief that the peace and stability essential to the wellbeing of the continent could be best assured by the concerted action of the members of the Alliance. Although the events of the Hundred Days and the conclusion of a second Peace of Paris had done much to efface the rivalry which had been born in the negotiations at Vienna, harmony among the Allies did not continue. United in their determination to prevent France from disturbing the peace yet again, they engaged, nevertheless, in a game of rival intrigue in French politics. The predilections of the French prime minister, Richelieu, and the skill of Pozzo di Borgo, Alexander's ambassador, enabled the Russians to win most of the points in Paris at the cost of the perpetuation of the Anglo-Austrian entente against them. The machinations, often without official sanction, of Russian agents elsewhere exaggerated the distrust of her purposes. Castlereagh found it expedient early in 1816 even to send a circular dispatch to English representatives abroad, warning them not to take the Russian activities too seriously and ordering them not to aggravate the situation by similar maneuvers.³²

The purpose which inspired this circular dispatch and the more particularized ones which amplified its conclusions with reference to the special circumstances of the various capitals demonstrate clearly Castlereagh's attitude toward Russia. While he instructed his subordinates to watch her conduct carefully, he was unwilling, on scanty and inconclusive evidence, to convict her of hostile intent. He wrote to the British representative in Naples: "*My wish then is that while you watch with all due attention whatever the Russian agents may be about, that you do not suffer yourself to be drawn... into a premature attitude of suspicion, much less of hostility.*"³³ True to the legacy of Pitt, he entertained some suspicion of Russia's ambitions. Although his personal relations with the tsar were cordial, he was unable apparently to fathom fully the enigmatic character of Alexander. In spite of some doubts, Castlereagh was not weaned from his cordiality toward Russia.

Fortunately few questions were carried over from the discussions at Vienna in which the interests of England and Russia conflicted. The problem of Poland had been compromised so satisfactorily that for a decade and a half that country remained quiescent. Even in the Near East peace was undisturbed until the outbreak of the Greek revolution. In 1818 France was readily restored to the comity of nations. In fact, none of the dispatches which passed between the foreign office and the embassy at St. Petersburg dealt with a negotiation in which Russia and England were principal parties. Perhaps the satisfactory character of their relations is best shown by the absence of men of proven diplomatic capacity among the British envoys to the tsar's court. Lord Cathcart, who was primarily a soldier, remained there until October 1819, and Sir Charles Bagot set forth on very short notice to take over when the consul had been obliged to assume control of a chancery denuded of all members of the diplomatic corps.

Inevitably there were matters of minor import upon which states of such widely spread interests and territories could not completely agree. Thus England and Russia took important, and not always harmonious, parts in the determination of some of the business which came before the congresses of Aix, Troppau, and Verona; Persia, Spain, and the Spanish colonies, proposals on the part of Russia for general disarmament, even the suppression of the slave trade and of the Barbary pirates required the careful attention of their diplomatists. The complicated commercial regulations of both states were a fertile source of misunderstanding; but the basic harmony is shown clearly by the ease with which these disputes were adjusted.

Persia first assumed a position of significance in British eyes when the Egyptian expedition of Napoleon and the subsequent machinations of his agents demonstrated that control of the sea did not ensure the crescentic Indian empire against all danger of foreign attack. The governments, both at Calcutta and Westminster, dispatched missions which eventually secured the conclusion of an Anglo-Persian alliance in the definitive treaty of November 1814. Britain promised to lend Persia military or pecuniary assistance in the event of an unprovoked attack by a European power and secured in return a promise of aid against an invasion of India from Afghanistan. The treaty was designed to forestall French aggression, a danger which the fall of Napoleon completely removed, but the engagement applied equally to Russia. The Russian annexation of Georgia in 1800, the abortive plan of 1808 for a Franco-Russian expedition against India, and the campaigns on the Caucasian frontier which were terminated by the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 had awakened the Persians to a danger far more immediate. Hence the treaty with England included provisions for mediation in disputes with Russia and for the definition of the Perso-Russian boundary by a negotiation between the three powers. Persia was further promised the aid of English officers in the training of her nascent regular army, and gave England extensive commercial privileges.³⁴

The Russian threat to Central Asia appears to have been taken more seriously in Teheran than in London, where the Quadruple Alliance and the general harmony seemed to outweigh a supposititious threat in a region so remote. True to the obligations of the alliance, the English government offered their good offices in the settlement of the issues which survived the Treaty of Gulistan and urged leniency upon the Russian government, but when it was intimated that Russia could accept no mediation in her relations with Asiatic states, the overture was not pressed. Lord Cathcart reported the progress of negotiations, took the recently arrived Persian ambassador under his wing, and gave him advice, but dissuaded him, with the approval of Castlereagh, from proceeding to London.³⁵

In 1820 dispatches from St. Petersburg told of Russian negotiations with the tribes of Turkestan, transmitted an official report concerning methods of promoting commerce with the Trans-Caspian region and thus delivering it from *the monopoly of the English*, and even spoke of *an approximation by Russia to the British possessions in India*.³⁶ More characteristic of the official correspondence with re-

gard to Persia, however, was a passage in Castlereagh's general survey of Anglo-Russian relations of 16 May 1817, in which he, almost as an afterthought, authorized Cathcart to show to the Russian government a copy of the treaty with Persia, in case the subject should be broached, but not to initiate such a conversation. Castlereagh's attitude is most clearly shown by his account of his conversation on Persian affairs with Alexander at Aix, in which he declared that Britain was bound only to mediate and would endeavor to ensure friendly relations between Persia and Russia.³⁷

Napoleon's unsubstantial and evanescent challenge to British dominion in the East and his later, surreptitious intrigue in Persia were emphasized in British minds by a knowledge that all other successful invaders had descended into the plains of the Panjab from the highlands of Central Asia. The East India Company was not content, therefore, with nullifying the French threat by concluding an alliance with Persia; the diplomatic agents who negotiated that treaty were accompanied by several enterprising soldiers and civilians charged with the duty of exploring the unknown recesses of Turkestan. Led by members of two prominent Anglo-Indian families, Mountstuart Elphinstone and Henry Pottinger, they began the process of extending British influence among the Turcoman tribes. The leaders of this as of most later expeditions published full accounts of their adventures and explorations. Elphinstone's *Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, and Pottinger's *Travels in Ballouchistan*, together with Sir John Malcolm's *History of Persia*, comprised the first reliable descriptions in English of the fabulous regions visited by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century and by Jenkinson in the sixteenth.³⁸

Elphinstone's book, the first to appear, inspired articles in both the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly*, which alluded to the existence in England of a great and widespread interest in the region, and showed encomia upon the author. Limited largely to a summary and criticism of the new information, the articles did advert briefly to the threats, both French and Russian, to British security in the East. The *Edinburgh* remarked that *it would have seemed far less extravagant to predict the entry of a Russian army into Delhi, or even Calcutta, than its entry into Paris*, and that Russia was the power from whom alone any danger to India can be at present dreaded. but it concluded that *the enmity of Great Britain with Russia was ...accidental - in most states of the world unnatural...* The *Quarterly* treated the Russian danger with sarcasm. *We are actually presented with the gigantic and amusing portrait of the modern Alexander, perched with one foot on the minarets of Teheraun, and the other on the battlements of Delhi; and while with terrific grasp his right hand seizes the pinnacle of St. Sophy, with the left he lays hold of the five-clawed dragon on the summit of the palace of Pekin.* The reviewer concluded: *little is there to apprehend for the safety of India from the whole power of Russia...*³⁹

The *Quarterly* again expressed its view of the Russian threat to India at the conclusion of an article on Malcolm's *History of Persia*. Persia, it thought, would inevitably succumb to Russian pressure, unless its system of government were radically improved, for even if the tsar remained averse to foreign conquest and the shah did nothing to disturb the peace, the acts of inferior agents would inevitably produce hostilities. When, however, Russia should receive her first reverse, her eastern provinces would fall away, and centuries must elapse before she could reach the Indian Ocean. The reviewer's considered opinion was that those who were alarmed by the prospect of a new Alexander in the East should remember that the far greater threat of Napoleon had recently not seemed to warrant any very positive measures of defense.⁴⁰

The advance of Napoleon towards India thus inaugurated a train of events which entailed two important but quite unanticipated effects. In the first place, it directed English attention to Persia and Central Asia, and inspired the Indian government to send thither that series of agents, very active, imaginative, and intelligent young men, whose explorations had little political result, but gave to European readers their first reasonably exact knowledge of a hitherto fabulous region.⁴¹ Secondly, the chance of international politics subsequently effected a transfer of the threat to India from France to Russia, and what had been in the time of Peter, of Catherine, and even of Paul, only a chimerical rumor received now the serious consideration of many Englishmen. It is inconceivable that a statement of the Russian menace, so squarely and so boldly put by both the great reviews, can have been ignored by the Indian and foreign offices. That their opinions were not embodied at this time in official correspondence is adequate negative evidence that the danger did not appear to require the active attention of the diplomatic corps. The unofficial verdict was similar. The reviewers agreed that while Russia might *make the threat, if not the accomplishment of an invasion of India, a part of every future quarrel with Great Britain*,⁴² she offered no immediate danger to the security of India.

In the newspapers the affairs of Persia received only the most inconsequential treatment. The conditions of Central Asia precluded more than sporadic and incomplete articles. News of the events of

such a distant and inaccessible region secured only an occasional passing reference in the news or editorial columns.⁴³ Nearly all knowledge of Persia was derived from such books as Elphinstone's, which might form the basis of the semi-judicial analysis of an article in a review, but did not lend themselves to the purposes of the daily press.

Yet a widespread interest in Persia must be reflected in the literary success of J. B. Fraser and of James Morier. The first of their many more or less fictitious romances - novels and travelogues - were published at this time and were followed by similar works at short intervals for two decades. There can be no doubt that the first anxiety over potential Russian aggression coincided with the first general English interest in Persia.

Of a totally different character was the problem, a *mélange* of fact and rumor, which centered in Spain. Although the ferment of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France had disrupted the Spanish political order, the diplomatists at Vienna had made little attempt to alleviate the tasks which tried the restored Bourbon dynasty. It had not only to reconstruct the government at home, but also to subdue revolution in South America which was rapidly assuming dangerous proportions. The detailed arrangements for the suppression of the slave trade and the eradication of the Barbary pirates complicated the relations of Ferdinand with his subjects no less than with foreign governments. His own character and the general conditions of his court invited the growth of intrigue and the dissemination of rumor, arts at which the Russian minister, Tatishchev, was past master. It was, hardly by chance, a report of conditions at Madrid which had induced Castlereagh in December 1815 to compose a dispatch deploring the re-creation in European diplomatic circles of an atmosphere of suspicion and passive hostility between the different states, which he attributed to the tendency of ministers to try to *augment what is called the influence of their courts abroad*.⁴⁴

A year later rumors began to reach London from all quarters of Europe that Spain had concluded a treaty by which she had ceded to Russia territory in the Mediterranean in return for aid in South America. Though inquiries in St. Petersburg brought denials of the truth of such allegations, the reports persisted, and in April made their way into the English press. Further rumors in August revived the discussion and appeared to some observers to afford confirmatory evidence of the validity of the charge. Then in early October, when the excitement created by an inflammatory pamphlet, *A Sketch of the ... Power of Russia*,⁴⁵ had hardly subsided, there arrived news of the departure of a Russian squadron from Reval, destination and purpose unstated. It was variously suggested that the fleet might be used to subdue the Spanish colonies, to suppress the pirates, or to coerce Turkey, but a consensus connected it with Spain. Later in the month came the news that the ships had been sold to Spain, and a semiofficial statement was made that the transaction afforded no occasion for alarm. But the treatment of the episode by the press is illuminating. While there were clearly many men who were ready to believe the worst of Russia, opinion was sharply divided, and the general political position of the several newspapers appears to have determined their attitude toward this tempest in a teapot.⁴⁶

The ultra Tory *Morning Post*, with its monarchical, almost absolutist views, scoffed at the alarm and refused to believe any of the hostile allegations against Russia. The *Times*, more independent, adopted a skeptical position, weighed the evidence, pro and con, attempted to survey objectively the general European situation, and Russia's relation to it, and finally concluded that she was quite within her rights, provided she received for her squadron no territorial gain which would disturb the balance of power. The Whig *Morning Chronicle* professed to think the worst of Russia, but lost no chance to use the episode for an attack on the English government and its policy, both foreign and domestic. Its editorial article of October 24 shows that in 1817 a not altogether irresponsible commentator could express very extravagant ideas about Russia.

Those who suppose that either the Russian people or the Russian Government are deficient in a confidence in their own power, are but little acquainted with them. A very general persuasion has long been entertained by the Russians, that they are destined to be the rulers of the world, and this idea has been more than once stated in publications in the Russian language. To do the Russians justice, their aggrandizement has never for a moment been lost sight of under the various Sovereigns, who, for a century, have filled the throne. The most arbitrary Sovereigns must yield to the prevailing inclinations of their people, and the prevailing inclination of the Russians is territorial aggrandizement. With such a feeling, and with the confidence which recent events have given them, to suppose that a colossal Power like Russia will be contented to remain without any other maritime communication than the Northern Ocean and the Baltic, both accessible only at certain seasons of the year, and that she will not endeavor to obtain for by far the most valuable part of her Empire, the command to the situations which secure an entrance to the Mediterranean, argues not a great degree of political foresight.

This is the great object which Russia has at heart, and we may rely on it that she will seize the first favourable opportunity which offers itself for the accomplishment of that object.

Probably more characteristic of British opinion was the leading article in the *Times* of April 24. It remarked that:

There are many people who look with a degree of anxiety towards the acts of Russia, and we think attach more importance to them than is necessary; and Russia, unluckily on her part, affords food for observation by a certain degree of activity, which may at last be no more than a kind of strenua inertia - bustle without object.

It thought that if Russia had agreed to subdue the Spanish colonies in return for the cession of Minorca, it would be *the most immoral public act that has taken place in Europe perhaps since Buonaparte's invasion of Spain*, but that *neither the tendency of the Emperor of Russia's politics, nor the bias of his mind would lead him to such an act*. Actually his possession of Minorca might cause England some worry, but it could hardly produce greater harm, and might even be a blessing, for were Russia a maritime power she would be more easily subject to British coercion.

The episode created a very unpleasant impression in British minds. Only the most pronounced denials by the Russian government that there were any political implications in the transaction, and their refusal to approve most of the schemes - hardly less fantastic than some of the rumors in the press - of Tatishchev, the real author of the plot, prevented a rupture of cordial relations between England and Russia.⁴⁷ The press secured, though only after a short interval, surprisingly accurate knowledge of the facts of the case, and, if it be taken as a whole, appears to have represented with rough accuracy the opinion, not only of the public, but also of the English government. The fiasco provided evidence that there was a strong tendency in England at this time to distrust Russia, though a desire to preserve the solidarity of the Alliance made such suspicion unwelcome in most quarters.

Persia and Spain were given more attention both by the press and by the foreign office than the intrinsic importance of their affairs warranted. While the concert of Europe was still much more than an idealistic concept, the major problems of international politics, those which were canvassed at the intermittent congresses, formed necessarily the core of Anglo-Russian relations. Their very importance, however, makes it difficult to find in them any clear indications of the state of English sentiment toward Russia, for the issues there under discussion were complicated by the admixture of extraneous considerations. But if Spain and Persia present an unshaded picture, the hazier background of general conditions may not be ignored.

The well-known story of Castlereagh's triumphant reconstruction of the Alliance at Aix and of the reintroduction of France into the European international system, of the subsequent breakdown of harmony and the practical isolation of England need not be recapitulated here. Professor Webster and others have traced the gradual transformation of the Alliance into a league to suppress revolution. In that process Alexander and his government played a part little less decisive than that of Metternich, and, when Castlereagh died, the Greek revolution had estranged Russia from Great Britain even more than from Austria. The diplomatic history of those years shows a tragic conflict between antagonistic ideals and the consequent slow growth of distrust and suspicion. Russia had not yet become the particular opponent of Great Britain.⁴⁸

The techniques of diplomacy prevented the details of these transactions from reaching the public. The newspapers, in spite of the occasional employment of a *special correspondent*, were forced to be content with unauthenticated reports about the course of a negotiation and knew positively only the conclusions which were finally announced. Nevertheless, their speculations were often shrewd. The press explained, for instance, that the conference at Aix was devoted almost exclusively to making arrangements for the evacuation of France, and that the sessions were concluded in an atmosphere of general harmony. There was little suggestion that rifts in the concord were forming, and Russia basked in the pervading good will.⁴⁹

Of the major London journals, only the *Whig Chronicle* entered a dissenting opinion. Anxious to attack the government on any pretense, it was beginning already to refer sarcastically to the *Holy Alliance* and had selected Russia for special opprobrium.

*If Russia have France as a friend, she may attempt, without much apprehension, to realize her views respecting Turkey, views which she can hardly have relinquished. She will never forget that the value of her fertile provinces on the Black Sea is greatly dependent on the possession of the avenues to the Mediterranean... Alexander has been at great pains to persuade the world of his magnanimity, but every now and then, circumstances are transpiring which demonstrate pretty clearly that he has a constant eye to his aggrandizement.*⁵⁰

The revolutionary movements of 1820 produced a change in the European order which required a serious consideration of the relations between Great Britain and her continental neighbors. In an atmosphere charged with the fear produced by the assassination in Germany of the Russian agent, Kotzebue, the Spanish and Neapolitan risings impelled Russia, and then Austria, to propose international measures of repression. The English government found itself unable to agree to these proposals and adopted the policy of nonintervention, which was formulated in Castlereagh's well-known memorandum of May 5, 1820.⁵¹ The distinction there clearly drawn between absolute or despotic, and representative or constitutional, governments, was to become the criterion which divided Europe into two camps, and to lead, a decade later, to a general acceptance of the probability of a *guerre des idées*. The rupture between England and her allies was slowly making; the transformation of the Holy Alliance into a league against liberty, beginning. The ideological division of Europe into two opposing factions destroyed the harmony which had minimized, since 1815, the inevitable, minor, international misunderstandings. Once that solvent had disappeared, the disputes became potentially serious.⁵²

In the press Russia was soon recognized to be a despotic power, a force inimical to England; her apparently irrepressible tendency toward aggrandizement became the subject of frequent, disparaging comment. In August 1820, the newspapers uncovered a circular dispatch to the Russian diplomatic corps which displayed the tsar's vehement hatred of revolution. He conceived the Spanish revolt to be merely one manifestation of a general, diabolic plot to subvert the established order. Such a document cried for editorial discussion, in which all the great London journals indulged. While their remarks were more highly colored than their ordinary treatment of Russia, they show thus more clearly the general drift of opinion. The *Times* was moderate. It was distressed to find that so illustrious a man as Alexander could so misunderstand the situation in Spain, and suggested that his own very virtue prevented his realizing the wickedness of a Ferdinand, but it concluded that a government which rested on force must inevitably be dismayed by military insurrection. The *Herald* alluded to Alexander's demand that the *cortes* turn against the revolutionaries and added that such a course would inhibit their proper task of improving conditions in Spain and *turn an orderly, improving peasantry into banditti and a fair province into a La Vendée*. In reply to Alexander's assertion that liberal institutions were beneficent only when established by the grace of the sovereign, it asked when had such a concession ever been made. The *Chronicle* paid little attention to Russia, but praised liberalism at the expense of the absolutist powers. The *Globe* and the *Post* reprinted the memorandum *in extenso*, but did not comment.⁵³

The readiness of English journals to express hostility to the *Holy Allies*, to Russia particularly, appears even more clearly in the leading articles which were printed late in November on the news of a minor mutiny in Russia itself. Then the *Chronicle* *did not believe any portion of the people of Russia sufficiently advanced in civilization to concern themselves with constitutional matters... But this is an age of wonders*. The *Times* was sure that a Russian subject was not *capable of aspiring to political freedom*, and that *the members of the Holy Alliance need on that score have little apprehension*.⁵⁴

The refusal of the English and French governments to take full part in the Congress of Troppau-Laibach advertised the divergence of opinion between the east and the west, and set England clearly off from the Holy Allies. Her policy was determined by the principle of nonintervention; there is no evidence that the cabinet suspected the Allies of entertaining schemes of aggrandizement. In general, the press followed the government; it vehemently attacked the intervention in Naples and condemned the illiberal principle upon which it was based.⁵⁵ But occasionally there were suggestions of ulterior motive, and the *Herald* leveled a bitter indictment against Russia.

*Nothing can be more glaring than her designs of aggrandizement. The project of re-establishing the integrity of Poland was nothing but a rapacious grasp at territorial enlargement, by driving before her into the South of Europe the dispossessed intervening Powers. We have as yet no disavowal of the 'northern maritime conspiracy' which was to drive English commerce out of the northern seas. It would appear that this ambitious and gigantic power has been checked somewhat by this country and France. We hope it is so. It will be a general benefit, and a particular one to Naples, for it may be concluded that the Emperor Alexander who has given amateur lectures upon liberalism, as well as legitimacy, will take no great interest in the security of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, if he is foiled in the attempt to obtain his quid pro quo.*⁵⁶

The *Herald's* references to the League of Armed Neutrality and the suppression of Poland are an excellent example of a journalistic technique which came to be generally employed when Russia was the victim of a propagandist attack. Her ancient sins were perennially resurrected to give her latest crime a more vicious setting. Before 1830, however, the device was employed infrequently; indeed, the practical oblivion of Poland is a tacit testimonial to the merit of the settlement made at Vienna.

Only very occasionally did there emanate from Warsaw news which attracted attention in the English press, and the files of the foreign office are void of dispatches concerning Poland. When in 1818 Alexander assembled the first diet of the new regime, brief accounts of its proceedings, particularly his speech of dissolution, were published. Their tone was uniformly sympathetic. The *Times*, for instance, thought that the new constitutional rights might *be said to constitute a fair foundation for the freedom and happiness of future ages. These gifts, worthy of an enlightened Prince, will gloriously efface from the Russian diadem the stains affixed to it by the past calamities of Poland.* The *Herald* suggested that while “none of the partitions of Poland are justifiable, as to their motives, ... there is every appearance that Poland will be recompensed by tranquility and by a rapid advance in prosperity for its name as an independent state, and for its futile pretensions to liberty”.⁵⁷ Even the news of the death of Kosciuszko elicited only several gracious tributes to his heroism,⁵⁸ not the invective against tyrants which must have appeared had the Polish cause been a live issue. Other occasional references to Poland were equally unimpassioned.⁵⁹ There appeared to be some justice in Alexander’s contention that his assumption of the crown of an independent, united, and constitutional kingdom would satisfy the Poles. For a decade, English emotions were not harassed by the misfortunes of that unhappy people.

In the periodical press, Russia received little attention. Passing events were of insufficient importance and her broad policy too intangible to excite the interest of a casual reader. In spite of the general interest which Russia’s part in the Napoleonic wars must have produced, there was only one travel book about Russia proper which deserves comment. Robert Johnston’s *Travels through Part of the Russian Empire...* was, significantly, warm in its admiration for Russia and her inhabitants.

*In a political point of view, never perhaps was there a period in which the affairs of the North, and particularly Russia, could be of more interest than the present. Every Briton must feel a conscious glow of pride in looking at the glorious alliance of Russia with his country; long have they joined in the bands of a holy and sacred war, and long may they be kindred in the spirit of peace.*⁶⁰

Perhaps the state of English opinion about Russia in the years after Vienna is best shown by the reception which was given to Sir Robert Wilson’s pamphlet, *A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817*. The hot-headed author, a soldier who had served with distinction in many of the campaigns against France, had already won some literary reputation by his books on the Egyptian campaigns, on the Polish campaign of 1806-07 with a survey of the Russian army, and on the relative military power of France and Russia in 1803. Detailed as military commissioner with the Russian army in 1812, he succeeded in winning simultaneously the respect and confidence of Alexander and the distrust of his own government. His *Sketch* seems to have been provoked by wounded vanity as much as by a patriotic impulse to call attention to a threat to English security.

The thesis of the brochure, which included a discursive description of the general state of Europe, with only particular reference to Russia, was stated boldly in the preface.

The author... does not propose to notice more of the moral state of Europe, than is necessary to establish his position, that Russia, profiting by the events, which have afflicted Europe, has not only raised her ascendancy on natural sources, sufficient to maintain a preponderating power, but farther, that she has been presented by her rivals with the sceptre of universal dominion...

*England devoted all her resources to remove the danger of one domineering rival, France; but Russia, profiting by the occasion, mounted to a higher pinnacle than that rival ever reached; while America, nourished by the war system, became a naval power, threatening to take her station on the high seas, and throw a boom composed of her ships of war across the channel of communication with the Indies.*⁶¹

The body of the tract began with an inflammatory extract from a Frankfort newspaper which warned Europe of the danger of Russian hegemony and was followed by the deprecatory comment upon the Frankfort article which appeared in a London paper. Perhaps the greatest significance of this portion of the book is the method employed. While Wilson did not himself positively endorse the sentiments of the Frankfort article, neither did he express his disbelief. The reader was allowed to draw his own conclusion. The article itself was an early example of a type which became common during the next two decades, consisting in accusations of Machiavellian diplomatic practices - in this instance, the prevention of the projected marriage between the Crown Princess Charlotte of England and the Prince of Orange and the consummation of various other marital alliances which promised to solidify Russian influence upon the continent. It was a clever technique, for the fact of the failure of the Anglo-Dutch negotiation and the consummation of the others was beyond dispute, while the insinuated explanations of the purposes of the Russian diplomacy were quite incapable of disproof.

No less significant than the method of attack on Russia was the treatment given the episode in England. By itself the German article must have been virtually unnoticed at a time when Coleridge and Carlyle were notable among intellectual leaders for their ability to read German.⁶² But the newspaper press was efficacious in bringing the German article to the attention of English readers, for it was noticed not only by Wilson and the unidentified London paper which he quoted, but also by the *Times*.⁶³ While the latter took no stock in the allegations of the German journal, noting that England had often been accused of comparable ambition, it added that some politicians echoed the views of the scare-mongering German and suggested that the whole affair was a Jacobin plot, designed to excite unrest. Soothing, perhaps, was its suggestion that there was no cause for alarm and that a too evident distrust of foreign powers merely stirred up ill feeling, but the complementary idea that complete trust might not be a wise policy implicitly carried a hint that the allegation was possibly valid. The *Times*'s discussion was certainly not inflammatory, yet the effect of the article can only have been to arouse suspicion, however slight, for most of its readers would never otherwise have learned of the episode.

Wilson's argument proceeded, in the manner of the German journalist, with a cursory sketch of Russian history since the accession of Peter. It emphasized the constant growth of Russia's territory and made comments incapable of demonstration. A characteristic example is the statement that Paul's *project of penetrating through Persia to the Indies, rejected as wild and visionary at the time, has been gradually and seriously engaging the attention of the government and obtaining the sanction of those destined to be the executors of this enterprise*.⁶⁴ Alexander's personal qualities Wilson praised, but the outline of the events of his reign could leave only the impression that he followed in the footsteps of his predecessors. The discussion of the Viennese settlement was calculated to illustrate the gains which the wily Russian emperor had won for his country. An independent Poland, it seemed, might have been recreated if the federative system which had united France with the Vistula had not been broken up, and if *above all, there had not been a Congress at Vienna*. But Poland's vanity was now gratified, her national existence recognized, and

Poland also knows, that in case she draws the sword against Russia, her own country, along an open and extensive frontier, must be the theatre of war.

*In forming the van of Russia, she either enjoys tranquillity; or, if she marches, is certain, from the weight of supporting force, and the offensive advantages of her salient position, to carry the ravages into a foreign territory.*⁶⁵

But not only had Russia acquired Poland; the acquisition of Finland, and the Aland Islands had brought her within seventy miles of Stockholm, while farther south her frontiers came within one hundred and seventy miles of Berlin, and still farther south, the same distance from Vienna.⁶⁶ If the threat to those important capitals did not suffice, she had reached a point nearly as close to Constantinople.⁶⁷

The distance is to Trebisonde, but eighty miles; to the western bank of the Euphrates, not above ninety; to Arzerum [i.e. Erzerum], one hundred; to Sinope, two hundred and seventy; to Scutari, opposite Constantinople, a little more than five hundred; across the Isthmus of Asia Minor to Alexandretta [A footnote states that "near this town Alexander conquered Darius at the battle of Issos"] (a seaport town opposite Cyprus in the Mediterranean), and only sixty miles from Aleppo, little more than four hundred; and to the Red Sea from thence not five hundred.

*Here she is moreover posted with perfect communications, with a sea road for the transport of her stores and magazines, awaiting but a signal to advance, and make herself mistress of those communications along which the Turks in Europe must receive their Asiatic reinforcements. Here she is posted to lance the Greek fire from the shore of the Bosphorus on the towers of the Seraglio, if the Sultan does not obey the Russian Ukase!*⁶⁸

Wilson then asserted that even this power was not enough, for Russia had reduced Persia to virtual subjection *under the auspices of England* and thus was in a fine position to dominate the world.⁶⁹

[How Alexander] will employ the vast force at his disposition, is certainly a most interesting question. Whether he will take the line of the Vistula or even Oder for himself; push Prussia into Holland; instigate France to imitate England, and complete and terminate her revolution by the election of a sovereign from the family of Nassau [which the German news article maintained that Alexander controlled]; or whether he will enter into negotiations with Austria for a new arrangement of Europe, which may restore the balance; are speculations, which have excited the hopes and fears of many. Whether he will profit by the positions and present superiority of Russia, to accomplish other projects long assigned to her system of policy, must interest all governments, not excepting the government of the East Indies; whose attention may also be more excited by the information, that General Yermoloff, the governor of the Caucasus line, who probably at this very moment has reached the capi-

tal of Persia on an embassy, is an officer of the highest merit and capacity as an administrator as well as a soldier; and that he has gone assisted not only by the French officers employed by Napoleon, under Gardanne, in Persia, and whom Alexander, with the exception of three, engaged in the Russian service, but with the Reports and maps sent by that mission to Napoleon, and which being carried into Russia at the time of the invasion, were found during the retreat, in two abandoned tumbrils.

These reports and plans had convinced Napoleon, that the expedition to India was practicable; and it is a positive fact, that he had resolved on sending an united Russian and French force on that expedition, in case Russia had been compelled to make peace on his terms.⁷⁰

The propensity of the press at this time to take up an idea and bandy it around is well shown by the reappearance of this last passage under another guise a few weeks later. On October 9, the *Chronicle* carried a news article summarizing an account of Yermoloff's embassy to Persia which had appeared in a Flemish newspaper.

*On this embassy, he will be accompanied by those French officers who were formerly sent by Napoleon to Persia, and afterwards entered the Russian service, and has with him the Reports and Maps which were sent by the French Embassy in Persia to Napoleon, and which were found in two coaches left behind on his retreat from Russia. These Reports and Plans had convinced Napoleon of the possibility of marching an army to the East Indies, and it is proved, that if he could have compelled Russia to such a peace as he wished, he had determined to undertake this expedition with a Russian-French army.*⁷¹

Wilson concluded his diatribe by explaining that England might still "avoid shipwreck" if only she returned to her ancient insular policy, economized her resources, established a real sinking fund to pay off her national debt, reestablished her people in the enjoyment of their ancient freedom, and negotiated with the trident in her hand.⁷²

His program resembled closely that which Pitt had proposed in 1791. But when Russia was then haled before the bar of the commons, the nation had refused to indict and had not allowed the use of the trident. In 1817 the charge was stated more fully, though the evidence was of a circumstantial nature, and the press immediately began to examine it. On September 11, the *Times* printed a full column of extracts, connected by running comment, and promised to continue its selections. The editorial column discussed the pamphlet at length. The editor's broad judgment was that Russia, unquestionably a powerful nation, could make the consequences of her strength manifest only over a considerable period of time and that in international politics such potentialities are not always fulfilled. He suggested that should Russia become an aggressor, she would lose great moral strength, and he had no doubt that Europe would keep her in her place.⁷³ Later ridicule was added to argument in the suggestion that the next three jumps after that from Alexandretta to the Red Sea were to the Cape of Good Hope, the South Pole, and the Moon.⁷⁴

Other papers also found the charges worthy of examination; but their own political predilections influenced their judgments. The *Tory Post*, for instance, devoted almost its whole article to an attack on Wilson, as a party demagogue, and concluded: *the reputed author, proceeding from false premises altogether, displays all the consistent inconsistency of the school to which he belongs.*⁷⁵ On the other hand, the *Chronicle*, which already had been crusading against Russia, endorsed Wilson's position.⁷⁶ There was much comment also in other English newspapers.

The ultimate courts of appeal, however, were the great party reviews, the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly*. The fact that they both reviewed Wilson's extravagant tract at length is clear evidence that his charges excited general interest.⁷⁷ The tenor of the two articles was so similar, and their position so like that of many of the newspapers, that they must represent the contemporary English consensus about Russia, her policy, and her power. Wilson was so prominent a public figure that each reviewer devoted much attention to the author himself, to his career and to his credibility. When they had finally concluded their party polemics, they expressed essentially the same opinion about the subject really at hand. Each admitted the great size and power of Russia, but thought that she offered no threat to England.

*Let us not, on the mere possibility that she may one day become too powerful, dissolve our union with an ancient ally, from whose greatness we now derive, and are likely to derive, increasing benefits. - Let not the two nations whose languages (it is no vain boast) are one day to divide the world, interfere without necessity in each other's harvests - but let the rivalry between them be which shall govern best, and be the instrument of most improvement to the goodly fields which Providence has intrusted to their care.*⁷⁸

The evidence seems to show conclusively that when Wilson brought Russia to the bar of English opinion in 1817, the charges against her were fully and even ably argued, but that the verdict was, as in 1791, an acquittal. Nevertheless the evolution of Russophobia in England had advanced. In all rel

evant quarters, governmental, journalistic, literary, her conduct was judged to deserve the careful scrutiny of distrust.

- (1) Vide infra, pp. 26-32.
- (2) This survey is largely based upon E. Halevy, *History of the English People*, I, II (London, 1924, 1926).
- (3) E. Halevy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism* (New York, 1928), p. 296.
- (4) T. Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands* (Berlin, 1904-1918) I, 416-418. There were 289 auxiliaries and branches of the Society in Russia in 1826; British and Foreign Bible Society, *Twenty-third Report* (London, 1827), 169; cf. Margaret J. T. Holland (Viscountess Knutsford), *Life and Letters of Zachary Macaulay* (London, 1900), p. 330.
- (5) *Retrospective Review*, XIV, 32 (London, 1826).
- (6) James Holman, *Travels through Russia, Siberia, Poland, Austria, Saxony, Prussia, Hanover, etc., undertaken... while suffering from total blindness*. (2 vols., London, 1825), dedicated by permission to H.M. George IV.
- (7) Vide infra, passim.
- (8) William Smart, *Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century* (2 vols, London, 1910, 1917), I, 407.
- (9) Smart, I, pp. 217-219, 755—758; Albion, *Forests*, passim, particularly p. 355.
- (10) Smart, I, passim.
- (11) James Marshall, *A Digest of all the Accounts... of Great Britain and Ireland* (London, 1833), pp. 71, 62. The totals are my own computations of the official values given in the returns made to parliament. The "official" values were ones assigned to each commodity late in the seventeenth century and not subsequently adjusted.
- (12) Marshall, *Digest*, pp. 71-75; C. W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 229.
- (13) M. L. de Tegoborski, *Commentaries on the Productive Forces of Russia* (2 vols., London, 1855, 1856), II, 419.
- (14) Cf. *Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1815, XII, 501.
- (15) Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 95/232, no. 3, Walpole to Castlereagh, 30 Jan. 1815. Foreign Office papers in the Public Record Office will subsequently be cited by the symbol "F. O.," followed by the class and the volume number in which the paper is to be found.
- (16) F. O. 95/232, Walpole to Castlereagh, 21 May (private), 20 Aug. (most secret) 1814.
- (17) F. O. 95/233, no. 2, Castlereagh to Walpole, 24 June 1814.
- (18) E.g., *Times*, 14, 22 June 1816.
- (19) WF. O. 95/236, nos. 5, 9, Cathcart to Castlereagh, 25 Jan., 17 Feb. 1818.
- (20) F. O. 95/236, no. 20, Cathcart to Castlereagh, 25 April 1818.
- (21) F. O. 9S/238, nos. i, 3, Casamajor to Castlereagh, 5, 19 Jan. 1820. *Times*, 5, 7 Jan. 1820. Cf. also 4, 12, 14 Jan., 12 Feb. 1820; *Post*, *Globe*, 5 Jan. 1820.
- (22) F. O. 95/238, no. 3, Casamajor to Castlereagh, 19 Jan. 1820; nos. 14, 15, Bayley to Castlereagh, 20, 22 April 1820.
- (23) F. O. 9S/237> no. 2, Castlereagh to Cathcart (consul), 18 April, 1820; no. 4, Castlereagh to Bagot, 16 June 1820/238, no. 6, Bagot to Castlereagh, 19 July 1820, nos. 2, 10, 37, 3 Jan., 14 Feb., 4 July 1821; /239 nos. 1, 4, 15, Castlereagh to Bagot, 12 Jan., 23 Feb., 28 Oct. 1821.
- (24) *Parliamentary Papers*, 1820, III, 1821, VI, passim. The evidence of T. Tooke, the author of the *History of Prices*, gives the fullest account of Anglo-Russian trade. Tooke had long been associated with the leading English house, Samuel Thornton Bros. & Co. It was an open secret that he, the son of the author of books on Russia, wrote the petition of the merchants; Smart, I, 744.
- (25) E.g., F. O. 95/233, Castlereagh to Cathcart, separate, 28 July 1816, /233, nos. 12, 14, Castlereagh to Cathcart, 14 Aug., 16 Oct. 1818.
- (26) C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822* (London, 1925) > PP- SO-S9-
- (27) Cf. C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1815* (London, 1931), pp. S3-63-
- (28) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, passim.
- (29) Cf. Liverpool's judgment that Britain could not accept Alexander's original proposals with regard to Poland... I am satisfied that some protest will be absolutely necessary to render the proceeding on the subject palatable in this country." C. K. Webster, *British Diplomacy* (London, 1921), pp. 290, 291.
- (30) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, pp. 13-21; *British Diplomacy*, pp. xxxi-xxxv.
- (31) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, pp. 7-9.
- (32) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, pp. 65-68, 509-512.
- (33) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, p. 66.
- (34) P. M. Sykes, *A History of Persia* (London, 1915), II, 395-414.
- (35) F. O. 95/232, Walpole to Castlereagh, no. 36, 13 Aug. 1814, no. 1, 23 Jan., no. 30, 27 Oct. 1815; Cathcart to Castlereagh, nos. 27, 31, 66, 18 April, 5 May, 21 Nov. 1816; /233, Castlereagh to Cathcart, no. 2, 5 June 1815.
- (36) F. O. 95/238, nos. 9, 33, Bayley, and Bagot to Castlereagh, 2 April, 30 Nov. 1820.
- (37) F. O. 95/235, Private, most secret and confidential, Castlereagh to Cathcart, 16 May 1817; /237, no. 3, Secret, 2 Feb. 1819.
- (38) Cf. *Edinburgh*, Oct. 1815, XXV, 398-437.
- (39) *Edinburgh*, Oct. 1815, XXV, quotations, pp. 400, 438, 401; *Quarterly*, Oct. 1815, XIV, 152-188, quotations, pp. 155, 156.
- (40) *Quarterly*, April 1816, XV, 291, 292.
- (41) H. W. C. Davis, *The Great Game in Asia* (London, 1927), passim.
- (42) *Edinburgh*, Oct. 1815, XXV, 421.
- (43) E.g., *Morning Chronicle*, 23 April, 12 Aug. 1817, 2, 9 Oct. 1818; *Times*, 3 Sept. 1817.
- (44) F. O. 95/233, no. 9, Castlereagh to Cathcart, 22 Dec. 1815; Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, pp. 65, 66, 93-95. Cf. supra, p. 36.
- (45) Vide infra, pp. 50-55.
- (46) *Times*, 24 April, 14, 16, 18 Aug., 14, 16, 18, 23, 24 Oct. 1817; *Chronicle*, 23, 25 April, 11, 12, 13, 18 Aug., 14, 23, 24 Oct. 1817; *Post*, 25 April, 15 Aug., 14, 15, 17, 23, 24 Oct. 1817. Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822* pp. 93-95.
- (47) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, pp. 93-95, 411, 412.
- (48) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, passim, particularly chaps. iv-vii.
- (49) *Herald*, 10, 28 Oct., 23, 26, 27 Nov. 1818; *Post*, 9 Oct. 1818; *Globe*, 16 Oct., 25 Nov. 1818.
- (50) *Chronicle*, 9 Oct. 1818.
- (51) Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, chap. v, particularly pp. 235-242.
- (52) Cf. *Chronicle*, 1 Jan. 1821. "Europe ... may be considered as pretty evenly divided into Constitutional States and Republics, and States without Constitutions...
- (53) *Times*, 10, 12 Aug. 1820; other papers, 10 Aug. 1820.
- (54) *Chronicle*, *Times*, 29 Nov. 1820.
- (55) E.g., *Times*, 18 Jan., 12 Feb. 1821; *Herald*, 16 Jan. 1821; *Chronicle*, 1 Jan. 1821.
- (56) *M Herald*, 18 Jan. 1821; cf. also 2 Dec. 1820.
- (57) *Times*, 6 May 1818; *Herald*, 19 May 1818.

- (58) Tmg, Post, 31 Oct. 1817.
- (59) E. Chronicle, 28 Oct. 1818; Times, 27 Feb. 1819; Chronicle, Post, Times, 9 July 1815.
- (60) Robert Johnston, *Travels through Part of the Russian Empire to the Country of Poland* (London, 1815), passim, particularly pp. 169, 399, quotation, p. xi.
- (61) Sir Robert Wilson, *A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817* (London, 1817), pp. vii, xi. Here and in all subsequent quotations marks are those of the original.
- (62) *C Wfourterly*, April 1818, XIX, 132, in review of Wilson's book.
- (63) 26 July 1817.
- (64) Wilson, *Sketch*, p. n.
- (65) *Ibid.*, pp. 131, 133.
- (66) *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.
- (67) *Ibid.*, p. 140.
- (68) *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 145.
- (69) *Ibid.*, pp. 145-152, quotation, p. 146.
- (70) *Ibid.*, pp. 152-154*
- (71) Chronicle, 9 Oct. 1817.
- (72) Wilson, pp. 196-198, quotation pp. 196, 197.
- (73) Times, 11 Sept. 1817.
- (74) Times, 11 Sept. 1817. Cf. also 16, 19 Sept.
- (76) *Vide supra*, pp. 43, 46; Chronicle, 11 Sept. 1817.
- (77) The attention given the book by the newspaper press in general and the fact that it went through five editions before the end of 1818 seem by themselves to be proof that the book excited popular interest.
- (78) *Quarterly*, April, 1818, XIX, 131-177, quotation, p. 177; *Edinburgh*, Nov. 1817, XXIX, 164-190.

IV. THE GREEK REVOLUTION

Although the manifold problems of the first years of peace had created some dissension between Russia and England, none had produced a serious quarrel between the two countries. The English cabinet, content with an assertion of the principle of nonintervention, had not actively resisted the policy of repression inflicted upon the continent by Alexander and Metternich. With regard to the Greek revolt such passivity was impossible. England could not ignore her protectorate in the Ionian Islands, even had the commercial and strategic importance of the Levant not impelled her attention, while Russia was powerfully driven by religious and racial, as well as by commercial and strategic, considerations. Both countries were affected nearly.

Anglo-Russian harmony might have been destroyed by the circumstances which attended the outbreak of the insurrection, for the growing estrangement of the two governments had just been punctuated by the promulgation at Laibach of a monarchical principle of antirevolutionary intervention. Actually the adoption of that formula eased the situation, since, upon the receipt of news of the rising in the Principalities, just as the congress was dispersing, logic required Alexander to repudiate Ypsilanti. Anglo-Russian tension was minimized in consequence, even though the subsequent insurrection in the Morea provoked outrages which taxed Russia's patience and provided her ambassador at Constantinople, Count Stroganov, with ample opportunity to precipitate a Russo-Turkish war. Castlereagh, cognizant of the danger and anxious to avert hostilities, immediately entered into direct communication with the tsar. Playing upon the latter's prejudices, even invoking the monarchical principle of the alliance as an argument in this case against intervention, he was able, with Metternich's aid, to inspire Alexander to resist the belligerent tendencies of his nation.¹

That Castlereagh desired to preserve peace there can be no doubt. Just how far his policy was directed by a positive fear of Russian aggrandizement, with consequences injurious to British interest, and how far by a wish to safeguard the political order which had been so laboriously evolved at Vienna is uncertain. Doubtless he was not altogether immune to the general misgiving about the power and designs of Russia, but his refusal even to discuss the possibility of a rearrangement of the Ottoman empire, with new safeguards against Russian hegemony, seems to imply a broader purpose. He recognized that Turkey had violated her contractual obligations to Russia and conceded the difficulties under which Alexander labored, both from the bellicose sentiments of his people and the provocation of the Turks. From Sir Charles Bagot in St. Petersburg he received contradictory reports, some telling of the martial fervor of the nation, others of Alexander's pacific intentions.² He privately expressed the opinion that the influence of Catherine II no longer governed Russian policy, and told the house of commons that "with regard to the desire of aggrandizement with which the Emperor of Russia has been charged, he believed from his knowledge of the character of the Emperor ... that that illustrious personage was too deeply impressed with a sense of his own glory and his real policy to seek for any further aggrandizement . on the side of Turkey".³ Probably Castlereagh's position is most clearly shown in a dispatch to Bagot which was essentially a second personal letter to Alexander. Its general tone one of sympathy for Russia's difficulties and trust in her purposes, it emphatically stated the conviction that the alliance must be preserved and the European status quo maintained. It denied the determination of British policy by commercial jealousy of Russia, and asserted that Britain also must profit from the growth of Russian prosperity. Only considerations of the general stability of Europe prevented, Castlereagh wrote, the gratification of the appeal for liberation from the yoke of the infidel of the descendants of the men who had laid the foundation of European culture.⁴

The attitude toward the Greek revolt first adopted by the English journals was rather colorless; there was little apparent realization of its tremendous implications. The *Times*, for instance, judged with regard to Ypsilanti's exploit and his repudiation by Alexander that Turkish misgovernment afforded an adequate explanation of the event and was surprised *not that the enterprise should at length have been attempted, but that it should have been so long delayed...* The editor concluded that

*So far as an accession of territory could be considered profitable to those whose dominions are already perhaps more than conveniently extensive, Russia and Austria might perhaps be gainers by the dissolution of the Turkish empire; but they both appear anxious to have it understood that they have a nearer interest in defending foreign despotism than in dividing its spoils.*⁵

The *Morning Chronicle*, however, was more suspicious, for it remembered that Russia had *always been most liberal in declarations of this nature, at the very moment when she was most busily employed in fomenting disturbances in countries which she seized.* It opined that the Greeks could be

successful only with Russian aid, and wished to know whether the British agent in Odessa was as satisfied as Lord Castlereagh that Russia entertained no ambition. *The crafty autocrat of Russia... may think... that as we were unable to prevent the partition of Poland, we are now unable to prevent the spoliation of Turkey.* A few days later, the *Chronicle* ridiculed the idea that the sultan might get aid from the tsar. *When Turkey throws herself into the arms of Russia, we shall next expect to hear of lambs flying for protection to ravenous wolves... The magnanimous conduct . of Russia and Austria... must afford great encouragement to all Powers similarly circumstanced to throw themselves on their generosity.*⁶

Yet in general the English journals were content with publishing the daily budget of news from the East. Like parliament, their attention was directed toward the affairs of Italy. Only in July, when the revolt in the Morea had clearly assumed serious proportions and the dispute fomented by Stroganov became known, did there slowly emerge a more precise judgment of the Anglo-Russian aspects of the disturbance.

The anti-Russian opinion of the *Chronicle* hardened. It declared that the Russians were *the most ambitious people in Europe ; they have long looked forward to the possession of Turkey; and they would probably never forgive the Emperor if this favorable opportunity were neglected.* But it hastened to add that *the character of the Turkish government is detestable...* It attacked Russia merely because *the consequences of Russian interference will not be Grecian independence but extension of Russian dominion.*⁷

The *Morning Herald* was more extreme. One of its editorial articles outlined the history of Russo-Turkish relations, giving emphasis to Catherine's reputed scheme to enthrone her second grandson, Constantine, at Constantinople. It asserted that Alexander appeared to have revived the ambitions of his grandmother, while Russia's well-known desire to possess the Ionian Islands, and her even more gigantic design upon India made the present crisis a primary concern of England. Unwilling to see the Greeks put in danger of extermination, it was unable to offer a solution for the complex problem.⁸

Other papers were less pessimistic, although they recognized Russia's long-standing desire to gain unimpeded access to the Mediterranean. The *Times* decided that should Russia control the Straits, *she, with her unequalled resources, must eventually command the Mediterranean, a consummation to be deprecated.* But it added that:

Such a danger, though distant, ... may prove at once to other states... both a clue to direct, and a bond to unite their counsels... This may not induce them to prevent the interposition of Russia on behalf of Greece, but it may teach them to qualify and limit the extent of that interposition. This, too, may not be considered as an insuperable objection to the banishment of the infidels out of Europe; but it is an argument undoubtedly against suffering Russia to succeed them.

*Of all the leading monarchies of Christendom, Russia is precisely that which has least capacity of carrying on extensive operations beyond her own frontier... She is not quite so formidable as she looks.*⁹

This non-alarmist attitude was enhanced in other papers by religious and political considerations. The *Morning Post*, for instance, declared that:

The fury which devours the Greeks looks upon all Christendom as its prey. It is time that all the Powers of Europe unite in declaring ... that Christian blood is not to be shed impunely ... The appearance of a few of our ships, joined to those of France and the Netherlands, with the advance of an Austrian and Russian force, would immediately compel submission without any danger to the balance of Europe ...

The *Post's* advocacy of joint intervention is partly explained by its belief in monarchical solidarity. *May the same spirit of moderation which directed the occupation of Naples preside over the Councils of the Allied Emperors. The expulsion of the Turkish power and of the Turkish faith from Europe is certainly a task particularly proper for the members of the Holy Alliance to undertake.*¹⁰

The influence of pro-Grecian, Christian sentiment, however, alone explains the similar position of the *Whiggish Globe*.

*...Should the Crescent sink in the contest before the Cross, it would not realize the ambitious projects of Catherine by uniting Turkey to the Russian empire. The empire of the Greeks will most probably rise upon the ruins of the Ottoman Power, and a Christian Government [be] established under the protection of the other Powers of Europe ...*¹¹

The tendency of the English journals to show cordiality toward Russia was nourished by her policy at the time, for the ultimatum which she presented to the Porte appeared, in English eyes, to be very moderate. As the probability of international hostilities diminished, English sympathy for the Greeks grew. The *Chronicle*, for example, adopted the Greek cause with enthusiasm and came to admit that

Alexander was not showing the ambitious purpose with which it had previously credited him. Even the alarmist *Herald* retreated slowly from its bellicose position and finally conceded the tsar's good faith. Perhaps the general attitude of the English journals is best illustrated by an editorial article in the *Times*. *We say again, and we have looked with suspicion, that we can fix no act of the Emperor of Russia that indicates a disposition to sacrifice the principles of justice to the hope of aggrandizement.*¹²

The foundation of British policy in the Near Eastern question was laid by Castlereagh before his death in August 1822. England and Austria had induced Alexander not to attack the sultan, at least until his case had secured the approval of a congress. In effect, England had thus separated the Greek revolt from the Russian quarrel with Turkey, and although full diplomatic relations were not resumed, the danger of a war on the latter pretext had become small. Meanwhile the success of the rebels and the growth of philhellenic sentiments made the former problem more acute.

When Canning was finally entrusted with the seals of the foreign office, he had thus to formulate a policy toward Greece, as well as one with regard to intervention and to congresses in general. The expectation of Castlereagh that the Congress of Verona would undertake a settlement of the Grecian question was belied, however, for its attention was devoted almost exclusively to Spanish affairs. Moreover the Greek problem was greatly simplified for Canning when Lord Strangford won the approbation of Alexander and, after his return to Constantinople, as ambassador, was able to pursue the difficult task of mediation. Actually the affairs of the Greeks were set further apart from the Russo-Turkish quarrel, and England, as is shown by her virtual recognition of their status as belligerents, in March 1823, could indulge her philhellenic sentiment more safely.¹³

Anglo-Russian relations remained precarious, nevertheless, and Canning's diplomatic finesse continued to be taxed in his persistent endeavor to coordinate the efforts of Strangford in Constantinople and Bagot in St. Petersburg. The detailed history of this complicated negotiation, which won Turkey's acceptance of Russia's four demands but failed to secure the resumption of Russo-Turkish diplomatic relations, need not here be outlined. More significant was the quasi-rupture of Anglo-Russian relations which followed Canning's refusal to participate in a conference convoked to meet in St. Petersburg. But he was undismayed when Alexander announced, in Canning's incisive phrase, that *he will be dead if he ever talks Greek to us again.*¹⁴ Thus the problem dragged on for three years without coming sensibly nearer a solution.

English policy appears to have been directed by a desire to induce the Porte to arrange its difficulties both with the Russians and with the Greeks, before her coercion had become unavoidable. Its broad purpose was the preservation of general peace and the existing political order, both of which would be threatened by a Russo-Turkish war. Perhaps the instructions which Canning drew up for the guidance of Stratford Canning on a special mission to St. Petersburg are the clearest statement of this policy. Since the younger man enjoyed his cousin's full confidence and friendship, it is a fair assumption that he was as fully cognizant as any man of the foreign secretary's ideas. The annotations on the document, presumably in Stratford Canning's hand, are as significant as the instructions themselves.¹⁵

TO PRESERVE THE PEACE OF THE WORLD is the leading object of the policy of England.

*For this purpose, it is necessary, in the first place, to PREVENT, to the utmost of our power, the breaking out of new quarrels, - in the second place, to compose, when it can be done, by friendly mediation, existing differences, and thirdly, where that is hopeless, to narrow as much as possible their range, fourthly, to maintain for Ourselves, an imperturbable neutrality in all cases where nothing occurs to affect injuriously Our interests or Our honour.*¹⁶

With regard to Russia, the crux of the whole matter lay, of course, in the last clause - *where nothing occurs to affect injuriously Our interests or Our honour* - for should Russia go to war with Turkey those interests and possibly that honour might be prejudiced. How was Canning to judge the intentions of the tsar? Alexander persistently denied any desire for aggrandizement, but was he to be trusted? At the time of the Congress of Verona, Canning thought that Alexander might be forced to embark on hostilities. If the skill of Strangford, however, tided over the first crisis, the failure of the tsar to send his ambassador back to Constantinople was suspicious. Nevertheless Canning appears to have trusted Alexander; he even suggested that in spite of that pacific disposition, Turkey put too much trust in Russia's good faith.¹⁷ Bagot's account of his farewell audience must have rejoiced Canning.

[Alexander] disclaimed, in the most solemn manner the most distant project of aggrandisement, or territorial conquest in any quarter ... She [Russia] was surely large enough to satisfy the widest ambition which any sovereign could, with any reason, indulge.

[The Tsar continued:]... Had I been actuated by a restless military spirit, by a spirit of vengeance - a thirst of power - or by the supposed ancient policy of this empire, I have certainly not wanted fair and most unexceptionable opportunities of gratifying my desires. Powerful means are 'always in my hands, fair grounds of hostility have been repeatedly offered to me. I think that a forbearance of more than three years, terminated by a renewal of my friendly and diplomatic relations with the Porte entitle me to credit when I declare... that nothing but the very improbable contingency of my being myself attacked by a Turkish force within my own dominions shall ever induce me to attack singly and alone, any part of the Ottoman Empire, - and if... any joint or general attack should hereafter, under any circumstances, be thought necessary, I am the first to declare that I will not add thereby one iota to my present possessions.¹⁸

Not even the most skeptical observer could deny the force of the argument, and Canning's knowledge of Alexander's character induced him to rely upon the promise. Indeed on more than one occasion he expressed the opinion that while Alexander might be trusted not to seek special advantages for Russia, a successor might not be so moderate. There was also the danger that "in the prurient and tantalized state of the Russian army some vent must be found... some sphere where it could be exercised and its threat to the existing order at home removed. Nevertheless, as late as August 1825, Canning still believed that Alexander would not break the peace."¹⁹

Canning's broad opinion about Russia may not be determined more precisely, for his domination of the cabinet, in matters of foreign relations, allowed him to formulate his policy without much regard for the ideas of his associates, and he had little need to express on paper the motive which inspired each step. Far the greater part of the enormous correspondence which has been preserved is comprised in official documents, too often written with an eye to their being communicated to foreign diplomats. His lack of confidence in, and respect for, several of his agents, notably Strangford, further depreciates their value for the historian's purposes.²⁰ Thus there exists no indication whether he based his policy, even in part, upon the relative commercial opportunities afforded British traders in Russia, in Turkey, or in Greece. The ideas expressed in the foregoing quotation from his instructions to Stratford Canning afford an adequate explanation of the policy pursued. In the crisis created by the Greek revolt, Canning's major concern seems to have been the preservation of peace and of the balance of power.

Even scantier is evidence of the ideas of the other members of the government or of the diplomatic corps. Wellington and Liverpool concurred in Canning's judgment at the time of the Congress of Verona,²¹ and there is no reason to suppose that a difference of opinion developed later. Even the growing philhellenic sentiment of the nation found little expression in the debates of parliament; Russia was virtually ignored.²²

In the press the cause of the Greeks received more attention. There were full accounts of public meetings in their behalf, long lists of members of Greek committees, and detailed reports of the events of the war.²³ But the references to Russia were infrequent; her connection with the broad problem was seldom discussed. Indeed, the *Annual Register* remarked: *In Russia little occurs at any time worthy of being recorded; and, from the nature of the government, of that little only a small part can be known.*²⁴ Nevertheless there can be little doubt that in England there was a general antipathy to Russia, for she was a leading member of the neo-Holy Alliance, which excited a strong disfavor often expressed both in the press and in parliament. It is significant that a brief editorial article in the *Times*, which was designed to attract attention to an account of education in Russia, should have included the irrelevant remark that: *From an expedient for confirming the repose of nations, the Holy Alliance now stands confessed an engine for making despotism universal and immortal.*²⁵ By most journals the publication of the Verona circular was made an occasion for opprobrious commentaries on the Holy Alliance, in which Russia was given her share of abuse. Even the reactionary *Post* was distressed at the obvious insincerity by which the Allies identified the Greek revolt with the *carbonari*.²⁶ Most of the news which specifically concerned Russia was based upon events unconnected with the Near Eastern question. The sessions of the Polish diet, a misunderstanding between Russia and Persia, maritime rights in the north Pacific, attracted the attention of the metropolitan journals.²⁷ There were occasional reports of unusual happenings within Russia, such as the tsar's decree that consuls must not belong to a masonic order.²⁸ Not infrequently a few inches of an odd column were filled with an extract from a travel book, a description of a peculiar Russian custom. All these items were inconsequential.

The birth, in January 1824, of a new quarterly, the *Westminster Review*, the organ of the Benthamite radicals, must have been an event in itself. That its first two issues included articles on Russia, with a markedly antipathetic bias, gives its appearance much present significance. The article in the first number, though unsigned, was written by the editor, John Bowring, who had already won some reputation for his *Specimens of the Russian Poets*, an anthology of original translations which was warmly praised by several reviewers and afforded most English readers their first acquaintance with Russian verse.²⁹ It was, indeed, the sole translation of Russia's still scanty literary achievement which appeared in English prior to 1840. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century did the work of the great Russian novelists begin to modify the common and natural belief that Russia was a cultural desert.

The article in the *Westminster* opened with a vivid analysis of the growth of Russian power in the last hundred years.

There was a country a century ago which excited neither interest, nor jealousy, nor anxiety; it was known and thought of only as the land of strange and distant barbarians, of whom some vague notions might indeed be gathered together by the curious, from the travels of a few adventurous wanderers... But things are altered now; and Russia, barbarous still, has aspired to, and has obtained, a dictatorship over the states of Europe. She sits like a huge incubus upon the rest, disposing of kingdoms at her will, directing and controlling the fate of nations...

In the reviewer's judgment, there were mitigating circumstances. Great as was Russia's power, it was not yet irresistible and her increased connection with more advanced states must be followed by her own progressive civilization and finally by the adoption of a more liberal form of government. Poland, he thought, might throw off her chains and become again the bulwark of the west. Much of the article was devoted to a summary of Russian literary and historical writings, of which the author plainly recognized his readers' ignorance. In his opinion they constituted some evidence of the progress of enlightenment in Russia. In short, the tone of the article was strongly hostile to Russia, but it gave the impression that a catastrophe was not imminent.³⁰

In April, the *Westminster's* attention was turned to *Greece and Russia*. The reviewer here argued vehemently that the Muscovite danger could best be countered, not by preserving the integrity of the Ottoman empire, but by the erection in its place of an independent and powerful Grecian state. He further suggested a division of other portions of the sultan's dominions among Austria, France, and Great Britain. Finally he turned to a discussion of Wilson's *Sketch of the ... Power of Russia*, which he demolished with the argument that mere size did not constitute power, unless there were equivalent economic and human resources.³¹ In these two articles the *Westminster* clearly placed the radicals, whom it represented, in the van of those who distrusted and disliked, but did not yet fear, Russia.

Several new travel books dealing with Russia were added at this time to the already considerable number, notable among them being *The Character of the Russians...*, by Robert Lyall, a Scottish physician and botanist who had been able to secure a not too lucrative practice among the nobility of St. Petersburg and Moscow. In his book he capitalized his knowledge of the habits of polite society, if his vindictive account of its behavior was an ungracious tribute to the hospitality which he had received. The book attracted much attention, and Lyall was able to publish a supplementary brochure, dealing with the Russian military colonies, and a journal of travels in southern Russia. His picture was vivid and malignant. It included a story of a large house party at which the guests collapsed in a drunken stupor upon beds brought by themselves, described in detail the *Club Physique de Moscou* - a well-patronized brothel - and discussed a bathing party at the "prolific lake." In short, Lyall emphasized the most extravagant episodes of his experience. Yet he pretended to be complimentary, for he took pains to refute the deprecatory judgment of Dr. E. D. Clarke - the author of many well-known travel books - whom he quoted at length. More worthy of serious consideration were his detailed history of Moscow and his *critique* of the fire of 1812. Very significant was his failure to give any space to politics or to the navy, topics which would not have been ignored ten years later by a writer seeking to be sensational.

The reception accorded to Lyall's books is illuminating. Although *The Character of the Russians* was a shoddy piece of work - Alexander's public repudiation of the dedication might have been expected - it was reviewed widely and often generously, even in the *Edinburgh and the Quarterly*. That it attracted so much attention must testify to a general English interest in Russia, in her social conditions more than in her politics. If judgments about her varied, she was not regarded mainly as a potential menace to English prosperity. Moreover Lyall must have contributed significantly to the development of the unsavory stereotype which was forming in England, for a decade later newspaper editors were

still using short excerpts - descriptions of the boorish life of the upper classes - to fill space not otherwise appropriated.³²

The English tendency still to regard Russia with tolerance is even better shown in the treatment accorded her extravagant claim of exclusive rights in the north Pacific. In the press the ukase, which interdicted access to both its American and its Asiatic coasts, was given much attention, but was not treated in an unfriendly fashion. The *Times*, declaring that the question was very important, suggested that it was another example of the *preposterous and intolerable pretensions of Russia*, but added that Alexander showed no signs of sacrificing justice to the hope of aggrandizement.³³ The other papers adopted a comparable point of view,³⁴ and the episode was soon forgotten.

Of necessity the foreign office paid more careful attention to the dispute. If the Russian action was quite unjustified, it was important, nonetheless; and when the first protracted negotiations for a settlement broke down, Stratford Canning's special mission was designed to effect a resolution of the consequent *impasse*, much more than to essay a solution of the Levantine problem. Noteworthy was his success in obtaining the abandonment of most of the Russian pretensions in the convention of February 1825, at a time when the tension over the other issue was particularly acute. It is clear that even in 1825 the major misunderstanding did not preclude the satisfactory consideration of other matters. Some slight cordiality must be shown also by the ability to agree to disagree with regard to the vital Near Eastern question.³⁵

The unexpected news of Alexander's death in December 1825 excited such general interest that it affords explicit evidence of English opinion about Russia which had only been implied in earlier writings. The circumstances of the decease - the lack of detailed information owing to the difficulties of communication with the Crimea, doubts about the succession, and, finally, the Decembrist revolt - provided all the elements of a good newspaper story. From December 20 until the end of the following January, the reports from Russia overshadowed all other news.

About Alexander's character there was general agreement. As a young man he had shown unusual ability and excellent intentions, but his later years had belied his early promise. Typical comments were:

Russia may have had one greater monarch; it will be difficult for her to expect a better.

The latter part of his life, during which he formed the leading member of the Confederacy of Monarchs, professedly directed against the liberty of nations, has taken away much of the credit which his reputed humanity and mildness had once acquired for him.

... that he has been the benefactor of his own country, and that he is alike, honored, loved, and deplored, both by his people and by his family, there appears to be no doubt... His loss seems to be lamented with a sincerity which even the Princes of civilized states would not disgrace themselves by rivalling.

The *Times*, which had been more outspoken in its indictment of the Holy Alliance than had most of its contemporaries, did not change its tone.

But if the death of Alexander was an event to be deplored by the great majority of his own people, by Europe generally, ... it will be looked at with very different emotions. As the author, and master, and mover of the Holy Alliance, the late Emperor was the declared foe to the political rights of all civilized nations, to the cause of freedom over the whole earth, and to the improvement and happiness of man as a member of society. It has required the most painful struggles for four long years on the part of England, Austria, and Prussia, to prevent Alexander from marching down the Danube and extinguishing at once the Turkish despotism and the infant hopes of independence for the Greeks.³⁶

Most of the speculation about the future concerned the Near East. The *Times* was disturbed by Nicholas' proclamation that he would follow his brother's policy.

...the late reign was an example of steady and successful aggrandizement at the expense of all the neighbors of Russia... and exhibited a growth of military power more formidable to enemies or rivals, than any reign within the last century, that of Catherine not excepted.

Other papers shared the idea that Russia might win new Turkish laurels, but their philhellenic sentiments made them greet it with more favor.

We should prefer Greece Russian to beholding a whole Christian people swept to the grave to make room for sanguinary hordes of Mohammedan negroes.

But if the expulsion of the Turkish government from Europe were undertaken with the consent of all the great powers, and if the territory instead of being assimilated to the Russian Empire were placed under some government likely to improve its resources, the event, desirable in itself, would be far from being disadvantageous to the future tranquillity of Europe.

Even the *Herald*, which did not share the philhellenic enthusiasm, was not alarmed.

*There are two ways by which the resources of Russia may be judged - the accounts of those who profess to have personally observed them, and the history of Russia for the last half century; and from both, it will be apparent that Russian power has been of late extravagantly overrated... Mere population is anything but strength, when left to itself without wealth, industry, or the arts of civilized life. The sources of power in a nation are essentially moral or intellectual, not numerical or physical.*³⁷

The virtual unanimity of papers of different political affiliation must reflect the general public opinion with substantial accuracy. Such an English estimate, no more inimical to Alexander or to Russia, may probably have facilitated the decisive change in the Near Eastern crisis which took place in the last months of the tsar's life. As Canning had foreseen, the major accomplishment of the conference of St. Petersburg was the estrangement of Russia from her continental allies. Unwilling any longer to talk Greek to them, Alexander turned back toward England at a time when the growth of philhellenic sentiment had made it as impossible for her, as for Russia, to watch passively Ibrahim Pasha's scheme to depopulate the Morea of its Christian inhabitants. Canning was convinced that a settlement could be postponed no longer, for there were many signs that Alexander would resort to arms alone if England would not cooperate, and he thus welcomed the overture brought in the late autumn by the Princess Lieven, the talented and influential wife of the Russian ambassador. He hoped that if he acted jointly with Russia he could influence her policy, and thought that the Porte might be induced to accept the mediation of England which the despairing Greeks now had entreated at long last.³⁸

At first the sudden death of Alexander threatened to disrupt the embryonic negotiation, but Nicholas' determination to carry on his brother's policies encouraged Canning to send Wellington on a commiserative and congratulatory mission to St. Petersburg which had a political purpose. The Duke's instructions with regard to the Turkish question and his reports of his conversations with the Russians make Canning's motives clear. His primary aim was unchanged, the preservation of peace by British mediation in behalf of the Greeks. He was still unwilling to admit the tsar's right to undertake hostilities, for a settlement of the purely Russian grievances had been virtually achieved by Strangford. In consequence, a war must be one of aggression. On the other hand an English parliament, influenced by the national sympathy for the Greeks, would hardly sanction armed support of the sultan, the only other certain means of reestablishing order in the Near East. Should it appear to be the only alternative to a disastrous war with Russia, the Porte might accept English mediation. The Anglo-Russian negotiations might thus possibly avert hostilities and would at least give England some influence over Russian policy.³⁹

In St. Petersburg, Wellington discovered that the Russian government wished to act in concert with England, although the tsar was determined to resort to war rather than to allow his honor to be sullied by the confession of weakness implicit in further acquiescence in Turkish procrastination. While he was thus unable to elicit a Russian promise not to resort to arms, the Duke was sanguine at this time that peace would be preserved and believed that he had assured Canning's secondary goal, the limitation of the scope of hostilities. Failing to secure a unilateral engagement that Russia would seek no selfish advantage, he did induce her statesmen to subscribe to a joint abnegation of particular privilege. He maintained that it was *an increase of territory . to Russia in Europe which would produce jealousies and apprehensions to other powers*, and, in view of Alexander's confessed Asiatic ambitions, naturally took great credit for obtaining Nicholas' specific declaration that he *disclaimed the wish for even a village*.⁴⁰

Canning was not so easily satisfied. Since he had hoped *to save Greece through the agency of the Russian name upon the fear of Turkey, without a war*, he could not approve the tacit recognition made in the St. Petersburg protocol that Russia might be forced to coerce Turkey. While he thought there was *little danger of a war on account of Greece*, he did not know... *on what the D. of W. grounds his hopes that peace... will not be interrupted* and he remembered that Wellington had returned from Verona with precisely the same professions of confidence that Spain would not be invaded.⁴¹

While there survives little evidence of the views of the other members of the cabinet, Canning's apprehension was probably general. Even Wellington did not always feel the optimism which appeared in his official dispatches. At the outset he had regarded his mission as a forlorn hope and in his private correspondence he expressed opinions which coincided with Canning's. In spite of Nicholas' repudiation of territorial ambition, Wellington believed that he had designs on Asiatic Turkey and little concern with the fate of the Greeks. Lord Bathurst agreed with Canning and the Duke. Having no doubt that Russia would be easily and rapidly victorious, they were more worried by the ultimate than

by the immediate effect of her victory. The consequences of a rupture of the established political order seemed more alarming than an increase of Russian power on the Balkan peninsula, or even the Mediterranean littoral.⁴²

So far as it was represented by the press, the English public was less apprehensive of Russia than was the cabinet. Wellington's mission to St. Petersburg revived a flagging discussion of Russian policy which continued after his return. In general the editors thought that war was unlikely, that the Duke's mission had advanced the cause of the Greeks, and that in any case there was little ground for English apprehension.⁴³ So far as there was an anti-Russian school of thought, the *Times* was on this occasion its most vehement exponent.

Should Russia, then, convert her triumphs over the Turkish arms into the means of territorial aggrandizement... even by a single province now under the sway of Turkey, should she obtain a frontier more contiguous to Constantinople,... we see not how Austria or England could look on while such an engine of future annoyance was forging under cover of an expulsion of the Infidels from Europe.

The *Globe*, however, was more nearly characteristic of the press as a whole when it stated:

...there can be no question in which a contest between two powers, nominally European, can less affect the interests of his country than one between Russia and Turkey... We have no doubt that Russia in the present state of its finances, will not venture upon a war unless the provocation be sufficient fully to justify it, and, in such a case, we do not see that the fear of any advantage which might result to Russia... would warrant us to interfere...⁴⁴

War, indeed a war of which the justness was universally conceded, was declared to Russia sooner, perhaps, than the editorial writer of the *Globe* had anticipated, for there occurred one of those alternations of Russian hostilities between the Near and the Middle East which persisted throughout the nineteenth century. Hardly had the Russian grievances against Turkey been adjusted in the Convention of Akerman in October when there was trouble on the Persian frontier. The incursion into the Caucasus of a band of soldiers led by an insubordinate son of the shah was followed by an outrage on the person of the Russian ambassador which provoked the tsar's prompt declaration of war. After initial successes, the Persians were routed, and bowed to the dictated peace of Turkomanchai. Acting in accord with the earnest advice of the British agents in Tabriz, Persia ceded two border provinces and agreed to pay a large indemnity; Russia gained a more readily defensible frontier.⁴⁵

Only the most inadequate news reached London of events which proved later to have transformed the relative positions in Central Asia of Russia, England, and Persia. The reports which the English *chargé* in St. Petersburg sent to Canning were based, perforce, in large parts upon rumors, Russian newspaper articles, and casual conversations with Russian ministers, because Disbrowe, knowing that a suspicion of the existence of secret clauses in the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814 magnified the usual Russian jealousy in her Asiatic relations, was reluctant to press Nesselrode either for the confirmation of event or for a statement of policy. Canning apparently agreed with Disbrowe that Persia was the aggressor and refused to recognize a *casus foederis*. In deference to Russian sensitiveness he did not offer English mediation until it had been formally invoked by the Persians and, when it was finally tendered in accord with treaty obligation, it was offered in the most conciliatory terms. Disbrowe's almost apologetic conversation with Nesselrode elicited, much to Canning's satisfaction, a renunciation of serious territorial ambition at the expense of Persia. There is no indication that alarm for the safety either of Persia or of India was excited in official circles by the events of the war or the terms of the Treaty of Turkomanchai.⁴⁶

The English public knew, and apparently cared, even less than the cabinet. The press gave the outbreak and progress of the war only the scantiest and most infrequent attention, its notable indifference being best shown by the calm treatment accorded the subject in the *Herald*, for the moment much the most alarmist of the leading metropolitan journals. This paper admitted that "which party is at fault, we know not and probably never shall know", and added that Persia was "very convenient to our East Indian possessions". But it concluded that it might "be some time certainly... before Russia would march her Cossacks into India from Persia" and could suggest no precautionary measures. The terms of the Treaty of Turkomanchai evoked no more vehement discussion than that which greeted the outbreak of war.⁴⁷

But, if the fourth estate in England did not discover in this Russian war a sufficient threat to divert their attention from the well-worn subject of the Greek revolution, there had been added a new count to the general indictment which was slowly building up. Thus in June 1827 the *Quarterly* printed a long analysis of conditions in Central Asia, based primarily upon the published accounts of the expeditions un-

dertaken on behalf of their government by two Russian explorers, Meyendorff and Muraviev. The article began with an outline of Russian expansion in the Middle East since the time of Peter and proceeded to examine the possibility of an invasion of India by any conceivable route. Its judgment was unqualified.

These alarms, we confess, are to us little more than mere bugbears... The only cause that could induce Russia to undertake the quixotic enterprise... - and it is one at which humanity shudders - would be that of getting rid of a certain portion of an army out of all proportion numerous, in which a long-continued idleness and inactivity have induced a state of discontent and insubordination.

The expeditions were judged to have had a purely commercial purpose which could not materially injure British trade and need excite no apprehension.⁴⁸

The influence of the war is apparent also in an article on Persia in the next number. It was primarily a description of the history and condition of the country, and it concluded with a brief discussion of the probable terms of peace. The author prophesied that Russia would not demand any considerable cession of territory, lest in the future England find the means of making the shah a troublesome neighbor. Later publicists, nevertheless, adduced the war of 1826-27 as added proof of the limitless rapacity of the Russian nation.⁴⁹

Whatever may be the proper solution to the vexed problem of apportioning credit for the St. Petersburg protocol of April 1826 between Canning, the Lievens, Wellington, and the tsar, there can be no doubt that Canning made the agreement the foundation of his subsequent attempts to pacify the Near East. He may have thought that it was *not very artistically drawn*, but he soon discovered the merits of the diplomatic revolution which it effected. The friendly influence of Russia facilitated the satisfactory arrangement of several totally unrelated affairs. But the protocol did have the weakness that it presumed the adherence to its provisions of other European powers and their, but not England's, guarantee of the Greece which was to be.⁵⁰

In the autumn, after some months of informal conversations with France and Russia, Canning embarked upon serious negotiations to implement the protocol and to enforce English mediation between the Porte and the Greeks. The Wellington wing in the cabinet immediately discovered great cause for dissatisfaction. Bathurst and the Duke agreed that it had *been long a great object with the Foreign Office to take a part for the Greeks, as being a very popular cause among a large description of well meaning people, as well as with all democrats*, and decided that it would not be easy to *keep the Foreign Office to the Protocol*, which they believed had been designed to facilitate a voluntary, not a forced, mediation.⁵¹ Disagreement on foreign policy thus widened a rift in the cabinet caused primarily by differing opinions about domestic affairs, and may have contributed to its dissolution after Liverpool's retirement in the spring of the next year. That crisis delayed the consummation of the negotiations with France and Russia, but the withdrawal of Wellington and his group from office enabled Canning, now prime minister at last, to adopt whatever line of policy appeared to him to be most expedient. Although there survives no clear statement of his views, it seems to be a reasonable assumption that the Treaty of London, finally concluded on July 6, 1827, was an embodiment of his ideas.⁵²

In essence that treaty provided that the allies should offer to the Porte the mediation which the Greeks had entreated and that they should jointly enforce a suspension of hostilities. Should the sultan reject the proffered arbitrament, they agreed to concert whatever measures might best effect a permanent settlement of the protracted threat to the peace of Europe. Perhaps the most significant article in the treaty was the fifth, by which the powers each promised to seek no augmentation of territory or exclusive advantage. England appeared to have tied the tsar's hands.

The purpose which inspired the treaty of July was the settlement of the Greek problem by means which would obviate the danger both of Russian aggrandizement and of the general war which might well be engendered by a Russo-Turkish conflict. Canning's unexpected death bequeathed to his less able and more timid political heirs the detailed accomplishment of a policy of which only the foundation had been laid. It must remain forever an interesting speculation what would have been his judgment of the battle of Navarino and whether his genius would have discovered in the consequent crisis a course of policy which would have avoided all further gunshot. Whether the affair be properly termed *untoward*, as Wellington described it, or *unlooked for*, as George IV suggested,⁵³ it transformed the whole situation fundamentally. Utterly unable to fill the shoes of his predecessor, Lord Goderich gave way in January 1828 to a ministry dominated by Wellington.

While the negotiations which culminated in the Treaty of London were in progress, the East, at least so far as it concerned Russia, did not attract much attention from English newspapers. Although there had been rumors of an Anglo-Russian agreement at the time of Wellington's mission to St. Petersburg, there was certainly no realization that a diplomatic revolution had taken place, nor that an entirely new phase of the Greek problem had begun. The *Times*, which was prone to announce as facts events of which it had only unofficial and imperfect information, congratulated Europe editorially, in January 1827, *on the adoption of a final and decisive measure on behalf of Greece by the three great Powers of Great Britain, France, and Russia*. Later several papers printed an article which purported to give the terms of a protocol negotiated by Wellington in St. Petersburg. In June there were occasional references to unusual diplomatic activity and in early July statements that a treaty was being concluded. The *Times*, perhaps the most ardently philhellene of the English journals, paid the subject the most attention, fearing that after the fall of the Acropolis intervention might be too late and declaring that the publication of a treaty would be an event which *every friend of humanity will hail with joy*.⁵⁴

When on July 12 the terms of the treaty leaked out prematurely, they did not win unqualified commendation. Several papers admitted their inability to extract from the technical phraseology the full implications of the instrument. Beneath its guarded language the emphatic approval of the *Times* was quite manifest. It concluded of the treaty that:

It is calculated to dispel those apprehensions which existed respecting the designs of Russia. If Russia shall be found to have ultimately multiplied her pacific relations by the operation of this treaty, we shall rejoice at such a result; commerce will only thereby have marked out another high road between her dominions and England.

The *Globe* also cordially approved the treaty, though it did not comment specifically on Russia; the *Chronicle* paid even less attention. The *Post* and the *Herald* were not disposed to find merit in any of Canning's work. The former thought the treaty was too late seriously to injure the Turks, who had considerable justice on their side, and feared that it might lead to difficulties between England and Russia. The latter suspected that it might produce hostilities with the Porte, England's natural ally against Russian designs on India. In short, while the treaty was a mild sensation, it won by no means universal approbation.⁵⁵

During the interval between the conclusion of the Treaty of London and the outbreak of hostilities at Navarino the press indulged in occasional, desultory speculation about the new policy of cooperation with Russia. Its general attitude was one of watchful waiting; indeed, the less ambiguous news from Spain received more constant attention. With regard to the East, there were two main schools of thought; one, best represented by the *Times*, was disposed to put faith in the Russian ally, the other, most clearly exemplified by the *Herald*, showed extreme distrust. The position of the *Times* was fully stated in an article late in September, which was believed in some quarters to be officially inspired.

*If Russia sacrificed the probable advantages of a commanding military position, and those personal though gigantic objects, in pursuit of which she promised herself, to the dissatisfaction of England, a quick and facile success - if, in fact, the result of... Mr. Canning's long and anxious negotiations with Russia was her acceptance of a British ally for a generous and universally beneficial end, instead of an isolated but perhaps brilliant effort of her own unassisted troops and resources, for the attainment of a selfish one - this country is, beyond question, pledged to accomplish the indemnity by which Russia was detached from her own peculiar and well-known schemes of aggrandisement...*⁵⁶

The *Herald* leveled a vehement and sustained attack against Russia. An extract from one editorial article suffices to show the extravagance of its expression.

*It is evident that it is not the real intention of Russia to make Greece an independent state, but to transfer her dependency from the Turkish yoke to her own. By that means the Autocrat of the North will possess what the Muscovite Cabinet have long been endeavoring to obtain - a naval station in the Mediterranean... The Greek archipelago affords one of the best nurseries for seamen in the world... It is no wonder, therefore, that Russia has long looked with a covetous eye to the Greek territory - and if she neglected the present opportunity of annexing it to her own dominions, we might give her credit for less ambition or more indolence than she has displayed from the battle of Pultowa to the occupation of Paris. By such an accession to her power she can, whenever she pleases, with very little comparative difficulty, take possession of Constantinople, and, extending her arms eastward, shake the throne of our Asiatic empire.*⁵⁷

The entirely unexpected news of the battle of Navarino precipitated on November 10 a protracted and animated consideration of the transformed Eastern situation. It was agreed by all that the British navy had added a major laurel to its crown, though some apprehension was expressed that the principles of international law had been violated. The independence of Greece appeared to have been

secured. Slowly the discussion centered on a broader question - the influence of the battle upon the positions of Russia and Turkey. Opinion was divided between the two same schools of thought which had developed in the early autumn. The papers which supported the ministry - the *Times*, the *Chronicle*, and the *Globe* - reached the conclusion that English interests had not been jeopardized; the Tory journals - the *Herald*, the *Post*, and less confidently the recently established *Evening Standard* - vociferated their apprehension. The general tenor of the latter group was well shown in the *Post's* discussion, late in December, of a Russian promissory manifesto to remain true to her contracted obligations and to seek no special advantage. The satirical vein made the attack the more vicious.

It would be idle and perhaps indecorous to dispute the solemn and repeated assurances of the Court of Russia as to its desires. They must of course be best known to itself, and we are perhaps bound to take its word, that territorial aggrandizement is not one of them. But if this be so we are compelled to pronounce the Ministers of Russia the most unskilful and unfortunate set of Statesmen that ever existed upon the face of the earth. With these miserable Muscovites, everything appears to have gone wrong. They have been foiled and counteracted on every side...

Professing our unwillingness then to believe, in deference to those who are the adulators of Russian virtue and honour, that Russia is and always has been actuated in her political movements by motives the most pure and disinterested, that she possesses Poland in virtue of a miscalculation, that her influence and pretensions in Valachia and Moldavia have resulted from mischance, that she has been entrapped and defrauded, in short, into an elevation from which she can overlook Asia with one eye, and Europe with the other; - professing our unwillingness to believe all this, we still venture to say that the Treaty of Intervention is sure to add another to the long series of instances in which Russia has had 'greatness thrust upon her' that upon this occasion also, the uniform tenor of her history will be preserved, that the disinterestedness of her Councils will once more miss their aim, and be compelled, however reluctantly, to bear the inappropriate trophies and reap the unwelcome harvest of ambition.⁵⁸

The nonalarmist judgment of the opposing school of thought was compounded of two elements, a disposition to trust Russia's good faith,⁵⁹ and a doubt of the aggressive power of the Russian army.

So great a disproportion is there between the aggressive powers of Russia and those which she can exercise in self defense, that although it is evident from recent experience how little she has to fear from a foreign attack, when the whole of continental Europe is united against her, there is none among the superior States of the Continent less formidable in the character of an assailant. We doubt whether Russia could support for two campaigns, beyond her own frontier, an army of 80,000 men; and Turkey is a region where she could not move a step but by virtue of stores and provisions brought from within her own territory.⁶⁰

The progress of the war which the tsar finally declared against the sultan in April 1828 provided for English journalistic speculation a less hypothetical foundation and revealed even more clearly the sharp differences of opinion between the several papers. For the purposes of a study of the evolution of Russophobia, the cumulative effect of the war is its major significance; it is not necessary to follow in detail the tortuous course of each of the journals. But some attention must be paid to the influences which determined their policies, for they did not divide themselves into a few schools of thought. Neither party allegiance nor the course of British policy offers an adequate explanation of their changing attitudes.

The *Times* underwent a slow but complete reversal during the first year of the war. When hostilities were about to begin, it still believed Russia to be bound by the Treaty of London and explained that:

England has nothing whatever to apprehend from the power of Russia. We have seen enough of the issue of the most vigorous attempts at universal empire ever to dread them from any quarter. The more Russia adds to the superficial extent of her territory, the more she increases her weakness, and brings upon herself the certainty of falling asunder, or breaking in pieces... With respect to Russia, as a naval power capable of competing with England, the idea is absurd...

The provocations which Russia has received from the Porte... abundantly justify a recourse to arms...

The state of our relations with Russia is more friendly and cordial, than it has been, at least for some time past.⁶¹

The publication in August, however, of an alarmist brochure by Colonel George de Lacy Evans⁶² inspired the *Times* to reexamine the whole situation and apparently led it to take a very much more serious view of Russia. Anxiety for the security of England's great and vital commerce in the Levant reënforced the suspicion which Evans had aroused. After the Russian military half-failure of 1828 had allowed an interval of relative complacency during the autumn and winter, the course of the campaign of 1829 induced the *Times* to publish a series of hysterical diatribes against Russian ambition. The fall of Adrianople convinced it that *the schemes of Catherine have abundantly succeeded*. The publication of the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople led it to harp for two weeks upon the general

theme, *the unpalatable truth... that Turkey in Europe has no independent existence, but is henceforth... substantially the slave and property of Russia.*⁶³

*But again we ask, when during the last 1000 years have such enormous acquisitions been made in so brief a period by any European conqueror, as those of Poland and Turkey by the Czar of Muscovy during the space of 15 years? When, in a single generation, were such masses of dominion superadded to any pre-existing empire? When were the relative positions of one power with each and all of the surrounding states so fearfully changed to their detriment as in this instance? We say nothing of the rapid strides of Russia between the Caspian and the Euxine, and her recent appropriation of the keys as well of Persia as of Asiatic Turkey; - of Finland and the lodgment made by Russia almost within the suburbs of the Swedish capital, we say nothing. But confining ourselves to Poland and to the space between the Danube and the Dardanelles, with Greece, including Thessaly for its outwork, may it not be affirmed that twenty years ago the empire of Russia was not half European, and that while we write, Europe is almost half Russian? ... There is no sane mind in Europe that can look with satisfaction at the immense and rapid overgrowth of Russian power.*⁶⁴

Yet in spite of this violent language, the *Times* was still unready to suggest that the government should inaugurate *measures of combined hostility*.⁶⁵ After two weeks of concentrated panic and invective, the subject was allowed to disappear from its columns.

A sharp difference of opinion developed within the ranks of the Tory press during the course of the war. At its outbreak, they had been united in apprehension over Russia's conduct. The *Herald* remained firm in that position and printed several articles which were no less extreme than those just quoted from the *Times*.⁶⁶ Although it expressly dissented from the alarmist judgment of the *Times*, its comment upon the terms of Adrianople was hardly less violent.

*Moderation indeed! ... The Empress Catherine was as moderate in her tone, as meek in her dissimulation, as just before the unprincipled partition of Poland, as Nicholas is now, when a country more ardently desired by Russian ambition than Poland ever was, when fairer provinces than Russian ever before possessed lie defenceless at his feet. The terms of his 'moderation'... are known to everybody. They leave about as much national independence to Turkey as victorious Rome left to her ancient rival Carthage.*⁶⁷

The selection, as prime minister, of Wellington, whom they both fully approved, may partly explain the otherwise remarkable forbearance of the *Post* and the *Standard*, for Wellington's vacillating, but passive, policy did not allow his partisans to express any very positive opinion. Thus the *Post* and the *Standard* maintained, virtually unaltered during the course of the war, the mildly alarmist position they had adopted before its outbreak.⁶⁸

The strictly Whig portions of the press maintained a constantly consistent position. At the outbreak of war, the *Chronicle* and the *Globe* did not share the alarm of some of their contemporaries, the *Chronicle* being able to remark in March 1828:

*We trust that Ministers will not allow themselves to be deluded by any supposed necessity of preserving Turkey as an independent State, and excluding Russia from the Mediterranean, into a fresh war. Turkey cannot be long preserved if Russia be disposed to take possession of the European part of it, for the rapid growth of the resources of Russia, in that quarter, must soon remove all conceivable obstacles to the fulfillment of her views ... But this apprehension is in great measure a chimera, while the advantages which all Europe would derive from the destruction of the Government (if it can be called such) of our ancient but barbarous Ally would be great indeed... If Russia do occupy a part of Turkey, her strength will not be in the ratio of her extension of territory. Her old provinces will no doubt be greatly benefitted by the command of an access to the Mediterranean, but for a long time to come the possession of Constantinople would be a source of weakness rather than of strength to her.*⁶⁹

Although it was distressed by the rumor of the existence of an agreement between France and Russia for a partition of Ottoman territory, to war it preferred British acquiescence in French control of Egypt.⁷⁰

Later the *Chronicle* decried the jealousy of Russian naval strength expressed in some quarters. *What stupid nonsense! ... Russia is not at present, and indeed, can hardly ever be, a maritime Power of the first magnitude...* Of the Treaty of Adrianople, it judged:

The terms imposed on the Turks by their victorious opponents are sufficiently moderate. Less could not have been exacted from them than an indemnification for the expense of the war and the free navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the merchant vessels of Russia or Powers not at war with Turkey trading with Russia. The cessions in Asia, however important they may be to Russia with a view to the consolidation of her Caucasian possessions, are of comparatively trifling magnitude.

The whole affair, the *Chronicle* felt, was a tribute to the public law of Europe; governments, even more than peoples, appeared to have abandoned aggrandizement.⁷¹

Like the *Chronicle*, the *Globe* gave the events of the war more attention than did the Tory papers. Similarly, it commented at length, but in a nonalarmist vein, upon Colonel Evans' pamphlet. Britain's trade with Russia it thought to be more important than that with Turkey. It was even less worried than the *Chronicle* over the possibility of an attack upon India.⁷²

The sharp difference of opinion about Russia and her potential threat to the welfare of Great Britain which was revealed in the press plagued the government also. The difficulty of formulating a policy to meet the extremely complicated situation which the battle of Navarino had engendered was augmented by the heterogeneous nature of Wellington's cabinet. Designed to unite once more the disparate elements over which Liverpool so long had presided, it soon found itself divided upon almost all questions, foreign as well as domestic, into Canningite and orthodox Tory factions. The details of the tortuous, pusillanimous policy which was adopted in consequence need not be examined, but a true picture of the English estimate of Russia does require a consideration of the divergent views of the several political groups.

The Russian notes of January 6, and February 26, 1828, which announced the tsar's belief that in view of the conduct of the Porte the prolongation of pacific relations was impossible, and requested the cooperation of his allies, forced the Duke's government to take a positive step in a situation which it believed to be unparalleled. If Russia embarked on hostilities, what was the status of the Treaty of London? Did the outbreak of war automatically abrogate an instrument designed to preserve peace? Could Russia simultaneously attack Turkey on the Danube and participate in the pacific coercion which France and England were sustaining in the Mediterranean? These questions Wellington and his colleagues found themselves unable to answer, for they were desirous of retaining the influence over the conduct of Russia which the St. Petersburg protocol and the London treaty had appeared to give England, and unwilling to repudiate publicly a measure which, devised by several members of the present cabinet, had won marked, popular approval. While they agreed that Russia should not be allowed to gain either territory or influence at the expense of Turkey, they were sharply divided over the means by which that purpose might be accomplished.

The thought of the Canningite group was well summarized by Palmerston.

*Russia has bound herself by so many obligations and declarations not to look to territorial aggrandizement that one must believe her sincere; but successful war offers great temptations to depart from the moderation which may have been felt at its commencement; and the sooner the cause of the contest is over, the less likely is it that that temptation will be presented.*⁷³

Disposed thus to trust Russia, Palmerston and his clique were ready to accept her request for continued cooperation and hoped that the rapid settlement of the Greek question would entail an adjustment of Russia's private quarrel with Turkey.

The Wellington wing believed that the coercion of Turkey, particularly the invasion of her territories, would probably lead to her complete disintegration.

*Every man [the Duke wrote] will raise his hand against his neighbour, and all nations will arm for the purpose of protecting each its own interests. No power that the Allies could exert could settle the government of the Turkish dominions in Europe again in the hands of the Grand Signior. All the consequences of this invasion ought to be well weighed and considered by the Allies before they embark in so portentous an undertaking. In this manner a course of measures commenced with the view of pacifying Greece, ... would expose all to the risk, nay to the certainty, of a war of indefinite duration and of the most sanguinary character.*⁷⁴

That Wellington could have agreed to the Russian proposal was, in view of this judgment of its consequences, impossible, even if he were disposed to trust the tsar's reiterated repudiation of ambitious purpose.⁷⁵ The Russian statement that, should her allies not join her in coercing the Porte, *elle ne pourra consulter ... que ses intérêts et ses convenances*⁷⁶ or, as Wellington interpreted the phrase, that she would act *selon ses intérêts et convenances*,⁷⁷ naturally alarmed English statesmen. Even Palmerston thought that the phrase seemed to announce an intention to violate the treaty.⁷⁸ Divided as the cabinet was - the diaries of Palmerston and Ellenborough make this point perfectly clear⁷⁹ - it inevitably fixed upon the one point on which it was agreed, an admission of the tsar's right to declare war on purely Russian grounds, and postponed, pending an elucidation of the noxious phrase, the formulation of a positive policy. Wellington's distress was magnified by his belief that the Russian intention to require of Turkey a satisfactory solution of the Greek question implied the surrender to the Greek leaders of the ultimate determination of the conditions of peace and by his fear that Russian martial fervor might force Nicholas to violate his promises. The situation has been aptly described as the *Duke's Dilemma*.⁸⁰

The withdrawal of the Canningites from the cabinet in May 1828 left it denuded of men who thoroughly approved of the policy of the Treaty of London and should have been followed by the breach of relations with Russia which the Duke had appeared to desire for several months. But the Russian reply to the remonstrance over the ambiguity in the note of February 26 was so conciliatory that there was no alternative to the resumption of conferences under the terms of the treaty. The Duke was thus driven by the force of circumstances to execute one of the changes of front in which his political career abounded, and he adopted the policy which had been advocated by the disciples of Canning. The attempt to settle the Greek problem as rapidly as possible was resumed with France; Russia, in a duplex position of *amicable hostility*,⁸¹ being a sleeping partner. Stratford Canning, at this time an ardent Russophile, was retained in his diplomatic position in the Levant and given instructions to re-open negotiations with the Porte.

Lord Heytesbury, soon to become *a mere Russian*,⁸² was nominated as ambassador and sent off to wait on the tsar at his headquarters near the Russian armies. He was ordered to impress upon Nicholas the great opportunity of *establishing in the beginning of his reign a character for probity and good faith which may ultimately prove of more value than many victories*, but only to *adopt the gravest tone of remonstrance consistently from abstaining from all language of menace*, should other counsels unfortunately prevail.⁸³ Arrived at the Russian camp, Heytesbury was soon forced to report that Russia would surely retain possession of Anapa and Poti, on the Eastern shore of the Black Sea, in apparent violation of her engagement.⁸⁴ His later dispatches, containing much information about the plans, army, finances, and organization of Russia appeared to substantiate his judgment that "colossal as is its mass, and formidable as are the obstacles it presents to an Invader, [Russia possesses] - fewer and less formidable means of *aggression* than any other of the Great Powers of Europe." His full conversion to Russian sympathies appears in his complacent comment on the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople that Britain must *be prepared, ere long, to see the Emperor of Russia assume the novel character of Friend, Ally, and Protector of the Ottoman Empire*. Quite convinced that the Russian government must prefer, as neighbor, an impotent Turkey, since it *would rather forego its pretensions altogether than suffer Austria to partake in the plunder*, he predicted that *the Turkish Sultan will probably be as submissive to the orders of the Russian Czar as any of the native Princes of India to those of the Company, and the Russian Minister be as .powerful in Constantinople as the Russian Minister was at Warsaw before the Partition*.⁸⁵

Heytesbury's sympathetic attitude toward Russia did not fully convince the cabinet in London. In September 1828, military considerations impelled Russia to abandon her neutral status in the Mediterranean and to undertake a blockade of the Straits, in spite of her earlier abnegation of that tactic. While the difficulties which this decision entailed were ironed out, though only after the British cabinet had determined to resort to force if necessary, continued coöperation with Russia became increasingly difficult. Heytesbury's opinion that the possession of Anapa and Poti would greatly facilitate Russia's subjection of the Caucasus did not reassure a cabinet which was beginning to consider seriously the possibility of a Russian invasion of India. Nevertheless, Wellington did not avail himself of any of his several opportunities to denounce the Treaty of London, and disagreement within the cabinet continued to impede the adoption of a clearly defined policy.⁸⁶

The Duke watched carefully the course of the Russian maneuvers. He was critical of the technical conduct of the war, attributing the failure of the first campaign to a refusal to follow the ordinary precepts of military strategy. Although he recognized as early as July 1828 that the excessive difficulty and cost of the war, as well as the inglorious achievement of the army, irked Nicholas, he concluded that the tsar would not accept English mediation. Basically he distrusted Russia. Influenced by a feeling that he had not been treated fairly in St. Petersburg, and by a just belief that the Lievens were in triguing with the king and Lord Grey to accomplish his overthrow, his irritation rose, but he contented himself with the decision to conduct all business through Heytesbury, in order that his political enemies might not learn of his decisions before they had begun even to take effect. Unwilling to believe the tsar guilty of purposeful deceit, he did not extend to Russia the full confidence which Nicholas repeatedly required. He seems to have felt that the Russian policy would entail consequences which were not intended perhaps, but were nonetheless noxious to England.⁸⁷

There does not survive evidence which demonstrates the detailed views of most of the other members of the cabinet. If they appear to have shared in general the Duke's distrust of Russia, they did not support always the details of even the hesitant policy which it produced. Aberdeen, the foreign secretary, was at once more cautious and more daring than his leader.⁸⁸ Confident apparently in his own judgment, nevertheless he was not ready to insist upon his own proposals and was only too will

ing to accept the often inconsistent suggestions of his colleagues. His early Athenian enthusiasm had largely evaporated, but he had not become so thoroughly Turcophile as the Duke. Ellenborough privately decried the weakness of both the foreign and the prime ministers, and sometimes embodied his ideas in a draft dispatch, but he seems never to have considered enforcing his proposals by the threat of resignation.⁸⁹ Even after he had been transferred from the sinecure office of lord privy seal to the presidency of the board of control, he continued to follow in detail the business of the foreign office and to compose draft dispatches, but otherwise to allow affairs to take their own course.⁹⁰ Peel occasionally formulated his own ideas in a letter or memorandum addressed to the Duke,⁹¹ but ordinarily domestic problems, notably Catholic emancipation, required his full attention. The negative evidence afforded by both the Despatches of Wellington and the Diary of Ellenborough proves that the other members of the cabinet paid still less attention to foreign affairs. Even Bathurst, who had collaborated with Wellington in the first few months of the administration, ceased to show much interest, for the Duke found it expedient in October 1829 to urge strongly that he attend a cabinet which would discuss the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople. The general indifference or disgust of the ministers must be reflected in the Duke's further remark that it was desirable to have a full cabinet,⁹² and the degree to which the Duke and Aberdeen dominated the foreign relations of the country is amply demonstrated by the fact that between April 29 and August 13, 1829 the Eastern Question was discussed by the cabinet on only one occasion.⁹³ The stultifying effect of the lack of harmony is further shown by the fact that even Aberdeen and the Duke did not really agree, for the former ceased to submit his proposed dispatches to the Duke's criticism.⁹⁴ At length, even some members of the cabinet recognized that British policy had been virtually without influence upon the course of events.⁹⁵

Russia's victories early in 1829 made it apparent that her second campaign would be as successful as her first had been fruitless, and the consequences became of immediate concern. Wellington anxiously wrote to Aberdeen:

We must expect that this victory will raise the Russian demands, and I can't say that the Porte has any means of resistance.

We are certainly interested in preventing the extension of the Russian power in Asia, and particularly in preventing their having possession of Anapa and Poti. They feel that this is the case, and therefore keep secret from us this intended departure on their part from the letter and spirit of their engagement to the world when they commenced the war.

*I quite agree with Lord Heytesbury respecting the nature of their power. But observe that they are harmless only when single-handed. If united with France or either of the great German Powers they are very formidable, and having the desire, not only as a nation, but as individuals, to mix themselves up as principals in every concern, and having a real interest in none, I am not quite certain that they are not the most inconvenient for us to deal with on friendly terms of any Power of Europe...*⁹⁶

*We ought not, we cannot advise the Turks not to cede Anapa and Poti without promising and giving them assistance; and Anapa and Poti are not sufficiently well known, nor, indeed, are they so important to our interests, as to induce us to incur the risk of involving ourselves and all Europe in war, in order to prevent these places from falling into the hands of the Russians.*⁹⁷

While the Duke refused to comply with a Russian suggestion that he urge the Turks to accede to Russia's demands, without knowing himself what they were,⁹⁸ and instructed Heytesbury to remind the tsar of his promise,⁹⁹ he did admit, in a calmer moment: "*I can't believe that the Emperor will refuse anything that we have a right to ask... The Emperor of Russia dares not... break faith with this [country]...*"¹⁰⁰ These judgments were, indeed, the fantastic sequel to a decision adopted by the cabinet on August 13, that a Russian occupation of Constantinople must be opposed by force of arms.¹⁰¹

When this farcical tragedy reached its *dénouement*, and the Russians dictated peace to the Turks at Adrianople, the cabinet was still unable to formulate a positive policy. Although the terms had been predicted, with substantial accuracy, in the previous December,¹⁰² there was general agreement that the British protest must await a study of the convention which would fix the Turkish indemnity. Even then the remonstrance was drawn more with an eye to parliament and the English public than to its influence on Russia.¹⁰³ Wellington was more incensed by the clause which provided that merchant ships should be exempt from visitation by Turkish officials in the Straits than by Russia's taking it upon herself to carry out the settlement of Greece under the Treaty of London,¹⁰⁴ and Aberdeen's most incisive comment on the peace was reserved for a dispatch to his brother at Constantinople.

The effects of the war have clearly shown to even the most incredulous, not only that the Porte was utterly unable to contend with any prospect of success against the arms of Russia, but that trusting to its own resources, and without foreign aid, the existence of the Turkish Empire may be said, at this moment, to depend upon the

*absolute will and pleasure of the Emperor Nicholas. It is incontestable that the Sultan will reign only by the sufferance of Russia... It is possible that Austria may in her own defense feel herself compelled, as in the partition of Poland, to join in the commission of an act which she is unable to prevent.*¹⁰⁵

Thus in spite of the opinion of several members that England must fight rather than see Turkey dismembered,¹⁰⁶ the *fait accompli* was accepted and the attempt made merely to secure a slight enlargement of the very limited territory which had been allotted to the new Grecian kingdom.¹⁰⁷

The Russian attack on Turkey did not arouse in other quarters the apprehension and exasperation which it engendered in the minds of Wellington and his cabinet. The Whig portion of the press, for instance, and even some of the Tory papers took issue with the alarmist *Times* and *Herald*, and the Canningite Tories hardly shared the opinions of their more conservative associates. In some unofficial circles there were even firm partisans of Russia, notably in the Whig coterie of which Lord Grey was the Nestor. From the recesses of Northumberland, Grey watched the progress of events carefully, carried on a correspondence with those more actively engaged in politics, particularly Princess Lieven, and was even able to exert some influence upon the negotiations which aimed to fulfill the Treaty of London.¹⁰⁸ He had retained the bias acquired from Fox and expressed so clearly at the time of the Ochakov scare. The opinion which he expressed to Lord Holland, shortly after the outbreak of the Greek Revolution, is a succinct statement of the general Whig position.

*My politics with respect to Greece and Turkey are line for line the same as yours; they are the same that I learnt from your uncle in 1791, and all subsequent reflection has confirmed me in them. I quite agree with you that the danger arising from the extension of Russian power and influence on that side is so remote and contingent as to bear no degree of comparison with the certain evil of the existence of the Turkish Empire.*¹⁰⁹

Throughout the whole controversy he expressed, in terms which imply sincerity, his ardent desire for Anglo-Russian cordiality.¹¹⁰

The opinions of most of the other Whig leaders have not survived. However, the Princess Lieven, a competent witness, reported that the able men were on her side. The Canningite group, the king, and several of the royal dukes were accorded her equal approbation.¹¹¹

In parliament, the whole Eastern Question and particularly its Russian aspect was much less noticed than in the press or in private intercourse. It had been Madame Lieven's judgment that in the session of 1828 Russia would be subjected to the violent attack of the Tories, inspired largely by partisan motives.¹¹² But the change of ministry was attended by a responsibility which necessarily restrained their utterance, while the Whigs were inclined to share the pro-Russian sentiments of their leaders.¹¹³ In the lords, the issue was thrice debated, once on the address in reply to the speech from the throne, and twice, on motions of the Earl of Carnarvon and of Lord Holland, for the production of papers dealing with Turkey, Greece, and the battle of Navarino. On each occasion, the Whig speakers were much more prominent than the Tory, and their remarks very friendly to Russia. Holland, for instance, denied that Turkey was England's ancient ally, and Carnarvon maintained that it was not consistent with the nature of man that the Russians should remain placid spectators at the annihilation of the Greeks. Both peers commended warmly the policy of the Treaty of London. In the commons, Sir John Cam Hobhouse supported his own parallel motion in a speech which was extremely cordial to Russia, and Sir James Mackintosh argued that the treaty was the keystone of the safety of Europe. The Tory leaders, who had determined not to repudiate the treaty, could reply but lamely to these eulogies.¹¹⁴ It is quite clear that any anti-Russian sentiment which may have been felt by the members cannot have influenced greatly either the policy of the government or the opinion of the English people.

During the course of the prolonged Near Eastern crisis, there were two developments outside the strictly political sphere which bore upon Anglo-Russian relations. The growing movement for freer trade, particularly in corn, spurred on by the distress and agitation of the industrial communities, induced the government in June 1825 to send William Jacob, F.R.S., comptroller of corn returns, on a tour of investigation in northern Europe, especially in Prussia and Poland, to determine the probable effect of a modification of duties. His long, interesting, and able report constituted a cogent argument for a relaxation of the restrictions imposed upon the import of corn. His investigations convinced him that neither Prussia nor Poland could ship to English markets a quantity of grain which would seriously impair the prosperity of domestic producers, for the advantage of their lesser expenses in production was removed by the cost of transportation. Jacob's findings were sharply criticized by Disbrowe, who, at Canning's acrid command, then made further investigations. Disbrowe's several long memoranda proved, if accurate, that Poland, and more particularly Russia proper - which was not

considered by Jacob - could export almost unlimited supplies of wheat at a price greatly lower than that prevailing in England. Disbrowe also expressed the opinion that, the progress of Russia's industry having been considerable, her government would lower the tariff on imports only if it were required by a specific reciprocal agreement.¹¹⁵

There was implicit in these investigations the possibility that a policy might be adopted which would augment appreciably the commercial intercourse of England and Russia. Yet that aspect of the problem, with its potential ameliorative influence upon their diplomatic relations, does not appear to have been considered seriously in London. Certainly the members of parliament who furiously debated the merits of the proposed, and partially adopted, alteration in the corn laws gave it scant attention. The ministers even were preoccupied by the partisan and domestic ramifications of their measures. There can be no doubt that Anglo-Russian relations were dominated at this time by considerations not of commercial or domestic but of international politics.

The other extra-political development grew out of the Decembrist insurrection. Although the intensive investigations of the activities of all organizations failed to produce evidence that the Russian Bible Society had been implicated in any subversive enterprise, its dissolution was ordered in 1826. The event did not excite the attention of the English press and was not protested by the government. Even the annual report of the British and Foreign Bible Society contained only a most dispassionate account, which committed *the cause of the Russian Bible Society into the hands of the God of the Bible...* There is no evidence which suggests that the Russian action was resented in England, but it cannot have passed completely unnoticed by the large membership of the British society and it removed one bond which might have mitigated the future antagonism of the two countries.¹¹⁶

Of greater importance than the essentially ephemeral hysterics of the newspapers, and even than the more judicious discussion in the periodicals, were the pamphlets of Colonel George de Lacy Evans, like Wilson, Evans had had a military career which had won him some public reputation and enabled him to speak *as one having authority*. His first brochure, *On the Designs of Russia*, published in August 1828, was noticed widely and on the whole favorably in the London journals. If no one of them accepted his ideas without reservation, all agreed that he had called timely attention to a subject of vital significance.¹¹⁷

Read in the light of subsequent developments, the pamphlet appears to be fantasy of the first water, and, indeed, some contemporaneous commentators so judged it,¹¹⁸ but there were others, not merely harassed newspaper editors, who found much sense in Evans' notions. His method closely resembled that of Wilson, before him, and of the school of David Urquhart, a few years later. The remotest possible consequences of Russia's occupation of Constantinople were assumed to be the inevitable result of the war then in progress. Adducing her uninterrupted growth since the accession of Peter as proof that Russian aggrandizement must continue, Evans agreed that the possession of the world's strongest strategic position would enable her, *ipso facto*, to dominate the Mediterranean and Central Asia and thus to undermine the trade and power of France and Great Britain. With Constantinople as a base, universal dominion was within Russia's easy grasp. Ignoring all the obstacles which might delay the realization of the imagined goal, Evans also assumed that the full strength of the conquered areas, military and naval, political and economic, would immediately accrue to the new sovereign. Not only would the tsar experience no opposition from the inhabitants of those regions, but he would be able to command immediately all their resources and to purchase, with the less valuable portions of his loot, the alliance of the few powers which remained outside his orbit.

Great was the danger conjured up by Evans, but all possibility of escape had not yet vanished. England and France might still be able to rally the free nations of Europe, and with their aid undertake an armed intervention to preserve the Ottoman empire. Should war with Russia be the consequence, it would afford an opportunity to undo all the crimes of the last century, for in spite of the fate of Charles XII and of Napoleon, Russia was not invulnerable. Were her periphery attacked, and her foreign trade annihilated, the Poles would rise against the oppressor, and the nobility against the tsar. Then that semibarbarous despot would be driven back into the steppes of Asia, the balance of power, restored, and Europe once more be free to pursue liberty and happiness.¹¹⁹

John Murray, who published it at 8s.6d., was able to sell five hundred copies of this diatribe, of which the foregoing *précis* is no exaggeration. The *Quarterly* judged it worthy of long quotation and full summary, although entirely dissenting from its conclusions, and a *Non-Alarmist* composed a reasoned refutation.¹²⁰ The scanty evidence available suggests that few Englishmen concurred in Evans' judgment, but his book had great significance, for it stated the case against Russia in the fullest terms and remained as an authority to be cited frequently by later alarmists.

Evans' second brochure, *On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India*, which appeared late in 1829 after the conclusion of peace at Adrianople, was designed to amplify the brief appendix of his first work which, as the *Quarterly* declared, was too cursory a treatment of such a tremendous problem. This pamphlet consisted of a series of long quotations descriptive of conditions in Central Asia from the works of many authorities, English, French, German, and Russian, notable among them being Malcolm, Elphinstone, Kinneir, Fraser, Muraviev, and Meyendorff. The opinions of these specialists were patched together to demonstrate the feasibility of a military expedition to the northwestern frontier. Little was said of Russia's intentions, but great point was made of the recent growth of her commerce in that region. The temperate character of this pamphlet gave it a force which the earlier one lacked.

Evans concluded that the government should institute a thorough investigation of this *dry, but not unimportant* subject, and thus be better prepared to meet the attack which he confidently expected. He anticipated that *the first quarrel with England, whenever that may happen, would, in all probability, be the signal for commencing the operation. if with no other object than as a weapon against the stability of British power.*¹²¹

The public reception of this analysis of the threat to India was much less notable than that accorded it in official circles. Perhaps its relatively dispassionate tone accounts, in part at least, for the slight notice of both the newspaper and periodical presses. Lord Ellenborough, who was doubtless familiar with the implications of Russia's possession of Anapa and Poti, forwarded copies to Kinneir and to Malcolm, and discussed the book with Wellington. The Duke thought that if Russia succeeded in forcing twenty or thirty thousand men into Kabul, England could win a pitched battle, but that their continued presence on the frontier would entail enormous expense and trouble in quelling Indian insurrections. He agreed to allow the Indian government to spend the money required if it were *to act as an Asiatic Power* and told Ellenborough that he was *ready to take up the question . in Europe, if the Russians [should] move towards India with views of evident hostility*. Both statesmen were agreed that commercial intercourse with the Central Asian khanates by way of the Indus should be fostered. Heytesbury was ordered to make a thorough investigation of Russian activity in that region, commercial and other. The ambassador's memorandum and a careful study of the literature of travel, particularly Meyendorff's *Tour in Bokhara*, to which Evans had called his attention, convinced Ellenborough that Great Britain and India could easily undersell Russia in Bokhara, but he was unable to discover what products might be imported in exchange. Thus Evans succeeded in stimulating the official investigation which he desired. The responsible officials concluded, however, that although Russia's conduct required careful observation, there was not in 1830 any immediate danger of an invasion of India.¹²²

Had a competent observer attempted to make an analysis of English opinion about Russia on New Year's Day 1830, he must have concluded that it had undergone a considerable and significant evolution since the death of Castlereagh. The Greek revolution had produced eventually the Russian attack upon Turkey which he had feared and had labored to avert. The policy of concerted action with Russia, inaugurated by Castlereagh, had been intermittently pursued by his successor and had been rewarded by a Russian engagement not to seek special advantage, which the tsar had respected, essentially, in spite of the aggravating conduct of Wellington's cabinet. The territorial status of the Near East had been altered, in consequence, only by the birth of an independent Grecian state, but the balance of power in that region appeared to have been transformed completely. The Ottoman empire lived on only by virtue of the tolerance and the mutual jealousies of her neighbors; Russia, in particular, appeared to be able to step into the heritage which she was generally believed to covet. Her failure in the campaign of 1828 had tarnished her military reputation, but the success of 1829 had restored her prestige, and few men knew how dire had been the condition of her army when peace was signed at Adrianople. All the evidence afforded by English newspapers, periodicals, private papers, and parliamentary debates suggests that the majority of the nation were not seriously alarmed by the growth of Russian power. In the tsar's struggle with the infidel he had had the good wishes of the Whigs, if their views may be inferred from the statements of their leaders. The editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, indeed, had not seen fit to publish an article which treated of Russia more recently than July 1824. The radical *Westminster Review* had printed an initial diatribe, inspired largely by Russia's illiberal political system and her prominence in the league of autocracies, but its subsequent discussions had been far milder and it seems to have appreciated, more than most of its contemporaries, that the war had demonstrated weakness rather than strength.¹²³ The most hysterical political

group were the Tories, although those portions of the party which accepted the opinions of the *Quarterly*, of *Blackwood's*, of the *Morning Post*, or of the *Standard* cannot have shared the apprehensions which pervaded the ministry.

That the cabinet should have been so disturbed may be explained by the mortification attendant upon their impotence and the belief that their competence had been compromised, for they had enjoyed far more complete and trustworthy information than that vouchsafed the public. The embassy in St. Petersburg made reports about the military and the naval, the financial and the general economic strength of Russia which uniformly demonstrated her weakness. After war appeared imminent, the reports had become more searching and more frequent. Heytesbury had even been able to employ a spy, who obtained for him copies of the most confidential Russian documents, and made critical abstracts of their contents, all of which indicated Russia's complete inability, financial and military, to carry on aggressive war.¹²⁴

The published sources of information had increased considerably, and the general portrait which they drew was slowly changing. There were still frequent references to English ignorance of conditions in Russia, but the books themselves tended to fill the void. The pains which several of the authors took to contradict the judgments of their predecessors prove that their knowledge of that country was not derived solely from their own experience, and their works were slowly becoming considered analyses of her condition, rather than mere descriptions of her exotic customs. In periodical articles, in pamphlets, and in newspapers, the Russian menace was beginning to receive a hearing far more serious than it had previously been accorded, even at the time of the Ochakov scare.

Only very occasionally were economic, religious, or even humanitarian considerations discussed. While they must have been present, at least unconsciously, in many minds, they were virtually ignored in the press, in parliament, and even in the cabinet. The value and character of English trade with Russia remained remarkably constant - in 1829 there were imports of £4,180,000 and exports of £3,154,000¹²⁵ - and was apparently taken for granted. The explanation, then, of the changed reputation of Russia must lie in the political sphere. The Persian war had reawakened dormant apprehensions for the safety of India, and the Turkish struggle had seemed to show her restless desire for military adventure. The deliberations of the cabinet were influenced almost entirely by such considerations and they appear also to afford an adequate explanation of the ineffective, pusillanimous policy adopted.

Few observers found the situation so alarming that they advocated a preventive campaign, but there were equally few who were ready to give Russia an absolutely clean bill of health. It is significant that Evans' fantastic indictment received a much more sympathetic hearing than had Wilson's earlier diatribe. Evans, and less vehement alarmists, must have made the politically alert portion of the nation quite familiar with the possible Russian danger, and their works had at least broken the ground for future agitators. It is at reasonable supposition that a large part of the nation entertained no positive opinion; a quantitative estimate of the extent of Russophobia is impossible. But if resort be had again to a legal metaphor, it may be said that while in 1791 Russia had been accorded a Scottish verdict - not proven - she may have escaped conviction on the more serious accusation of 1829 only because the charge had not been pressed by the prosecution.

¹ Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, pp. 349-400, *passim*; Crawley, *Greek Independence* chap. ii.

² *Ibid.* p. 373; F. O. 65/129, nos. 45, 51, Bagot to Castlereagh, 17 Sept., 20 Oct. 1821, private letters, 20 Oct., 29 Nov.; F. O. 65/135, private, 22 Feb., 6 May 1822.

³ Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, p. 361; Hansard, commons, 7 May 1821, col. 541.

⁴ F. O. 95/239, no. 13, Londonderry to Bagot, 28 Oct. 1821. This dispatch is fully summarized, with numerous quotations, in Webster, *Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, pp. 375-379.

⁵ *Times*, 11 April 1821.

⁶ *Chronicle*, 11, 20 April 1821.

⁷ *Chronicle*, 17 July 1821.

⁸ *Herald*, 31 July 1821; cf. 21 June,

⁹ *Times*, 30 July, 22 Aug. 1821.

¹⁰ *Post*, 28 July, 7 Aug. 1821; cf. 31 July, 1 Aug., 13 Sept. 1821.

¹¹ *Globe*, 21 July 1821; cf. 18 June 1821.

¹² E.g., *Times*, 7, 28, 31 Aug. 1821, 8, 10, 12 Jan, 14 March 1822; quotation 27 May 1822; *Chronicle*, 28 May, 7 June 1822; *Herald*, 6 April, 1, 6 June 1823; cf. *Globe* 28 Aug. 1821; *Post*, Jan. 1822, *passim*.

¹³ Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning* (London, 1925), chap. xiv, *passim*.

¹⁴ Public Record Office, G. D. [i.e. Gifts and Deposits] 29/8 Canning to Granville, 17 Jan. 1825.

¹⁵ Temperley, *Canning*, p. 287; Stanley Lane-Poole, *Life of... Stratford Canning* (2 vols., London, 1888), I, 342.

¹⁶ F. O. 352/9, no. 2, 8 Dec. 1824; Lane-Poole, I, 343. The words in small capitals appeared on the original underlined in pencil by a double rule and the words now in italics were underlined by a single rule, but this underscoring does not appear in Lane-Poole.

- ¹⁷ Vide Wellington, *Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda*, 2d Series (London, 1867-1880), I, 431-432, 541-542. Canning to Wellington, Wellington to Canning, 25 Oct., 18 Nov. 1822.
- ¹⁸ F. O. 65/143, no. 42, Bagot to Canning, 24 Aug. 1824.
- ¹⁹ Josceline Bagot, *George Canning and His Friends* (2 vols., London, 1909), II, 198, Canning to Bagot, 20 Aug. 1823; G. D. 29/8, no. 72, Canning to Granville, 13 Aug. 1825.
- ²⁰ Temperley, *Canning*, pp. 287-293. Strangford reciprocated the feeling; cf. his comment on his instructions for his mission to St. Petersburg, "a foolish sneer" F. O. 181/65, no. 2, 14 Oct. 1825.
- ²¹ Wellington, *Despatches*, I, 431, 432, 541, 542.
- ²² Cf. *Annual Register for 1822* (London, 1823), p. 157.
- ²³ Cf. *Times*, 16 Jan. 1823. "It is impossible, perhaps, to make this case of extreme misery better known than it is at present throughout Europe."
- ²⁴ *Annual Register for 1822*, p. 228.
- ²⁵ *Times*, 10 Jan. 1824, cf. 21 Dec. 1825.
- ²⁶ *Post*, 13 Jan. 1823.
- ²⁷ *Times*, *Post*, *Chronicle*, *Herald*, 25 March, 30 May 1825, Nov. 1822, May 1822, *passim*, respectively.
- ²⁸ *Times*, 10 Sept. 1823.
- ²⁹ George L. Nesbitt, *Benthamite Reviewing* (New York, 1934), pp. 44, 178; *Eclectic Review*, March 1821, XV, 284-289; *Scots Magazine*, June 1821, April 1823, LXXXVII, 546-551, XCI, 476-479; *Times*, 14 Feb. 1821; cf. *Edinburgh*, Jan. 1831, art. II; John Bowring, *Specimens of the Russian Poets* (2 vols., London, 1821, 1823).
- ³⁰ *Westminster Review*, Jan. 1824, I, 80--101, *passim*, quotation, p. 80.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, April 1824, I, 453-471.
- ³² Robert Lyall, *The Character of the Russians and a Detailed History of Moscow* (London, 1823), *passim*; *An Account of the Organization, Administration and Present State of the Military Colonies in Russia* (London, 1824); *Travels in Russia, the Crimea, the Caucasus and Georgia* (2 vols., London, 1825); Edward D. Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa* (1st. ed., 3 pts., London, 1810-27); *Edinburgh*, July 1824, XL, 476-494; *Quarterly*, April [i.e. December] 1824, XXXI, 146-166; *Chronicle*, 3 June 1824, 23 Dec. 1825, 7 Sept. 1831; *Times*, 26, 28 Dec. 1825.
- ³³ *Times*, 23, 27 May, 23 Aug. 1822.
- ³⁴ *Chronicle*, 23, 24, 28 May; *Post*, 24 May; *Globe*, 23 May 1822.
- ³⁵ Temperley, *Canning*, pp. 103, 104, 491-493; Lane-Poole, I, 363; F. de Martens, *Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances Etrangères*, XI (St. Petersburg, 1895), 311-312.
- ³⁶ *Post*, *Globe*, 20 Dec. 1825, *Herald*, 13 Jan. 1826, *Times*, 21 Dec. 1825, respectively; cf. *Chronicle*, 22, 23 Dec. 1825.
- ³⁷ *Times*, 14 Jan. 1826; *Post*, 20 Dec. 1825; *Globe*, *Herald*, 30 Dec. 1825; cf. *Times*, 11 Jan., *Post*, 27 Jan. 1826, *Gentleman's Magazine*, Jan. 1826, XCVI, 81-86, *Examiner*, 25 Dec. 1825.
- ³⁸ Temperley, *Canning*, chap. xv; Crawley, *Greek Independence*, chap. iv.
- ³⁹ F. O. 65/153, no. 2, Canning to Wellington, 10 Feb. 1826; printed in Wellington, *Despatches*, III, 85-93.
- ⁴⁰ F. O. 65/155, nos. 13, 14, Wellington to Canning, 4 April 1826; printed in Wellington, *Despatches*, III, 224-251.
- ⁴¹ G. D. 29/8, nos. 16, 17, Canning to Granville, 4, 14 April 1826; printed in part in A. G. Stapleton, *George Canning and His Times* (London 1859), pp. 472-473.
- ⁴² Wellington, *Despatches*, III, *passim*, particularly 113-116, 254-259, 282-283, 290-296, 302-307.
- ⁴³ E.g. *Post*, 27, 30 Jan, 9, 26 May; *Chronicle*, 26 May; *Herald*, 6 April, 5 May; *Times*, 30 Jan, 10, 11, 15, 16 Feb, 22 March, 5, 26, 27 May 1826.
- ⁴⁴ *Times*, 9 May 1826; *ibid.*, 6, 8 April, 8 May; *Globe*, 23 May 1826.
- ⁴⁵ Sykes, *Persia*, II 416-421; Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, II, 154-178; F. M. (Acalister), *Memoir of ... Sir John McNeill* (London, 1910), pp. 94-105.
- ⁴⁶ Disbrowe to Canning, F. O. 65/158, nos. 26, 27, Aug. 17, 23; /159, nos. 35, 36, Sept. 19, 20, 1826; /164, nos. 12, 14, March 22, April 4; /165, nos. 40, 41, July 31; /166, no. 84, Nov. 21, 1827; /172 no. 5, April 5, 1828. Canning to Disbrowe, F. O. 181/69, no. 13, Sept. 24, 1826; /72, nos. 5, 6, n, June 27, Oct. 8, 1827; particularly F. O. 65/164, nos. 12, 14; /165, nos. 40, 41; 181/72, nos. 5, 6, 11.
- ⁴⁷ *Herald*, 19 Oct. 1826, 31 Dec. 1827. *Ibid.*, 11 July, 13, 23, 31 Oct., 13, 25 Dec. 1827; *Times*, 19, 20 Sept., 16, 17 Oct., 6, 7 Nov. 1826, 24 July, 13, 23 Oct., 7, 26 Nov., 11, 12, 29 Dec. 1827, 1 Jan. 1828; *Chronicle*, 18 Oct. 1826, 29 Dec. 1827; *Post*, 19, 20, 22 Sept., 17, 18 Oct. 1826, 24 July, 26 Sept., 29 Dec. 1827; *Globe*, 19 Sept., 17 Oct. 1826, 24 July, 11 Dec. 1827, 1 Jan. 1828; *Standard*, 12, 22 Oct., 6, 26 Nov., 10, 12, 28 Dec. 1827.
- ⁴⁸ *Quarterly*, June 1827, XXXVI, 106-139, quotations, pp. 107, 136.
- ⁴⁹ *Quarterly*, Oct. 1827, XXXVI, 390-391.
- ⁵⁰ Temperley, *Canning*, chaps. xv, xvii, *passim*, quotation, p. 391; Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 59-62.
- ⁵¹ Wellington, *Despatches*, III, 402-406, quotations, pp. 402, 405.
- ⁵² The fact that the negotiations took place in London, under Canning's immediate supervision, added to the fact that his new office entailed very heavy additional duties, affords an adequate explanation of the nonexistence of a written formulation of his purposes. Cf. Temperley, *Canning*, pp. 397-403; Crawley, *Greek Independence*, chap. v.
- ⁵³ Ellenborough, *A Political Diary* (2 vols., London, 1881), I, 9.
- ⁵⁴ *Times*, 8 Jan., 4, 19 June, 2, 10 July; *Post*, 30 April, 6 June; *Herald* 11 July; *Globe*, 4 June, 9 July 1837.
- ⁵⁵ *Times*, 12, 13 July; *Globe*, *Post*, 12 July; *Herald*, 14 July 1827.
- ⁵⁶ *Times*, 26 Sept. 1827; cf. *Standard*, 26 Sept., *Times*, 19, 25 Sept., 5, 6, 9, 25 Oct. 1827.
- ⁵⁷ *Herald*, 24 Oct. 1827. *Ibid.*, 27 Sept., 31 Oct., 3 Nov., *Post*, 19, 23, 29, 30, Oct., 3, 7, 8, 9 Nov. 1827.
- ⁵⁸ *Post*, 24 Dec. 1827. *Ibid.*, virtually every day 12 Nov. - 31 Dec. 1827; *Herald*, 12 Nov., 25 Dec., *Standard*, 12 Dec. 1827.
- ⁵⁹ E.g. *Times*, 22 Dec. 1827.
- ⁶⁰ *Times*, 12 Dec. 1827. *Ibid.*, *passim*. Nov. & Dec. 1827, 1, 30 Jan. 1828, *Chronicle*, 14 Dec. 1827, *Globe*, 27 Nov., 22 Dec. 1827, 3, 12 Jan. 1828.
- ⁶¹ *Times*, 22, 17 March, 28 April 1828.
- ⁶² Vide infra, pp. 101, 102.
- ⁶³ *Times*, 22, 23, 26 Aug.; Oct., Nov. 1828, *passim*, quotations 11 Sept., 27 Oct. 1829.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 16 Oct. 1829.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 15 Oct. 1829.
- ⁶⁶ *Herald*, 1, 27 Aug. 1828.
- ⁶⁷ *Herald*, 19 Oct. 1829.
- ⁶⁸ *Post*, 17 May, 29 Aug., 1, 8, 16 Oct., 5 Nov. 1828, 7, 15, 19, 21, 22, 25 May, 9 Sept., 15, 16 Oct. 1829; *Standard*, 13 March, 12, 16, 17 May, 26, 29, 30 Sept., 3, 7, 8, 10 Oct. 1828, 1 Jan., 20, 21 July, 24 Aug., 16, 21 Sept., 5, 14, 16, 19 Oct. 1829.
- ⁶⁹ *Chronicle*, n March 1828; cf. 13, 14, 17, 18, 29 March.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 19 March 1828.

- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 19 June, 15, 16, Oct. 1829.
- ⁷² *Globe*, 17 March, 25, 26 Aug. 1828, 19 May, 14, 17 Oct. 1829.
- ⁷³ E. L. Bulwer, *Life of ... Viscount Palmerston* (2 vols., London, 1870), I, 224, Palmerston to Temple, 25 March 1828.
- ⁷⁴ Wellington, *Despatches*, IV, 277-278, Wellington to La Ferronays, 26 Feb. 1828.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 283-284.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 285.
- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 303, 312.
- ⁷⁸ Bulwer, *Palmerston*, I, 236.
- ⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 229-250; Ellenborough, *Diary*, I, i-m, *passim*.
- ⁸⁰ Crawley, *Greek Independence*, chap, viii; Wellington, *Despatches*, IV, 444-449 S26-527.
- ⁸¹ Wellington, *Despatches*, IV, 421.
- ⁸² Ellenborough, *Diary*, II, 88.
- ⁸³ F. O. 181/74, no. 4, Aberdeen to Heytesbury, 13 June 1828. Intended for Heytesbury's eyes alone, the instructions presumably reflect accurately the views of the government.
- ⁸⁴ F. O. 65/173, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, Separate and Secret, 17 Aug. 1828.
- ⁸⁵ Quotations, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, F. O. 65/180, Separate and Secret, 29 June 1829; /181, Separate, 30 Sept. 1829; cf. also Heytesbury to Aberdeen, F. O. 65/173, Separate and Secret, 17 Oct., no. 61, 11 Dec. 1828; /179, no. 12, separate (2), 26 Jan., 20 April, 23 May 1829.
- ⁸⁶ Crawley, *Greek Independence*, chap, viii; Ellenborough, *Diary*, I, 211; II, 92-93, 149-150, 153.
- ⁸⁷ Crawley, *Greek Independence*, chap, vii, viii, *passim*; Wellington, *Despatches* IV, V, *passim*, particularly IV, 527; V, 78, 312, 341, 417.
- ⁸⁸ Ellenborough, *Diary*, I, 235.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 231, II, 82, 87; Wellington, *Despatches*, V, 55-56.
- ⁹⁰ Ellenborough, *Diary*, I, *passim*.
- ⁹¹ E.g., memorandum of 24 April 1829, Wellington, *Despatches*, V, 598-599.
- ⁹² Wellington, *Despatches*, VI, 198.
- ⁹³ Ellenborough, *Diary*, II, 24-83, particularly 25, 49, 83.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 2.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 86; Wellington, *Despatches*, VI, 92.
- ⁹⁶ Wellington, *Despatches*, VI, 13-14, 14 July 1829.
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, VI, 57, 29 July 1829.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, VI, 79-83, memorandum of 12 Aug. 1829.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, VI, 112, 117, Wellington to Aberdeen, 27, 28 Aug. 1829.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 103, 99, Wellington to Aberdeen, 24, 21 Aug. 1829.
- ¹⁰¹ Ellenborough, *Diary*, II, 86.
- ¹⁰² Wellington, *Despatches*, V, 303, Polignac to Wellington, 2 Dec. 1828.
- ¹⁰³ Ellenborough, *Diary*, II, 147.
- ¹⁰⁴ Wellington, *Despatches*, VI, 268-271, 286, memoranda of 29 Oct., 4 Nov. 1829.
- ¹⁰⁵ Copy of Aberdeen to Gordon, 10 Nov. 1829, enclosed in Aberdeen to Heytesbury, 8 Dec. 1829; F. O. 181/79, no. 29, confidential.
- ¹⁰⁶ Wellington, *Despatches*, V, 213; Ellenborough, *Diary* f I, 236, II, 49, 82-87.
- ¹⁰⁷ Wellington, *Despatches*, VI, 2 12-2 19, 225-227.
- ¹⁰⁸ Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 174, 176; Guy le Strange, ed., *The Correspondence of the Princess Lieven and Lord Grey* (3 vols., London, 1890), I, *passim*; G. M. Trevelyan, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill* (2d ed., London, 1929), 228-230.
- ¹⁰⁹ Trevelyan, *Lord Grey*, p. 227.
- ¹¹⁰ le Strange, *Lieven-Grey Correspondence*, I, 142-334, *passim*.
- ¹¹¹ L. G. Robinson, *Letters of Dorothea, Princess Lieven* (London, 1902), pp. 1 10-201; A. de Nesselrode, ed. *Lettres et Papiers du Chancelier comte de Nesselrode* (Paris, 1904-1912), VII, 45; cf. Spencer Walpole, *Life of Lord John Russell* (2 vols., London, 1889), I, 152-153.
- ¹¹² Robinson, *Lieven Letters*, p. 114, 17 Dec. 1827.
- ¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123, 20 Feb. 1828.
- ¹¹⁴ Hansard, lords, 29 Jan., particularly cols. 18-22, 11 Feb., particularly 266, 16 July 1828, 19 June 1829; commons, 14 Feb. 1828, particularly 373-374, 408-409, 1 June 1829.
- ¹¹⁵ D. G. Barnes, *A History of the English Corn Laws* (London, 1930), pp. 187-202; F. O. 65/159, no. 56, / 165, nos. 36, 53, /166, nos. 73, 76, Disbrowe to Canning and to Dudley, 16 Nov. 1826, 10 July, 16 Sept., 27 Oct. 1827; F. O. 181/72, no. 2, Canning to Disbrowe, 7 Feb. 1827.
- ¹¹⁶ British and Foreign Bible Society, Twenty-third Report (London, 1827), p. xl; cf. W. R. Wilson, *Travels in Russia* (2 vols., London, 1828), II, 125-129; *Quarterly*, March 1827, XXXV, 384. In March 1835, the *Eclectic Review*, a non-conformist organ, remarked in reviewing a book on Russia by Pinkerton, one of the society's agents; "Let us not delude ourselves by imagining that the triumph of Christianity can be aided by the extension of a nominally Christian empire based on the degradation and ignorance of the people, and bearing the anti-Christian mark of religious intolerance." (3d Series, XIII, 165.)
- ¹¹⁷ *Times*, 22, 23, Aug., *Chronicle*, 23, 25 Aug., *Globe*, 25, Aug. 1828.
- ¹¹⁸ E.g., *Examiner*, 7 Sept. 1828.
- ¹¹⁹ George de Lacy Evans, *On the Designs of Russia* (London, 1828), *passim*.
- ¹²⁰ *Quarterly*, Jan. 1829, XXXIX, 30-40; *A Few Words on our Relations with Russia*, by a Non-Alarmist (London, 1829). For the sales' figure I am indebted to Lord Gorell, a present partner in John Murray.
- ¹²¹ George de Lacy Evans, *On the Practicability of an Invasion of British India* (London, 1829), *passim*, particularly pp. 86-101, quotations, pp. 87, 92.
- ¹²² Ellenborough, *Diary*, II, 92, 122-125, 137, 150, 153, 157, 206, 361; F. O. 181/79, no. 33, Aberdeen to Heytesbury, 23 Dec. 1829, enclosing a questionnaire from the India office; F. O. 65/185, nos. 26, 33, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 28 Feb., 11 March 1830.
- ¹²³ Cf. *Westminster*, Oct. 1830, art. IX.
- ¹²⁴ F. O. 65, *passim*.
- ¹²⁵ Crawley, *Greek Independence*, p. 229.

V. THE POLISH REVOLUTION

The events of 1830 were patently of transcendent import. The settlement negotiated at Vienna had not remained unchallenged until then, but the Spanish and Italian upheavals of 1820 had been successfully repressed and Greece and the Spanish colonies lay outside the area protected by the Viennese engagements. Thus the Act of Vienna remained intact in theory, if the jealousies of the powers had disrupted its ideological foundation. The French and Belgian revolutions, in contrast, were a manifest infringement of the principle of legitimacy. They proved that even in Europe peoples might impose their wills upon monarchs with impunity.

Although England had been the major dissident from the Holy Alliance and had herself first destroyed the harmony of the concert of Europe, the new situation affected her more profoundly than it did the three eastern autocracies. They were able to emerge, apparently unscathed, from the challenge to their fundamental principles implicit in the popular victories in France and in Belgium. England, however, was no longer the outstanding representative of the opposing system of government. The implications of the new international situation were more immediately apparent and hardly less significant than the ensuing revolution by Reform which in 1832 made her once more the most liberal of European states. Upon the ruins of the Holy Alliance there arose in the west a constitutional entente which balanced the league of autocrats; a *guerre des idées* became a less remote possibility.

The influence of the new alignment was promptly reflected in the relations of England and Russia. If the decade and a half which followed the Congress of Vienna be properly denominated the *Age of Metternich*, it deserves that appellation because the Austrian chancellor most fully represented the reaction which was the most obvious characteristic of the period and exercised an influence over European politics apparently greater than that of any other statesman. But in many ways the policies of France, of Russia, and of England were actually more significant, because they were more positive, more fully integrated with the forces which were determining the evolution of European politics. For example, it was the rivalry between England and Russia which first seriously disturbed the superficial harmony of the concert, and it was hardly an accident that a solution of the Greek question was built upon an agreement between them to which France was later admitted. It may well be that the events of the period were more affected by the policies of England, of Russia, and of France than by that of Austria.

The revolution of July instantly transformed the relative positions of the three former states. France could no longer occupy the intermediate position in which she profited from the pacific struggle between England and Russia. Nicholas, whose advent to the throne had precipitated the Decembrist insurrection, entertained a horror and fear of revolution quite untempered by any liberal sentiment. The events of July thus excited his profound apprehension, in spite of the fact that, for more than a year, he had anticipated trouble in France. His government interdicted the publication of news from Paris and ordered Russian subjects to evacuate France.¹ The news that, on Wellington's advice, William IV had promptly recognized Louis Philippe was very unwelcome to Nicholas, who was seeking the joint action of the powers and had declared against a usurper.² Nevertheless, the existence in France of a *régime* founded on revolution ameliorated his relations with England. She was no longer the focus of the malignant, liberal virus, and was pledged to resist any possible imperialistic crusade by a France once more subject to a Jacobinical mania.

The moderation of the new French government soon allayed the tsar's apprehensions and he determined, in not very enthusiastic deference to the English example, to recognize Louis Philippe. Although the spread of disorder to Brussels did not appear at first to be very alarming and some assurance was derived from Wellington's decision not to allow the total separation of the two Netherlands, several Russian army corps were placed upon a war footing. Heytesbury's dispatches emphasized the Russian desire for complete cooperation with England, and the news that the Russian minister would be ordered to follow England's lead in circumstances not anticipated in his instructions must have been received with satisfaction in London. Matushevich's personal decision to take part in the conferences which Aberdeen initiated to settle the Belgian problem pacifically was promptly approved in St. Petersburg.³ England was already profiting from the new medial position in which she had been placed by the July revolution. The desire of the powers at each extreme to gain her support facilitated her effort to guide the course of events.

The nascent Anglo-Russian *entente* was shattered by two events, each in large measure a consequence of the July revolution. In England, a new parliament defeated the government of Wellington, and Lord Grey became the leader of a Whig ministry pledged to Reform. Although Grey was an intimate friend of the Lievens, and his advent was hailed by the princess with a satisfaction heightened by her belief, erroneous in fact, that she had procured the selection of Palmerston for the foreign office,⁴ the ministerial change was not really propitious to Anglo-Russian friendship. Grey might remember the Foxite tradition of amity dating from 1791, and Wellington had certainly not forgotten his bitter disapproval of Russia's course with regard to Greece and Turkey, but basically the Duke's political propensities were more congenial to Russia than were those of the Whig earl. Wellington's distrust arose out of a particular policy, an issue now dead - its later resurrection could not have been predicted with certainty - and a conflict of policy is intrinsically more susceptible to compromise than is one of principle. From the Russian point of view, the Reform ministry bore some of the stigmata of Jacobinism.

The Polish revolution, in November, followed the resignation of Wellington so closely that its outbreak was known in St. Petersburg before news had arrived of the new English cabinet. It immediately made impossible an armed Russian intervention in Belgian affairs and thus facilitated the negotiation which Palmerston inherited enthusiastically from Aberdeen. Russia's desire to secure English good will was increased by her domestic difficulties; certainly the tsar made no serious objection to the declaration of Belgian independence, in spite of his earlier satisfaction that such a step was not contemplated in London. It was only after the complete suppression of the Polish rising that he adduced his family alliance with the house of Orange as a reason for dissenting from the decisions of the conference in London. Russia, likewise, readily agreed to British proposals for a modification of the Greek frontier. Happy to accept any arrangement which suited England, she feared only that Turkish recalcitrance might impede a final settlement.⁵

The Polish question, largely one of principle, soon proved to be incapable of harmonious adjustment. Opinion in England was aroused and only her inability to press the case prevented the growth of a dispute which might have developed into war. France, inspired by a similar political idea, adopted an identical position, but Russia did not yield to protests. The issue, abandoned eventually by the governments, lingered in the public mind and embittered subsequent international intercourse.

France took the first step in December, with a proposal for a joint mediation between the tsar and his revolted subjects. At that time the English government was unwilling to add to Russia's embarrassments. In March 1831, however, in accordance with a promise to the French ambassador, Palmerston made a dispatch from Heytesbury, which suggested the probability of a *material change of system with respect to the future Government of Poland*, the ostensible foundation for the mild remonstrance which he instructed Heytesbury to make to the Russian government. Explaining that the members of the cabinet were *more than ever desirous of keeping up the closest relations of friendship*, he recognized the extreme delicacy of the situation. This revolution was unlike most internal upheavals, for Russia's connection with Poland was based upon an international agreement. The Polish constitution, promulgated in compliance with the Act of Vienna, specifically decreed that only Polish troops should garrison the kingdom. Palmerston argued that one purpose of this provision was to free Prussia and Austria, whose capitals were very near the Polish frontier, from too great a dependence upon Russia. *These considerations*, he added, *have acquired additional weight since that time, in consequence of the increased security which Russia has acquired on her Southern and on her Asiatick frontiers, by the success of her arms over the Turks and the Persians...*⁶

When Heytesbury undertook the delicate task of discussing Nicholas' treatment of his revolted subjects, Nesselrode disputed most of Palmerston's arguments. He maintained that the Treaty of Vienna provided no particular constitution for Poland, and that the Poles themselves, having denounced and abrogated the existing one, had enabled the tsar to replace it as appeared to him to be expedient. Surely it was inconsequential what uniform was worn by loyal subjects. Prussia and Austria might be trusted to remonstrate, should they discover that Russia threatened their security. In short, Nesselrode repudiated the right of England or France to interfere in the internal affairs of the tsar's dominions. His declaration that Nicholas would adhere to Russia's contracted engagements afforded but slight satisfaction.⁷

The Russian position was further explained by Heytesbury. Even in Russia, he declared, public opinion must be considered, and so great would be the exasperation of Nicholas' loyal subjects if the rebels were not punished for the great expenditure of blood and treasure that such magnanimity

could not be unattended by personal danger to the tsar.⁸ He seems to have felt less sympathy for the Poles than did most of his contemporaries in London and Paris. He was disposed to agree with the representatives of Austria and Prussia that France, not Russia, was the great menace to European tranquillity. *The secret of the weakness of Russia for offensive war was partly disclosed by the Turkish campaign. It has since been made more manifest by the Polish War.* This judgment was amplified in another dispatch.

The effect of this successful struggle on the part of the Poles has been very sensibly felt in the provinces more anciently conquered, where Russian dominion seemed to be eternally secured by the universal conviction of the inutility of resistance. All this proves the little solidity of the Colossal Empire, which has so long been the bug-bear of Europe, and shows how little able Russia really is to support those lofty pretensions, whether of menace or succour, which she is so ready to put forward...

*But in what state will Russia be left after having accomplished her object? She will have reestablished her rule indeed over a ruined country, and a subdued yet still exasperated people; but her military means will be seriously crippled, and her finances entirely exhausted.*⁹

In July and again in September, the cabinet declined to undertake with France a joint mediation, but when the revolt was finally suppressed, Heytesbury was ordered to urge moderation upon the Russian government again, in spite of his reiterated advice that such a procedure would jeopardize Anglo-Russian cordiality. Written perhaps with concern for what might be said in parliament, Palmerston's dispatch repudiated the Russian interpretation of the Polish clauses of the Treaty of Vienna. Heytesbury skillfully fulfilled his unwelcome and difficult task, but elicited only an assertion of the validity of an opposing Austro-Prussian interpretation of the relevant portion of the Treaty of Vienna. When, in 1832, the organic statute for Poland was published, England did not reopen the question.¹⁰

Few subjects could have been better calculated than the Polish revolution to attract the attention of the English newspaper press. Distant memories of *the greatest crime in history*, no less than more recent fears of Russian aggrandizement in the east, commended it to English readers. If the struggle was briefer than the Greek revolution, its relative propinquity aided the receipt of news, and, from the first vague rumors which reached London in mid-December 1830 until the fall of Warsaw was announced in the following September, hardly an issue of the metropolitan papers failed to include some more or less well-authenticated report or editorial commentary. From the very beginning, the Poles were accorded unanimous sympathy, even the reactionary *Morning Post* agreeing that theirs was a worthy cause.¹¹ This virtual uniformity, so unlike the treatment accorded the Eastern question, makes unnecessary for the purposes of this study the detailed consideration of more than one typical journal, and it presumably reflects a similar agreement on the subject among the British public.

It was on December 14, three days after the first intimations of an insurrection in Warsaw, that the *Times* first pronounced an editorial judgment upon the significance of the unexpected events. Already it had discovered an explanation of the Russian armaments and had decided that the west of Europe had been set free *from any fears of an anti-revolutionary crusade*.¹² There was no longer any danger of intervention in France or Belgium.

But this is far from being the brightest part of the prospect which opens on humanity. The world has not yet forgotten, and can never forget, the flagitious conspiracy of despots by which the old European system was broken in upon, and by which an ancient and independent kingdom was parcelled out and divided among the royal plunderers, by the employment of perfidies, cruelties and massacres, scarcely paralleled in the annals of ferocious barbarians. It has not forgotten the atrocious oppressions to which the brave and unfortunate Poles have been subjected by the victors. It is, therefore, doubly gratifying to every friend of national independence and civil freedom to be able to indulge the hope, however transitory, of seeing this brave people appear again on the stage of the world endeavoring to assert their national identity and avenge at least part of their long account of wrongs, if not definitely to regain their national rights.

From this diatribe delivered indiscriminately against all three partitioning powers - it was not altogether chance that they were also the present league of autocracies - the article advanced to a consideration of Russia's probable action. Nicholas, it was stated, had too many nations subject to his power to allow him the option of permitting unpunished or unrestricted revolt. The example would be too contagious. The Poles must prepare themselves to resist *the whole force of the Empire*. Unfortunately their chance of success was slight.¹³

During the next few days the *Times* canvassed the possibility of foreign, particularly French, intervention, which it judged would be quixotic. It gave a prominent position to a series of letters from *Polonius*, one of which stressed the commercial value of an independent Poland. *Polonius* contended that the resurrected state would adopt a policy of free trade, and since the exports of Danzig, Königsberg,

and Odessa were already largely Polish in origin, her commerce would flourish. The obvious economic advantage to Great Britain would be no less than the political gain derived from the geographical separation of the three autocracies. There was constant reference to the unbearable wrongs and cruelties inflicted upon the Poles. Indeed a Polish manifesto was described as *the most important exposure of national grievances since the celebrated declaration of independence by the United States of North America*.¹⁴

During the spring, the fortune of war invited continued speculation about the ultimate outcome. Early hopes for Polish victory were belied by the success of the first Russian attack, but the subsequent retreat revived some optimism. At no time were the Poles judged to have more than an improbable chance. In March, a rumor that the tsar might incorporate Poland directly in his Russian territories elicited a discussion of the terms of the Treaty of Vienna remarkably similar to Palmerston's almost exactly contemporaneous dispatch. The *Times* concluded that such a violation of the treaty would justify British intervention, were such a course expedient.¹⁵

By the beginning of July, the enthusiasm of the *Times* led it to attack the indecision of the European cabinets in not acknowledging Polish independence and initiating mediation.¹⁶ Finally the editors were ready to advise British intervention.

How long will Russia be permitted, with impunity, to make war upon the ancient and noble nation of the Poles, the allies of France, the friends of England, the natural, and, centuries ago, the tried and victorious protectors of civilized Europe against the Turkish and Muscovite barbarians? ...

*The Polish Question, indeed, contains all that was ever contemplated as an argument or authority by the advocates of Greek interference. By the war of Russia against Poland, commerce is extensively restrained and embarrassed. The pacific enterprises and occupations of the whole of Europe are disturbed, patriot and Christian blood is poured out in torrents, and, more than was ever alleged of the Greek contest, the invasion of Russia against the unhappy Poles has been the channel through which pestilence [i.e. cholera] invades the whole continent and threatens nearly these sea-encircled islands... That the French and British ministers are bound to answer that question in a very different manner [from 1791] every friend of Mr. Pitt's reputation will surely concur with us in affirming. The equilibrium of Europe, and the faith of treaties both speak trumpet-tongued for our interference in behalf of Poland... Never did such an opportunity arise for achieving an immortal benefit to Europe.*¹⁷

The news of Czartoryski's resignation, at first a rude shock to the *Times*, was later adduced as a further argument for prompt intervention. Even the fall of Warsaw did not immediately dim its ardor. *Polish courage, Polish revenge, and the unquenchable hatred of the Poles to their barbarous conquerors remain as powerful as ever...* But the war was virtually at an end, and, with the cessation of stirring news, the subject soon disappeared from the columns of the newspaper. In a parting sally, the editors once more deplored British passivity, declared that peace was now more precarious than ever before, and insinuated that the Princess Lieven had greatly *helped to weigh down the hopes and better fortune of humanity*.¹⁸

The echoes of the heroic struggle were long in dying. Well into 1832 any news which concerned Russia in the least might induce the publication of another diatribe. Her support of the King of Holland in the Belgian negotiations, for example, was frequently attributed to an infamous ulterior motive. But of all the subjects which aroused indignation, the reports of barbarities in the restoration of order in Poland were the most provocative. It has been seen that the rebellion itself evoked incessant animadversions to Russian cruelty. Her repressive measures were even more provocative. The full and unusually dispassionate editorial article on the Russian punitive measures which appeared in the *Times* early in January 1832 was a fair sample of many discussions in English newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and travel books. It analyzed the several repressive policies adopted in the reconquered country - the closing of the University of Warsaw, the abolition of school instruction in Polish and in French, the confiscation of real and personal property, with the consequent pauperization of exiled patriots, the torture of those who had not escaped, and the transfer to Russia of the contents of Polish libraries and museums. It was explained that the Russian army of occupation maintained its position by force alone under considerable personal danger.

*The Poles who remain at home in their own land, watered with the blood of their fellow patriots, can do nothing to arrest such military oppression, and such barbarous injustice, but they manifest no inclination to display a slavish acquiescence... The Russians are abhorred in Poland, and... [there is] little chance of permanent tranquillity under, their barbarous tyranny.*¹⁹

The publication of the organic statute evoked a diatribe against Russian perfidy. The *Times* asked how could the civilized nations of Europe still put any trust in the engagements of such a government, or continue to covet its friendship.²⁰

The slight divergencies between the treatment accorded the Polish revolt by the *Times* and by the other journals deserve brief notice. The *Morning Chronicle* paid great attention to the efforts to raise money in England in behalf of the Poles. It never explicitly advocated English intervention, and it found in these events conclusive evidence that the Russian menace, which it had previously discounted, was illusory.²¹

The *Globe* gave rather more emphasis to the struggle as a manifestation of the general conflict between liberty and despotism.²² The *Evening Standard* found in the English official quiescence a useful club with which to belabor the Whigs, attributing the Polish defeat to the vicious foreign policy of Palmerston.²³ The *Morning Herald*, unlike the *Chronicle*, found proof of the Russian menace.²⁴

The only really dissentient voice in the metropolitan press was that of the ultra-Tory *Morning Post*. It alone professed to believe that the Polish insurrection was merely a manifestation of the general spirit of revolution rampant in Europe. Nevertheless, it wished that the cause of the Poles might be dissociated from that of revolution in general, and even hoped that the tsar would receive in Poland a condign punishment for his apostasy in Greece.²⁵ Its parody of the speech from the throne at the opening of the session of parliament which first considered the great Reform Bill deserves quotation.

The Czar of all the hems and tallows
Has lately sentenced to the gallows,
A gang of rebel rogues called Poles,
Not more than sixteen million souls!
This my paternal bosom rends,
Of justice sure 't would serve the ends,
To execute some few as samples,
One or two millions for example,
And spare the rest, confirmed in duty
Thus by compassion's native beauty;
But if the conqueror of the Turk,
Should onward to this hardy work,
The friends of freedom, bound by treaties,
And honour's law, as ever meet is,
By scorning to foment alarms,
By aid with money, men, or arms,
Will yet in whispers to each other,
Forbear to praise their royal Brother,
Nor scruple 'mongst themselves to say
'Alas, Alas, and well-a-day!
Non-intervention is our rule,
A modern Quixote is a fool.'
Here then, as Kings, Allies, and Friends,
Our sympathy begins and ends,
And England leaves the Poles to chance,
The D - I, or providence, or France.²⁶

Later the *Post* forgot its sympathy with the rebels, and denied England's right to intervene, since the Treaty of Vienna, it declared, had been abrogated by all parties. It added, *no people... ever enjoyed more fully the blessings of good, paternal Government than the misled Poles...*²⁷

The most enduring influence of the Polish revolution upon English thought with regard to Russia was its humanitarian appeal. Added to the several other counts in the indictment of Russia was an element, hitherto almost entirely lacking, which associated it with a particularly pregnant current in the social development of nineteenth-century England. If the suppression of Poland in 1795 had horrified men of all classes and inspired poets to articulate the shrieks of freedom, those stirrings of nascent, Romantic nationalism had given the world several immortal phrases, but they had not been comple-

mented by any positive action. In 1830 the potentialities of the political and propagandist activity of well-integrated groups had been demonstrated by the Jacobins of the French revolution, the Hampden Clubs of England, and the Catholic Association of Ireland. The enslaved and suffering Greeks unquestionably owed their freedom in large measure to the effective mobilization of the Romantic and humanitarian instincts of France and England. Should not the Poles benefit also from a comparable appeal to public sentiment?

On December 27, 1830, the *Morning Chronicle* published a letter from two gentlemen who suggested that subscriptions be raised in behalf of the Polish cause. A month later the editor commended the proposal, arguing that only great pecuniary resources could save Poland and that a philanthropic campaign would serve also to arouse public opinion. On the following day, he acknowledged the receipt of subscriptions of ten guineas and seven shillings. The idea took. Some days later a public meeting voted a perfervid address to the Poles and collected £13/14/-. Other contributions came in, some of them forwarded by a newspaper in Leicester. The total sum amassed by these means was inconsiderable, - only £46/11/- was acknowledged in the *Chronicle* - but a general movement had been initiated.²⁸

Several well-attended banquets in London and the larger provincial cities served to excite enthusiasm. Among the guests at a dinner in honor of the Polish envoy, the Marquess Wielopolski, were Bowring, Hobhouse, Hume, O'Connell, Buller, and Thomas Campbell. The liberties of France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain were associated with that of Poland in flamboyant speeches and toasts. The meeting was interrupted dramatically by the departure of the members of parliament to attend the debate on the Reform Bill. The emphasis on the cause of freedom in general hardly requires comment, but the fact that most of the noted guests were prominent radicals deserves notice. The account of the celebration filled three columns of the *Times*.²⁹ The Polish government endeavored to raise a loan of £2-3,000,000 by the sale of bonds of small denomination, but although several prominent banking firms acted as agents, the necessity of offering an extremely high rate of interest and of resorting to a lottery shows the low rating of Polish credit.³⁰ The attendance of a thousand denizens of London at a meeting which bewailed the fall of Warsaw is evidence that the movement was not without its influence upon English opinion.³¹

This latter catastrophe might well have discouraged English sympathizers and ended their efforts to aid Poland. Thomas Campbell prevented such a result. After having maturely considered the problem, he devoted most of his time, with the aid of Lords Camperdown and Panmure, of Sheil, Wyse, Mackinnon, de Lacy Evans, and other members of the lower house, to the formation in the spring of 1832 of the Literary Association of the Friends of Poland.³² The formal constitution of the society proclaimed that it was *instituted for the general knowledge of the history and events of the ancient kingdom of Poland and for collecting all such information as may tend to preserve in the public mind of Great Britain a lively interest in the condition of that country*. Its major activities consisted in semi-monthly meetings, a special annual commemoration of the birthday of Kosciuszko, the publication of a monthly magazine, *Polonia*, the collection of a library of Poloniana, and the relief of distressed exiles.³³

Branch societies were established in Hull, Birmingham, Nottingham, Leeds, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and probably elsewhere, largely through the efforts of Count Plater, who became an itinerant promoter. Their activities were similar to those of the parent association, their more democratic nature obviating some of the handicaps which curtailed the membership and influence of the former. The Hull society undertook the publication of the *Hull Polish Record* and that in Glasgow printed full accounts of the proceedings of its annual meetings. Both the periodicals contained sketches of Polish history, diplomatic documents, extremely vivid descriptions of the cruelties inflicted on the Poles, reprints of the apposite speeches in parliament, and detailed accounts of propagandist meetings.

The precise influence of this pro-Polish movement must remain a matter of speculation. Several of the societies enjoyed a life of many years, although *Polonia* and the *Hull Polish Record* both met an early death. They formed a focus for philo-Poles and kept in close touch with sympathetic members of parliament. They were largely instrumental in securing signatures to petitions to the king and to parliament. The leading exiles - Czartoryski and Niemcewicz - were given honorary membership and soon became lions in London society.³⁴ Perhaps the best evidence that the movement enjoyed a considerable influence is found in the success of the pro-Polish agitators in parliament.

During the session of 1831, the revolution received scant attention in the speech from the throne and in a few debates which were initiated by Hunt, Hume, and particularly by Colonel de Lacy Evans. The

latter's greatest effort was made in August on a motion that information be printed about the activities of Prussian troops. He argued vehemently that an independent Poland was an essential component of the balance of power and asserted that Russia had flagrantly violated all the liberties of the constitutional charter guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna. Both he and his supporters were forced to admit the apathy of the house, and the motion, opposed by Palmerston, was lost without a division. Evans two subsequent efforts to secure a real hearing of the question were equally futile.³⁵

In 1832 the crusade was led by Cutlar Fergusson, at that time a private member, but after 1834, judge advocate-general and a member of the privy council. In April and again in June, he precipitated protracted debates about Russia's conduct toward Poland. His own speech on the earlier occasion included a detailed discussion of the circumstances in 1815 which had induced Castlereagh to insist upon the creation of a separate Kingdom of Poland, an exposition of Constantine's violations of the chartered liberties of the Poles - *so far did he carry his acts of cruelty, oppression, and tyranny, that human endurance could bear it no longer* - and an assertion that the recent abrogation of the charter afforded ample grounds for Anglo-French intervention, even if the alarming growth of Russia's power were not in itself enough. The situation, he maintained, was now such that instead of resisting so trifling an aggrandizement as that of Ochakov, the powers were infected by a species of terror and Russia had merely to threaten war in order to attain any end she wished. Finally, he called upon the government to take advantage of the pro-Polish sentiment which pervaded the country to curtail her power. Fergusson's speech on the second occasion covered the same points, but laid much more emphasis upon the Russian atrocities in Poland. In April the ministers had resorted to the conventional subterfuge of lack of official information to defeat the motion for the submission to the house of the dispatches dealing with Poland. Nevertheless, Fergusson had been supported by several prominent members of the house, among them Labouchere, Lushington, Hume, Ewart, Shiel, and Hunt. In June the similar motion was unopposed; and a growing interest in the subject must be indicated by the much larger number of members who spoke, for enthusiasm for the subject is the only possible explanation of a speech on an unopposed motion. To the radicals were added Lords Sandon, Morpeth, and Ebrington, Messrs. Gaily Knight, Beaumont - at this time the President of the Society of the Friends of Poland - Wyse, and Baring, Sir Robert Inglis, and Sir Robert Peel. Although Morpeth defended Russia against the charge of inhumanity, the general tone of the debate was much less temperate than before; Peel, Baring, Inglis, and Palmerston were even forced to deprecate the language used by some members. Sheil, for instance, explained that:

he would not call Nicholas a miscreant; because he saw a man delegating his brother, into whom the spirit of Nero must have transmigrated - if there was a metempsychosis among despots, to tread the heart of Poland out - when he saw him betraying a nation of heroes into submission, and then transporting them to Siberia, shaving off the grey hairs of nobles with the blood of Europe's saviours in their veins; degrading and enslaving women, sparing neither age nor sex, and thrusting the hand of a ruthless and Herod-like infanticide into the cradle of Polish childhood. When he saw him acting thus, and leaving nothing to add to damnation, he would not call him 'miscreant,' because the word was too poor and incommensurate with his depravity...

Hume added that the tsar was a *monster in human form*.³⁶

Fergusson's second motion was carried without dissent, probably because it committed neither the house nor the government to any action. It appears to be significant of a growing interest in the cause of Poland upon which all shades of English political opinion were agreed.

Parliament gave more attention, however, to another topic which concerned Russia. Palmerston had negotiated with Lieven a convention by which England agreed to continue her payment of half the interest and principal of the so-called Russo-Dutch loan as arranged in 1815. Although nearly all the members of both acknowledged that the separation of Belgium from Holland did not free England from her moral obligation, if it did release her from the letter of the original convention, several suggested that she might well refuse to make the payments unless Russia had fulfilled her coeval engagement with regard to Poland. These debates are significant for their inclusion of the quite irrelevant question of Poland, a procedure which was becoming conventional whenever Russia was considered.³⁷

The parliamentary phase of the pro-Polish agitation of 1832 appears to have been chiefly the work of a few, individual members of the commons, Evans, who was already well known for his anti-Russian convictions, Cutlar Fergusson, and several of the Irish-radical bloc. The general character of the debates suggests that little thought was given to strategy or to the organization of a campaign, but that aspect of the problem of mobilizing English opinion was not totally ignored. Fergusson was in touch

with Macvey Napier, editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, and postponed his motion in April for some days in order that it might follow the publication of an article on Poland written by Henry Rich which was carefully considered and approved by Czartoryski, Niemcewicz, and, at his own wish, by Palmerston - the latter judged it *an admirable review*, but insisted that his early knowledge of it should be *most confidential*.³⁸

The nature of Rich's article affords an ample explanation of Palmerston's desire for secrecy; it was an excoriation of Russia which gained force from the temperate character of its phraseology. Although there were a few passages - the statement, for example, that *It has been the misfortune of Russia, and the punishment of her neighbours, that she has become powerful and corrupted without being civilized...* or the remark, regarding the coronation of Nicholas, *that he went to the altar, preceded by the assassins of his father, followed by those of his brother, and accompanied probably by his own* - which were less circumspect, most of the article was statement of fact. Basically it was a survey of Polish history, which praised the virtues, but did not ignore the vices, of that brave and famous people, and gave particular emphasis to the period of the partitions, the Napoleonic resurrection, the subsequent fourth division, and the recent revolution. The concluding paragraphs were a strong plea for the intervention of England and France, supported, the author hoped, by Austria to preserve the status established by the Treaty of Vienna. Thus the article was implicitly an explanation and justification of the policy which Palmerston had adopted. Rich categorically repudiated the alarmist point of view - *We are not of the school that has a nightmare dread of Russian domination* - but he did argue that one of Russia's routes toward the world outside ought to be effectively barred and concluded that *a breaking up of the old tripartite partitioning league would be a signal benefit to Europe at large...*

He expressly admitted *that two great antagonist principles now divide Europe - freedom and despotism*. Perhaps the general tenor of the article was best summarized by its title, *History, Present Wrongs and Claims of Poland*. In view of the circumstances of its preparation, the article must be regarded as an intentional, if secret, piece of propaganda emanating in part from both Polish and official sources and as evidence of the extreme hostility toward Russia which had been engendered in the minds of sane and responsible men.³⁹

After the adjournment of parliament, a more carefully planned campaign was undertaken. Various groups, more or less closely affiliated with the Polish Association, convoked open meetings in many of the larger provincial cities, at which strenuous efforts were made to arouse public enthusiasm. Typical probably was the one in Manchester on August 22, though it received rather more attention in the London press than did any of the others. Equally inflammatory sentiments were being expressed all over the country.

The presiding officer, a prominent citizen, declared that there could be no difference of opinion about the humanity of British intervention in behalf of the Poles, although its expediency might be a question which deserved calm consideration. The first speaker was Mark Philips, at that time a candidate, shortly successful, for election to the first reformed parliament from the newly enfranchised city. He regretted the absence of Count Plater, busy with the arrangements for similar gatherings at Leeds and Hull.

[Plater] would have told. of the best and bravest of the country being degraded to the ranks in the Russian army, or expatriated to serve in distant countries. He would have told. of the brave men and delicate women and children, sent on foot into Siberia, to labor in the mines, and endure perpetual bondage - of children being torn from their parents, and husbands from their wives. by a Government unequalled in its atrocious tyranny since the days of Nero. (Loud cheers.)

Philips contrasted Russia's violation of the Polish terms of the Treaty of Vienna with Britain's scrupulous payment of the moneys due under the Dutch-loan convention. *The abettors of the dismemberment of Poland meditate further aggressions, but the eyes of Europe are upon England.*

The second speaker, Richard Potter, was a successful candidate for parliament from Wigan and a founder of the *Manchester Guardian*. He adduced the character of Constantine as a full justification of rebellion in Poland. *This monster in human shape, who, not satisfied with the ordinary means of execution, put the venerable principal of a university to death with his own hands, merely because it was said that the scholar had imbibed liberal opinions. (Shame.)*

Later speakers repudiated the suggestion that Great Britain was in no condition to go to war, the editor of the *Manchester Times* arguing that the Poles had fought a British battle.

It was our own fight. (Hear, hear.) We were fighting abroad upon the same principle as we were fighting against the boroughmongers at home. Poland was only one of our outposts. All the distresses of England, and the con-

inent might be traced to the first division of Poland. If that people could have remained free and unshackled, we should never have seen the barbarian hordes of Russia ravaging all Europe; and the Calmucs and Cossacks of the despot bivouacking in the streets and gardens of Paris... Was there a single sailor in our navy, or a single marine, who would not rejoice to be sent forth to lift up his hand in the cause of freedom and in aid of the unfortunate Poles? (Cheers.) The expense would not be great to blow the castle of Cronstadt around the Russian despot's ears. (Cheers.) In a month ... our navy should have swept every Russian merchant vessel from every sea upon the face of the globe. (Cheers.) Let a fleet be sent to the Baltic to close up the Russian ports, and what would the Emperor of Russia be then? A Calmuc surrounded by a few barbarian tribes, (Cheers) a savage, with no more power upon the sea, when opposed by England and France, than the Emperor of China had. (Cheers.)

After other speeches in like vein, the meeting closed with the adoption of several extremely bellicose motions, and a petition to the king, that he give aid to the Poles, received many signatures. This meeting is further evidence of the readiness of responsible men to express publicly the most violent sentiments.⁴⁰

The most tangible effect of the campaign of propaganda carried on by the Polish sympathizers was a series of petitions directed to the king and to the commons. The former can have had little positive result, although they may possibly have strengthened William's anti-Russian sentiments. The latter, when presented to the house, were made the occasion for many vituperative speeches which, fully reported by the press, must have contributed to the waxing hatred of Russia.

The petitions which reached the table of the commons in 1833 came from Hull, Birmingham, Dartford, and Glasgow and bore altogether only some fourteen thousand signatures. Judged by a quantitative standard, the laboring mountain had brought forth a mouse; the contemporaneous petitions dealing with the abolition of slavery and the observance of the sabbath were incommensurably greater. But such a standard is deceptive, for, in some cases, the petition was signed only by the officers of the association, or by the chairman and secretary of the meeting. Such was the petition presented on May 24, by Thomas Attwood, the Chartist and founder of the Birmingham Political Union. The directors of the Birmingham Polish Association vehemently deplored the injuries of Poland and expatiated on the benefits to British trade of the restoration of a free market there. The petitioners desired that England cooperate with France and Austria to restore the political conditions of 1772. Attwood's supporting speech alleged that British apathy alone had allowed the overthrow of Poland, as it was apparently just then permitting a Russian seizure of Constantinople, and suggested that these aggressions might be followed by similar action in the Thames.⁴¹

In July, Fergusson initiated a long debate by his motion in support of petitions from the Glasgow Polish Association and from the inhabitants of Birmingham that England should not recognize Russia's aggrandizement. His speech dwelt in more florid language upon the same topics which he had examined in the previous year, and his motion was seconded by Attwood in still more lurid terms. Palmerston, in rebuttal, explained that a protest had been made against the incorporation of Poland in the Russian state. The government, he said, had decided that the issue did not merit the risk of a general war and had been forced to let the matter rest. He admitted the fact of the atrocities. Many other speakers examined the relations of Russia and England in all their ramifications, not excluding a possible invasion of India. O'Connell, Lord Dudley Stuart, Sheil, and J. S. Buckingham urged that Russia must be restrained before she became even stronger. The motion, opposed by the ministry and by a few cool-headed members of the opposition as tantamount to a declaration of war, was eventually lost, 177-95.⁴²

This long debate was the climax of the agitation designed to effect English intervention in behalf of Poland. The motion was defeated by a large majority, but the size of the minority is significant, for it had been strenuously opposed by a cabinet which, in the first session of the reformed parliament, had full control of the house. If some of the members who supported the motion may have been actuated by partisan motive, the list included the names of many distinguished men - rather more than a quarter of them are commemorated in the *Dictionary of National Biography* - who were apparently sincere. Far the largest portion of the group were radicals, Attwood, Cobbett, Sir William Molesworth, and their less prominent disciples. Another large element were the Irish members, headed by Sheil and three O'Connells. The presence of the leading philo-Poles, Evans, Fergusson, and Dudley Stuart, is easily explained, but the fact that such a level-headed Whig as Henry Lytton Bulwer - later a distinguished diplomat and the author of the *official* biography of Palmerston - and Sir Harry Verney, a former diplomatist, William Ewart, and Alderman Matthew Wood abandoned their party argues that some of the minority seriously believed that England should adopt a more positive policy of resis-

tance to Russian aggrandizement. The supposition gains weight from the presence among the majority of most of the leading Tories, who cannot have been guided by party advantage, and of such prominent philo-Poles as P. M. Stewart and Viscount Ebrington. In short the house of commons gave serious consideration to a motion tantamount to a declaration of war.

The government had already abandoned the Polish cause. To the Russian reply to their *démarche* in support of the terms of the Treaty of Vienna, they made no rejoinder, and even the publication of the organic statute in April 1832 elicited no further protest. Included in the instructions to Lord Durham on his special mission to St. Petersburg in the summer of that year, however, was a section dealing with Poland. Palmerston there explained that the subject was extremely delicate, and that Great Britain still maintained her position - that set forth in the original remonstrance and in the article in the *Edinburgh Review*. The English government had concluded that the general state of Europe, and the negotiations for a settlement of Belgium in which the two powers were associated, made a resort to force inexpedient. They had determined consequently not to press the subject in such a way that existing difficulties would be aggravated without affording benefit to Poland. Nevertheless, Durham was expected to investigate so far as possible the reports of the adoption of a positive policy of Russification and the authenticity of the atrocities in Poland.⁴³

Durham postponed the discussion of the Polish problem until the eve of his return to London. In his conversations with the tsar and the Russian ministers he merely expressed the difficulty of the English statesmen in denying allegations which Russia herself did not contradict. Nesselrode, in consequence, drew up a memorandum which was carefully analyzed in London, but appears not to have carried conviction. So far as Poland was concerned, the mission was inconsequential.⁴⁴

The agitation in the commons destroyed the slight amelioration of Anglo-Russian tension which Durham had effected. Bligh, the new *chargé d'affaires*, was forced to report that the debate had produced a most unpleasant impression upon the minds of the tsar and Nesselrode. The former had been particularly incensed by Palmerston's statement that Russia had violated the Treaty of Vienna, while the latter maintained that the English government could *have restrained public opinion... if they so wished*. Bligh later reported that there was little danger that the affair would be followed by increased severities in Poland, which Durham thought he had possibly forestalled, but the Russian government answered the British arguments in an article in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*. Bligh thought that Nicholas desired to cement the cordial relations with Great Britain which *the violent and abusive language so unremittingly used by the Press* tended to weaken and *if encouraged by angry parliamentary discussions to break off altogether*. At a time, then, of high tension over Belgium and Turkey the Polish agitation was not without an exacerbating influence upon Anglo-Russian relations.⁴⁵

After the failure of their political aims in 1833, the advocates of the Polish cause concentrated their attention on its philanthropic aspect. They had already succeeded in raising several thousand pounds for the relief of indigent exiles, the most spectacular method being a special party at Vauxhall Gardens, under the patronage of the Duke of Sussex, to which nine thousand people paid a four-shilling admission fee. Since the funds raised even by such appeals were inadequate to support the three hundred refugees, in 1834 an appeal was made for governmental assistance.⁴⁶

When the subject was broached in the commons in March, the ministers declined, in spite of the French example, to appropriate money for the relief of men, however distressed and deserving, who had not actually served the nation. In vain Evans, Verney, O'Connell, Dudley Stuart, and Attwood rehearsed the arguments which had been so fully stated in the past. But the press disseminated their remarks once more and commented favorably on their proposal. The Polish associations then undertook another campaign of petitions which were presented to the house in late April, in May, and in early June. Private representations to the ministers induced them not to oppose a second proposal that £10,000 be granted to the exiles. That appropriation, renewed annually until 1852, must have prevented any real distress, but Dudley Stuart, who after Campbell's death became the animating spirit of the movement, found it necessary to supplement the official grant by private charity.⁴⁷

With regard to Poland, England thus followed a characteristic course of practical compromise. Unable or unwilling to enforce her interpretation of the Treaty of Vienna, she was obliged to swallow Russia's confident and humiliating refusal to consider her protest. The Polish refugees, however, benefited from the humanitarian instinct which impelled charity, both public and private. But this partial success of the pro-Polish agitation was by no means its sole influence. The associations continued to hold meetings redounding with paeans in praise of Polish virtue and denunciations of Russian

villainy, which were occasionally published and regularly reported by the press. The inspired propaganda was supplemented by independent periodical articles and other literature.

The *Westminster Review* was the most notable collaborator. As early as January 1831, it had contained an extremely outspoken article on *European Revolution* which was chiefly devoted to the rising in Poland.

There is now only one question; 'Will Europe desert Poland?' If she does, it is simple charity and pure unmingled meek humanity to pray that she may be subjected for another half century, to baser barbarians if they can be found, to more ensanguined hypocrites if the earth can breed them, than those who have borne sway and rioted in all her quarters for the last... The people of England were the parties really made war upon, from the first junction of English ministers with the Holy Allies in 1792 to the termination in 1815.

*It is we who were the downtrodden, and it is we who now intend to be up. Give us Poland; our sufferings began with Poland, and with Poland they shall end. The beggar in the streets, - the man who is to be hanged for rick-burning, - is son and heir to the spoliation of Poland. If the Russians are driven over the Niemen, we shall have the Ballot; if they cross the Dnieper, we shall be rid of the Corn Laws; and if the Poles can get Smolensko, we too in our taxes shall get back to the ground of 1686... Poland is God Almighty's granary; it is the place where ought to be grown the millions of quarters of corn, and thousands of millions of quartern loaves, which should be dropping into the mouths of the children who are starving... Poland has its liberation to win, and so have we. We have both of us fallen among thieves; and we cannot do better than carry on the contest in concert.*⁴⁸

Subsequent articles recalled Poland and Russia to the attention of the *Westminster's* readers.⁴⁹

Even the Tory periodicals assisted the process of keeping Poland in the public mind by making the ineffective policy toward the revolution one count in their indictment of the Whig cabinet.⁵⁰ Only the ultraconservative *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, like the *Morning Post*, failed to join the general lamentation that the Poles had been once more subdued; its editor could not approve even that revolution, but he agreed that Russia constituted the greatest danger to the welfare of Europe.⁵¹

The pamphlets dealing with Poland were virtually unanimous in their argument that Russia possessed Poland solely by virtue of the Treaty of Vienna, which bound her to respect the constitution promulgated by Alexander. Several of them asserted that the violations of that charter, prior to the revolution, were an infringement of the Treaty, which recovered for the other signatories their freedom of action, and enabled them, by intervention, rightfully to reestablish an independent Polish state.⁵² Perhaps the most interesting of the pamphlets was Disraeli's anonymous *England and France, or a Cure for the Ministerial Gallomania*, which attacked the Whig *entente* with France and maintained that England should have made the due observance of the Treaty of Vienna the price which Nicholas should pay for the restoration of Belgium to the sovereignty of his Dutch brother-in-law.⁵³ Several foreign pamphlets were also noticed in the press.⁵⁴

Other, perhaps less ephemeral, works which appeared at this time probably reflect the common interest in the subject. Samuel A. Dunham, a regular contributor, produced in the inexpensive serial, *Lardner's Cyclopaedia*, a *History of Poland*. Mrs. Gore, a not undistinguished novelist and dramatist, published her *Polish Tales*. There was finally completed a translation of Zagoskin's *Iuri Miloslavski*, an extremely romantic tale of the struggles of Russia for her freedom from Poland during the Time of Troubles. Various poetical works signalized the virtues and the fate of Poland.⁵⁵

The most enduring and effective influence of the Polish movement appears to have lain in the intellectual sphere, in the bias which it contributed to the English stereotype of Russia. In the years before the Polish revolution, the press had often employed brief excerpts from books about Russia to fill the crevices for which no real news item happened to be available. Those short paragraphs had ordinarily described the odd customs of a strange land, but the general tone was one of friendly curiosity.

After the revolution the characteristic newspaper squibs were of a significantly altered nature. At first, there were many selections from *Polonia* or the *Hull Polish Record*. When those inspired sources of supply were exhausted, the continental press and the literature of travel in Russia and Poland were culled for comparable materials, which almost invariably narrated the atrocities of the Russians and the suffering of the Poles.

Equally significant was the change which occurred in the treatment accorded to the tsar. Nicholas' advent to the throne had been greeted with gracious interest by the English press, its opinion of his character being quite unformed. English confidence was measurably shaken by the Persian and Turkish wars, for Nicholas appeared to entertain a strong desire to extend his dominions into quarters where English interests were threatened. Russian ambition thus began to be a subject for anxious speculation. But after the revolution, the tsar was known to be also the oppressor of Poland, the mas

ter of noble slaves, the ravisher of women, the destroyer of domestic happiness, the assassin of children, in short, a monster in human form.

The new stereotype took the public imagination. Almost all references to Russia and her tsar whether in parliament, the press, or private correspondence attested the change. An estimate of Nicholas and his ambitions became a conventional element in the travel literature on Russia. Even the dead were not immune from the influence of the Polish revolution. The ambiguous reputations of Catherine and of Alexander underwent some revision, the former's less savory exploits becoming the subject of malicious comment and the early liberal years of the latter being forgotten. Even the most innocent Russian actions came to be regarded with suspicion and a howl of indignation and abuse greeted any move which seemed to demonstrate ambitious intent.⁵⁶ The further multiplication of examples of the changed point of view toward Russia is unnecessary; they emerge inextricably enmeshed in other contexts. Poland had contributed the essential element of the innocent and noble victim of savage tyranny to the rapidly crystallizing English hatred of Russia.

¹ F. O. 65/186, nos. 117, 118, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 17 Aug. 1830.

² *Ibid.*, nos. 121, 129, 20 Aug., 14 Sept. 1830.

³ F. O. 65/186, no. 137; /187, nos. 164, 165, 166, 179, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 2 Oct., 6, 8, 29 Nov. 1830.

⁴ Harold Temperley, *The Unpublished Diary and Political Sketches of Princess Lieven* (London, 1925), pp. 162-168; Herbert C. F. Bell, *Lord Palmerston* (2 vols., London, 1936), I, 94.

⁵ John Hall, *England and the Orleans Monarchy* (London, 1912), chap. iii, *passim*; Bell, *Palmerston*, I, 112-120; Crawley, *Greek Independence*, pp. 202-205.

⁶ Hall, *Orleans Monarchy*, p. 87; F. O. 65/191, no. 39, Heytesbury to Palmerston, 25 Feb. 1831, received 16 March; F. O. 181/84, no. 11, Palmerston to Heytesbury, 21 March 1831; cf. Wilson, *Sketch*, *supra*, p. 50.

⁷ F. O. 65/191, no. 71, Heytesbury to Palmerston, 13 April 1831.

⁸ *Ibid.*; cf. F. O. 65/193, no. 217, Heytesbury to Palmerston, 18 Nov. 1831.

⁹ F. O. 65/191, Separate and Secret, no. 84, Heytesbury to Palmerston, 30, 29 April 1831; cf. Hall, *Orleans Monarchy*, p. 88.

¹⁰ F. O. 181/86, no. 40, Palmerston to Heytesbury, 26 Aug. 1831, enclosing Talleyrand to Palmerston and vice versa, 20, 22 July; /87, no. 52, Palmerston to Heytesbury, 23 Nov. 1831; Hall, *Orleans Monarchy*, p. 88; F. O. 65/193, separate and secret, nos. 194, 202, 230; /199, nos. 1, 36, Heytesbury to Palmerston, 1, 8, 18 Oct., 18 Dec. 1831, 2 Jan., 6 April 1832.

¹¹ *Post*, 1 Jan. 1831.

¹² *Times*, 11 Dec. 1830.

¹³ *Times*, 14 Dec. 1830.

¹⁴ *Times*, Dec. 1830, Jan. 1831, *passim*, particularly 23 Dec., 25 Jan.

¹⁵ *Times*, 24 March 1831; cf. *supra*, pp. no, in.

¹⁶ E.g., *Times*, 1 July 1831.

¹⁷ *Times*, 20 July 1831; 29 July, 11 Aug.

¹⁸ *Times*, 17, 20 Sept. 1831.

¹⁹ *Times*, 7 Jan. 1832.

²⁰ *Times*, 9, 10 April 1832.

²¹ E.g., *Chronicle*, 21, 23 Oct. 1830, 18 May, 4, 15 June 1831.

²² E.g., *Globe*, 13 Dec. 1830, 17 Feb. 1831.

²³ E.g., *Standard*, 13 Aug., 2, 17 Sept. 1831.

²⁴ *Herald*, 20 April 1832.

²⁵ E.g., *Post*, 14 Dec. 1830, 17 Feb., 30 Aug. 1831.

²⁶ *Post*, 3 Feb. 1831.

²⁷ *Post*, 20, 9 April 1832.

²⁸ *Chronicle*, 27 Dec. 1830, 22, 23 Jan., 1, 11 Feb. 1831. There is a cursory account of the pro-Polish agitation - Tadeusz Grzebieniowski, "The Polish Cause in England a Century Ago" - in *Slavonic Review*, XI, 81-87.

²⁹ *Times*, *Chronicle*, 10 March 1831.

³⁰ *Times*, 1 July, 20 Aug.; *Chronicle*, 2 Aug. 1831.

³¹ *Chronicle*, 22 Sept. 1831.

³² William Beattie, *Life and Letters of Thomas Campbell* (3 vols., London, 1849), III, 101-140.

³³ *Polonia*, no. 1 and subsequent issues, *passim*. There appears to have been subscribed at least £230.

³⁴ Cf. *Times*, 30 Dec. 1833; le Strange, *Lieven-Grey Correspondence*, II, 305-332, III, 176; Broughton, *Recollections of a Long Life* (6 vols., London, 1909-11), IV, 210, 214; Adam Guilgud, ed., *Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski* (2 vols., London, 1888), II, chap. xxv.

³⁵ Hansard, commons, 16 Aug. 1831, cols. 101-108; *ibid.*, 21 June, 8 Aug., 7 Sept., 13 Oct.

³⁶ Hansard, commons, 18 April, 28 June, 1832, *passim*, quotations cols. 642, 1146-1147, 1143.

³⁷ E.g., the speeches of Hume, Fane, and Evans in Hansard, commons, 16 July, 7 Aug. 1832, cols. 438, 463, 1209-1214.

³⁸ British Museum, Additional Manuscript 36,615, fos. 273b, 274, 301, 303, 303b, 307, Rich to Napier, 16 Feb., 26 March, 5, 7 April 1832.

³⁹ *Edinburgh*, April 1832, LV, 220-270, *passim*, quotations, pp. 234, 248, 261, 269, 264.

⁴⁰ *Times*, 25 Aug. 1832; cf. D. N. B. on Philips and Potter.

⁴¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1833, XLIV, 48, 906, 1347; Hansard, commons, 24 May 1833.

⁴² Hansard, commons, 9 July 1833.

⁴³ F. O. 65/200, no. 2, Palmerston to Durham, 3 July 1832.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, nos. 14, 20, Durham to Palmerston, 22 Aug., 12 Sept. 1832; cf. Chester W. New, *Lord Durham* (Oxford, 1929), pp. 209-212.

⁴⁵ F. O. 65/208, nos. 72, 75, 77, Bligh to Palmerston, 31 July, 8, 17 Aug. 1833.

⁴⁶ *Times*, 21 Feb., 4, 7 March, 30 May, 9 July, 14, 20 Aug. 1833, 20 Feb. 1834.

⁴⁷ Hansard, commons, 25 March, 3, 9, June 1834; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1834, "Public Petitions," 122, 198, 226, 264, 289, 303, 383, 418 and appendices nos. 578, 934, 1688; D. N. B., "Dudley Stuart."

⁴⁸ *Westminster*, Jan. 1831, XIV, 246, 250-252.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, April 1831, art. XVII, July 1835, art. VIII particularly; cf. July, Oct. 1833, April 1834.

⁵⁰ E.g., *Quarterly*, July 1833, XLIX, 527-528; *Fraser's Magazine*, XIV, 512.

⁵¹ *Blackwood's March*, April 1832, XXXI, 448-464, 569-591, Oct. 1832, XXXII, 635-638.

⁵² "An Englishman", *The Polish Question Shortly Stated* (London, 1831); *Thoughts on the Present Aspect of Foreign Affairs* (London, 1831); *The Constitutional Charter for the Kingdom of Poland in the Year 1815* (London, 1831); Montagu Gore, *A Letter to the Rt. Hon. Visc. Palmerston on the Affairs of Poland* (London, 1831); *Remarks on the Conduct and Probable Designs of Russia* (London, 1832).

⁵³ [Benjamin Disraeli] *England and France...* (London, 1832), particularly p. 240.

⁵⁴ E.g., Chodzko, *Esquisses polonaises...* (Paris, 1831); Michael Oginski, *Memoires sur la Pologne* (1832).

⁵⁵ Samuel A. Dunham, *History of Poland* (London, 1832); Catherine G. F. Gore, *Polish Tales* (London, 1833); Michael Zagoskin, *The Young Muscovite*, trans. by Frederick Chamier (3 vols., London, 1834); W. E. Aytoun, *Poland, Homer, and Other Poems* (London, 1832); *Blackwood's*, Oct. 1832, XXXII, 612-613.

⁵⁶ E.g., Robert Bell, *History of Russia* (3 vols., London, 1836-1838), II, III, *passim*.

IV. THE CRISIS OF 1833

The aggravating influence exerted by the events of the Polish revolution upon English judgments of Russia and her policy was immediately apparent during the Near Eastern crisis of 1833. If the startling success of the Egyptian armies in 1832, the consequent advance of Russian military and naval forces to the Bosphorus, and the conclusion of a Russo-Turkish alliance at Unkiar Skelessi constituted a major transformation in Near Eastern affairs,¹ the contemporaneous discussion of those events shows that there was very little immediate appreciation of their significance. Their nature and location afford at least a partial explanation of the scant attention paid to them in the press. The efforts of the Porte to secure the assistance of its allies were necessarily secret, only unsubstantiated rumors being available to journalists, and the military events in Syria and Asia Minor were even more remote from the ordinary channels of news than had been those of the Russo-Turkish war. Thus although the arrival of a Russian expeditionary force could not remain secret, its presence on the Bosphorus was still doubted in London in late April.² The complacent character of the editorial commentaries upon the occasional reports which did arrive in London and the tendency of the articles to conclude with a tangential harangue on the ills of Poland must reflect a general failure to appreciate the full significance of what was taking place.

The treatment accorded the subject by the *Times* serves to illustrate that of the press as a whole, and, particularly in view of their smaller size and circulation, only the deviations of the other papers require notice. Although the Russian proffer of aid to Turkey had been known in London officially in December 1832, and publicly in February 1833, the *Times*'s first editorial discussion of the question appeared in the middle of March.³ At that time the reported offer of French and British assistance was commended because it would avert the calamity of Russian succour and deprive the armies which in 1829 had reached Adrianople of the opportunity to encamp in the gardens of the Seraglio. *How long, the editor demanded, is Europe to be exposed to the ambitious designs of this barbarous Power? Every day that passes... must make us regret more the fate of Poland, which might have been a barrier against Russian aggression, and inspire us with a warmer desire for the restoration of a noble people capable of driving the Muscovite back into his Asiatic wilderness.* The first really comprehensive editorial analysis of the critical situation appeared early in May, in response to the certainty that 50,000 Russian troops had arrived at Constantinople.

The sublime Porte is more than conquered - it is protected...

We are no alarmists for the political destinies of the world, and desire to be thought no Quixotic champions for the national point of honour against any particular Power, but surely the unobstructed advance of Russian barbarism towards the west, and the contempt of our interference or remonstrances in every case where we have endeavoured to check its arrogant pretensions in the east, should have induced us to take a more decided attitude in the present distractions of Turkey.

As in March the article included a dirge on the fate of Poland.⁴

A few trifling articles appeared in the next few days, but it was only at the end of the month that the continued presence of Russian troops at Constantinople after the formal adjustment of the dispute between the sultan and the rebellious pasha made the *Times* suspect that Russia was slowly preparing European opinion for her permanent occupation of the Straits. Even under those circumstances, the suggestions that "too much vigilance cannot be exerted, or too much vigour displayed by those Powers which desire (whether justly or not is another question) to preserve the existing political balance of Europe" were the tame conclusion of an article of which the mildness was in striking contrast to the remarks it had made about the war in 1829 and the atrocities in Poland.⁵

In July, the *Times* deplored the constant statements by members of the commons that war must not be risked, for *the wretched twaddle* satisfied Nicholas that he might injure Great Britain with impunity, but it announced also that it did not desire war. The news of the departure of the Russian troops was printed without comment, and the whole episode was finally dismissed with the remark about the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi that *such impudent and barefaced pretensions... must be scouted with contempt, or resisted with vigour, or ordered to be formally cancelled.*⁶

The complacency of the *Times* was shared by the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Globe*, the other major journalistic adherents of the Whig ministry. Two characteristic opinions of the former appeared in January and in April.

We take credit to ourselves for having been among the first... to dispel the notion of Russia being a formidable Power. It is not.

The intervention of Russia in the affairs of Turkey now lays the foundation for Russian intervention for ever. If Russia succeed, we shall have a second edition of Poland... There is no saying how all this will end.

Yet the *Chronicle* had no positive suggestion to offer to avert the catastrophe and apparently judged that the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi did not merit editorial comment.⁷

The *Globe*, rather more bellicose, announced that the powers would not permit another blunder like that of Poland, although in defending the government's passivity it suggested that British interests in Turkey were less considerable than those of Austria or even of France. Nevertheless, it expressed dismay over the terms of Unkiar Skelessi. *It appears probable that Turkey will go through the same stages, and to the same fate, as a worthier nation - Poland - has now reached... The progress of Russia must evidently soon become the principal object of attention of those who turn their eyes to foreign politics.* But it concluded that the hope of Europe lay in the cordial cooperation of France and England against despotism, and had neither criticism to level against the policy of England, nor a specific remedy to offer for the ills of the East.⁸

Although the Tory journals were not handicapped by a party loyalty which precluded criticism of English policy, they gave the Eastern crisis little more attention. The most considerable discussion of the problem which appeared in the *Herald*, for instance, made the conventional comparison between the plights of Poland and of Turkey, decided that *the latter may be looked upon as already within the claws of the Russian bear*, and concluded with the lame statement that *the affairs of the East deserve to be looked to*. When finally news of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had been received, the paper undertook an editorial campaign of abuse, but the Whigs were chastized as soundly as Russia, because they had allowed her to gain a paramount influence in the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Greece, as well as in Turkey and Poland.⁹

In parliament, the fate of the sultan received even less attention than it did in the press. In the commons questions were addressed to the ministers on five occasions, and there were scattered references to the subject during the course of the great debate on Poland, but only once, on July 9, was the house invited to take formal action. Even then, after Cutlar Fergusson and Evans had uttered the strongest warnings against trusting Russia, Bulwer withdrew his motion for the production of the official correspondence.¹⁰

The policy which the cabinet came to adopt in the crisis of 1833 was not in accord with British precedents. An active English interest in Turkish affairs had germinated during the Napoleonic struggle, grown during the initial stages of the Greek revolution, and fructified in the Treaty of London and the battle of Navarino. The passivity which succeeded the advent of Wellington was the enforced inactivity of impotence, for the explosions of wrath which punctuated the Duke's correspondence show that circumstances, not desire, produced the abnegation of 1828 and 1829. Grey's cabinet made a prompt and successful attempt to acquire a decisive influence in the negotiations which eventually enabled Greece to become fully independent of both the sultan and the tsar. Thus the apparent failure of the government to adopt any policy whatsoever, a failure which contrasts so strikingly with the past as well as with the subsequent attitude of England, constitutes a historical problem which has baffled solution. In spite of Temperley's judgment that a definitive explanation must await the conclusion of Professor Webster's study of the Palmerston papers, certain aspects of the question may profitably be considered here.¹¹

The English quiescence may not be excused by the plea that the crisis developed so rapidly that the foreign office lacked the information upon which a policy might be constructed. The first tremors of the Egyptian earthquake reached London in March 1832.¹² Early in August Durham transmitted from St. Petersburg a report that Russia was preparing to assist the sultan against his rebellious vassal. Her subsequent activity, particularly the mission of Muraviev in November, inspired Bligh, at that time *chargé* in St. Petersburg, to discuss at length the possibility that Russia had offered her aid to the Porte. He wrote:

Such a proceeding would be in perfect accordance with the policy which it appears to me will in future be pursued by this Country towards the Porte, that of not only taking every opportunity of allaying the long standing fears and jealousies of Her neighbor by shewing, in the first instance, that She wishes for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire by withdrawing her commercial agents from places in revolt, and by sending friendly missions to give to Her moral support in the hour of adversity, but that of being ready to seize the first occasion when material aid may be withheld by Her other allies, of spontaneously offering it to the Sultan, and by saving the Ottoman Empire from destruction, at least, secure the existence of an impotent neighbor (whose only ob-

ject for some time would be to keep Her own subjects under immediate Controul with Russian aid) and prevent the triumph of one, who might perhaps excite the Mohammedan subjects of Russia to revolt, which events in Georgia have proved would not be difficult.

Bligh further prophesied that Russia's reward might be a grant for her ships of free passage through the Straits and possibly the cession of an Adriatic island for a naval base.¹³

Bligh's prophetic dispatch did not reach London until after the Turkish request for aid had been refused, but his remarkably shrewd analysis of Russia's purpose and his accurate forecast of her action were not too late to have induced a change of policy in London. A month later even, reiterating his estimate of the situation, he could still report preparations, not their fulfillment. At that time he wrote that although Nicholas' magnanimity in saving Turkey without seeking his own advantage was commonly discussed, it was not likely that *the present Sovereign will depart from the System invariably followed by His Predecessors . of obtaining great advantages for His Empire by commercial Concessions from the Turks, and of strengthening His maritime Power about which he is so assiduous...* The force of this warning was weakened by an accompanying account of a conversation with Nesselrode on the general European situation. The Vice-Chancellor had explained Russia's regret over the decease - in the phrase of the tsar which was current at the court - *of l'ancienne Angleterre*. England's close coöperation with France made it difficult *to cultivate sedulously, as heretofore, a good understanding between England and Russia...* Bligh replied that the Russian conduct with regard to Germany, Italy, and Belgium inevitably strengthened the Anglo-French alliance. Bligh's concluding analysis of Russia's position in Europe may have influenced English policy.

*I think I may safely assure your Lordship, after the closest observation which I have been able to give to the state of things and of feeling in this Country, that... this Government will not court a War, nor even be willing to enter on one, so long as England and France by remaining cordially united guarantee... the preservation of peace... Count Nesselrode assures me that unprovoked War is out of their contemplation . I am fully persuaded that in this he speaks the sentiment of the Russian Cabinet, and also of the Emperor in His moments of cool reflection... Russia cannot possibly be a gainer by War . I consider Her quarrelling with England seriously to be quite out of the Question. - She was compelled to do so twice, at one time by a domestick, at another by a foreign Tyrant; the result of those experiments is not likely to induce her Rulers to repeat them, - nor will they inconsiderately lose that Market for her produce which props up the dilapidated fortunes of her Nobility, and contributes so considerably to fill the coffers of the State... In case of a chivalrous decision of the Emperor to assist His Dutch relations by an isolated hostile demonstration, He might possibly embark (if the Spring should still find the negotiation unfinished) a few thousand of His Guards on board His Cronstadt Fleet for the purpose of sending them to the Helder, but even then, I cannot but think that a few more ships added to His Majesty's Fleet in the North Sea would make him hesitate to trust His navy outside the Sound.*¹⁴

Bligh's allusion to a possible Anglo-Russian skirmish in the North Sea reflected the prolonged disagreement over Belgium which Durham had not been able to resolve completely, but it also has an interest which cannot have been intended, for it affords some support to the extraordinarily ingenuous explanation offered by Palmerston eight months later for the English failure to give aid to the sultan - the statement that the blockades maintained off the shores of Holland and Portugal required the full force of His Majesty's navy.¹⁵ More significant, however, is the fact that his survey of the sources of Anglo-Russian tension in January 1833 virtually ignored the Turkish crisis. There can be little doubt that Palmerston and the cabinet were so preoccupied with several fateful problems in the west of Europe that they did not appreciate the real import of the events in the Near East.

The British courteous refusal to grant the aid requested by the sultan was accompanied by the expressed hope that Turkish resources would be adequate and was made before news had arrived of the battle of Konieh which opened the road to Constantinople to the Egyptian army. The fact, nevertheless, that the cabinet's decision was not communicated officially to the embassy in St. Petersburg until March 1833 seems to imply a failure in London to understand immediately the full significance of Ibrahim's victory. Furthermore, even as late as April, Palmerston discounted the Egyptian danger, for, unlike most of his contemporaries, being skeptical of Egyptian power, he thought that Mehemet Ali would not "think of standing out against Austria, France, Great Britain, and Russia, any one of whom could crush him with their little fingers".¹⁶

British policy was hampered, moreover, by the fortuitous event that the representatives both in St. Petersburg and in Constantinople were *chargés d'affaires ad interim*. Stratford Canning had been gazetted, indeed, as ambassador to Russia, but he was so thoroughly *persona non grata* that the tsar refused to receive him. The consequent lengthy negotiations increased the bitterness already engendered on both sides by Belgian, Iberian, Polish, and other disputes, and Nicholas persisted in his re

fusal.¹⁷ Significant of this tension and also of Palmerston's apparent belief that the Eastern problem would be adjusted satisfactorily without active British participation is the fact that at no time prior to the *dénouement* of Unkiar Skelessi was his agent in St. Petersburg given any instructions which bore on Turkey. A disposition to minimize that affair must be reflected also in his willingness to allow Lord Ponsonby, the new ambassador to the Porte, to dally in Naples for many weeks, granted even the truth of the excuse of a wind-bound ship, which seemed specious to his critics in the house of commons.¹⁸

To these various explanations of British passivity may be added several other considerations. French policy in the Mediterranean, particularly when Mehemet Ali was involved, was not above suspicion, for after the failure of Wellington and Aberdeen to extract from Polignac an engagement that Algiers would be evacuated, Palmerston had to guard against a Franco-Egyptian partition of the portions of the North African littoral which still remained more or less subject to Ottoman control. Thus while France eventually assisted Russia in effecting a settlement between Mahmud and Mehemet Ali - the agreement at Kutaya was the result far more of French mediation than of Russian military intervention - she was probably fully as anxious to protect the pasha as the sultan.¹⁹ Unable wholly to trust the French, yet, because of the more vital Belgian problem of which Anglo-French coöperation was slowly producing a satisfactory resolution, unwilling to risk a quarrel with them, Palmerston must have been sorely puzzled in the formulation of a policy with regard to the Near East. The task certainly was not made easier by the lack of a really responsible agent in Constantinople and the ordinary delay of a month in the receipt of news. Might not the notorious antagonism of France and Russia be relied upon to produce the compromise solution which would accord most nearly with British interests? France could hardly enthrone Mehemet Ali in Constantinople when Mahmud was protected by a Russian army. Her efforts at mediation seemed, on the other hand, to deprive the tsar of any reason not to recall his troops. Palmerston wrote in March: *Roussin [the French admiral and ambassador] has settled capitally the Turkish dispute... and has done well in sending back the Russian admiral with a flea in his ear. The Russian will no doubt be very angry, but that will not signify.*²⁰ France inspired less worry, for her position in Europe, particularly with regard to Belgium, was dependent upon the *entente* with England.

Against the Russian danger there was yet another safeguard. Austria's interests in the Near East seemed to be far greater than, but identical with, England's and from Vienna Palmerston received a series of reiterated assurances that Russia, too, desired only the preservation of Turkish integrity. The dispatch of the Russian expedition to Constantinople appeared to Metternich to be added evidence of Nicholas' good intentions, but at how nearly their face value Palmerston accepted the Viennese corroborations of Bligh's opinion there is no evidence. If he did not discount them in part at least, he gave them more than their due weight, for even after reports of the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish alliance were rife in several European capitals, Metternich lent them no credence. The chancellor's language was emphatic, *so frank and unreserved as to inspire... full confidence* in Sir Frederick Lamb. Moreover, Metternich admitted that:

The Emperor of Russia... looks upon the succession to the Ottoman Dominions as His Right, but though He counts it as ultimately certain to accrue to him, He would be unwilling to endanger it by a premature assertion of His claim. He knows that in Europe He could appropriate no part of the Turkish Dominions without a War with Austria. He cannot engage in operations on a great scale in Asia without sacrificing his influence in Europe...

Later Metternich informed Lamb that Tatishchev, the Russian ambassador, had been instructed to tell the Austrian emperor that Nicholas, having heard so much about the system of Catherine II, had instituted a fruitless search of the archives for a formulation of its terms. Nicholas had wished to *assure the Emperor of Austria that that system is not His, [and] that he takes a solemn engagement, if the Turkish Empire should fall to pieces not to appropriate to Himself a single village of it.*²¹ From the English point of view, the pledge bore a disquieting resemblance to the pledges of 1826-1829.

The conduct of the Russian government was consistent, however, with the tsar's protestations. Bligh was informed promptly by Nesselrode that the Porte's renewed request for assistance had been granted and that the appropriate forces were about to set forth for Constantinople, and was kept in constant touch with later developments. But in spite of these confidences, Palmerston's apprehensive opinion of the probably subversive result of a Russian quasi-occupation of Constantinople was imparted to the Turkish, and not to the Russian, ministers. Although the tenor of Bligh's conversations with Nesselrode was in harmony with the conduct of his colleague in Constantinople, it was adopted upon his own discretion and not in obedience to orders from London. Palmerston's reserved

attitude toward Russia was further shown by his instructions that while the consul in Alexandria should communicate freely and confidentially with his Austrian and French colleagues, he should merely accept, but not invite, the confidence of the Russian agent.²² The only positive action of England took place in the Near East. Ponsonby was instructed to urge strongly upon the Porte the importance of securing the departure of the Russian forces at the earliest opportunity; the Mediterranean squadron was dispatched to the Dardanelles, long after such a move could have influenced the conduct of the Egyptians and even then was not allowed to enter the Straits. Palmerston believed that the Russians would actually retire without forceful suasion.²³

Although a definitive explanation of British policy during the critical stages of the Near Eastern crisis of 1833 must await the conclusion of a careful study of the Palmerston papers, the evidence in official documents seems to warrant the conclusion that Palmerston wished to trust Russia on this occasion, but was unable to banish all suspicion from his mind. In circumstances in which England, hampered by commitments elsewhere, was unable to exert a decisive influence, he hoped that the jealousies and particular interests of Austria, France, and Russia would produce a compromised resolution of the affair which could be tolerated by England.

The arrival in London at the end of July of indubitable news of the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi brought an abrupt end to British uncertainty about Russia and to the ambiguity of her Levantine policy. Palmerston's first thought was to forestall the sultan's ratification of the treaty, and with that purpose he promptly accepted a French proposal for a *joint démarche* in Constantinople. When that procedure proved to have been belated, the two governments determined upon a concerted protest at both Constantinople and St. Petersburg that the treaty violated Turkey's obligations to other powers and effected an intolerable alteration in the European balance of power. Russia and Turkey stood firmly upon their right as independent states to make such an alliance. Although France and England admitted that contention, they notified both allies that, should the *casus foederis* arise, their action would be determined without reference to the treaty. From Russia the English declaration elicited a haughty rebuttal, but was followed by an exchange of notes of a more temperate character, in which each government explained its position unequivocally and agreed to disagree.²⁴

If the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi produced a revolution in English policy toward Russia and Turkey, it constituted a landmark not so much because at the moment of its signature Russia enjoyed greater power in Constantinople than at any other time, as because the implications of the treaty satisfied the foreign office that Russia was pursuing a policy carefully calculated to secure for herself the ultimate possession of the European portion of the Ottoman empire. To men who had been disposed to give qualified credit to assurances of Russian disinterest, the terms could be only a severe shock. There was strong suspicion, furthermore, of the existence of additional, secret clauses. Russia had not exacted, it was true, any tangible gain, but she appeared to have established a protectorate over the Porte which was tantamount to an effectual control of the empire. In the light of her recent conduct toward Persia, the Greek revolution, and Poland - in all of which, while violating the spirit, she had adhered, perhaps, to the letter of her more or less formal engagements - who could doubt that, beneath her reiterated denials of ambition, she was determined unscrupulously to achieve the goal supposedly contemplated by all Russian sovereigns since Peter? Certainly Palmerston and his associates, stung by the deception which they thought had just been practiced upon them, did not.

Their distrust was aggravated in the autumn by the secrecy which pervaded the conferences of the rulers and foreign ministers of the three autocracies at Schwedt and Münchengrätz. Metternich, who had maintained in the face of the most credible reports his disbelief in the existence of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, must certainly have been bought off by the tsar; an agreement for the partition of Turkey must have been concluded.²⁵

Palmerston adduced these circumstances as the explanation and justification of the policy toward Turkey which he defined in an extremely bellicose dispatch to Ponsonby in early December. He also expressed his opinion of Russia and her policy in no uncertain terms.

No reasonable doubt can be entertained that the Russian Govt, is intently engaged in the prosecution of those schemes of aggrandizement toward the South which, ever since the Reign of Catherine, have formed a prominent feature of Russian Policy.

The Cabinet of St. Petersburg, whenever its foreign policy is adverted to, deals largely in the most unqualified declarations of disinterestedness; and protests that, satisfied with the extensive limits of the empire, it desires

no increase of Territory, and has renounced all those plans of aggrandizement which were imputed to Russia under the former Sovereigns, professing, however, to doubt whether those were ever entertained.

But notwithstanding these declarations, it has been observed that the encroachments of Russia have continued to advance on all sides with a steady march, and a well directed aim, and that almost every transaction of much importance, in which of late years Russia has been engaged, has in some way or other been made conducive to an alteration either of her influence or of her Territory.

The recent events in the Levant have, indeed, by an unfortunate combination of circumstances, enabled her to make an enormous stride towards the accomplishment of her designs upon Turkey, and it becomes an object of great importance for the interests of Great Britain, to consider how Russia can be prevented from pushing her advantage further, and to see whether it be possible to deprive her of the advantage she has already gained.

Palmerston then explained that Austria's unfortunate inclination to pander to Russia had hampered an Anglo-French countervailing policy and made it impossible to rely upon her in the future. Ponsonby was ordered to impress upon the Porte the folly of an association with its greatest enemy and the value of England's amity, for her naval power enabled her to exert an effective control over the activity of the Egyptians. A threat lay behind this candid advice. *But if the British Govt, should be reduced to the necessity of choosing between the Establishment at Constantinople of the Power of Mehemet Ali, or the subjection of that Capital to the Power of Russia, it would be impossible that we should not prefer the former of these alternatives.*²⁶

Palmerston expected that Russia's next move would not long be delayed and judged that war was not unlikely. The full measure of the alarm felt by the cabinet is best shown by their decision in the spring, when the weather first made the movement of armed forces again easily practicable, to empower the commander of the Mediterranean squadron in case of need to pass up the Straits to defend Constantinople against a Russian attack without waiting for further instructions from London. That the violently Russophobe Ponsonby should have been given the discretion to initiate a step tantamount to a declaration of war admits of only one explanation, a suspicion that Russia might soon act with such rapidity that retaliatory measures must be initiated before instructions could arrive from London.²⁷

It would be supererogation to adduce further evidence that the cabinet was dismayed by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, but an article in the *Edinburgh Review* of October 1833 deserves notice as a semiofficial *pronunciamento* in defense of Whig policy. It was written by Henry Rich, the author of the article on Poland in 1832, who informed Napier that he had access to the necessary papers. Thus while there survives no proof, there is a strong presumption that the article enjoyed at least the tacit approval of the foreign secretary. Ostensibly written as a review of David Urquhart's *Turkey and Its Resources*, it was actually a comprehensive analysis of the Near Eastern question on the morrow of Unkiar Skelessi.²⁸

Rich introduced his article with an analysis of the condition of Turkey, based largely upon Urquhart, whose conclusions were adopted almost without qualification. There followed a survey of Russia's expansion since the Treaty of Karlowitz, which gave emphasis to her relations with Poland, whose fate was thought to be an example of that in store for Turkey. Marked attention was paid to the Russian atrocities in the Balkan peninsula during the recent war which were shown to be of a kind with those too well known to have been committed in Poland. The Porte was carefully warned that the dangers of Russia's friendship were no less than those of her hostility.

We repeat, Turkey has everything to fear from Russia, and everything to gain from this country... Our object, as well as our interest, is to confer on her the mutual benefits of commercial intercourse, and to aid her in the recovery of her strength, and the reformation of her corrupt and oppressive Government; in short, to prevent her absorption by Russia. If she will accept these benefits and this aid - well; but if not, then it becomes our duty to search for other allies, and to construct other barriers to the fifth-monarchy dreams of the Emperor Nicholas and his semi-barbarian nobles.

Such a bulwark against Russia, Rich thought might be created by a reestablishment of the Armenian state, and an enlargement of Greece, Persia, and Egypt. England's pacific policy in the years since 1815 had enabled Russia, he noted, to assume the leadership of the *Holy alliance* which had suppressed all liberal stirrings in Central Europe and had deluded Austria and Prussia into playing Russia's game. England had preferred not to risk a breach of the general peace, but there were limits to her toleration of Russia's pretensions.

For the integrity of her own dominions she does not entertain the shadow of a shade of fear; neither has she any base and foolish thought of purchasing peace at the price of submission, which never yet insured it. There-

fore, whenever Russia shall make it appear that the faith of treaties, or the honour and independence of this country, are compromised by an acquiescence in her arrogant pretensions, from that hour she will be made to feel the power of Britain even to the very core of her huge empire.

These are lofty words; but none are more capable of estimating their truth and value than the present rulers of Russia. They are well aware of the weakness of their own state, and of the dignified forbearance which has been maintained by this country. They know that their empire is an unwieldy mass, utterly unfit for long continued and distant wars... Russia is now, and has been, ever since the accession of the Emperor Nicholas, in a critical and precarious state. She is surrounded by the smouldering vengeance of her mangled Polish provinces, in the treatment of which she calls forth the execration of mankind by her barbarities... But if Russia be obstinately proud, and resolve to make a stand at Constantinople, then a vigorous application of force may prevent a prolonged and general war... We have small doubt that the damming up of the Baltic and the Black Sea with our fleets, the destruction of her navy, and the annihilation of her commerce, which would be the easy and not expensive result of one campaign, would bring her to reason; and, the more so, as the first shot fired in the contest would signalize the restoration of the kingdom of Poland.²⁹

The contrast between the tenor of the *Edinburgh*'s article and the generally noninflammatory tone of the newspaper press is emphasized by the treatment accorded the Eastern question by the other great periodicals. To the *Quarterly*, the events at Constantinople added merely another count to its general indictment of Whig *Foreign and Domestic Policy*. *The occupation of Constantinople by a Russian army!* fulfilled, indeed, Catherine's ambitious dreams, but was little more important than the Palmerstonian blunders in Portugal and Greece. In July the Westminster rephrased its earlier discussions of the insidious growth and ambition of Russia, but it suggested that if Russia were about to realize her iniquitous plans, the consequent gigantic empire must inevitably split into two parts whose mutual relations would probably not be harmonious. The whole problem, it thought, was an integral part of the more vital general conflict *between the antagonist principles of light or liberalism on the one side, and darkness and Russia on the other...* In October, the Westminster, like the *Edinburgh*, reviewed Urquhart's *Turkey and Its Resources*, but for it the great interest of the volume was the light it shed upon the infant kingdom of Greece, and upon the Ionian Islands. It noted with pleasure that direct taxation and governmental decentralization were the hope of the East, no less than of the west, and added that Austria, not Turkey, was the proper bulwark against Russia, if the Straits could not be entrusted to an Oriental Denmark. The *Foreign Quarterly Review*, also, disliked both Turkey and Russia. Although it praised Urquhart's *Turkey*, it paid tribute to Mehemet Ali's achievements. It concluded that the Anglo-French *entente* could cope with Russian ambition. Blackwood's Magazine produced several articles which touched on Russian aggrandizement, but like the *Quarterly* it found therein chiefly supplementary evidence of the inability of the Jacobinical Whig cabinet to protect the interests of the nation.³⁰

The article in the *Edinburgh* was in complete accord with the ideas of Palmerston, whether or not it was directly inspired by the foreign office. Although the expression of such belligerent sentiments by an organ so closely connected with the ministry - several of the Whig leaders, notably Lord Chancellor Brougham, were known to be frequent contributors - deserves particular notice, its most significant characteristic was its full statement of the policy which England was to pursue toward Russia and Turkey during the rest of the decade. When Palmerston found that the Russian forces did not immediately return to Constantinople, he turned his attention toward securing the effective nullification of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi by the conclusion of a general guarantee of the integrity of Turkey and toward encouraging her regeneration. No effort was spared to induce the sultan to adopt the program which Rich had derived from Urquhart, a policy of friendly reliance upon Great Britain in foreign affairs and of thorough-going political and economic reform at home.³¹

Since Rich's article constituted the first intimation, even of a semiofficial nature, that England might attempt to make of a rejuvenated Turkey a bulwark against Russian advance in the Near East, the sources of its inspiration are of great interest. The influence of Urquhart's ideas can be inferred only from the praise which was bestowed upon his book, the fact that most of them were adopted, and Rich's dictum that: *Mr. Urquhart's book is the work of a man of sense and observation, tho' tinged with some prejudice and bias.*³² There is no surviving evidence to justify a statement that Palmerston and the Whigs owed their future policy to David Urquhart. The broad concept must have occurred to any man who made a dispassionate survey of the possible methods of curbing Russia. On the other hand, some explanation must be sought for the reversal in Palmerston's opinion of the desirability, and particularly of the possibility, of Turkish regeneration.³³ Urquhart's book differed in kind from any previous study of the Ottoman empire. So much fuller was its information, and so plausibly argued

were many of its conclusions that it not only attracted great attention in the press, but also established for its author the reputation of an expert in Eastern affairs.³⁴

David Urquhart, born in 1805, became, while still in his middle twenties, the titular leader of a Highland clan, but his education and whole experience were continental. Of a passionate, mystical temperament, he was driven by an imperious zeal in the pursuit of what was right in his own eyes. He was fortunate to win among many of his contemporaries a regard and influence which, because of the extravagance of his ideas and his conduct, has puzzled men not subject to his magnetic personality. Uncomfortably aware that he could inspire the confidence and enthusiasm of many ordinarily dispassionate souls, they have been quite unable to understand how his apparently preposterous notions passed a sane and critical examination. With his burning excitement, his tremendous energy, and his inscrutable belief in his own mission, in other circumstances he might have been the messiah of a religious revival.³⁵

Urquhart's first acquaintance with the East followed his enlistment in the band of zealots who fought for the independence of the Greeks. When the intervention of France, Great Britain, and Russia had brought success to the rebels, he slowly explored several portions of the Ottoman empire and, like many others, discovered virtues in the Turk which he had not anticipated. Several years' travel and residence gave him a knowledge of the region greater perhaps than that of any of his contemporaries and so thorough an appreciation of Turkish life that in spite of his Christian faith he was welcomed in Mohammedan circles from which ordinarily Franks were rigorously excluded. On his return to England late in 1832, he availed himself of a family friendship with Sir Herbert Taylor, private secretary of William IV, to gain *entrée* to the highest official circles. Taylor had been much impressed by Urquhart's accounts of conditions in the East and found that the king, to whom his letters had been shown, wished to become acquainted with the author. With the encouragement of these powerful patrons, Urquhart undertook to qualify himself for the diplomatic career which had already been inaugurated in a short secret mission entrusted to him by Stratford Canning. It was agreed that the requisite reputation could best be acquired by the publication of a study of Turkey which would demonstrate the author's unique knowledge and understanding of conditions in the East. After six weeks' hard work had been rewarded by the enthusiastic public reception of *Turkey and Its Resources*, Taylor and the king, who had now succumbed to the spell of Urquhart's magnetic personality, were in a position to urge strongly upon Palmerston that he be deputed to undertake a further investigation of the commercial opportunities of the Near and Middle East. That the book made a great impression upon William there can be no doubt; he took so much interest in it as to read it through, an honour... that he had not accorded to any book for a long time, [and] a copy was sent under his seal to each of the ministers...³⁶

Turkey and Its Resources purported to be an analysis of the administrative and commercial systems of the Ottoman empire, but essentially it was an extended *apologia* for freedom of trade, direct taxation, and local administrative independence. To these elements in the Ottoman polity, Urquhart attributed the inherent strength which had enabled the Porte to survive its recurrent catastrophes and which still promised its regeneration. He made no attempt to conceal his belief that other nations, England particularly, would benefit enormously by adopting these Turkish principles. His survey of the economic condition of the sultan's dominions convinced him that they offered rich commercial opportunities for British merchants. England could supply manufactured goods far cheaper than they could be produced in the Levant and could import in return many raw materials, especially silk. An equally profitable trade might be developed in the hinterland which was served by the potentially great channel of the Danube. Urquhart adduced the present international crisis as his justification in presenting his study to the public and did not refrain from an examination of the political position of Turkey. His general thesis must have gained credibility from his astute interpretation of the purposes of Russia. It required no exceptional perspicacity to realize that she constituted the greatest threat to Turkish welfare, but his specific statement that Mehemet Ali's *attempt at supplanting the sultan would inevitably lead to the placing the sultan [sic] under Russian tutelage, whence all consequences, disastrous alike to Turkey, Mehemet Ali, [and] our commercial and political interests... would flow*, added to ones that: *Open aggression has been carried as far as practicable... and that: Nicholas would exercise, as protector, an authority he never could enjoy as conqueror...* showed, on the eve of Unkiar Skelessi, an extraordinary insight into Levantine affairs. Their identical estimate of the designs of France in North Africa and of her intrigues in Egypt cannot have diminished his general credibility in Palmerston's eyes.³⁷

The book may have forfeited, as Urquhart thought, some popularity by departing from the form of travelogue which was in such great favor, but its reception by the reviews and by *the more serious portion of the public may*, as he hoped, have been enhanced. There is no evidence of the impression which it made upon the ministers, but the moment of its appearance was propitious. The fear that the serpent might devour the drowning man had just induced them to order the Mediterranean squadron to the mouth of the Dardanelles, and they may have been already familiar in part with Urquhart's thesis from several of his memoranda which had been submitted to them. Further investigation could not impede the formulation of a long-range policy in the East, and Palmerston, in fact, did act subsequently in harmony with Urquhart's general principles. It was agreed that Urquhart should make a more complete study of the problem, and Palmerston spent several hours with the king, plotting on the map the itinerary of the exploratory journey.³⁸

Thus it was that late in 1833, his loosely defined instructions having been imparted orally by Taylor, Urquhart set out from England armed with samples of English merchandise which lent him the guise of a commercial traveler and obviated the possible embarrassment, both to him and to the government, of an official mission. The trip cost the exchequer £1200, and among his stock was £200 worth of muskets, which he apparently delivered to Prince Milosch in Serbia. Until he reached Constantinople, by way of the Rhine, the German fairs, and the Danubian principalities, his conduct was consistent with his instructions, but on the Bosphorus he found in Lord Ponsonby a man who fully shared his own ardent distrust of Russia. With the ambassador's approval, later ratified by Downing Street, he began to devote his attention exclusively to politics, and his reports to the foreign office were far more concerned with methods of curbing Russia than of nourishing English trade. After a year spent in intrigue, both in Constantinople and in Caucasian Circassia, which he came to believe was the key to Russian power both in Turkey and in Central Asia, he returned home, for both he and Ponsonby believed that the cause must be advanced in London.³⁹

There had been indications already that Palmerston was recovering from the semi-hysteria induced by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Certainly he had not shown enthusiastic approval of Urquhart's political intrigue. Installed in the foreign office, however, was the Duke of Wellington, who may have hated the Russians, as Palmerston thought, even more than he did, but who had realized that there was no immediate danger of war, and had revoked Ponsonby's contingent power to call the fleet to Constantinople. Since the Duke enjoyed with his sovereign a degree of confidence which Palmerston never won, the change of government had not necessarily damaged Urquhart's prospects. But the Duke had concluded that Urquhart lacked the qualities of a government servant and secured, in spite of William's continuing interest, the cancellation of the nomination as consul at Constantinople which was one of Palmerston's last official acts. Deprived thus of official status, Urquhart was free to undertake the campaign of anti-Russian propaganda which he and Ponsonby had planned.⁴⁰

The state of Anglo-Russian relations which Urquhart found upon his return from Constantinople differed in its essentials hardly at all from that which he had left behind him a year earlier. Palmerston's interpretation of the Russo-Turkish *rapprochement* had been remarkably astute with the easily explicable exception that, judging Russia's intentions by her actions, rather than by her professions, he completely failed to realize that she was, for different reasons, quite as anxious as England to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman empire. In spite of the alarmist character of his instructions to Ponsonby in December 1833 - they may have been indited with a view to their influence upon the Porte, and also the possibility that having been secretly communicated to the Russians, they might inspire caution in the councils of St. Petersburg - he unofficially expressed his doubt that Russia would precipitate another crisis immediately. Thus he soon evaluated correctly the conferences of the autocrats in the autumn of 1833 which had been primarily concerned with the state of Europe and the general progress of revolutionary activity. The understanding between Austria and Russia was that they would endeavor to preserve the Ottoman empire, and would pursue a concerted policy should the *sick man* unfortunately die, rather than the agreement upon an eventual partition which Palmerston had imagined at first. Since he decided that the greatest danger lay in the likelihood of a revolution in Turkey - the English and French navies could easily avert a new Egyptian attack by cutting the indispensable line of maritime communication between Egypt and Syria - he was not greatly worried by the Russian decision to keep the Black Sea fleet ready for action. The English squadron, possessed of the discretionary power to pass the Straits, would be able, in his opinion, to defend the Bosphorus against a Russian attack. It was possible that, in the absence of a revolution, time might effect an improvement in the condition of Turkey and that the *casus foederis* of Unkiar Skelessi might never

arise. Thus the official intercourse of England and Russia during 1834 remained, in Palmerston's words, *on a footing of cold civility*.⁴¹

In the foreign office papers there is a plethora of corroborative evidence of Palmerston's distrust of Russia and many clear signs of the malignant influence it exerted upon the relations of the two governments. Particularly interesting are a comprehensive *critique* of the policy and position of Russia which Bligh composed in January 1834 and Palmerston's observations upon it. Bligh restated, in most convincing terms, the argument which had already been adumbrated by Heytesbury in September 1829, that Russia, far from contemplating a conquest of Turkey in Europe, desired only that the Straits should continue to be possessed by the Porte, which was too weak to deny her the ready access to the Mediterranean upon which the prosperity of her southern provinces depended. She would go to war rather than see a strong and potentially hostile power established athwart that commercial outlet, but she realized that she was in no condition to maintain the war against Austria, England, and France which must follow her own effort to conquer that region. Furthermore, in Bligh's opinion, all sensible Russians feared that such an attractive situation might lure the government from the *Neva* and thus accomplish its denationalization, if not the disruption of the empire. Bligh finally alluded to Russia's Asiatic ambitions and suggested that there was the bare possibility that she might reach some understanding with Mehemet Ali, which would give her access to the Persian Gulf and enable her eventually to threaten British power in India.⁴²

The influence of English Russophobia must be reflected in the persistent refusal of the statesmen in London to lend credence to the reiterated estimates of Russia's power and intentions submitted by their successive representatives in St. Petersburg, estimates which approximated remarkably the basic principles of Russian policy toward Turkey, now known to have been formulated by the *conciliabulum* of September 1829 and formally approved and adopted by Nicholas.⁴³ In this instance Palmerston commended Bligh's conscientious antidote to the poison of other commentators' pens, but his real reply, which shows that Bligh's argument was discounted almost completely, was contained in a dispatch which likewise ran the whole gamut of Russian policy.

Palmerston had initiated in December 1833 a negotiation designed to avert a misunderstanding with regard to naval plans. He had explained that the English estimates, shortly to be laid before parliament, must depend in part upon the state of other navies and that the reported Russian activity in the Baltic and Black seas had appeared to the cabinet to exceed the requirements of a purely defensive policy. While admitting Russia's undoubted right to maintain whatever establishment seemed to her to be expedient, he expressed in the most friendly fashion the hope that the Russian government would be able so to reduce the Baltic fleet from its twenty-seven sail-of-the-line that no addition need be made to the English navy. He *added that whether such augmentation of our defensive force was proposed to Parliament, or pressed by Parliament, or by the public, upon the Government, in either case, there must arise discussions, which could not tend to improve the relations between the two Governments*. Although the Russian response to this overture had not been altogether satisfactory, Palmerston explained that the cabinet had decided to *rely upon Count Nesselrode's denial of any aggressive intentions on the part of Russia... and upon his distinct disavowal of any hostile disposition towards Great Britain...* He proceeded then to amplify his previous explanation of English dissatisfaction in Russia's conduct at Unkiar Skelessi, and the declaration that she must prefer Mehemet Ali to a sultan wholly dependent upon Russia. He finally expressed his satisfaction that Russia also desired to preserve the Ottoman empire.⁴⁴

Disguised by the politic phraseology of this dispatch, a copy of which Bligh was instructed to give to Nesselrode, there appears to have been an effort on Palmerston's part to convert the Russian statement of intentions into a quasi-engagement and, in consequence, an implication that the English government suspected the designs of the Russian statesmen. Such an interpretation of the document is substantiated by the exchange of gratuitous recriminations which grew out of a Russo-Turkish convention to modify the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople. To the contention that a readiness to reduce the indemnity and evacuate the principalities was evidence of good intentions, Palmerston objected that in view of Russia's renunciation of territorial ambition, the reduction of a debt in return for the cession of an additional portion of the Caucasian coast showed small liberality and that the continued occupation of Silistria rendered the evacuation nugatory.⁴⁵ When Bligh communicated Palmerston's observations, Nesselrode curtly denied England's right to criticize the action of two independent states. Virtually identical strictures were one consequence of a similar and contemporaneous modification of the Treaty of Turkomanchai.⁴⁶ Minor disputes about tariffs and the personal claims of British subjects

cannot have made the intercourse of the two governments more harmonious, and the general tension was epitomized by Palmerston's refusal to urge upon Russia the recognition of the young Queen of Portugal. He wrote to Bligh: *If the acknowledgment is to be asked for as a friendly concession to the British Government, the present state of relations between Great Britain and Russia are not... such as to render such a request fitting, and if the application is to be made on any other grounds, there are already subjects of discussion enough... without opening any fresh topic...*⁴⁷ Finally, in May, Palmerston learned that the tsar, piqued by his bland refusal to substitute another ambassador for the rejected Stratford Canning, had recalled the Lievens. The conduct of all diplomatic business was relegated to *chargés d'affaires*, but so great had become the antipathy that even the princess realized that the step might facilitate the establishment of more cordial relations.⁴⁸ So lively was Palmerston's distrust of Russia that the succession to his office of the Duke of Wellington, who had contemplated war in 1829, tended to reduce Anglo-Russian tension.

During the relatively quiescent period which followed the crisis of 1833, the diplomatists were engaged in redrawing their lines and in shaping the plans of future campaigns, either purely diplomatic, or in part military. Ordinarily their activity did not invite or permit publicity, and only occasionally was there some transaction which received the attention of the press. Russia attracted much less notice in English journals after 1833 than she had been accorded during the years of activity which followed the advent of Nicholas.⁴⁹ That her great increase of strength threatened British welfare was an almost unchallenged opinion, but few commentators were so alarmed as to advocate an immediate retaliatory enterprise. Even the unfettered discussion in the house of commons of the events at Constantinople, the only patently apposite event in England in 1834, received but casual notice in the newspapers.

On March 17, Sheil precipitated an exhaustive examination of the relations of Russia and Turkey, by a motion for the production of papers dealing with the subject. The situation was thoroughly canvassed, particular attention being paid to Russia's aggrandizement and to her outrageous conduct in Poland, but little doubt was expressed of Great Britain's ability to defend herself. Other speakers included several prominent philo-Poles, Bulwer, Evans, and Fergusson, but the strongest speech was made by Peel. The absence of a feeling of real alarm appears from the general failure to urge positive remedial measures, the rejection of the motion without a division, and the fact that the subject was treated more as a pretext to indict the Whig cabinet than as a consideration of a vital issue.⁵⁰

Also in 1834, there were presented to the public two accounts of travels in Central Asia which attracted unusual attention. Lieutenant Arthur Connolly told the story of his *Journey to the North of India... through Russia, Persia and Affghannistaun*. Primarily a well-written narrative, the book contained much information about regions still little known, notably a discussion of the commercial possibilities of Afghanistan. Connolly believed that English merchants could greatly increase their business in that country and drive their Russian rivals almost entirely out of a rich market. Most interesting was his appended discussion of the possibility of an overland invasion of India. An analysis of the various routes which Russia might follow led to the conclusion that with Persian and Afghan assistance an attack might be launched against the northwestern frontier at the end of the second campaign. Since all the routes led through Afghanistan, Connolly advocated for Great Britain the adoption of a policy of friendship with the Afghan tribes since their opposition would so augment the not insurmountable natural obstacles as to make the enterprise impossible. He hoped that some one of the rival chieftains might unite the country and thus be able to avert the most immediate danger, the extension of Persian sovereignty to Herat. Connolly's study of the vexed problem reached a calm conclusion, and his suggestions, had they been adopted, might probably have spared England much anguish during the next decade.

Lieutenant Alexander Burnes's *Travels into Bokhara* contained, in addition to an exciting narrative of his journey, a systematic account of part of Central Asia, a historical sketch of the region, and a survey of its commerce. He agreed with Connolly that English interests might largely supplant their Russian rivals in fabulous Bokhara. John Murray sold 3300 copies of his book and brought out a second edition in the next year.

Both works were reviewed at length in the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* and more briefly in other periodicals. All the articles were extremely laudatory and the reviewers accepted the authors' conclusions that there was no serious present danger to India and that Central Asia appeared to offer a highly promising market for British manufactures. The character of the reviews and the success of the books seem to warrant a judgment that in England Russia's military and commercial activity con-

tinued to attract to the Middle East general and interested, if less anxious, attention than that accorded the Levant.⁵¹

¹ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 63-74.

² *Times*, 30 April 1833.

³ F. O. 65/201, no. 24, Bligh to Palmerston, 23 Nov. 1832; *Times*, 8 Feb. 1833.

⁴ *Times*, 19 March, 2 May 1833.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 31 May 1833.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 12 July, 2 Aug., 16 Oct. 1833.

⁷ *Chronicle*, 26 Jan., 10 April 1833.

⁸ *Globe*, 16, 19 March, 5, 10 April, 6 Aug. 1833.

⁹ *Herald*, 16 March, 19, 21, 22, 23 Aug. 1833.

¹⁰ Hansard, commons, 22 April, 10 May, 11 July, 24, 28 Aug. 1833.

¹¹ Temperley, *Near East*, p. 64.

¹² F. O. 181/93, no. 39, Palmerston to Heytesbury, 15 March 1832, enclosing a copy of Canning to Palmerston, no. 7, 13 Feb. 1832.

¹³ F. O. 65/200, no. 7, Durham to Palmerston, 2 Aug. 1832, rec'd 13 Aug. (N. B. Palmerston's penciled annotation asking whether a later report had been received from Odessa); /201, no. 32, Bligh to Palmerston, 20 Dec. 1832, received 10 Jan. 1833.

¹⁴ F. O. 181/97, no. 30, Palmerston to Bligh, 7 Dec. 1832, enclosing a copy of Palmerston to Mandeville, 5 Dec. 1832; F. O. 65/207, nos. 4, 3, Bligh to Palmerston, 9 Jan. 1833.

¹⁵ Hansard, commons, 28 Aug. 1833, col. 900.

¹⁶ F. O. 181/101, no. 25, Palmerston to Bligh, 5 March 1833, enclosing a copy of Palmerston to Mandeville, no. 8, 5 Dec. 1832; Bulwer, Palmerston, II, 154, Palmerston to Temple, 19 April 1833.

¹⁷ F. O. 65/207, extracts of private letters from Bligh to Palmerston, 9 Jan., 3 March, 19 June 1833; Bell, Palmerston, I, 174-177; Lane-Poole, Stratford Canning, II, 18-22.

¹⁸ Hansard, commons, 10 May 1833, col. 1102; cf. Peel's ridicule, *ibid.*, 17 March 1834, col. 338.

¹⁹ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 65, 66, 412, n. 101.

²⁰ Bulwer, Palmerston, II, 144, Palmerston to Temple, 21 March 1833; cf. F. O. 65/207, no. 23, Bligh to Palmerston, 2 March 1833, for another argument that Russian intervention was no longer necessary.

²¹ F. O. 181/102, nos. 25, 31, /108, no. 63, Palmerston to Bligh, 5, 29 March, 19 July 1833, enclosing copies of Lamb to Palmerston, nos. 18, 25, 117, 14 Feb., 8 March, 5 July 1833.

²² F. O. 65/207, nos. 23, 27, 28, 41, 47, 57, 62, Bligh to Palmerston, 2, 13, 16 March, 24 April, 22 May, 19 June, 3 July 1833; 181/101 no. 25, Palmerston to Bligh, 5 March, enclosing a copy of Palmerston to Campbell, 4 Feb. 1833.

²³ F. O. 181/105, no. 47, Palmerston to Bligh, 21 May, enclosing copies of Palmerston to Ponsonby, no. 2, and to the admiralty, 10 May 1833.

²⁴ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 70-74; Hall, *Orleans Monarchy*, pp. 163-166; F. S. Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question* (Urbana, 1924), pp. 30, 31; F. O. 181/112, no. 93, /114, no. 101, Palmerston to Bligh, 13 Oct., 6 Dec. 1833; F. O. 65/208, nos. 113, 119, 134, 138, 143, Bligh to Palmerston, 2, 6 Nov., 21, 28 Dec.

²⁵ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 70-74; Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 169, 170, Palmerston to Temple, 8 Oct. 1833.

²⁶ Palmerston to Ponsonby, 6 Dec. 1833, enclosed in Palmerston to Bligh, 16 Dec. 1833, F. O. 181/114, no. 103. This dispatch is printed, *in extenso*, by R. L. Baker in *English Historical Review*, Jan. 1928, XLIII, 86-89.

²⁷ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 74-76; Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 170-171, 176, Palmerston to Temple, 8 Oct., 3 Dec. 1833. Ponsonby's Russophobia hysteria is well shown by G. H. Bolsover, "Lord Ponsonby and the Eastern Question 1833-1839" in *Slavonic Review*, XIII, 98-118. That Palmerston's opinion was unchanged in Oct. 1834 is clear from his refusal to accept Metternich's assurance of Russia's good intentions with regard to Turkey. F. S. Rodkey, "Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question in 1834", in *English Historical Review*, Oct. 1930, April 1936, XLV, 627-640, LI, 237-256.

²⁸ Add. Ms. 34,616, fo. 105, Rich to Napier, 20 July 1833.

²⁹ *Edinburgh*, Oct. 1833, LVIII, 114-143, quotations 136, 140-142, 143.

³⁰ *Quarterly*, July 1833, LXIX, art. X, particularly 526-528; *Westminster*, XIX, July 1833, art. XI, particularly 178, Oct. 1833, art. XV, particularly 502-510; *Foreign Quarterly*, Feb. 1834, XIII, 161-228; *Blackwood's*, 1832-1834, *passim*, particularly June 1833, Oct. 1834, XXXIII, 931-948, XXXVI, 507-523.

³¹ Cf. F. S. Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41" in *Journal of Modern History*, I, II, Dec., 1929, Jan., 1930. Temperley, *Near East*, chap. I, *passim*.

³² Add. Ms. 34,616, fo. 105b, Rich to Napier, 20 July 1833.

³³ Rodkey, "Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," I, 570-572; C. W. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations, 1815-40," in *Cambridge Historical Journal*, HI, 55-56.

³⁴ Gertrude Robinson, *David Urquhart* (Oxford, 1920), p. 46.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, particularly introduction and chap. I; Sir Charles Webster, "Urquhart, Ponsonby, and Palmerston," in *English Historical Review*, July 1947, LXII, 327-351. Miss Robinson's biography unfortunately fails to integrate Urquhart's activity with the political developments of the period but she was able to portray his extraordinary personality. Sir Charles Webster's article, based on the Broadlands papers, provides much detail which amplifies the more general statements made herein.

³⁶ Urquhart Mss. in the Balliol College Library, letters from Urquhart to his mother, 3 Jan., June or July 1833; Urquhart to his uncle, 13 June (from the F. O.), 7 Aug. 1833 (the quotation above is from this letter); Stratford Canning to Urquhart, 26 Aug. 1832; G. H. Bolsover, "David Urquhart and the Eastern Question, 1833-37: A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy," in *Journal of Modern History*, VIII, 444-446.

³⁷ David Urquhart, *Turkey and Its Resources* (London, 1833), *passim*, particularly chap. xi, quotations, pp. 235, 220, 218.

³⁸ Ernest Taylor, ed., *The Taylor Papers* (London, 1913), pp. 294-300; Urquhart Mss., Urquhart to his uncle, 7 Aug. 1833.

³⁹ Urquhart Mss., Backhouse to Urquhart, 24 Aug. 1833, Urquhart to Palmerston, 21 Dec. 1833, 20 Feb., 2 Sept. 1834.

⁴⁰ Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 214; Temperley, *Near East*, 76-77; Bolsover, "Urquhart and the Eastern Question," pp. 448-454.

⁴¹ Temperley, *Near East*, 78-82; Serge Gorianov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles* (Paris, 1910), 51-52; Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, III, 238-240; Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 169-172, 176, 179, 182-183, Palmerston to Temple, 8 Oct., 3 Dec. 1833, 3 March, 21 April 1834.

⁴² F. O. 65/213, no. 6, Bligh to Palmerston, 7 Jan. 1834; cf. F. O. 65/181, separate, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 30 Sept. 1829, and *supra*, p. 92.

⁴³ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 57-58, Gorianov, *Bosphore et Dardanelles*, pp. 25-28; Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, II, 367-369.

⁴⁴ F. O. 65/212, no. 5, Palmerston to Bligh, 28 Feb. 1834 ("Highly approved, William R."); cf. *Times*, Jan. 1834 *passim*.

⁴⁵ F. O. 65/213, no. 8, /214, no. 71, Bligh to Palmerston, 11 Jan., 2 July 1834; F. O. 181/117, no. 26, Palmerston to Bligh, 16 June 1834. The same argument was made by the *Times*, 5 May 1834.

⁴⁶ F. O. 181/117, nos. 26, 37, Palmerston to Bligh, 16 June, 5 Aug. 1834; F. O. 63/214, no. 70, Bligh to Palmerston, 2 July 1834.

⁴⁷ F. O. 181/115, no. 3, Palmerston to Bligh, 11 Feb. 1834.

⁴⁸ Le Strange, *Lieven-Grey Correspondence*, III, 13-33, *passim*.

⁴⁹ The German papers indeed noted the complete cessation of English attacks upon the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; *Times*, 1 April 1834.

⁵⁰ Hansard, commons, 17 March 1834.

⁵¹ Arthur Connolly, *Journey to the North of India* (2 vols., London, 1834), particularly II, 264-276, 301-339; Alexander Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara* (3 vols., London, 1834), particularly II, 422-444; *Edinburgh*, Oct. 1834, art. IV, Jan. 1835, art. VIII; *Quarterly*, Aug. 1834, art. II, Nov. 1834, art. IV; *Foreign Quarterly*, Aug. 1834, XIV, 58-92; *British and Foreign Review*, I, 459-491. For the sales figure I am again indebted to Lord Gorell.

VII. DAVID URQUHART - THE VIXEN

Although the Tory ministry, which followed the sudden fall of the Whigs in November 1834, was short-lived, and in many respects inconsequential, it effected two important changes in Anglo-Russian relations. The Duke of Wellington brought to the foreign office a mind which was free from the passion and prejudice which the quarrels and the chagrin engendered by the affairs of Poland and Turkey had aroused in Palmerston. The Duke made no attempt to reorient the policy of the country. He transmitted to St. Petersburg only three trivial dispatches, and Ponsonby, in Constantinople, complained that for months he had been without instructions. That hiatus was concluded, to the latter's intense disgust, by a revocation of the discretionary power to summon the fleet into the Straits. Although it is probable, as Palmerston thought, that the Duke, had he remained in office, could not have modified British policy significantly, his good sense and native caution convinced him that the probabilities of the Near Eastern situation did not justify an ambassador's possessing the potential authority to precipitate war. Palmerston's failure to renew the order immediately upon his return to office may reflect the calming influence in Anglo-Russian tension of the Duke's brief interlude.¹

A more positive accomplishment was the resolution of the impasse with regard to Stratford Canning. For Wellington and for Peel there was no question of pride or prestige, and an alternative nominee, the Marquess of Londonderry, was promptly selected for the post. When the appointment was announced belatedly in March, the immediate public dissatisfaction substantiated the doubts of his fitness which had been felt from the first by some observers. Sheil brought the subject before the house of commons in a speech which emphasized Londonderry's anti-Polish sentiments. The Tories made little attempt to meet the Whig and radical argument that a man who had shown sympathy for the autocrats and referred to the Poles as rebellious subjects was disqualified *ipso facto* for the embassy in St. Petersburg. Such a man, it was asserted, would inevitably succumb to the blandishments of the tsar and would not struggle valiantly in the battle between the rival forms of government. The attack was waged, significantly, chiefly by men who had already won a pro-Polish and anti-Russian reputation, Fergusson, Hume, Bulwer, and Ewart. Lord Dudley Stuart's speech was notably replete with vilification of the despot.²

Inevitably the newspapers commented on such an exceptional debate. Although little restraint had been shown by the more vehement members of the house, the press was remarkably temperate. The *Morning Post* characteristically defended the nomination, noting that the major count against Londonderry was his lack of compassion for the Poles, and suggested that, since puling sympathy had availed naught, Londonderry's more realistic attitude was proof of his competence. The other papers, however, including the *Times* and the *Morning Herald*, both firm advocates of the ministry, were agreed that the nominee was totally unfitted for the position, both from his *want of sympathy with the known feelings of Englishmen in favour of the oppressed liberties and trampled rights of Poland*, and from his manifest inability to match his wits against the most subtle and insidious intriguers in Europe.³

Londonderry's resignation brought the episode to an end before the temper of either the press or the commons had become highly inflamed, and its greatest effect was to weaken Peel's already precarious position. Nevertheless, this political thunderstorm deserves careful consideration. There was much to commend the appointment. Londonderry's early military career had been followed by his nomination to the embassy at Vienna, where he had collaborated closely with Castlereagh and Wellington. His resignation followed Canning's accession to the foreign office, but after his return to England he showed in the lords that he gave constant and critical attention to foreign affairs. If his extravagant speeches and extreme partisanship alienated some normally Tory sympathizers and excited doubts about his fitness for an embassy, Wellington had had unusual opportunity to evaluate his ability. In parliament and in the press, his lack of sympathy for Poland was the basis of a more vehement attack than his notoriously anti-democratic sentiments, and the threatening conduct of Russia in Turkey and Persia was virtually ignored. The attack was led mainly by the most prominent friends of Poland and their informal organization perhaps directed the mobilization of anti-Russian propaganda. But the fact that the Turkish and Indian aspects of Russia's policy did not intrude themselves, more or less automatically, is evidence that they were not yet integral elements in the stereo typed indictment of Russia. That so slight a provocation could so rapidly arouse such a whirlwind can mean only that both the commons and the press entertained at this time a very strong, if still latent, hostility toward Russia.⁴

When Palmerston returned to the foreign office in April, he found affairs substantially unchanged. Wellington had not even recalled Ponsonby from the shores of the Bosphorus. Perhaps the selection of Lord Durham for the vacant post in St. Petersburg is evidence that his vacation had fostered reflection and had enabled Palmerston to form a, somewhat less apprehensive judgment of Russia. Certainly the appointment was likely to soothe the tsar and Nesselrode, for by his tactful handling of several difficult problems, particularly the Polish dispute, no less than by his personal magnetism, Durham had become in 1832 *persona gratissima*. The chance that Nicholas made a summer's tour of inspection in southern Russia was utilized to strengthen English influence in Constantinople and to investigate the Russian military and naval establishments on the Black Sea. Durham could most promptly wait upon the tsar at Kiev, and his journey might plausibly be made in a ship of war which properly might demand the right to pass the Dardanelles and thus challenge the implications of Unkiar Skelessi.⁵

Durham undertook his mission fully cognizant of the difficulties which it entailed. He appreciated as thoroughly as Palmerston and the more violent Russophobes the dire consequences to England which might follow Russian control of the Straits, but he was inclined to discount that danger, not because he doubted Russia's desire to extend her influence in that quarter, but because he believed such a *coup* to be beyond her power. From his first mission, he had derived an unusual knowledge of conditions in Russia, an insight into elements of her weakness as of her strength, which convinced him that, invulnerable to foreign attack, she was unprepared to contend abroad with the forces of a first-rate power. The interests of England and Russia he believed to be complementary, and it was his fervent desire to establish relations of harmony and trust between the two governments.⁶

The considerable success which Durham achieved is treated admirably in Professor New's biography and only certain details require present consideration. That he was able to allay the suspicion, not only of the ministers in general, but also of Palmerston and, to some degree, of the king, was the more notable because of the unexpected obstacles which the course of events and the conduct of Ponsonby, Urquhart, and the tsar superimposed upon the many older sources of hostility. As countervailing advantages, he enjoyed the good favor of the Russian government and his well-earned reputation for political talent. The opinions of a former colleague in the cabinet naturally inspired more confidence than those of a *chargé d'affaires*, even though their ideas did not differ in essentials. His discussions of Russian policy were supported by analyses of her military, naval, and economic power which were incomparably more searching and complete than any which had been transmitted to London previously.

Durham's opinions were substantiated, to the day of his return to England, by frequent factual abstracts, based often upon the secret archives of the Russian government. One analysis of its economic condition showed that in spite of a much larger population the annual budget was rather less than half that of the United Kingdom, and that in 1835 an expenditure of about £24,735,000 produced a deficit of nearly £2,500,000.⁷ It is significant that his reports of Russian commercial activity were perfunctory; - clippings from newspapers, statements of the total value of imports and exports, of the proportion of the trade carried on in St. Petersburg, and of the number of ships entering and clearing that port.⁸

Durham's failure to compile more searching analyses of Russian trade is less disappointing because of the reports of the consuls which were abstracted in 1838 and made public in a parliamentary paper on the trade of the United Kingdom.⁹ It there appeared that over the five years from 1831 to 1835 Russian average exports were £9,290,847, of which Great Britain took nearly half (£4,626,446), and her imports, £7,813,347, the British share being about three eighths (£2,956,370). Far the greater portion of the trade passed through the Baltic ports. The degree to which England still dominated Russian commerce is shown further by the fact that about 40 per cent of the total was carried on by British subjects resident in Russia - exports, £3,614,150; imports, £2,794,915 - and that an equal proportion of the mercantile tonnage was British. The remarkably small change in the past two decades in the character of Anglo-Russian commercial intercourse is apparent in its details. In an average year, 1834, flax (£858,370), hemp (£515,429), tallow (£1,949,699), accounted for £3,323,498 or 70 per cent of Russian total exports to Great Britain. The greatest change was in the imports from Great Britain. The value of cotton twist had shown some increase to an average of £1,036,896, but the other major commodities had all fallen off, cotton manufactures being now only £117,614, sugar, £103,649, and woolen goods, £118,360. The compensating increases had been made chiefly in British colonial produce.

Figures derived from British sources correspond with fair exactitude to the returns made by the consuls in Russia. The *official* valuation¹⁰ of English foreign trade, for instance, substantiates the Russian evidence that Anglo-Russian intercourse had failed to keep up with the general growth of British commerce. The total foreign trade of the United Kingdom, which by the *official* figures had reached a maximum of just over £100,000,000 in the years immediately after 1815, was £154,852,516 in 1836, an increase of about 50 per cent. The declines in the major items of Russian imports from Great Britain reflect plainly the success of the Russian protective tariffs. If Russia thus appears to have become of less importance in British economy, it must be added that she retained her quasi-monopoly of the British supplies of tallow, flax, hemp, linseed, and hides. Great Britain, moreover, was still very much the most important consumer of these commodities. But other countries were beginning to offer Russia rather serious competition. Her relatively less important position in English commerce is emphasized by the fact that in 1836 Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, India, British North America, the British West Indies, the United States, and Brazil, all absorbed a larger declared value of British manufactures than did Russia.¹¹

At a time when commercial considerations were being accorded progressively greater attention, in official and unofficial quarters, Anglo-Russian trade was becoming slowly less important to Great Britain. Commercial treaties were negotiated with Turkey and with Austria; there were abortive negotiations for a reciprocal agreement with France. In England several analyses of the trade of the Black Sea were published, but even in that area Russian producers were meeting competition from Turkey, the Principalities, and the Danubian area. Urquhart's commercial mission was only one of several investigations of the commercial opportunities of the Near East undertaken by the government during the decade. In Central Asia there developed a direct competition between English and Russian interests. It is quite clear that the evolution of trade was slowly transforming the economic relationship of Russia and Great Britain from the complementary one which might foster amity into an antagonistic one which might have an opposite influence upon their general intercourse.¹²

This point of view was argued ably and concisely in an article in *Blackwood's* in February 1836. The author first sketched the alarming growth of Russia's political power and then analyzed her commercial relationship with Great Britain. He concluded that British trade with Turkey, though smaller in value, was much more profitable than that with Russia.

*From our present exposition two facts are apparent; first, how much more gainful, on the whole, although more limited in gross amount, are our trading relations with Turkey than with Russia; secondly, how completely is Russia dependent upon this country. Without pretending at this moment to define the exact proportion, we are probably about the mark in stating, that one half of the whole foreign exportation of Russia is to England, whilst in return she absorbs but one-twentieth part of ours. Commercially, therefore, as well as politically, she is within our control. Retaliate restriction for prohibition, and how will the noble pay the poll-tax for his serfs when tallow, hemp, or hides are no longer marketable? Will the autocrat quell the rising storm by an ukase against cotton yarns, and by turning thousands of crown boors out to starvation? - let him.*¹³

Durham's report of the Russian military establishment in 1836 showed that her army totaled 818,000 men, of whom only 180,000 could be employed abroad, and investigation convinced him that the system of military colonies was a failure.¹⁴ Although the English government must unquestionably have found this information interesting, the size of the Russian army was of much less significance than that of her navy, for should hostilities break out, England could not be directly threatened by the Russian army, so long as her own fleet commanded the sea. The reports about the Russian navy were much more frequent.

Shortly after his arrival in St. Petersburg, Durham forwarded an analysis of the Russian Black Sea establishment made by his naval attaché, which appeared to show that that fleet, numbering seventy-one ships of various descriptions, would overpower a Turkish defense of Constantinople.¹⁵ The Baltic squadron, moreover, was so powerful that in 1836 the cabinet was impelled to increase the English naval strength. In reply to a Russian query, Palmerston declared that the increase was based upon the general political situation and that it implied no hostility toward Russia, but conversations between the two governments about naval matters continued for several months. Durham strove valiantly to minimize the distrust on both sides, and, when British merchants in St. Petersburg became so alarmed that they hesitated to undertake commercial ventures, suggested that a part of the British fleet join the Russian squadron on its annual cruise. This suggestion was rejected in London,¹⁶ but his subsequent proposal that the maneuvers should be confined to the neighborhood of Cronstadt was approved by the Russian authorities. Durham and a young English naval officer were

cordially invited to take part.¹⁷ This experience formed the basis for a long report upon the size and condition of the Russian fleet which emphasized the defects in Russian equipment and seamanship. Rigging was poor and gunfire slow and inconstant. The general tone of the document was certainly not such as to alarm the admiralty.¹⁸ Nesselrode's confession that in case of war the British navy would promptly destroy the Russian, and Durham's statement that, in the opinion of most Russians, the money lavished on the fleet was wasted must have been equally calming news.¹⁹

Most important of all Durham's dispatches from St. Petersburg was the carefully considered estimate of Russian power and policy which he made in March 1836.

I recommend no blind confidence in Russian moderation or Russian self-denial. I advocate no such policy as in former days permitted her to pour her armed masses into Turkey without remonstrance or opposition, and then, when war and disease had nearly annihilated her army, and prevented almost her power of advance (facts which have been admitted to me personally by the most eminent Russian generals), allowed her to conclude a treaty at Adrianople with all the honours and advantages of a triumph, which not only did not in reality exist, but which the diplomacy of that period ought to have known, could have been easily converted into a disastrous defeat... I do not see why, because we justly reproach ourselves with our blindness in not perceiving, or our subserviency in aiding her schemes in 1829... we ought to entertain the same fears, when she is retired within her own frontiers, when no military demonstrations of an aggressive tendency are visible, when all her declarations (backed also by the specific act of the voluntary withdrawal of her army from the Bosphorus) disclaim the intention of war, and profess the desire for peace...

The power of Russia has been greatly exaggerated... Her advances in civilization and internal organization have been so rapid - effected indeed almost within the memory of the living - that to Russians themselves her present state appears comparatively gigantic... Few opportunities occur of testing the reality. by the observation and scrutiny of Europeans... The difficulties of communication, the vast extent of territory, and the inclemency of the climate prevent, except in isolated cases, all inspection of, and acquaintance with, the internal state of Russia... There is not one element of strength which is not directly counterbalanced by a corresponding check of weakness...

In fact her power is solely of the defensive kind. Leaning on and covered by the impregnable fortress with which nature has endowed her, - her climate and her deserts - she is invincible, as Napoleon discovered to his cost. When she steps out into the open plain, she is then assailable in front and rear and flank, the more exposed from her gigantic bulk and unwieldy proportions, and exhibiting, as in Poland and Turkey, the total want of that concentrated energy and efficient organization which animates and renders invincible smaller but more civilized bodies.²⁰

The conclusions which emerged from Durham's assay of Russia's potentiality appear to have won the approval of the cabinet - Palmerston considered it one of the ablest and clearest documents ever received at the foreign office²¹ - but from their necessarily confidential nature, they can have enjoyed little influence outside official circles. The chance that such convincing counsels of moderation were injected into the Anglo-Russian estrangement was happy, for both the English ministers and public were subjected simultaneously to a barrage of antithetical sentiment. Urquhart had sent before him from Constantinople the manuscript of his *England, France, Russia and Turkey*, which, published late in 1834, was the opening thrust in the propagandist campaign which he had plotted with Ponsonby.

The brochure was, in part, an elaboration of the thesis of *Turkey and Its Resources*, but much more attention was paid to the international implications of the Turkish crisis. Urquhart's theories were summarized strikingly in the introduction. In an unproven assumption that Russia's major purpose was the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits, he found proof that in both 1829 and 1833 she had been unable to accomplish that purpose. But in 1835 she had not abandoned her intention.

The occupation will take place . as the means of arresting convulsion and bloodshed. This state of things can only be brought about by the acts of the Government itself. Russia stepping in to restore tranquility, has it in her power - is placed under the necessity of changing the course of internal policy that has led to convulsion. Even before convulsion has taken place could she ostensibly assume the protectorate of Turkey, she would conciliate to herself the goodwill of all classes, by putting an end to those abuses into which she herself has led or pushed the Turkish Government. Occupation, therefore, by the causes that lead to it, destroys every interest for Turkey in England, deprives England of every support in Turkey, and of every means of acting either on the people or the Government (if it be allowed to subsist), and by its consequences attaches the Turkish population (the other populations are of course hers body and soul) to the Russian sway. The whole Ottoman empire passes at once from us to her, then our open foe. The force, the arms, the frontiers, the fortresses, the treasures, and the ships of Turkey now placed against Russia, will be placed against us - disciplined, combined, and directed by her... Russia chooses her own time; she prepares the events, she has them all under her own control. She sees on all sides at once ; she cannot miscalculate on such a moment as this. Her whole mind, en-

ergies, and resources, are concentrated on it. She will be perfectly certain of success before she makes the move; and there is no reason whatever for her making the move before she is certain. Match with her knowledge, decision, secrecy, rapidity, and proximity our ignorance, uncertainty, changeableness, absence of disposable force, and distance, and then say if Russia has anything to apprehend from the awakened interests or aroused indignation of England - at least until she has had time to fortify herself within the Dardanelles, and to concentrate at the point of attack her armies and her navies?

But let us turn to another subject - the effect of the occupation of Constantinople on England herself... We have hitherto looked on Persia merely as a body which it is necessary to place between our Indian possessions and Russia, as a space of two thousand miles in traversing which her influence (we talk not of armies) was weakened and lost. What must that influence become after the conquest of the centre of Islamism, of the capital of the East, of the maritime key of all the countries that touch or communicate with the Euxine. What the effect - not indeed of the subjugation of Persia - but of the instantaneous transmission of the power and capabilities of Persia into the hands of Russia. That neutral space is wiped out of the map. It is converted into a source of imposing and aggressive force; it bears a numerous, patient, and warlike people, to be disciplined and moved by Russia without inconvenience or expense. Amongst whom, too, an Indian expedition is popular by its present attractions, by traditionary associations and experience. If a camp of 50,000 men only be assembled at Herat, let those who know India judge the consequences!

This passage is an admirable example of Urquhart's work. The breadth of his imagination was tremendous, and, like his predecessors, Wilson and Evans, he leaped from one point to its most remote implication, ignoring all the intervening difficulties. He made little attempt, for instance, to explain just how the resources of Turkey and Persia would accrue to Russia instantaneously and without expense.

The body of the pamphlet merely amplified the ideas expressed in the preface. Poland was adduced as a horrible example of the fate that awaited the Ottoman empire, if her allies did not help her, and particular emphasis was laid on the historic association between Poland and Turkey against Russian aggression. The scene then shifted to Greece. Russia, Urquhart maintained, had fomented the revolution, induced England and France to destroy at Navarino Turkey's one means of defense, and then, declaring war, had taken advantage of the Porte's weakness to extract the Treaty of Adrianople. Like that of Poland, the story of Greece suggested the fate in store for the Turks. Urquhart then described reforms in Turkey, past and future, and told of her potential strength, which had prevented direct conquest in 1828-29 and could still do so. Therefore, Russia's method of entrance must be that of a protector as in 1833. At that time the influence of England and France had stopped Ibrahim and forced Russia to withdraw with no more profit than the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Urquhart's final plea was for a real alliance to supplant the spurious Anglo-French *entente* which Russia had fostered. Austria, he declared, would soon join, Turkey would be safe, and Russia baffled.²²

England, France, Russia, and Turkey was followed in a few months by *The Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Alt Pasha*. The second pamphlet rehearsed the theories of its predecessor, but paid more attention to the Turko-Egyptian *impasse*. Urquhart argued that open and enthusiastic support for the pasha would be a far better policy than the present attempt to preserve a status which could benefit only Russia. In his judgment the sultan was greatly preferable to the pasha.

*But if we choose to seek the evil, and to check it at its source - if we choose to meet Russia in the Black Sea; if we resolve that she is no longer to interfere in the affairs of Turkey or Europe, then, indeed, there will be no necessity for choosing between the Sultan and the Pasha; we then dictate our terms to them, and to Russia.*²³

When Palmerston returned to the foreign office, Urquhart's prospects improved. He refused to accept the consular appointment, to which Palmerston had nominated him, but he was finally given in September, apparently only after the king and Taylor had subjected Palmerston to great pressure, the post of secretary of embassy at Constantinople. He, at least, thought that he would be entrusted with the negotiation of a commercial treaty which would embody the theories set forth in *Turkey and Its Resources*, and produce the great mutual advantages accruing from the removal of restrictions upon Anglo-Turkish trade. During his stay in Constantinople Urquhart had explored the subject fully with several Turkish statesmen and had even been granted an interview with the sultan. These unofficial negotiations enabled him to assert that the Porte had already approved his draft of a treaty. If his diplomatic appointment subsequently appeared to be extraordinarily indiscreet, at the time it had much to commend it. Urquhart enjoyed the unqualified favor of Ponsonby, Taylor, and the king, and obviously possessed an unrivaled knowledge of Turkish conditions and influence in her councils. His proposed convention was fully in accord with principles of commercial freedom which were beginning to influence Whig policy. From Palmerston, he differed with regard to Russia only in the greater vehe-

mence of his distrust. To offset these merits were merely his lack of experience and his monomaniacal hatred of Russia.²⁴

The necessity that the foreign office and the board of trade make a careful study of the proposed agreement prevented Urquhart's immediate departure for Constantinople and enabled him to pursue the other phase of his campaign. Encouraged by the success of his pamphlets which had been widely reviewed and had evoked other polemical brochures, he undertook the publication of the *Portfolio* and effected a junction between his cause and that of Poland. From Czartoryski and his nephew, Zamoyski, he obtained copies of Russian diplomatic documents which had been extracted from the archives at Warsaw during the revolution. They were the major and most sensational portion of the series of official and semiofficial documents which for eighteen months appeared in that extraordinary periodical.²⁵

Urquhart's publication of a weekly phillipic against Russia was one of the more remarkable phases of his astonishing career. The nature of its contents - Nesselrode privately admitted the authenticity of the documents - ensured its attracting great attention, particularly in diplomatic circles. Since the cancellation of Urquhart's new appointment did not follow immediately the protest of the Russian ambassador, there has been some doubt that the foreign office had direct knowledge of the part which he played in its publication. The Urquhart papers prove, however, that he enjoyed at the outset the constant advice of Fox Strangways, Palmerston's political undersecretary, and of Sir Herbert Taylor. So enthusiastic was the former that Urquhart believed not only that his paper enjoyed Palmerston's approbation, but that its expenses would be defrayed by the foreign office. Just how much Palmerston knew of the project is not quite clear. He declared in the commons that he had had no control whatever over the *Portfolio*. But the part which Strangways played, and the fact that Urquhart's severance of all connection with it was not demanded until after the sixth number had appeared and the Russian protest been delivered suggest that Palmerston's statement, if technically correct, was at least a trifle disingenuous.²⁶

The first number of the *Portfolio*, which appeared late in November 1835, contained only a memorandum submitted by Count Bernstorff to the King of Prussia, in January 1831, on the relations of Prussia to the other members of the Germanic confederation. Only a reader who shared Urquhart's mystical insight into the implications of an ambiguous sentence could have found here any evidence of Russian intrigue although there were phrases which could easily offend an ardent liberal. In the newspaper press, the new periodical was greeted with acclaim, the *Post*, for instance, suggesting that such publication of state papers constituted a highly beneficial public service.²⁷

In the second number Urquhart capitalized a blunder committed by his arch culprit. The tsar had visited Warsaw in October 1835 for the first time since the revolution and had delivered to its suppliant municipal officers a tirade of which the violence defied explanation. The flamboyant comments of the French press were promptly echoed in England, and in November the columns of all but the most conservative papers teemed with invective against Russia. Read in the light of the political oratory of the Europe of Hitler and Mussolini, the speech does not seem to be extreme. The most threatening remarks were the tsar's warning of the fatal result of another insurrection. *I will cause... cannon to thunder upon the city. Warsaw shall be destroyed and certainly shall never be rebuilt in my time.* But to a generation which breathed the Romantic atmosphere of liberal nationalism his prediction that: *If you persist in your dreams of a distinct nationality, of the independence of Poland, and of all these chimeras, you will only draw down upon yourself still greater misfortunes,* appeared to be exceeded in its villainy only by the faithless breach of the Treaty of Vienna which it confessed.²⁸ The full measure of the horror which the speech excited is shown by the refusal of the editors of the *Times* to credit its authenticity. When after several days it was finally printed *in extenso*, an editorial commentary began by characterizing the tsar as a *fierce Tartar* and expressed the opinion that insanity or possibly the malignant experience of possessing tyrannical power were the sole plausible explanations of his remarks. A characteristic sentence from its paraphrase of the speech illustrates its extreme hostility. *Don't dare to tell me that I am not execrated at the bottom of your hearts - I who have perfidiously violated all those pledges to Poland and to Europe, under which your country was placed in my possession. - I, who have covered Poland with the tombs of her best and bravest patriots...*²⁹ During the remaining weeks of the year, the entire press of England, with virtually the single exception of the *Post*, reverberated with comparable invective which was gradually extended to include all aspects of Russia and her policy.³⁰

The *Portfolio* was peculiarly violent, its second number containing suppressed portions of the speech, its third, three different versions, each more vicious than the last, the fourth and fifth numbers being largely *exposés* of Russia's threat to the security of Europe and the liberties of mankind. Recognizing perhaps that the public was beginning to tire of the Warsaw affair, Urquhart shifted his attack to the Russian campaign in the Caucasus. He had brought back from his tour of investigation a document which purported to be an appeal addressed to the peoples of Europe by the valiant Circassian tribes. This *Declaration of Independence* came probably from Urquhart's own pen, though it doubtless had the sanction of some warrior chieftains. Successive numbers of the *Portfolio* vehemently developed the thesis that Russia had no rights in the area at all, that the *impassable barrier* of the Caucasus was the bulwark which preserved the independence of Persia and the invaluable commercial traffic between Central Asia and western Europe. Should Russia command that strategic position, Turkey, Persia, and India must inevitably succumb to her attack. Thus to the earlier thesis that the safety of England and of Europe hung upon the fate of Turkey, there was added the corollary that the noble Circassians possessed the key to the happiness of mankind. Surely England must seize her opportunity to realize a huge commercial profit while preserving the liberties of Europe. If she recognized the independence of the Circassians, she would open to her own subjects a source of raw materials which would render them independent of Russia's monopolies.³¹

With the attack upon Russia thus thoroughly launched upon several fronts, Urquhart was able, in accord with the demand of Palmerston and Taylor, to relinquish all active part in the *Portfolio*. Several of his disciples, Captain G. E. Westmacott, H. H. Parish, a *quondam* rather incompetent secretary of Stratford Canning, and a certain David Ross of Bladensburg, all of them old friends of Urquhart's, were responsible for its conduct. Urquhart's mother, James (later Sir James) Hudson, Strangways, and Taylor appear to have had an advisory capacity, while H. H. Wilson, professor of Sanskrit at Oxford, and Sir John McNeill enjoyed a more tenuous connection. Henry Bulwer and possibly Stratford Canning were among the contributors. The magazine continued to appear until June 1837, the contents ranging from the purloined Russian documents to unsigned pieces of rabid propaganda. The tone remained consistently anti-Russian, but in the last numbers the editors undertook, much to Urquhart's displeasure, an intemperate attack upon Whig policy. The nature of its influence can only be guessed. Its circulation, although not comparable to the great newspapers or reviews, was considerable, about 800, and the reproduction of its articles and its ideas in the metropolitan journals must have extended its influence far beyond the circle of its readers, particularly in the first few months.³²

Urquhart's propagandist activity was not limited to his own writings. Aided by other English students of the East, he initiated a conscious campaign in the English press, John McNeill, soon to be British minister in Teheran, whom he had met in Constantinople, and J. B. Fraser being his principal collaborators. McNeill was the author of an article in the *Quarterly* in February 1835 entitled *England, France, Russia, and Turkey* which summarized and discussed Urquhart's pamphlet of the same title. The tone and the thought of the article are so nearly identical with Urquhart's own writing that all that need be recorded here is the complete conversion of the *Quarterly* to the Urquhartite thesis.³³

More noteworthy because more indicative of the trend of British opinion and of the influence of the school of Urquhart was an article in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* in March. The reviewer here apologetically justified, by the importance of the subject, his notice of a work originally written in English. The article adopted *in toto* the Urquhartite thesis of the insidious strength of Russian diplomacy, and the necessity of Britain's assisting Turkey by sending a fleet into the Black Sea. It was followed by supporting articles in July 1835, and in nearly every subsequent issue for several years. It is significant that the *Portfolio* and Urquhart's other writings were particularly commended. Although the *Foreign Quarterly* had given considerable attention to Russia in the past, it was only in 1835 that it began to show an alarmist tendency.³⁴

Even clearer is Urquhart's influence upon a new periodical, *The British and Foreign Review*, which first appeared in July 1835. It was established by Thomas Wentworth Beaumont, the president of the Polish Association, and a co-founder of the *Westminster Review*. From the very beginning it conducted just such a campaign in behalf of Poland, and against Russia, as its auspices would indicate. The first number contained an inflammatory discussion of Russian diplomacy; the second had several comparable articles on *Russia, Persia and India; the Designs of Russia, Cracow, Greece and the Levant - Unkiar Skelessi*, and *Burnes in Bokhara*. There is no evidence in his papers that

Urquhart took any part in the management of the periodical, but both he and McNeill were contributors, and its anti-Russian bias was hardly less extreme than that of the *Portfolio*.³⁵

Urquhart's influence upon other papers is less certain. It was his own belief that he had converted *Blackwood's*, *Tait's*, and *Chambers' Journal*, and half influenced the *Westminster*, in addition to the periodicals already considered here. The *Westminster*, in fact, carried an article on Russian atrocities in Poland in July 1835, and in October a review of Quin's *Steam Voyage Down the Danube*, which included a tangential allusion to the Near Eastern question. *Blackwood's*, like the *Westminster*, had already expressed its distaste for Russia in no uncertain terms, but from the issue of August 1835 its articles became perceptibly more passionate and more frequent. It has already been noted that in February 1836 it adopted his thesis of the interrelation of "*Foreign Policy and Foreign Commerce*."³⁶

The energies of the Urquhart clique were devoted also to the production of pamphlets. David Ross compiled a series of excerpts from British and continental papers, particularly from the *Moniteur Ottoman*, which consisted, in fact, in a compilation of favorable reviews of *Turkey and Its Resources*. Urquhart himself arranged for the publication of a rather temperate reply to Cobden's *England, Ireland and America*, entitled *Turkey and Russia*, which laid great emphasis upon the importance of Turkish trade.³⁷ More significant was McNeill's *Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East*, which was submitted to Palmerston's criticism and published, at his request, anonymously. The conclusions which McNeill reached after a survey of Russian expansion since the time of Catherine are the most interesting portion of the brochure.

There is a point, however, in the progress of subjugation at which resistance ceases and protection begins; a point beyond which force and violence are no longer necessary, and where the absence of collision presents no occasion for third parties to interpose. To a power which has to dread opposition in its career of conquest, the step which enables it to pass this point is the most important in the whole series, and Russia, from frequent experience well knew its value... This was the result that Russia sought to obtain from the treaty of Unkiar Skellessee...

*The interest which Great Britain has in the preservation of Persia is more immediately with reference to her Indian empire, and her interest in Turkey is more immediately connected with the state of Europe; but the influence of each on the other is such, that the sacrifice of either would almost necessarily involve the fall of both. The resources of Persia in the hands of Russia would suffice to neutralize the whole remaining power of the Sultan in Asia; and the control of the resources of Turkey by Russia, would lay Persia prostrate without a blow. The whole interest we have in both is therefore ultimately at stake in each, and that double interest, taken in all its bearings, political and commercial, in Europe and in Asia, is perhaps as important as any we have to defend beyond the limits of these islands.*³⁸

Urquhart's propagandist campaign in the periodical press was important because it maintained the expression of anti-Russian sentiments in England at a time when lack of event had produced a hiatus in the diatribes of the newspapers. A precise measure of his influence cannot be made, but his stimulus must certainly be given much credit for the otherwise inexplicable increase of attacks upon Russia. Indeed, the eminence of the single voice which was raised in public protest tends to confirm the judgment that in response to Urquhart's call virtually the whole British press resounded with hostile sentiments. In official circles Durham's brilliant penetration enabled him to pierce the fog of prejudice and to perceive the real weakness of Russia, but an equally sane judgment appears to have been made elsewhere only by Richard Cobden.

Still an obscure *Manchester Manufacturer*, Cobden had become an ardent convert to the theory of free trade and was convinced of the folly of any but a strictly defensive war. Knowing that Urquhart was the author of *England, France, Russia, and Turkey*, he deduced from the news of the latter's diplomatic appointment the conclusion that the foreign office was equally inspired with hostile purpose toward Russia, and, in order to counteract the evil, published the pseudonymous pamphlets, *England, Ireland, and America, and Russia, 1836*. Cobden believed that trade was the source of all wealth and power, and mere territory of very little value. England's experience with Ireland and Russia's with Poland were conclusive evidence of the delusion. He felt no fear of Russia, for her vast territories and large population produced less revenue and less real wealth than did the smaller, but more efficaciously exploited resources of Great Britain. Neither India, nor British trade appeared to him to be threatened, for Russia had defended herself against Napoleon only with difficulty and her navies might easily be shut up in the Black and Baltic seas. Urquhart urged a crusade on behalf of Poland and Turkey, but Cobden argued that Russia's possession of the former had restored order and been the dawn of a new and more prosperous era for the Poles, and declared that a similar transformation would follow the tsar's conquest of the latter. Britain, Cobden asserted, could not justly

protest against Russian aggrandizement, for, in addition to her earlier successes in India and at Gibraltar, since 1800 she had herself made acquisitions of triple magnitude. He concluded his booklet with a stirring appeal for an English policy of peace and nonintervention which would allow the reduction of the public debt and the amelioration of the national competitive position with regard to America, the only serious rival. One paragraph illustrates admirably his complete scorn of Russia.

*The manufacturing districts alone - even the four counties of England comprising Lancashire, Yorkshire, Cheshire, and Staffordshire - could, at any moment, by means of the wealth drawn, by the skill and industry of its population, from the natural resources of this speck of territory, combat with success the whole Russian empire! Liverpool and Hull, with their navies, and Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham, with their capitals, could blockade, within the waters of Cronstadt, the entire Russian marine, and annihilate the commerce of St. Petersburg. And, further, if we suppose that, during the next thirty years, Russia, adhering to her system of territorial aggrandizement, were to swallow up, successively, her neighbours, Persia and Turkey - whilst England, which we have imagined to comprise only the area of four counties, still persevered in her present career of mechanical ingenuity, the relative forces would, at the end of that time, yet be more greatly in favour of the peaceful and industrious empire. This mere speck on the ocean - without colonies, which are but the costly appendage of an aristocratic government - without wars, which have been but another aristocratic way of plundering and oppressing commerce - would, with only a few hundred square leagues of surface, by means of the wealth which, by her arts and industry, she had accumulated, be the arbitress of the destiny of Russia, with its millions of square miles of territory. Liverpool and Hull, with their thousands of vessels, would be in a condition to dictate laws to the possessor of one-fourth part of the surface of the globe: they would then be enabled to blockade Russia in the Sea of Marmora, as they could now do in the Gulf of Finland - to deny her the freedom of the seas - to deprive her proud nobles of every foreign commodity and luxury, and degrade them, amidst their thousands of serfs, to the barbarous state of their ancestors, of the ancient Rousniacs - and to confine her Czar in his splendid prison of Constantinople.*³⁹

The common sense and the subsequent eminence of Cobden must not be allowed to magnify the importance of these pamphlets. At the time, they received much less attention than did the more sensational productions of the opposing school of thought. Only a few of the periodicals gave them favorable notice. Cobden himself believed that he was arguing a thesis which might otherwise have been lost by default.⁴⁰

The full measure of English antipathy toward Russia was succinctly drawn by Aaron Vail, who had been the American *chargé d'affaires* in London since 1832 and was a well-informed, competent, and impartial observer. In November 1835, he transmitted to Washington a comprehensive critique of British sentiment with regard to Russia. Of Nicholas' Warsaw speech he wrote:

*[It has] revived much of the sympathy towards the chivalrous Poles which time had much weakened... The Press, with scarce one exception, has rung with maledictions upon the head of the Tyrant and the cruel policy which seems to actuate him; the people throughout Europe have responded to the call, and it is not unreasonable to believe that Governments once in friendship with Russia have caught the influence, while others who have looked upon her with a jealous eye rejoice to see their ranks increased and feel their position strengthened... England is firm at her post, as regulator of European politics... She cannot hear with indifference the avowal of such principles as those lately declared by the Czar. Tory or Whig, the Press has passed unqualified sentence upon them, and the Press here on such topics speaks the public mind in plain terms. Under a Tory Government, efforts might, perhaps, have been made to check the spread of hostility toward such an Ally as the Czar, but the Councils by which Great Britain is, at present, governed possess no such sympathies; and the portion of the public organ which usually interprets the sentiments of the Cabinet is loud in its denunciation of Russian politics, and begins to calculate the chances of a war which would have for its object to set a barrier to Russian encroachments. Among the means daily employed to popularize this feeling, the pretended views of Russia upon British India have been, however absurdly, held up to excite the ignorant fears of the people. Some territorial dispute between British subjects and Russian authorities on the Northwest coast of America has come at a very opportune time to operate upon the public mind. The presence in the country of Prince Czartoryski and other distinguished Polish Exiles, who receive from the people new and spontaneous remarks of interest and admiration, affords daily opportunities for the expression of anti-Russian sentiments; while in higher and better informed quarters, the subjugation of Turkey and the command of the Bosphorus, virtually surrendered to Russia by the Treaties of Adrianople and Unkiar Skelessi, have excited - if not fears of the growing power of the Autocrat, an impression that it is time that an effectual check should be interposed to his encroaching policy. I do not believe that it is the desire of Great Britain to resort to a war for this purpose; but, at the same time, I do not entertain a doubt that Ministers rejoice at the unpopularity into which Russia has lately fallen, in the hope that either the consciousness of the fact will incline her to alter her course and facilitate the endeavours of England to annul the late Treaty respecting the Dardanelles; or that, if a resort to arms should ultimately be rendered necessary, it would receive the sanction perhaps the aid of other European states, not excepting those which, with her, have constituted the Holy Alliance against revolutionary principles.*⁴¹

The incident to which Vail alluded was a minor clash between agents of the Hudson's Bay Company and officials in the Russian territories in North America. It received some attention in the press for a short time, and was cited by Sir Herbert Taylor, in a letter of advice to Urquhart about the *Portfolio*, as an example of an issue which might be so dramatized as to incite the nation to an uncompromising stand against Russia. In the absence of germane inflammatory propaganda, however, the negotiations for a settlement of the affair dragged on without appreciably affecting the relations of the two countries.⁴²

The exacerbating effect of propagandist activity was shown, by contrast, in the debates in the house of commons which Lord Dudley Stuart, Stratford Canning, and P. M. Stewart precipitated in the spring of 1836. Stuart initiated his campaign in the debate on the address in answer to the speech from the throne in which he maintained that there was increasing apprehension among men of all parties and classes over the growing power of Russia and that they knew that there was danger to England's commerce, to her political position in Europe, and to India. But Stuart's real attack was made on a motion for the production of papers dealing with the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. On February 19, he expressly disclaimed the motive of sympathy for Poland and maintained that the question was *Russian, Turkish, Indian, English, European*. His speech ran the full ambit of the Urquhartite thesis, outlining Russia's tremendous growth since the time of Peter. Specific reference was made to her proximity to Stockholm, to Dresden, to Paris, to India. The rapid increase of her naval power, the threat which she exercised over England's increasing commerce in the Levant and with Persia by way of Trebizond, and the overwhelming power which the possession of the Straits would afford her were all discussed. Stuart thought that the direct danger to India was still distant but that her possession of Turkey and Persia would greatly increase England's handicap when war finally came. He referred directly to articles in the *Quarterly*, the *British and Foreign Review*, and the *Portfolio*.

Thomas Attwood supported Stuart's motion in an even more intemperate speech which was interpreted by other members to be a positive demand for an immediate preventive war. Palmerston and several other members of the cabinet discounted the danger so forcefully stated, but they argued more for confidence in the policy of the government than against the fact of a Russian menace. Only one, a Tory member, seriously disputed Stuart's general hypothesis.⁴³

The malignant influence of Poland became manifest in March, when the decision of Russia and Austria to intervene in Cracow to suppress subversive Polish intrigues induced Stratford Canning to bring the subject to the attention of the commons. In two speeches he argued the necessity of preserving the general settlement of Europe established at Vienna against the encroachments of Russia and her despotic allies. Canning's remarks were more temperate than those of Dudley Stuart, but Palmerston's moderation was an inadequate antidote to the ensuing vituperation of O'Connell and Hume.⁴⁴ P. M. Stewart reverted to the occupation of Cracow on March 30 and then inquired about Russia's right to establish a quarantine station on the Danube. Palmerston's conciliatory answers did not dissuade Stewart from bringing the general topic of the Russian menace once more into the debates of a session of parliament which had already considered the question more thoroughly than ever before. On April 20, he moved an address to the king for the establishment of a consulate at Cracow and the adoption of a policy which would be better adapted to the protection and extension of British commercial interests in Turkey and the Black Sea. The first, and briefer, portion of his speech dealt with Russian crimes in Poland, and included a quotation from Nicholas' Warsaw speech. With this background he turned to the question of British trade with Russia and with Turkey, particularly in the Black Sea. An impressive array of statistics dealing with tonnages and commodities was adduced to demonstrate the decline of trade with Russia and the increase of that with Turkey. Turkey's potentialities were thought to be much greater, particularly since Russia's established policy was one of economic independence. Prohibitive tariffs, he asserted, had been imposed in the past and would be revived in the future upon all commodities which she was able to produce herself. She was attempting to destroy British trade in the Danubian region, and, by way of Circassia, in Persia. Stewart made no specific reference to the writings of the school of Urquhart, but his argument was so thoroughly Urquhartite in tenor that it is inconceivable that it did not reflect the latter's influence.

Palmerston, in reply, accepted Stewart's thesis, but argued that his statistical proof of the growth of British commerce, in spite of the disturbed state of the East, was a justification, not an indictment, of Whig policy. The debate then degenerated into a partisan discussion of English policy since 1825, the Whigs and the Tories each defending, not very persuasively, their own conduct of affairs. Roe-

buck, a radical, introduced a new note when he suggested that Russian despotism was preferable to oligarchic anarchy in Poland and elicited a horrified rejoinder from Cutlar Fergusson.⁴⁵

The influence of these debates of the house of commons may be found in the diplomatic intercourse of Russia and England. They excited a distress in the minds of Nicholas and Nesselrode which Durham's skill, shown in the long *critique* of Russian power quoted above, was taxed to allay. They cannot have facilitated the settlement of the troubles of Cracow which Palmerston pressed on the Russian government.⁴⁶

Their inspiration and their influence in England are less certain. The press reported and discussed them fully, often in very hostile terms. Whether there existed a direct connection between Urquhart's group and the parliamentary Russophobes does not appear, but Stratford Canning was personally acquainted with Urquhart and Parish, and probably with McNeill, and their ideas were clearly in the minds of several of the speakers in the house. The importance of English trade in and through Turkey was accorded a general recognition it had not received before the publication of Urquhart's books. Thus it is a reasonable assumption that the unprecedented attention paid by the house of commons in 1836 to the problems associated with Russian ambition was in large measure the fruit of his propagandist campaign.⁴⁷

By the spring of 1836, the campaign in England had made great progress, and, having placed the active direction of the *Portfolio* in other hands, Urquhart devoted his attention to the preparation of the commercial treaty with Turkey. He composed several memoranda, and discussed the problem with Palmerston and with Poulett Thompson, the president of the board of trade; but, as always, he found that other men would not proceed at his own headlong pace. An intrigue with the Turkish envoy in Paris naturally called forth from Palmerston a severe rebuke and a warning that, unless he confined his activity to the business officially entrusted to him, his appointment must be withdrawn. Finally, in June, he set out for Constantinople in the company of McNeill, newly appointed minister at Teheran. Two sojourns at Munich and Vienna, where he waited upon the King of Bavaria and Metternich, can not have pleased Palmerston. His crusading ardor was indulged further in a visit in Serbia to his old friend, Prince Milosch. Hardly had he entered upon his duties before he was involved in so bitter a quarrel with Ponsonby, his one-time fellow intriguer, that the ambassador refused him access to the archives and communicated with him only through the dragoman. The breach seems to have been caused by Urquhart's exaggerated notion of his own authority and his consequent unwillingness to act as befitted a secretary of legation. It prevented his employment on official business, and the conclusion of the commercial treaty was the achievement of Henry Bulwer in August 1838. Deprived of all duties, he promptly proved that he might be a serious danger to the peace of Europe.⁴⁸

Before Urquhart left London, he had initiated a maneuver which was designed to afford the Circassians the positive aid of England. During the summer of 1836, a fellow conspirator named Stewart visited Circassia, distributed copies of the *Portfolio*, and intrigued with the purpose of encouraging Circassian resistance so effectively that his conduct became the subject of a conversation between Durham and the tsar and the occasion for a passionate plea by the former that if England must oppose Russia in the Caucasus she would at least do so openly.⁴⁹ His cue taken perhaps from Sir Herbert Taylor's opinion that only some violation of British rights would excite a national demand for coercive measures, Urquhart's next move in his vendetta was the creation of an incident which would require a definition of the status of Circassia.

The plot was well conceived. Urquhart doubtless knew that the region had received the careful consideration of the foreign office since the time of the Russo-Turkish war; official interest had even been acknowledged by Palmerston in the house of commons. A promising technique had been indicated when in May 1835 the Russian navy had seized an English ship, the *Lord Charles Spencer*, while she was cruising off the Caucasian coast. The Russian action was based upon a blockade of the coast, not effectively maintained, which had been imposed in 1831 in order to facilitate the subjection of the area recently acquired under the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople. The English and Russian governments were still engaged in a not too friendly discussion of the rights of the case. Only a few weeks before the new incident was known, the earlier dispute was settled by Russia's conceding the English claim that the *Lord Charles Spencer* had been seized on the high seas and granting compensation to her owners. The basic question of Russian possession of Circassia, which Palmerston did not wish to recognize, but was not ready to resist forcibly, was thus left open, although Metternich perceived that the argument over the three-mile limit inferred Russia's *de jure* sovereign rights.⁵⁰

Urquhart determined to send a ship loaded with salt, under the Russian regulations a prohibited commodity, into a port with which all foreign trade was interdicted. If the vessel were seized, the fundamental issue could not again be avoided. He hoped that Palmerston would categorically deny Russia's rights in the region and prepare to afford naval protection to English merchantmen. Even if war did not develop, the English fleet must be sent through the Straits and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi nullified. Should Russia not maintain her right of blockade, the independence of the Circassians would be recognized. The scheme thus appeared to promise some reduction of Russian power in the Black Sea.⁵¹

Urquhart arranged with his friends, George and James Bell of Glasgow and London, for the dispatch of the *Vixen*. George Bell and Co. were already known in the foreign office, for their protest, in the previous year, about the obstacles which Russian quarantine regulations imposed upon the trade of the Danube. On that occasion, Durham's desire to avoid the exchange of acrimonious correspondence induced him to discuss the Danubian quarantine in terms more general than the Bells' complaint. Vorontsov, the governor of south Russia, drew up a report which justified the quarantine and denied that its enforcement unduly obstructed commerce.⁵² Although the episode ended amicably, this earlier affair of the *Vixen* was probably the basis of P. M. Stewart's attack upon Russia in the commons in April.⁵³

Before the *Vixen* departed for Circassia, George Bell tried to extract from the foreign office a statement that the blockade of the Circassian coast was not lawful, but Palmerston scrupulously refused to commit himself and denied Bell's right to demand a ruling. Similar inquiries made in Constantinople by James Bell found Ponsonby equally discreet, and the adventure would probably have been abandoned had not Urquhart insisted upon its completion. There can be little doubt that Urquhart sincerely believed that he was thus promoting the plans of the foreign office.⁵⁴

When the Russian commander of the *Ajax* seized the *Vixen* at Soujouk Kalé in late November for an infraction of the blockade, Urquhart's plot appeared to be successful. The English public was promptly informed of the affair by Urquhart's friends, the British newspaper correspondents in Constantinople. The London journals were loud in their denunciations of the latest example of Russian villainy.⁵⁵

On one detail alone Urquhart had not counted. Palmerston and the cabinet had no more desire than had Durham to make of the incident a *casus belli*. In a series of dispatches skillfully phrased so that some of them, but not all, might later be submitted to parliament, Palmerston explained that while England could not admit Russia's right to the whole eastern shore of the Black Sea, the government was prepared to concede her *de facto* possession of Soujouk Kale and her consequent right to establish there *municipal*, or quarantine, regulations which the *Vixen* had infringed. This escape from the dilemma was sketched to Durham in a dispatch which purported to be strictly confidential, but was confidentially shown to Pozzo di Borgo, now Russian ambassador in London. The Russian government, equally ready to conclude the affair without exploring its ultimate implications, built its case entirely upon the foundation laid by Palmerston. No mention was made of a blockade of the whole coast. Urquhart's plot miscarried completely, and no one of his aims was accomplished.⁵⁶

The seizure of the *Vixen* was, nevertheless, a *cause célèbre* in both official and unofficial circles. The repercussions arising from the apprehension of no ordinary smuggler could have attracted the vigilant attention of Metternich. Yet, in spite of its undoubted importance, the affair of the *Vixen* exerted upon Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations an influence which may not be precisely determined. Palmerston's evident desire to effect a compromise appears to show that he did not, in 1837, still see in Russia the great and immediate danger he had conjured up in 1833. If the tone of his dispatches in 1833 reveals an outlook hardly less anxious than Urquhart's, clearly he was now not ready to enter lightly upon a course which might lead to war.

The episode itself must have been reassuring, for Russia's readiness to compromise was an act, not merely a declaration, which proved that she might be guided by counsels of moderation. Great had been her provocation, for Urquhart's part in the drama was strongly suspected. Indeed, the affair might justly have been judged to have had official inspiration, since Urquhart had been given a diplomatic appointment not long after the publication of his anti-Russian pamphlets, and had been sent out to his post only after the *Portfolio* had been well launched. It seems unlikely that Nesselrode was completely unaware of his anti-Russian intrigues in Munich and Vienna. Were England's intentions judged then by the criterion which Palmerston had established for Russia, by her acts, rather than by her official denials of knowledge of Urquhart's activity, the verdict could not have been doubtful.

Moreover, the journals, the *Globe* and the *Chronicle*, which were universally believed to enjoy the confidence of Palmerston, were extremely critical of Russia.

In spite then of serious provocation, and in spite of a confidential statement that England could not recognize her right to Circassia, Russia did not press that claim. Even if her moderation might be imputed to the weakness which Durham so persistently emphasized, the rapid adjustment of so explosive an issue must have been a good omen for the future, for it would hardly have been possible had the two governments still been *snarling at each other*. Perhaps the evidence of moderation which each country showed at this time may have made possible the growth of that mutual, if limited, confidence which flowered in 1840.

The *Vixen* affair serves as a good index to the state of public feeling as well as that in official quarters. Russia appeared to have committed just the act of injustice to innocent English traders which, as Sir Herbert Taylor thought, would most thoroughly arouse national indignation. Yet in spite of the stimulus of Urquhart's earlier propaganda, the reaction of the press was neither immediate nor violent. Although from the time of her departure for Circassia, the movements of the *Vixen* had been carefully reported in the *Times*?⁵⁷ - Urquhart's close connection with the correspondents in Constantinople affords an adequate explanation - the news of her seizure did not provoke an editorial discussion. The publication of the correspondence between Bell and the foreign office was equally unavailing. If Bell's primary aim was the extraction of compensation, the achievement of his purpose depended upon his success in stirring public indignation.

When the attention of the commons was called to the affair by Roebuck in March 1837, the debate centered more on the conduct of Palmerston than on that of the tsar's minions. Roebuck himself declared that: *whatever... the madness of the Emperor of Russia, he would at once yield to the representations of the English Government, and would not dare to brave the resentment of a power which could crush him in a month*. He called upon the nation to shake herself loose from the trammels which Russia placed upon her trade, but few members of the house responded to his challenge. Even of those who had spoken, only one appeared to realize that Palmerston's ambiguity had been inspired by the desire neither to concede nor to deny Russia's claims to Circassia,⁵⁸ and O'Connell's was the most vehement plea for strong measures. Lord Dudley Stuart made the longest and the most significant speech, in which he identified himself closely with the Urquhart group. He announced that "he was authorized to say" that the *Vixen* contained not the munitions which had been suggested, but only salt and samples of merchandise. After reading part of the Circassian manifesto, he certified its authenticity and declared that he was well acquainted with a *gentleman [i.e., Urquhart] of the highest character who was present when the document was signed...* But the commons refused to be excited, and the motion for the production of the relevant papers was lost without a division. Even references to Russia's infraction of the self-denying clause of the Treaty of London stirred little indignation in the house. Its mood was different from the fervor of the previous year.⁵⁹

A similar public lack of interest in the Russian threat to British interests in Circassia must be inferred from the quiescence of the London press. No one of the major metropolitan papers ignored the debate, but the editorial comments were moderate and the conclusions closely followed party lines. If the *Times*, the *Herald*, and the *Standard*, all independent opponents of the cabinet, did not conceal their animus with regard to Russia, the major portion of their articles was a bitter attack on Palmerston and his colleagues. The *Globe* and the *Chronicle* defended the minister, the latter reflecting so accurately Palmerston's own arguments, both in his speech in the house and in his dispatches to Durham, that its article probably was officially inspired. The radical *Examiner* agreed with the *Chronicle* that war must not be entered upon lightly, but it leveled against Palmerston an attack no less pointed than that of the radicals in the house. The *Post* alone took an unconventional line by conceding Russia's *de jure* possession of Circassia.⁶⁰ A lack of familiarity with Circassia and its strategic significance, in spite of the propaganda of Urquhart's clique, is the most plausible explanation of the failure of both press and parliament to display more serious concern over the seizure of the *Vixen*.

Urquhart's jubilant announcement to Fox Strangways of the seizure of the *Vixen* eventually reached Palmerston's eyes. Had his indiscreet and eccentric behavior not already made the foreign secretary wonder whether he were a knave or merely a fool, the letter itself was more than ample grounds for his recall, upon which Palmerston had already decided. Suspicious that Palmerston had turned Ponsonby against him, and perhaps unable to understand the official repudiation of the *Portfolio*, Urquhart now sought the meaning of the failure of the *Vixen* to achieve any of the goals which he had planned. To a man of his extraordinary imagination and singleness of purpose there could be only

one explanation of Palmerston's continued rejection of the several opportunities to checkmate Russia which he devised; could Palmerston have been bought by Russian gold? If the tsar's intrigues had penetrated the cabinet, the campaign to awaken the English public must be carried on the more vigorously. Thus if the moderation of Palmerston and Durham may have appeared to them and to others to have defeated Urquhart's ingenious plot, the future showed that his restless imagination was not so readily thwarted.⁶¹

Back in London in July 1837, Urquhart reconsidered the method of his struggle against Russia. He sincerely believed - his private papers are indubitable evidence - that his conduct in the Vixen affair had the tacit approval of the government. Thus his disappointment over the failure of his scheme was as keen as the distress entailed by the ruin of his diplomatic career and the death of his patron William IV. Two stormy interviews with Palmerston convinced him of the validity of his suspicion that Palmerston was a traitor, probably in the pay of the Russian government. Lords Anglesey and Richmond, to whom he imparted this dire accusation, gave him the impression that they were convinced of its justice, but second thought seems to have made them unready to attempt to secure the impeachment of the foreign secretary which he urged. Foiled once more, Urquhart reverted to his real forte, publicity, and composed for the *Times* a series of articles on foreign policy.⁶²

There was a paucity of germane topics. Once the explosive affair of the *Vixen* had been adjusted at considerable personal inconvenience, Durham and Nesselrode had disposed of all the major disagreements between the two governments.⁶³ Indeed so complete was his amelioration of Anglo-Russian hostility that Durham retired from his embassy in St. Petersburg leaving for the attention of his successor only one serious problem in western Europe, the tangential Spanish civil war. In the Near East, in spite of the reciprocal growls of the sultan and the pasha, the uneasy equilibrium of Kutaya did not appear to be threatened.

From one source, however, Urquhart derived materials for anti-Russian propaganda. Before he had left Constantinople, he had encouraged a visit to Circassia by James Bell, now deprived of other employment by the failure of his firm, and J. A. Longworth, one of the English newspaper correspondents at Constantinople. The story of their adventures and the details of their efforts to strengthen Circassian resistance were reported fully in London, particularly in the *Times*, and afforded a welcome means of keeping that struggle in the public eye.⁶⁴

Urquhart's contributions to the *Times* may not be identified positively, but its general attitude was so thoroughly in harmony with his ideas that the actual authorship of its articles is of little moment. During 1836 it had singled out Palmerston, among the ministers, for its most vicious attacks and had already accepted much of Urquhart's thesis. Thus to add to the familiar anxiety over the great danger to British interests inherent in the growth of Russia's power in the Near and Middle East the notion that Palmerston might be guilty of treason was a not inconsistent extension of the earlier belief in his incompetence.

Has Circassia, the barrier of India, and of Turkey and Persia, by a coincidence scarcely paralleled by its effect, not extended its arms to England for its own protection and for the interests of mankind? has not England exhibited to her the fruitfulness of her affection by conniving with Russia in cutting off her communications with the world, whilst our Ambassador at Constantinople was mixed up in contemptible intrigues to elicit their confidence for the purpose of more securely accomplishing their ruin?

*Have not Russia and France put forth their power, extended their frontiers, fortified their acquisitions, combined for projects of universal partition? Do they not scoff at the pusillanimity of England, or rejoice in the subserviency, if not treason, of its Minister?*⁶⁵

The sensational editorial policy of the *Times* was reflected in the other journals. The Tory *Herald* and *Standard* found in foreign affairs a convenient tool for their usual attack on the Whigs, but, stimulated probably by the diatribes of the *Times*, their castigation of the tsar and all his works became sensibly more intense. The Whig papers rose to the defense of the cabinet, and, in consequence, tried to minimize the Russian menace. But the exigencies of the battle of paragraphs in which the *Times* and the *Chronicle* joined in December forced the latter to disseminate thoroughly, if accompanied by an antidote, the Urquhartite point of view of the former.⁶⁶

The flood of anti-Russian propaganda, to which Urquhart so largely contributed, was magnified at this time by a contribution from an independent source. The alarm which the cabinet had felt in 1835 over the increasing strength of the Russian navy was only scotched by the reassurances of Durham and Nesselrode. Captain Craufurd repaid the hospitality which he had received from Nicholas during the annual maneuvers of 1836 by publishing a concise, but graphic, explanation of the extreme dan

ger inherent in the reduced condition of the British navy. While he expressed his disbelief in the systematic hostility of Russia so commonly expressed, he argued that if war should result from another *Vixen* affair, the navy would be unable to protect English commerce and could hardly make reprisals upon a nonexistent Russian mercantile marine. The pamphlet promptly elicited an anonymous rebuttal and was widely reviewed. In the house of commons, it served as a support for Thomas Attwood's diatribe on the *Vixen* and affairs of Circassia. If the comments of the reviewers and the laughter of the house over Attwood's suggestion that the Russian fleet might easily repeat van Tromp's famous exploit in the Thames estuary show that Craufurd's forebodings were discounted in many quarters, another count, one which touched Englishmen at a peculiarly sensitive point, had been added to the indictment against Russia.⁶⁷

In 1838 the affair of the *Vixen* was brought to bear upon English opinion once again. In the spring, Urquhart visited several of the larger commercial cities and gained a hearing for his theories about the neglect of British economic opportunities in the Near East. In Glasgow, for instance, he was entertained at a large banquet by the chamber of commerce which in an address to the queen denounced Palmerston's conduct of British policy. Further foreign office papers anent the *Vixen* were officially published in May and called forth many letters, the most sensational portions of the epistolary warfare between Urquhart and Palmerston being printed in the *Times* of June 21.

That same evening Stratford Canning moved in the house of commons the appointment of a select committee to inquire into the case. Canning outlined the facts of the affair, as they were known to him and to the public, and then discussed at length the question of Russia's right to Circassia. He adopted *in toto* Urquhart's estimate of the strategic and commercial importance of the region to Great Britain. The subsequent debate explored the legal aspects of the question and the rectitude of the conduct of Palmerston, Ponsonby, Bell, and Urquhart. In general the speeches followed party lines very closely and the argument came finally to turn upon the constitutional propriety of appointing a committee to consider the foreign policy of the government. Upon an issue that was essentially independent of the conduct of Russia, the motion was lost by a scant sixteen votes in a house of nearly four hundred. Aside from its effect in advertising further an already well-known subject, the great interest of the debate is the proof which it affords that Urquhart - in essence the motion was designed for his vindication - could secure at this time the active support of many distinguished and sane public men, among them, Stratford Canning, Peel, and Stanley. The anti-ministerial papers, particularly the *Times*, broadcast throughout the country the sentiments of the members of the house, embellished by their own extravagant commentaries.⁶⁸

The editorial pages of the metropolitan journals did not constitute an altogether satisfactory index of their opinion of Russia, for their editors appear to have been influenced in large measure by partisan motives. The Whig papers were driven to minimize the Russian menace by the necessity of defending the quiescent policy of the cabinet, while the antiministerial organs tended to magnify it. Only the *Times* was infected with Urquhart's monomania. Amid the welter of conflicting statements the judgment of the *Post*, which opposed the government, but did not stoop to the tactics of its less dignified contemporaries, probably best epitomized the general opinion of the nation. Its anti-Russian sentiments were the more significant because up to this time it alone had maintained a consistently non-alarmist point of view. Its attitude toward the whole vexed question was most fully expressed in its discussion of Attwood's speech in the commons in December 1837.

The relative position of Great Britain and Russia is at this moment the most interesting inquiry that can be presented to a statesman. We do not participate in the alarm that has lately been raised as to the immensity of the Russian power; but at the same time, we are not inclined to underrate the resources of that mighty empire. Of the ultimate designs of the Czar there can be but one opinion, and any person who calmly investigates the future, will see Circassia, Asia Minor, and Turkey in Europe gradually dropping into his possession. It is not in the west that Russia seeks for conquest. She is too happy to have Poland as a protecting frontier, and her preparations in the Baltic will never probably reach more than a defensive respectability. It is to the south and southeast that her vast ambition is directed, and we fear that all England can do now must fail in arresting the giant's stride. In Europe Russia has rivals whose enmity she dare not provoke. The first attempt at extending her frontier would be resisted by Prussia, Austria, and France. The two former kingdoms are united to the Czar more by the principle of Conservatism than from any attachment or sympathy. As long as he preserves those limits that have been assigned by the last general compact, their neutrality is assured; but, one step beyond the line of demarcation, the Austrian and Prussian eagles would unite, and Poland would be aroused, with the hope of gaining independence in the strife. The Emperor has no views likely to give umbrage to his jealous neighbours, and his whole policy is directed to the East, where his mind has long been quietly in activity, and where his ambition knows no bounds. If England hereafter suffers from these encroachments - if her rising trade in the East be

crushed - if the vast markets which are craving for her produce be closed - she has only to thank the stupidity of the Whig Government, that has, in lieu of resisting, aided, by its indolence, the designs of Russia.⁶⁹

The efficacy of Urquhart's effort to instill into English opinion an appreciation of the Russian menace was attested by the periodical press. For nearly a year and a half after the first consideration in parliament of the seizure of the *Vixen*, the more prominent periodicals teemed with discussions of the strategic and commercial significance of the Black Sea area. In many cases, the articles purported to review the books of Edmund Spencer who visited Circassia in 1836 in the company of consul-general James Yeames of Odessa and Count Vorontsov, but the adventure of the *Vixen* was universally accorded the center of the stage. A few brief excerpts will show Urquhart's success in adding the Circassian aspect to the general picture of Russian aggrandizement. The *Edinburgh*, for instance, concluded in the course of a discussion of *Russia, Turkey, and Circassia* that:

The Circassians once subdued, the Caucasus is open and Persia lies at her mercy... Thus we shall see the frontier of Russia advanced at one stride 1,200 miles nearer our Indian frontier.

The *Quarterly* inquired, with regard to the seizure of the *Vixen*,

What other object can Russia have but that of gradually shutting up herself in the basin of the Euxine, where she may carry on her projects of aggrandizement unobserved and unknown? But will the civilized world submit to this? will it not speedily be demanded of this northern autocrat - will not some one power, or a combination of the powers of Europe, have spirit enough to demand of him, Quousque tandem?

Fraser's Magazine was even more bellicose.

The seizure of the Vixen furnishes us with another proof, if we wanted one, of Russia's intention to increase her dominions, until they stretch down to the Mediterranean; but such is the cautious policy of that nation, such her stealthy steps towards aggrandizement, never losing sight of the object she wishes to obtain, nor even relinquishing what she has once secured within her grasp, that while she proclaims her magnanimity, she extends her boundaries, and in the midst of peace, makes vast preparations for going to war... Are we, then, afraid of going to war with Russia? It looks like it. Only let her suppose so, and we shall see her fleets studding the Mediterranean more thickly than our own; we shall witness the Russian troops assisting in bringing Mehemet Ali, and his Egyptian kingdom under subjection; and afterwards, taking the lion's share of the spoil; perhaps seizing the island of Crete, until something impossible to be performed is effected. Poland, Finland and Northern Turkey, belong to the Autocrat, and why not so small a spot as this little island too?... Russia can occupy Constantinople whenever it suits her, from the large portion of Turkey already under her sway; in time, her overwhelming strength will probably subjugate Circassia, and England, out-navied, must sink into a second-rate nation.⁷⁰

That Circassia attracted general interest and attention there can be no doubt. Subsequent British discussions of Russian policy frequently associated her villainous attack upon the liberty of those sturdy heroes with her earlier suppression of Polish freedom. Urquhart thus gained a secondary triumph which compensated in part for the failure of all his primary aims. It was hardly necessary for James Bell and Longworth to publish in 1840 accounts of their adventurous endeavor to strengthen Circassian resistance, for the common misbelief in the proximity of the Caucasus and India was quite sufficient to keep the subject alive.⁷¹

That by the end of 1837 Russophobia was a major element in English opinion is not open to doubt. The *Post's* statement that the *relative position of Great Britain and Russia is...the most interesting question that can be presented to a statesman* merely summarizes the evidence available from all sources. That Urquhart and his collaborators were in large measure responsible for this situation is equally transparent.

¹ Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 214; Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 76-77; F. O. 181/117-118, *passim*.

² Lytton Strachey and Roger Fulford, eds., *The Greville Memoirs 1814-1860* (8 vols., London, 1938) I HI, 130, 131; Hansard, commons, 13 March 1835.

³ *Post*, 14, 16, *Times*, 16 (quotation above), 17, *Herald*, 14, 17, *Chronicle*, 14, 16, 17, 18 March 1835.

⁴ The affair was widely noticed in all quarters; cf. *The Greville Memoirs*, III, 171, 173, 175, 177; Thomas Raikes, *A Portion of the Journal kept by Thomas Raikes, Esq.* (4 vols., London, 1856), II, 72.

⁵ Bell, *Palmerston*, I, 270; Temperley, *Near East*, p. 413; New, *Durham*, p.

279; cf. *Times*, 26 June 1835, where it was suggested that there were "fresh indications of an increasing eagerness on the part of Russia to pursue her favorite plan of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey."

⁶ New, *Durham*, chaps. xi, xiv.

⁷ F. O. 65/234, no. 54, *Secret and Confidential*, Durham to Palmerston, 13 March 1837. The actual figures were, receipts, R.

502,031,384, expenditures, R. 550,415,603; cf. Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relations," in *Cambridge Historical Journal*, III, 72-73.

⁸ E.g., F. O. 65/225, no. 130, /233, no. 19, Durham to Palmerston, 14 Aug. 1836, 26 Jan. 1837.

⁹ The following analysis of Anglo-Russian commercial relations is derived, except where otherwise noted, from *Parliamentary Papers*, 1838, XL VII, 182-223.

¹⁰ "Official" valuation is explained, *supra*, p. 27, note 11.

- ¹¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1838, XLVII, 12, 101; Tegoborski, *Productive Forces of Russia*, II, 293-434, *passim*.
- ¹² Durham transmitted many secret reports of Russian commercial activity in the Caucasian and trans-Caspian regions; F. O. 65/233, no. 30, /234, nos. 63, 64, 89, 90, 99, Durham to Palmerston, 14 Feb., 8 April, 17 May, 6 June 1837; V. J. Puryear, *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East* (Stanford University Press, 1935), p. 23; Jules Hagemeister, *Report on the Commerce of the Ports of New Russia*, trans. by T. F. Triebner (London, 1836); *Geographical Report of the Ports of the Black Sea* (London, 1837).
- ¹³ *Blackwood's*, Feb. 1836, XXXIX, 145-155, quotation, p. 154. The article contains many statistics, most of them derived from Marshall, *Digest*.
- ¹⁴ F. O. 65/225, no. 113, *Confidential*, Durham to Palmerston, 8 July 1836; /218, no. 16, Durham to Palmerston, 23 Nov. 1835.
- ¹⁵ F. O. 65/218, no. 15, Durham to Palmerston, 23 Nov. 1835.
- ¹⁶ F. O. 65/223, nos. 13, 17, 40, /224, no. 80, Durham to Palmerston, 26 Jan., 6 Feb., 20 March, 3 June; F. O. 181/121, no. 8, /122, no. 59, Palmerston to Durham, 12 Feb., 21 May 1836; Hansard, commons, 4 March 1836.
- ¹⁷ F. O. 65/224, no. 66, /225, nos. 117, 118, Durham to Palmerston, 16 May, 18, 21 July 1836.
- ¹⁸ F. O. 65/225, no. 120, Durham to Palmerston, 23 July 1836, enclosing Capt. Craufurd's report.
- ¹⁹ F. O. 65/223, nos. 17, 27, Durham to Palmerston, 6, 23 Feb. 1836.
- ²⁰ F. O. 65/223, no. 30, Durham to Palmerston, 3 March 1836; New, Durham, pp. 287-288.
- ²¹ New, *Durham*, p. 286.
- ²² [David Urquhart], *England and Russia; being a fifth edition of England, France, Russia, and Turkey* (London, 1835); quotations, pp. vii-xii.
- ²³ [David Urquhart], *The Sultan Mahmoud and Mehemet Alt Pasha* (London, 1835), *passim*, quotation, p. 15.
- ²⁴ Bolsover, "Urquhart and the Eastern Question", in *Journal of Modern History*, VIII, *passim*; Bell, *Palmerston*, I, 281; Urquhart Mss.
- ²⁵ Bolsover, "Urquhart and the Eastern Question", p. 457.
- ²⁶ Urquhart Mss.; Bell, *Palmerston*, I, 281-282; Hansard, commons, 21 June 1838, col. 946; F. O. 65/223, no. 8, Durham to Palmerston, 21 Jan. 1836; Bolsover, "Urquhart and the Eastern Question," pp. 457-459; Webster, "Urquhart", pp. 333-336.
- ²⁷ *Portfolio*, no. 1; *Post*, 2 Dec. 1835; *Chronicle*, 4, 11 Jan. 1836; *Herald*, 11 Dec. 1835; *Examiner*, 3 Jan. 1836; *Globe*, 29, 31 Dec. 1835, 4 Jan. 1836; *Standard*, 28, 29 Dec. 1835; *Times*, 1, 7, 29 Jan. 1836.
- ²⁸ *Times*, 16 Nov. 1835; cf. Lord Dudley Stuart's speech in the commons, 4 Feb. 1836, Hansard, col. 75.
- ²⁹ *Times*, 17 Nov. 1835.
- ³⁰ *Times*, *Chronicle*, *Globe*, *Herald*, *Standard*, *Examiner*, *Post*, Nov., Dec. 1835, *passim*.
- ³¹ *Portfolio*, I, II, *passim*.
- ³² *Portfolio*, *passim*; Urquhart Mss.; Lane-Poole, *Stratford Canning*, I, 319.
- ³³ Sir Henry Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East* (London, 1875), p. 52; Macalister, *McNeill*, p. 182.
- ³⁴ *Foreign Quarterly*, XV, 183-194; and succeeding numbers.
- ³⁵ J. K. Laughton, *Memoirs of Henry Reeve* (2 vols., London, 1898), I, 30, 50, 53; Macalister, *McNeill*, p. 182; David Urquhart, *Reminiscences of William IV*, p. 67; Urquhart Mss.
- ³⁶ *Vide supra*, p. 170.
- ³⁷ David Ross, *Opinions of the European Press on the Eastern Question* (London, 1836); Urquhart Mss.; *Turkey and Russia* (London, 1835).
- ³⁸ Macalister, *McNeill*, p. 183; [John McNeill], *The Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East* (London, 1836), pp. 112, 113, 124.
- ³⁹ A Manchester Manufacturer, *England, Ireland, and America; Russia, 1836* (London, 1835, 1836), reprinted in *The Political Writings of Richard Cobden* (2 vols., London, 1867), *passim*, quotation, I, 194-196; John Morley, *The Life of Richard Cobden* (2 vols., London, 1881), I, 101.
- ⁴⁰ Morley, *Cobden*, I, 76, letter dated 5 Feb. 1837; *Chambers' Edinburgh Journal*, 24 Sept. 1836; *Spectator*, 2 May 1835, p. 424.
- ⁴¹ U. S. Dept. of State Archives, Vail to Forsyth, no. 214, 28 Nov. 1835.
- ⁴² Urquhart Mss., Taylor to Urquhart, 14 Nov. 1835; F. O. 181/119, no. 12, /130, no. 16, Palmerston to Durham, 13 Nov. 1835, 21 Jan. 1837.
- ⁴³ Hansard, commons, 4, 19 Feb. 1836.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, 18 March 1836.
- ⁴⁵ Hansard, commons, 30 March, 20 April 1836.
- ⁴⁶ F. O. 181/121, nos. 8, 12, 32; /123, no. 51, Palmerston to Durham, 12, 16 Feb., 15 April, 9 May 1836; F. O. 65/223, nos. 30, 34, Durham to Palmerston, 3, 5 March 1836.
- ⁴⁷ Cf. *Times*, 21 April 1836; *Herald*, 21, 22 April 1836; *Chronicle*, 21 April 1836; *Post*, 21 April 1836; *Globe*, 21 April 1836; *Standard*, 19 March, 21 April 1836.
- ⁴⁸ Urquhart Mss.; Bolsover, "Urquhart and the Eastern Question", pp. 461-466; Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 34-35, 39, note 68; Robinson, *Urquhart*, pp. 49-54; Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 259-264; Webster, "Urquhart", pp. 340-348.
- ⁴⁹ F. O. 65/225, nos. 131, 133, /226, nos. 151, 184, Durham to Palmerston, 14, 19 Aug., 21 Sept., 4 Nov. 1836.
- ⁵⁰ Puryear, *International Economics*, pp. 49-53; F. O. 181/121, no. 13, /129, no. 210, /133, nos. 83, 84, 108, Palmerston to Durham, 29 Feb., 15 Dec. 1836, 22 April, 9 May 1837.
- ⁵¹ Urquhart Mss., *passim*.
- ⁵² F. O. 181/119, no. 14, Palmerston to Durham, 11 Dec. 1835, enclosing a copy of Bell and Co. to Palmerston, 8 Dec. 1835; F. O. 65/223, nos. 15, 28, 38, /224, no. 68, Durham to Palmerston, 2 Feb., 3, 19 March, 20 May 1836.
- ⁵³ *Vide supra*, pp. 188, 189; cf. letters of Bell in *Times*, 3 Feb. 1837.
- ⁵⁴ Urquhart Mss., copies of letters, Urquhart to McNeill, 9 Oct. 1836, 31 Jan. 1837, to Strangways, 7 Dec. 1836, to Palmerston, 20 July 1837; original letter Palmerston to Urquhart, 10 March 1837; *Times*, 21 June 1838; Webster, "Urquhart," pp. 341-348.
- ⁵⁵ E.g., *Times*, Jan., Feb. 1837, *passim*.
- ⁵⁶ F. O. 181/132, nos. 81, 82, /133, nos. 120, 121, Palmerston to Durham, 19 April, 23 May 1837; F. O. 65/234, no. 85, Durham to Palmerston, 13 May 1837. There are many other dispatches about the affair in the F. O. archives, including several from Lamb in Vienna, telling of Metternich's opinions on the subject; F. O. 181/131, nos. 43, 62, /133, no. 94, Palmerston to Durham, 6 March, 4 April, 2 May 1837, enclosing copies of Lamb to Palmerston, 3, 25 Feb., 21 April.
- ⁵⁷ *Times*, 6, 20 Dec. 1836, 27 Jan., 2, 7, 15 Feb. 1837.
- ⁵⁸ George R. Robinson, M.P. for Worcester.
- ⁵⁹ Hansard, commons, 17 March 1837, Roebuck cols. 621-628, Ewart 628, Palmerston 630-636, Hume 641-643, O'Connell 646, Dudley Stuart 647-653.
- ⁶⁰ *Times*, 20 March; *Standard*, 18, 20 March; *Herald*, 18, 22 March; *Chronicle*, 18, 21 March; *Globe*, 18 March; *Examiner*, 19, 26 March; *Post*, 20, 23 March 1837.
- ⁶¹ Urquhart Mss., Urquhart to Strangways, 7 Dec. 1836, Palmerston to Urquhart, 10 March 1837; Bolsover, "Urquhart and the Eastern Question," p. 465; Urquhart, *Reminiscences of William IV*, pp. 1-29, *passim*; Webster, "Urquhart," p. 345.

⁶² Urquhart Mss., various letters, particularly a copy of Urquhart to Palmerston, 20 July 1837, and an autobiographical account of the years 1836-1840; Urquhart, *Reminiscences of William IV*, pp. 6-8; History of the Times (London 1935), I, 379.

⁶³ F. O. 65/234, no. 105, Durham to Palmerston, 3 June 1837.

⁶⁴ E.g., *Times*, 8, 15 June, 7, 8 July, 3 Aug., 5 Oct., 3 Nov. 1837.

⁶⁵ *Times*, Sept. 1837 - April 1838, *passim*, quotation, 7 Dec. 1837; *History of the Times*, pp. 378-379.

⁶⁶ *Times*, 19, 25, 27, 29 Dec. 1837, 1 Jan. 1838; *Chronicle*, 15, 20, 26, 28 Dec. 1837.

⁶⁷ H. W. Craufurd, *The Russian Fleet in the Baltic in 1836* (London, 1837), *passim*; Hansard, commons, 14 Dec. 1837; *Chronicle*, 11 Oct. 1837, *Asiatic Journal*, Aug. 1837, Edinburgh, April 1838.

⁶⁸ *Times*, 31 May, 5, 20, 21, 22, 23 June, 18 July, 25 Aug.; *Post*, 23 June; *Herald*, 22, 23 June; *Standard*, 21, 22, 23, 25 June; *Chronicle*, 22, 23, 23 June 1838; Hansard, commons, 21 June 1838.

⁶⁹ *Post*, 21 Dec. 1837; cf. *Herald*, 16, 19 Sept.; *Standard*, 16 Dec.; *Chronicle*, 11 Oct., 20 Dec. 1837.

⁷⁰ Edmund Spencer, *Travels in Circassia*. (2 vols., London, 1837, 3d ed., 1839); *Edinburgh*, April 1838, LXVII, 123-146, quotation, 141; *Quarterly*, Oct. 1837, LIX, 362-395, quotation, 395; *Fraser's*, Oct. 1838, XVIII, 413-424, quotation, 421-424; cf. *Westminster*, April 1837, *Tait's*, Oct. 1837, Feb. 1838, *Dublin Review*, April, July 1837, *Blackwood's*, Nov., Dec. 1837, Jan., Dec. 1838, *British and Foreign Review*, July, Oct. 1838, *Asiatic Journal*, Aug. 1837. Spencer made a very unfavorable impression on Yeames; F. O. 65/225, no. 146, Durham to Palmerston, 12 Sept. 1836, enclosing an abstract of Yeames to Durham, 2 Sept. 1836.

⁷¹ James S. Bell, *A Journal of a Residence in Circassia during the Years 1837, 1838, and 1839* (2 vols., London, 1840); J. A. Longworth, *A Year among the Circassians* (2 vols., London, 1840).

VIII. THE NAVY - AFGHANISTAN

The news which began to arrive from Central Asia in the autumn of 1837 provided exceptional grist for the mill of the Russophobes. The theory that Russia was really intent upon the establishment of a *point d'appui* for an invasion of India appeared to be substantiated by the attack which Persia launched against Herat. At first it was only suspected in London that the shah's decision to reduce to his obedience an area over which he claimed an unacknowledged suzerainty had been made on the encouragement of the Russian envoy in the face of the advice and even of the threats of Sir John McNeill.

But already there had been other signs of a rupture of the Anglo-Russian coöperation which in 1834 had effected the peaceful succession of Muhammad Mirza to his grandfather's throne. The strategic importance of Central Asia and the ominous Russian activity there had been declaimed in several of the works of the school of Urquhart. McNeill, the author of the most comprehensive analysis of Russia's expansion there, had accepted his diplomatic appointment in the belief that the government was determined to stop the Russian advance. The potentialities of the trade of the region had received of ficial and unofficial study. The new course of events inevitably excited anxious attention in London.¹

On arriving at Teheran, McNeill had found that the Russian emissary, Count Simonich, had secured an effective control of Persian policy. All the determination and *finesse* which he had brought to the struggle for influence initiated by his less adept predecessor had not availed to discourage the young shah from seeking laurels on the field of battle. Although Simonich's encouragement was contrary to official instructions - Durham's protest drew from Nesselrode a promise of his recall - the expedition set forth for Herat. The consequent rupture of diplomatic relations by Great Britain did not daunt the Persians; the English cabinet and the Indian government both determined to initiate more positive coercive measures.

In June 1838 a small detachment of the Indian army occupied the island of Karrak in the Persian Gulf and probably thereby hastened the abandonment of an attack, which, in spite of the assistance of members of the Russian suite, had failed to carry Herat by assault. Since it is clear that England's armed intervention worried the Russian statesmen, alone it might have sufficed to adjust the balance between the two powers in what was rapidly becoming an undeclared war, had the rivalry not already spread into Afghanistan.²

In September 1836, the Indian government had sent Alexander Burnes on a second mission across the northwestern frontier. He was confined by his instructions to activity of a geographical and commercial nature, and was ordered to arrange for the reopening to commerce of the Indus, now possible because of the recent pacification of the Sind and the Panjab. He was to proceed, after his negotiations with Ranjit Singh had been consummated, to Kabul and Kandahar and to accomplish so far as possible the resumption of the trade between northern India and Afghanistan. Yet in spite of the general tenor of his instructions, his mission does not appear to have been planned as a conscious counter stroke to the Russian efforts to compete with their British rivals in Central Asian markets. Although for several years the government in London had received from the embassy in St. Petersburg and from the consulates on the Black Sea frequent reports of this Russian activity, their suggestion that Lord Auckland, the governor-general, send an agent to Kabul was justified by the growth there of Persian and Russian political, not economic, influence. The Persian plan to capture Herat, which was matured during Burnes's protracted negotiations for the restoration of trade on the Indus, naturally appeared to augment the need *to raise a timely barrier against the encroachments of Russian influence*.³

When Burnes finally set out for Kabul after a delay of a full year, he was possessed of supplementary instructions which gave his mission a primarily political character and ordered him to make a particular effort to preserve the supremacy of British influence in Afghanistan. Hardly had he begun his negotiations with Amir Dost Mohammad when he was confronted with a rival. In spite of the promise to Durham, Simonich had been allowed to supervise the Persian siege operations at Herat, and now, adopting an English technique, had sent a clever young soldier on a secret mission to Kabul. Captain Vitkevich was the bearer of an unsigned letter to Dost Mohammad which purported to come from the tsar. His status as a Russian emissary, however irregular, was immediately recognized both by the Afghans and by Burnes. With the latter he engaged in a struggle for influence and after five strenuous months routed his English adversary. Burnes dispatched to Auckland a continuous and detailed ac-

count of the battle of wit and intrigue and pleaded that his hand be strengthened by a promise that the Indian government would require of Ranjit Singh the restoration of Peshawar to the control of Dost Mohammad. Since friendship with the Sikh chieftain was the cornerstone of Auckland's policy, he was unable to comply with Burnes's plan. Resorting instead to a combination of reason and threat, he instructed Burnes to argue that the friendship of the near-by and powerful Anglo-Indian state was of much greater moment than that of distant Russia and feeble Persia, and to suggest that Dost Mohammad's submission to Russian cajolery might force the Indian government to install a rival on his throne.⁴

The issue of the contest hinged on the success of the Persians before Herat, and the spirits of both Burnes and Auckland rose or fell in harmony with the reports which they received from the beleaguered city. At length, in April 1838, Persian victory seemed to be assured, in spite of the heroic efforts of another Anglo-Indian soldier-diplomat, Colonel Eldred Pottinger, who, in Herat by chance at the inception of hostilities, placed his technical knowledge at the service of Shah Kamran. Dost Mohammad and his coterie of adventurers finally replied to an English ultimatum for the ejection of one of the rival emissaries by dismissing Burnes. An unauthenticated but also not disproven report that Vitkevich had established direct communication with the Sikhs may have fortified Auckland's judgment that Russian influence had approximated far too nearly the territories of the East India Company. He promptly initiated arrangements with Ranjit Singh for the restoration of deposed Shah Shujah to the throne in Kabul by an Anglo-Sikh army.

During the months when his new policy was taking form, Auckland knew that the government in London regarded Russia's activity in Persia with the gravest distrust and that they desired her influence in Afghanistan to be completely subordinate to their own. But his decision had to be taken on his own authority, for slow communications prevented his learning their opinion of this latest example of Russian duplicity until after he had initiated negotiations for an alliance with Ranjit Singh. In spite of his confession of doubts and fears to Hobhouse, president of the board of control, the preliminary steps were taken before the issue at Herat had been settled, and the decision to intervene in Afghanistan had been announced to the authorities in London prior to Persia's totally unexpected abandonment of the siege. Thus all credit for the fateful expedition, posited upon the actually false premise of the triumph of Russo-Persian plans, must be assigned to the Indian authorities.⁵

All the facts and the theories upon which Auckland's decision was based were explained in his dispatches to the board of control. Since they were corroborated by the no less alarming accounts sent by McNeill from Persia and further reinforced by reports of Russian intrigue in Khiva, the Caspian region, Serbia, and the Principalities, they could not but reawaken in the minds of the members of the cabinet the distrust of Russia and the alarm over the tremendous growth of her influence which Durham had partly allayed.⁶ Finally in September, with all these documents before it, the cabinet decided that the final determination of policy must be made in India and authorized Auckland to pursue, if it appeared to be warranted by his more immediate information, precisely the course upon which he had already embarked.⁷ Lord Clanricarde, the new ambassador to St. Petersburg, was instructed to remonstrate with the Russian government over the continued activities of Simonich and Vitkevich, and to inquire whether Russia's policy was that announced by Nesselrode or that carried into effect by her other agents.⁸

In the meantime the Russian statesmen also had become anxious over the events of the Middle East. The occupation of Karrak was unmistakable evidence of an English determination to challenge Russia's growing influence. Pozzo di Borgo reported the rising indignation of Palmerston and finally sent a warning that public feeling was running very high. Clanricarde, he wrote, might be the bearer of a virtual ultimatum. The outbreak of war appeared to be not impossible. Thus Nesselrode, hoping to avert that eventuality and also to effect the evacuation of Karrak, transmitted to Pozzo, for communication to Palmerston, an extremely conciliatory analysis of the situation, and explained his policy very clearly in an accompanying private letter. *We must convince the English ministry that we do not want war, but that we do not fear it; believe me, dear Count, that will be the best way to avoid it.* In the dispatch which Pozzo read to Palmerston, Nesselrode acknowledged that Simonich had exceeded his instructions, stated that Nicholas, while upholding the Persian right to defend herself against aggression from Herat, had repudiated his agent's guarantee of a treaty between Persia and Kandahar, and urged that in the future England and Russia cooperate to secure the tranquillity of Central Asia. He deplored the public belief that Russia threatened Indian security, declaring the idea of an invasion to be absurd, and asserted that Russia's interest in the region was purely commercial. He urged the

evacuation of Karrak and proposed a status in the Middle East not unlike that established much later by the entente of 1907. Although the note did much to calm the apprehensions of the cabinet, it did not convince the English ministers that Russia's acts would henceforth correspond with her words.⁹

To the cabinet, the situation had appeared to be serious and Pozzo reported an alarmingly bellicose state of opinion. Yet only twice did parliament discuss these pregnant developments in Central Asia. In March Palmerston was interrogated about the rupture of relations with Persia and succeeded in disposing of the topic without mentioning Russia. Late in July Stratford Canning, undeterred by his failure to carry his recent motion with regard to the *Vixen*, inquired of Palmerston whether the expedition dispatched from Bombay to Bushire might not compromise Britain's friendly relations with Persia. The question seemed to him to be very important.

It was notorious, that a connexion subsisted at present between Russia and Persia, and that it was even carried to the extent of being of an offensive and defensive nature. Now, the nature of the expedition recently sent from Bombay seemed to compromise our pacific relations with Persia, and if so with Russia.

When Palmerston replied that he had no knowledge of such a treaty, the discussion of the subject stopped.¹⁰ The press, absorbed at this time in the repercussions of the *Vixen* affair and in the implications of a fantastic pamphlet, *The Confederation of Gaul*, which outlined a supposedly Russian scheme for a partition of France, paid relatively scant attention to the affairs of Persia.¹¹ Thus articulate British opinion was strongly anti-Russian, but the hostility took its tone from past and relatively trivial developments, from the stereotype which Urquhart and the other Russophobes had delineated, rather than from the rivalry which threatened war.

When the news of the decision of the Indian government to intervene forcefully in Afghanistan arrived in London late in October 1838, the press and the public had no expectation of such a marked change in British policy. The *Times*, the *Herald*, and the *Standard*, which had long attempted to awaken the country to a comprehension of the Russian menace, gave the news their enthusiastic benediction. The *Times*'s commentary upon Auckland's manifesto in explanation of his policy was unrestrained.

But whether a treaty [between Persia and Russia for Indian conquest] subsist or not, the vigorous measures adopted by the British Government must be esteemed by Europe as well as Asia as a direct and bold challenge to the Emperor Nicholas, calling upon him to avow and justify his underhand instigations of Persia against this country in the case of Herat, protecting by his arms the catspaw of his acts, or to acknowledge in the face of the world that he dreads to share the dangers into which he plunges his unhappy dupes.

The *Herald* expressed a similar judgment.

That the eyes of the Whig government are at length open to the nefarious designs of Russia, we are disposed to believe; we hope they have not become wise too late. For several years we have endeavoured to make them understand that the ambitious designs of Russia extended beyond Turkey and Circassia and Persia, even to our East Indian dependencies, which Russia has not lost sight of since Catherine threatened to march her armies in that direction, and rally the native Indian princes round the standard of the Great Mogul.

The *Standard* declared:

It is of little use to watch Russia, if our care and exertion are to end with that exercise of vigilance. We have been watching Russia during eight years, and within that time she has pushed her acquisitions and military posts nearly 2000 miles on the road to India.¹²

It was in the Whig papers, however, that the most significant articles appeared, for the sudden change in British policy allowed an abandonment of the negative attitude which official quiescence had forced them to adopt. Thus as recently as October 10 the *Chronicle* had suggested that Russia would encounter *no light work in clearing and reclaiming each barbarous acquisition*, and could not *but consider that... she already has as much territory as she can well manage*. After the receipt of intelligence from India, it decided, nevertheless, that:

The course adopted by the Indian Government, tending to erect Afghanistan into a barrier of our Eastern empire, is such as is dictated by the soundest policy, and will be crowned... by the most complete success. Let Russia be watched, and when detected in hostility towards us, let us retaliate, but do not let a great nation... make itself ridiculous by an insane Russo-Phobia.¹³

More fuel for the fires of anti-Russian propaganda was supplied to journalists by the publication just prior to the arrival of news of the expedition to Afghanistan of a second edition of *The Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East* and of a temperate, but forceful pamphlet entitled *India, Great Britain, and Russia*. There is no evidence that this most opportune reappearance of McNeill's trenchant discussion of the dangers inherent in Russia's insidious Asiatic aggrandizement - actually it

constituted an excellent apology for Auckland's countervailing policy - was officially inspired or even given the specific approval of the government. Yet since it is unlikely that Murray brought out a new edition without the author's consent, it may reasonably be inferred that the publication enjoyed at least tacit official approbation. In the much wider notice which the second edition drew may be found confirmation of the opinion, unanimously expressed by reviewers, that the events of the two intervening years had demonstrated the perspicacity of McNeill's apprehension.¹⁴

The anonymous *India, Great Britain, and Russia* was an extremely lucid and terse statement of the case against Russia. As a clue to the state of informed British opinion it is particularly significant because its conclusions, which were immediately and widely commended in both the newspaper and periodical presses, were essentially those of the school of Urquhart, although they were stated in less hysterical terms. Since in print at least its judgment was seldom challenged, there can be little doubt that it articulated ideas very generally current among those Englishmen who kept in touch with the course of international politics.¹⁵

The preface contained an admirable summary of the author's opinions.

The present brief view of the relative position of India, Great Britain, and Russia, is put forward in the hope of exciting in the minds of the British nation that due degree of alarm which the author believes the occasion calls for. The unparalleled aggressions of Russia in every direction must destroy all confidence in her pacific protestations, and ought to satisfy every reasonable inquirer that the only limit of her conquests will be found in the limitation of her power. On the West, Poland has been reduced to the state of a vassal province. In the South, the Ottoman sovereign has been plundered of part of his possessions, and holds the rest subject to the convenience of his conqueror. The Black Sea cannot be navigated but by permission of the Muscovite. The flag of England, which was wont to wave proudly over all the waters of the world, is insulted, and the commercial enterprise of her merchants crippled and defeated. In the East, Russia is systematically pursuing the same course, Circassia is to be crushed - Persia to be made first a partizan, then a dependent province, finally an integral part of the Russian empire. Beyond Persia lies Afghanistan, a country prepared by many circumstances to furnish a ready path for the invader. The Indus crossed, what is to resist the flight of the Russian eagle into the heart of British India? It is thither that the eyes of Russia are directed. Let England look to it.

The body of the pamphlet began with an analysis of the relation of India to Great Britain. It was one of mutual profit, for India cost nothing, and produced a slight revenue. She was a most important market and provided exceptional opportunities for the investment of capital. In return Britain had given India a stable, orderly government, maintained the peace as it had never been before, and fostered economic development. In the author's opinion, English honor would be seriously compromised, were India relinquished without a mortal struggle.

*It would be the height of folly to go on believing that all is safe, while the Russians were deliberating at which part they should enter the British frontiers: it would be the height of wickedness as well as folly to attempt to palm such a delusion on the public mind. The truth must not be concealed that the British and the Russian nations are rivals for the possession of India - that the one ardently covets what the other holds, and has been long working by sap and mine to dislodge her enemy and vault into the vacant seat... England may be supine, but Russia will most assuredly be active and unremitting in her watchfulness and her labours. She will gloat in silence over the slumber of England, and abide in perfect resignation the brief delay which must intervene before her object can be avowed... She will attach herself to every court which approaches the British dominions, and thus draw round them a net through which escape will be impossible... Russia never strikes till she has made sure; and when she acquires confidence enough to relinquish dissimulation, her victim may be regarded as lost. Shall Russia, then, carry on her designs against our Indian possessions to this point, or shall her arm be arrested while the probability of averting it yet remains? Shall we abandon India to the mercies of the spoiler of Poland?... Shall we give up all the advantages of the commerce of India, and allow its vast territory to be hermetically sealed against our merchants and manufactures? Shall the hopes of good men for the improvement of India be disappointed - the lamp of knowledge just illumined be extinguished - the light of true religion which has yet but begun to dawn, be darkened - and those who are rising gradually but steadily into an equality with the most favoured people of Europe, be made serfs of a government which though calling itself civilized, is in truth barbarian, and which is the object of hatred and terror in its own dominions, no less than of jealousy and apprehension throughout the rest of the world?... Action must follow instantly upon decision; and India may yet remain British, and the course of human improvement may be spared the blow which would be inflicted upon it were so large a proportion of the world overwhelmed by the dead sea of Russian despotism.*¹⁶

In the early stages of the growth of English Russophobia, the apprehension which derived from Russian activity in one quarter was magnified by her behavior in another; the Persian and the Turkish wars, the suppression of the Polish revolution, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi came in rapid succession. After the strength of the Russian navy had attracted anxious attention in official circles for several years, Craufurd's pamphlet¹⁷ brought the subject momentarily into the pub-

lic eye in 1837. Its import was not thoroughly appreciated, however, for almost the only criticism of the naval estimates of 1838 was that made by Hume who suggested that the quiescent condition of Europe permitted a reduction in the British establishment. When Charles Wood, of the admiralty, adduced the size of the Russian navy as a justification of the budgetary proposal, Attwood immediately inquired whether the British fleets were strong enough to repel an attack from the Baltic, or, if necessary, to force the Straits. After Wood had affirmed their adequacy, the house voted the proposed appropriation without further discussion. The press practically ignored the cue for anti-Russian polemics.¹⁸

If in public the ministers were complacent and appeared to share the apathy of the commons and the press, in council they began to express doubts which increased as the affairs of Central Asia approached a crisis. The embassy in St. Petersburg was instructed once more to institute a searching investigation of the state of the Russian navy.¹⁹ The reported findings, taken in conjunction with the war in Afghanistan and certain indications that Mehemet Ali might precipitate another crisis in the Near East, convinced Palmerston and Melbourne of the necessity of strengthening the English forces. When the problem was considered by the cabinet late in November, Melbourne argued that: *We should not be justified in exposing our shores and our arsenals to the insults and outrages of a Russian fleet. Such an attack might appear to be a mad project; but it was never safe to suppose men incapable of mad projects, and even the unopposed appearance of a Russian fleet in the narrow seas would degrade England in our own eyes and in the eyes of all the world.*²⁰

Yet the cabinet adopted Palmerston's suggestion that before further strain was put upon the budget Russia should be asked to obviate the necessity of an augmentation of the English navy by agreeing not to equip her full fleet.²¹

The tense state of Anglo-Russian relations is manifest in the fate which awaited this *démarche*. In instructing Clanricarde to base the proposal upon the sentiment of England, Palmerston argued that since the period was characterized by the pacific settlement of disputes, *views hostile to Great Britain* afforded the only reasonable explanation of the unreduced status of the Russian navy. The government, he added with little regard for veracity, did not share the opinion of the public, but hoped that Russia would enable them to assure parliament that only a part of her fleet would be equipped, for *irritating discussion will inevitably arise... when the naval estimates are brought before Parliament*. An accompanying confidential dispatch informed Clanricarde that the cabinet did consider the Baltic fleet to be a menace which destroyed cordiality, and the Black Sea squadron a serious threat to Turkish integrity. When Clanricarde carried out his instructions, Nesselrode received the overture with extreme annoyance. Far from agreeing to the proposal, he delivered a diatribe against the propagandist activity, the press, the public, and even the ministries of England and France.²² Once again aroused opinion influenced the determination of policy.

Actually Palmerston's wish to avoid the exacerbation of public sentiment and the consequent increased naval expenditure was illusory. Even before the abortive negotiation with Russia had been undertaken, a *Flag Officer* - in fact Captain (later Admiral) Sir Charles Napier - had published his pamphlet, *A Letter Addressed to his Grace, the Duke of Wellington, upon the actual Crisis of the Country in respect to the State of the Navy*, which inaugurated one of the most heated propagandist controversies in the whole development of Russophobia. Naval officers, Napier explained, did not share the complacency of the nation and reprobated the satisfaction which Lord Durham had derived from his inspection of the Russian Baltic maneuvers.

Can any inquiring person entertain a thought, for an instant, that the enormous Russian fleet in the Baltic, faithfully described by Captain Craufurd, which has been increasing and training for years past is intended for anything else than to coerce or invade this country?

...Peaceable Russia! Having almost crippled Turkey, carrying on a murderous war with the brave Circassians and going on straight to India, without commerce, or a single colony, and as to the defence of her own empire, being almost invulnerable; yet with a powerful and expensive fleet, every year increasing in force and efficiency, ready for battle in a moment...*

** The brave Circassians to be reduced to the state of the Poles! Will the English like to be reduced to the same situation, - to beg of the Autocrat of Russia to spare them? The Circassians have their arms in their hands, England has not. The enemy are in great force, and England still sleeps on!*

Napier concluded with an analysis of the relative strengths of the French, Russian, and American navies which was designed to prove that England's vaunted wooden walls were no longer an adequate protection.²³

The *Morning Chronicle* immediately rose to the defense of the ministry, but its argument failed to avert a polemical torrent. The controversy raged most fiercely in the columns of the *Times*, but other papers gave it nearly as much space. In January, February, and particularly in March when the naval estimates were before parliament, there flowed an incessant stream of editorial articles and letters from contributors of all descriptions, many of them hiding their identities behind pseudonyms, *A Naval Officer*, *Anglicus*, *One of the People*. Opinions were divided about the relative strengths of the Russian and English navies, but of Russia's ambitious intention all disputants were agreed. A letter from a *Staff Officer* to the editor of the *Times* may be cited as an example of the dire possibilities which were frequently predicted.

I shall conclude these speculations by repeating my conviction that the destruction of our navy, and not the possession of India, is the grand aim of Russia. Would a man proposing to kill his enemy stab him in a limb when his breast lay exposed to the blow? No; India is the feint, and against our ships are the real design of the enemy directed.

The political allegiances of the several journals were reflected inevitably in their treatment of the subject, the Whig papers defending the cabinet from the attack of the Tories but seldom showing any fondness for Russia.²⁴

Equally excited were the pamphlets which discussed the question at greater length than was possible in the press and which supplied much of the argument for the former. There was disagreement about the adequacy of the British navy, but none about Russia's hostile intent. The opinion of a *Naval Officer* was characteristic.

*His Imperial Majesty's taste varies; at one time he has, in breach of treaty, a taste for the subjugation of Poland - he has long had a taste for supplanting us in India - he has also a taste for the possession of Turkey, which has not yet been gratified; he has a taste for the mountains of Circassia, and is leading on his masses of barbarians to drive her brave mountaineers from their native land, and next summer he will again indulge his innocent taste in sailing about the Baltic, and perhaps coming out of it, with the largest fleet, in the highest order and exercise for war (whatever may be said to the contrary), that was ever known to be kept up by any power during a time of peace!*²⁵

The full extent of the hysteria inspired by the Baltic fleet at this time is best shown by the action of the ordinarily sane Duke of Wellington. In March 1839 his sense of duty led him to communicate to Melbourne a rumor that Russia was about to dispatch an armada against India. Although the Duke thought that the Mediterranean was a more probable destination, he did not consider the other project to be totally out of the question.²⁶

The excitement reached a climax in the debates of the commons on the naval estimates. The cabinet's proposal to increase the enrollment by 5000 men was virtually unopposed and the acrimony of the prolonged discussions really arose from the endeavor of each party to fasten upon the other the responsibility for the weakness which had so alarmed the publicists. Palmerston declared that *there was nothing in the relations between this country and Russia to justify the entertaining of... an opinion... that a rupture... was likely to arise*, but the remarkably scant attention which was paid directly to the Russian danger was the silence of assent. There were constant references to the press and to the pamphlets of Napier and others. Only Attwood, who tried vainly to secure a still greater naval augmentation, found it necessary to make more than passing reference to the Baltic and Black Sea fleets.²⁷ In the lords there was a comparable consideration of the question, although Melbourne expressed his confidence in *the pacific intentions of Russia*.²⁸

The even more limited attention paid in parliament to the critical events in Persia and Afghanistan shows that the debates of the houses are not an accurate index of British opinion about Russia. Since the government had already embarked upon a policy which promised to establish adequate barriers against her ambitious career, the problem did not require the sustained consideration of the members. Indeed, more attention came to be paid, as the session advanced, to the disquieting reports which arrived from the Near East.²⁹

That war in Afghanistan excited great interest in England there can be no doubt. Sir Harford Jones Brydges, who had published in 1834 an apology for his conduct while ambassador in Persia between 1807 and 1811, broke into print again late in 1838 with a long open letter to Lord Wellesley. He leveled an unqualified indictment against British policy in Persia since his own mission, laying particular emphasis upon the vacillation which had permitted the growth of Russian power and influence during and after the war of 1826-27. The burden of his pamphlet was summarized in one sentence. *Herat, in the hands of Persia, never can be considered in any other light than as an advanced point d'appui for*

the Russians toward India.³⁰ New editions were published of Burnes's *Bokhara*, Connolly's *Overland Journey*, and Elphinstone's *Caulul*. After the apparent success of the expedition several of those who had taken part presented to the public an account of their exploits.³¹

More significant were the articles in the periodical press, for nearly all the leading magazines, both monthly and quarterly, discussed the new developments at length in the first six months of 1839. There were two sharply divergent schools of thought, one which censured and one which commended the present policy. The former was represented by the *Foreign Quarterly Review* and by *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine*, both of which declined to admit the possibility of a Russian invasion of India, and, though they criticized the supine policy which had enabled the Russians to secure a pre-dominant influence in Persia, argued that Britain should fortify her position in India by the benignity of her internal administration and not by the adoption of a policy no less expansive than Russia's.³²

The alarmist theory was boldly stated by the *British and Foreign Review*, *Blackwood's*, and, significantly, by the hitherto nonalarmist *Asiatic Journal*. More interesting, however, are the more or less officially inspired apologies for British policy which appeared in both the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly*. The article in the issue of the former of January 1839 was a long discussion of foreign affairs, quite independent of the pretense of being a review of other publications. As a semiofficial analysis of Great Britain's position with regard to Russia - it was written by Lord Brougham in June 1838, and possibly approved in proof by McNeill and Hobhouse although it was not revised in the light of the subsequent events in Central Asia - it deserves careful attention. It advocated just such a firm policy as that recently adopted.

*To these considerations regarding the dangers apprehended from Russia, many reasoners add another, derived from observing her progress in the East. No doubt in that quarter she has been constantly advancing; and Persia may be said to exist at her good pleasure. But of such a mighty operation as a march to the northern provinces of India, where, independent of the distance, and the barren and difficult country through which the route must lie, there would be found a powerful army, inured to the climate, admirably commanded, strictly disciplined, and amply appointed in all respects, - we really cannot entertain any very serious apprehension... Besides, long before England could have to contend for her Eastern dominions at Delhi, Cabul, or Lahore, Russia would have to encounter our fleets at Cronstadt, and to defend Petersburg itself. Miserably ill-informed must our Government be of the movements on the East of the Caspian, if she could make any advance towards India before an overpowering armament laid Petersburg in ashes.*³³

The article in the *Quarterly* was written by McNeill himself, and although not quite so alarmist as that in the *Edinburgh*, constituted an unqualified justification of the policy of Lord Auckland. McNeill began with the observation that the peculiar nature of Britain's tenure of India - moral, rather than military strength - made her unusually jealous of hostile intrigues among her neighbors. Russia's past history and her geographical position, even more than her recent behavior, proved her to be a serious danger to India.

Still the distance which separated her frontier from ours was so considerable; the difficulty of marching an army sufficiently numerous to endanger our possession of India was conceived to be so great; the assurances of friendly feeling towards England which Russia renewed from time to time were so strong; the protestations of the absence of all ambitious views - of all desire for territorial aggrandizement, or even for exclusive influence in the East, were so solemn - and Lord Durham was so satisfied of the perfect sincerity of all her professions - that this country was lulled into a feeling of security...

Alarmist publications were printed and speeches made in parliament; yet all attempts to increase the navy were vigorously resisted. Russia concluded she had little to fear, but even then she waited until an insurrection in Canada opened the prospect of freedom for her action in Central Asia. McNeill finally declared that Russia's open hostility had forced England to adopt a vigorous policy, and Russia had then denied having any ideas of Indian conquest. The undoubtedly hostile intrigues of her agents for several years past made it difficult to trust her statement, for either Nicholas was dishonorably lying to the British government, or he had little control over the actions of his agents.

*Are we then to suppose that there is in Russia a party opposed to the will of the Emperor, which is powerful enough to control it, and to protect those who brave his displeasure and counteract his views?... We find it impossible to escape from between the horns of this dilemma. If we assert the good faith of the Emperor and his Cabinet, we must deny his authority and even his influence in his own empire, and regard his opinions and the profession of his Cabinet as inconsequential; and, if we attribute to him authority, we must question his good faith. But, whichever of these embarrassing alternatives we may choose to adopt, one inference is inevitable - from the professions of the Russian government we can derive no security for the future.*³⁴

Much of the information required for a solution of the problem outlined by McNeill was presented to the English public by the authors of three accounts of travels in Russia which appeared at this time. Lord Londonderry, dis

appointed of an official mission to St. Petersburg, visited the country privately in the winter of 1837. He was received very graciously by the tsar and entertained lavishly by the Russian nobility. Upon his return he composed much the most favorable account of Russian society that appeared at this time. Although his experiences naturally led him to emphasize the affairs of the upper classes, he paid some attention to other aspects of Russian life and included much interesting statistical material. Particularly significant was his portrait of Nicholas, whom he believed to have the best interests of all the Russian people constantly at heart. A soldier himself, he was greatly impressed by the skill with which the autocrat maneuvered the imperial troops and was told that the tsar had an equal grasp of the details of the other governmental departments. Londonderry's flattering picture of Russia must have convinced those who had blocked his appointment as ambassador that their action was well conceived.³⁵

Thomas Raikes, the author of the well known *Journal*, visited Russia in 1830, but his book did not appear until 1838. A Tory, but apparently a more acute observer than Londonderry and less hampered by official entertainment, he produced a more complete and more interesting account. His impression of Nicholas was similar to Londonderry's. *If Napoleon chose to say in France, 'Le trone, c'est moi', with as much propriety may the Emperor Nicholas say, 'La Russie, c'est moi'*. He painted a very favorable picture of the life of the peasants.

If a comparison were drawn between the respective situations of these classes in the two countries, I mean as to physical wants and gratifications, how much would the scale lean towards this population of illiterate slaves? The Englishman may boast his liberty, but will it procure him a dinner? - will it clothe his family? - will it give him employment when in health? - or when sick, will it keep him from the poorhouse or the parish?

The Russian hugs his slavery; he rejects the airy boon of liberty and clings to more substantial blessings. He lives indeed without care for the present, or anxiety for the future. The whole responsibility of his existence rests with his lord... The result is, that, while beggars abound in other countries, none are seen here; each mougik has a master and consequently a home.

With the nobility Raikes was less pleased, judging that they suffered from an intolerable tyranny and were subject to many vicious habits.

The most interesting and significant portion of the book was that which dealt with foreign affairs. In 1830 Raikes judged that Russia was already overgrown and that her government wished only for the peace which would permit economic and social reform. A supplementary chapter written in 1837 noted the unexpected changes of the interval. The Russian army and navy had been greatly augmented and improved. They were intended clearly to effect the conquest of Constantinople which had been initiated at Unkiar Skelessi. Raikes concluded that the danger to India was chimerical, but he predicted an Anglo-Russian war in the not distant future.³⁸

A less alarmist opinion was expressed by Robert Bremner, the most penetrating of all the observers of Russian life at this time. He told the usual tale of a corrupt administration and a tyrannical polity. He declared that Nicholas had ambitions which aimed at nothing short of *universal conquest* but his investigation of Russia's resources convinced him such a course was beyond the present power of the country.

*We have now hurriedly and imperfectly stated some of the reasons which induce us to believe that, in place of being able to add to his dominions, the emperor will for the next few years have sufficient employment in keeping together those which he already possesses. However ambitious he may be to distinguish himself as a warrior, he will not, for the present, attempt to disturb the peace of Europe. That he will ultimately do so when Poland is more secure, Circassia conquered, and internal factions appeased, there can be little doubt; and therefore it is that we urge on England the necessity of being prepared for a struggle.*³⁷

From these three books two conclusions may be drawn. It is clear that Russia was no longer the *terra incognita* which she had been in 1815. If Bremner deplored the infrequency with which Englishmen visited her, a traveler's guide book to St. Petersburg and Moscow had been published in London in 1836.³⁸ The character of the books of travel shows also a greatly increased knowledge of the country. Even more significant is the fact that they all paid the closest attention to Russia's army, navy, and foreign policy. This emphasis reveals the anxious interest of the readers as well as of the authors and is strong evidence of the alarmed state of English opinion. That the alarm had been induced by the publicists of England, no less than by the action of Russia, is the only explanation of the recurrences of such irrelevant references to Poland or to Circassia as those in Captain Napier's pamphlet. Most of the elements in the generally accepted stereotype may be traced to the friends of Poland, to the school of Urquhart, or to both.

¹ *Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge, 1929), V, 490; *Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan in Parliamentary Papers*, 1839, XL, *passim*; Macalister, McNeill, p. 199; Urquhart Mss.

- ² F. O. 181/130, no. 14, Palmerston to Durham, 16 Jan. 1837; F. O. 65/233, nos. 33, 38, /234, no. 73, Durham to Palmerston, 24, 28 Feb., 2 May 1837; P. E. Mosely, "Russia's Asiatic Policy in 1838" in *Essays in the History of Modern Europe*, ed. by D. C. McKay (New York, 1936), pp. 52-60.
- ³ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 203, quoting Auckland Colvin, *Life of John Russell Colvin*, pp. 86-88.
- ⁴ *Cambridge History of India*, V, 483-496; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1859, 2d session, XXV, *passim*.
- ⁵ *Parl. Papers*, 1859, 2d session, XXV, 281-298, Auckland to the secret committee of the court of directors, 27 April, 22 May, 13 Aug. 1839; Add. Ms. 36,473, fos. 243-258, 262-266, 281-282, 304-305, 308-318, 319-326, 331-352, Auckland to Hobhouse, 3 May, 3, 17 June, 10, 12 July, 23 Aug., 19 Sept., 13 Oct., 15 Nov. 1838.
- ⁶ Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan, *Parl. Papers*, 1839, XL, *passim*; F. O. 65/232, no. 34, /241, nos. 38, 47, 55, 57, Palmerston to Milbanke, 7 Sept. 1837, 20, 24 April, 22 May 1838, enclosing copies of reports from various consular agents.
- ⁷ Laughton, *Memoirs... of Henry Reeve*, I, 106; W. M. Torrens, *Memoirs of Lord Melbourne* (2 vols., London, 1878), II, 270-274; L. C. Sanders, *Lord Melbourne's Papers* (London, 1889), pp. 452-455; Rollo Russell, *The Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell* (2 vols., London, 1913), II, 222-226; Broughton, *Recollections*, V, 159.
- ⁸ F. O. 65/243, no. 18, Palmerston to Clanricarde, 26 Oct. 1838.
- ⁹ Mosely, "Russia's Asiatic Policy," pp. 54-60, quotation, p. 60, quoting Nesselrode to Pozzo (private), 20 Oct. 1838; F. O. 65/247, copy of Nesselrode to Pozzo, 20 Oct. 1838; Sanders, *Melbourne's Papers*, pp. 455-456.
- ¹⁰ Hansard, commons, 16 March, 27 July 1838, quotation, col. 721.
- ¹¹ L. L. Sawaszkiewicz, *The Confederation of Gaul* (London, 1838).
- ¹² *Times*, 24 Dec.; *Herald*, 27 Oct.; *Standard*, 2 Nov. 1838.
- ¹³ *Chronicle*, 10, 29 Oct., 2 Nov. 1838; cf. *Globe*, 1 Nov. 1838.
- ¹⁴ E.g., *Globe*, 24 Nov.; *Chronicle*, 2 Nov.; *Times*, 1 Nov. 1838. Cf. *supra*, pp. 182-183.
- ¹⁵ E.g., *British and Foreign Review*, *Foreign Quarterly*, April 1839; *Times*, 27 Oct., 1 Nov. 1838; *Chronicle*, *Herald*, 30 Oct. 1838.
- ¹⁶ *India, Great Britain, and Russia* (London, 1838), pp. 1-45, quotations, pp. iii, iv, 46-48.
- ¹⁷ Cf. *supra*, pp. 199-200.
- ¹⁸ Hansard, commons, 5 March 1838.
- ¹⁹ F. O. 65/241, No. 77, Palmerston to Milbanke, 9 July 1838; separate, Backhouse to Milbanke, 16 Aug. 1838; /242, nos. 50, 54, Milbanke to Palmerston, 29 Aug., 15 Sept. 1838.
- ²⁰ Broughton, *Recollections*, V, 168.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169; Sanders, *Melbourne's Papers*, p. 385; Russell, *Early Correspondence*, II, 235. This episode is outlined in P. E. Mosely, "Englisch-Russische Flottenrivalität" in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (Berlin, 1936), I, 549-568.
- ²² F. O. 65/243, nos. 45, 47, Palmerston to Clanricarde, 29 Dec. 1838; /251, no. 10, Clanricarde to Palmerston, 21 Jan. 1839; all are printed in Mosely, loc. cit.
- ²³ *A Letter to... the Duke of Wellington...*, by a "Flag Officer" (London, 1838), *passim*, quotations, pp. 9, 12.
- ²⁴ *Times*, 28 Dec. 1838, 3, 9, 12, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 28 Jan., 4, 16, 18, 19, 25, 28 Feb., 2, 8, 11, 21 March 1839, quotation 3 Jan.; *Herald*, 7, 20, 25 Feb. 1839; *Chronicle*, 6 Dec. 1838, 19, 21, 24 Jan., 13 March 1839.
- ²⁵ *Observations upon "A Letter Addressed to the Earl of Minto, First Lord of the Admiralty, By One of the People"* by a Naval Officer (London, 1839), p. 13; Sir John Barrow, *Life of George, Lord Anson* (London, 1839), pp. 421-444; The Navy: *A Letter to the Earl of Minto*, by "One of the People" (London, 1839).
- ²⁶ Torrens, *Memoirs of Melbourne*, II, 282-284.
- ²⁷ Hansard, commons, 4, 6, 11, 18, 25 March 1839, quotation 11 March, col. 299.
- ²⁸ Hansard, lords, 22 Feb. 1839, quotation col. 809.
- ²⁹ Persia and Afghanistan: Hansard, lords, 19 March, 11 April, commons, 5 Feb., 18 March, 21 June; Levant: lords, 12 March, 25 April, 14 June, 20 Aug., commons, n March, 9 July, 22 Aug. 1839.
- ³⁰ Harford Jones Brydges, *An Account of the Transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia in the Years 1807-11* (2 vols., London, 1834); *A Letter on the Present State of British Interests and Affairs in Persia...* (London, 1838), *passim*, quotation, p. 43.
- ³¹ *Vide infra*, p. 268.
- ³² *Foreign Quarterly*, April 1839, XXIII, 161-212; *ibid.*, Oct. 1838, July 1839; *Tait's*, Feb., Aug. 1839, VI, 82-86, 518-521.
- ³³ *British and Foreign Review*, Jan., April 1839; *Blackwood's*, Jan. 1839; *Asiatic Journal*, March 1839; Macvey Napier, ed., *Selections from the Correspondence of the late Macvey Napier* (London, 1879), p. 285; Add. Ms. 36,469, fo. 392, McNeill to Hobhouse, undated (1838); *Edinburgh*, Jan. 1839, LXVIII, 527.
- ³⁴ Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, p. 4; *Quarterly*, June 1839, LXIV, 145-188, quotations, pp. 146, 188.
- ³⁵ Londonderry, *Recollections of a Tour in the North of Europe in 1836-37* (2 vols., London, 1838), *passim*.
- ³⁶ Thomas Raikes, *A Visit to St. Petersburg in the Winter of 1829-30* (London, 1838), *passim*, quotations, pp. 157, 116-17, 122.
- ³⁷ Robert Bremner, *Excursions in the Interior of Russia* (2 vols., London, 1839), *passim*, quotation, I, 471, 472.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. viii; Francis Coghlan, *Guide to St. Petersburg and Moscow* (London, 1836).

IX. THE NEAR EASTERN CRISIS, 1839-1841

UNDERLYING the naval rivalry of Russia and England, and indubitably responsible in some measure for Palmerston's apprehension of the Russian fleets, particularly that of the Black Sea, was the Turko-Egyptian problem. In May 1838 Mehemet Ali's declaration of his intention to effect his independence of the Porte had made acute once more the tension which had been dormant since the Anglo-Franco-Russian exchange of acerbities over the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. Palmerston promptly instructed his agent at Alexandria to explain clearly England's determination to prevent a dismemberment of the Ottoman empire. Since the other great powers made similar representations, Mehemet Ali, who had been plumbing the international situation, did not pursue his ambition overtly in the face of such united opposition. Nevertheless his trial balloon set the diplomatic machine to work. Proposals and counter proposals, conversations and intrigues kept the foreign offices and embassies of the powers busy during the ensuing twelve months. Palmerston tried unsuccessfully to establish in London a focus for discussions which might make possible the formulation of a concerted policy. When at length in the spring of 1839 the crisis was precipitated by the Turkish invasion of Syria, Metternich seemed to have succeeded in making Vienna, rather than London, the center of negotiations. This ephemeral union of the powers permitted their ambassadors in Constantinople to deliver to the Porte on July 27 a collective note which inaugurated a new phase of the Eastern question.¹

While the diplomatic transactions of the year which preceded the battle at Nezib in May 1839 were extremely complex, the purposes and conceptions which determined British policy were simple. In the Levant, Palmerston had *Two objects in view, First to uphold the Sultan, Secondly to prevent a Separate action of Russia in Turkey*. In 1833 he had warned the Porte that should Great Britain have to choose between a Russian and an Egyptian occupation of the Straits, she would undoubtedly select the latter alternative, but his subsequent policy had been designed so to rejuvenate Turkey that such a choice never need be made. He had come also to doubt the prevalent belief that the sick man was sure to die. He was *inclined to suspect that those who say that the Turkish empire is rapidly going from bad to worse ought rather to say that the other countries of Europe are year by year becoming better acquainted with the manifest and manifold defects of the organization of Turkey*. He thought that, *it is certain that the daily increasing intercourse between Turkey and the other countries of Europe must... throw much light upon the defects and weaknesses of the Turkish system, and lead to various improvements therein*. It was this belief which had inspired his unflagging attempts to stimulate reforms in the Ottoman economic and military organization.²

The Anglo-Turkish commercial convention, concluded at Balta Liman in August 1838, was expected to foster these reforms no less than to facilitate and to augment English trade in the Ottoman empire. Palmerston was completely in accord with Urquhart in these purposes, if not in the detailed measures by which they might best be fulfilled. It is of little significance whether the major credit for the convention be awarded to Urquhart who initiated, or to Bulwer and Ponsonby who consummated, the negotiation. To both the Turkish and the English governments the agreement had the great merit that its scope comprehended Egypt. Mahmud hoped that it would precipitate an Anglo-Egyptian quarrel and the consequent downfall of the pasha, and Palmerston expected that it would destroy the official monopolies which were an essential element in the Egyptian system. Between 1834 and 1838, Palmerston had received from several agents, particularly from the Polish general Chrzanovski and from John Bowring, reports which convinced him, unlike most European observers, of the fundamental weakness of the pasha's military and economic systems.³

There were associated with Palmerston's belief in the essential instability of the Egyptian regime several political considerations which impelled the adoption of a pro-Turkish policy. England was still exploring the feasibility of the various avenues of communication with India. An augmentation of Mehemet Ali's influence threatened to make him master of the route down the Euphrates, recently investigated by Colonel Chesney, in addition to that across the Isthmus of Suez, already subject to his authority. The extension of the pasha's power in southwestern Asia would have meant an approximation of the Egyptian territories to those of Russia and Persia at a moment when the shah appeared to be virtually a vassal of the tsar. The latest developments in Afghanistan naturally intensified English apprehension that Russia and Egypt might agree upon a partition of the Ottoman empire which would give them complete control of the Levant and of all direct routes to India.⁴

Palmerston's opinion of Mehemet Ali was succinctly stated in June 1839 in a letter to Lord Granville, the British ambassador in Paris.

I hate Mehemet Ali, whom I consider as nothing but an Ignorant Barbarian who by Cunning and Boldness, and mother wit has been successful in Rebellion and has turned to his own advantage by Breach of Trust Power which was confided to him for other Purposes. I look upon his boasted Civilization of Egypt as the arrantest Humbug; and I believe he is as great a Tyrant and Oppressor as ever made a People wretched.

Palmerston's attitude toward the whole Russo-Turco-Egyptian question was excellently summarized in an official dispatch which he ordered Granville to communicate to the French government. He there adduced a copy of a dispatch from Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo as strong proof that the real object of Russia is not to uphold but to weaken Turkey.

It would be impossible for Russia at once and openly to take part with Mehemet Ali against the Sultan; but Russia would gladly see the resources of the Turkish Empire continue to be wasted in internal War, so long as that War could be kept within such limits as not to involve the Powers of Europe... Russia would be glad that the gradual encroachments of M. Ali should still more weaken the Turkish Govt, and render it progressively less and less able to resist the Dictation of Russia as a friend, or to repel her attack as an Enemy. The existence of a secret understanding between Russia and M. Ali has long been suspected; and a glance at the Map is sufficient to shew that these two Parties have a common interest in despoiling Turkey, which lies between them...

Many people have been led to suppose that Russia, whatever language she may have had openly at Constantinople and at Alexandria, has secretly encouraged and invited the Sultan and the Pasha in their warlike Projects. But whether this suspicion be well founded or not, it is manifest that the state of things lately and at present existing in Syria, has been advantageous to the interests of Russia, and injurious to the interests of all other parties concerned. Encroachment upon Turkey is no doubt an object at which Russia steadily aims, encroachment by predominant influence over the Sultan in time of Peace, encroachment by acquisition of Territory from the Sultan in time of war. Everything that tends to weaken Turkey, tends to forward in this respect the views of Russia; and those views remain the same, though Russia may according to circumstances vary her means of accomplishing them.

Till recently, Russia proposed to herself to extend Russian Influence over Turkey by affording the Sultan Military Protection. Hence the Expedition to the Bosphorus in 1833; hence the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi; and hence the great military and naval preparations which at various times during the last two years have been made in the Southern Provinces of Russia for marching Troops through the Principalities into Bulgaria, and for sending an Expedition to the Bosphorus from Sevastopol. Russia appears now to have in some degree changed her plan; and finding that a military occupation of Turkey would either expose her to war with the other Powers of Europe, or would by the Interference of those Powers be rendered productive of little or no permanent advantage,... seems disposed to let the Pasha do her work for her. It is hardly possible that the three Powers [France, Austria, England] should not agree in a common course of action for the maintenance of their common Interests;... and if Prussia should join them, Russia would be unable openly to oppose them, and their united Force would be amply sufficient to defeat any secret Intrigues by which she might endeavour to thwart them. It seems, however, to H. M.'s Govt, that the great Interests of the Four Powers... can never be considered as secure until Mehemet Ali shall have evacuated Syria, and shall have withdrawn his Forces into Egypt.⁵

Palmerston here stated the principles which determined British policy in the Eastern question during the ensuing two years, though they happened to be implemented with the cooperation of Russia in the face of French opposition. There was one additional plank in the platform, the suppression of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. *It would be most important for the interests and independence of the Porte to get rid of that treaty; but the question is how to get rid of it before it expires? The only way seemed... to be to merge it in some more general compact of the same nature [which would] place the Porte in a state of comparative independence.* This was the purpose which had inspired Palmerston's persistent attempts to establish a conference of the great powers which might effect a concerted solution of the problem along lines which he himself determined. In the game of diplomatic fence, his great adversary was Russia, equally determined to prevent the formation of a concerted policy which would circumscribe her action and probably deprive her of the special status acquired in 1833. Palmerston believed the moment to be propitious.

Russia has been foiled and exposed by England in the East [i.e. Afghanistan] and has found by the Personal Experience of the Emperor that She has lost her influence in the West. She is embarrassed by her Circassian war and by the discontent in many of her Provinces. Her Treasury is poor and she could not find easily the means in men, ships, or money to make war except in Self-defense. A year or two hence she will have killed, and will hold a higher tone and be less manageable. You should always deal with a Bully when he has just had his nose pulled.⁶

It is perfectly clear that prior to September 1839 Palmerston entertained a profound distrust and dislike of Russia. That he considered the possibility of war is shown by his hope that Great Britain need not reinforce her Mediterranean squadron, and might keep her ships "near at Hand, in case anything

Should happen which might render it necessary. to look the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Face. Other members of the cabinet, however, were not so apprehensive. The precise views of most of them were not recorded in any form which is now available, but Lord Holland held an opinion which appears to have been characteristic of the nonalarmist group. He thought that Russia's reply to the British remonstrance about her navy was *not only clever, but in the main true, and indeed unanswerable*, that there prevailed *an extravagant apprehension of Russian designs and Russian power*, and that to British condemnation of her conduct in Central Asia she might well point to Karrak, Kabul, and Aden and ask *tu quoque*. He was unable not to smile at Britain's *unambitious* policy, and thought Wellington's fear of a Russian armada against India fantastic.⁷

The attention paid to foreign affairs by the English press during the latter part of 1838 and the first five months of 1839 was centered on the Afghan war and the naval agitation, but occasional references to the impending hostilities in the Levant showed that the general animus against Russia extended to her policy in that quarter. Perhaps the most significant discussion of the problem was that contained in the article by Lord Brougham in the *Edinburgh* in January, to which reference has already been made. The sentiments there enunciated were altogether consistent with Palmerston's opinion.

*Whether the encroaching policy of Russia shall be suffered to extend on the side of Turkey, is undoubtedly a question for the serious consideration of the other European powers. She is at the head of the Absolute Party, her influence affects habitually, if it does not rule the courts of Austria and Prussia. Her gigantic power, her resources of men, at least,... have given her a weight of late years in European affairs, very different from any she possessed, even under the reign of the ambitious Catherine. The only thing that has made this colossal empire at all a safe member of the European community, has hitherto been that remote position which, in another view, makes her almost irresponsible by making her secure. But it will be far otherwise if she moves to the southward and adds Constantinople to her vast dominions. She will then have the footing on the Mediterranean, which has always been her most favorite object, she will become in reality what as yet she has only affected to be, a naval power; and with the resources of the Levant, added to those of the north, no one can doubt she will be a naval power of the first order. The independence of Egypt, on any account a matter of the greatest importance to all the commercial states of Europe and America, will, of course, be a mere impossibility; and all the improvements now beginning in the East will be at an end. The view taken by some that there will be an advantage gained over Russia, inasmuch as she will be brought into the circle of the other European powers, and exposed to be attacked in her new dominions, appears a refinement too absurd to require a serious refutation. She still has her vast and inaccessible empire behind, on which to retreat; and, admitting the utmost weight that can be assigned to the argument just stated, it would only follow, that she might always run the risk of losing her new acquisitions, in an attempt still further to extend her encroachments; thus playing the safe game of either winning universal monarchy Or remaining where she was before she seized on the Dardanelles.*⁸

The *Edinburgh's* anti-Russian, pro-Turkish opinion was shared by some of its contemporaries in the periodical press,⁹ but there existed also several other schools of thought. There was one group of whom Thomas Waghorn was the most vociferous member, which vehemently argued the expediency of an alliance with Mehemet Ali. Waghorn, a former officer in the Indian navy, had become interested in more rapid communication with India and had set himself up in Cairo as an agent for the expedition across the isthmus of the mails and passengers of the recently established steamship services in the Mediterranean and the Red seas. Many of his innumerable letters about Egypt were printed by the editors of most of the London newspapers, and in his two pamphlets, *Egypt, in 1837* and *Egypt, in 1838*, he attempted to prove that Turkey was doomed to succumb to Russia. Once his independence had been recognized, Mehemet Ali, popular among Mohammedans and very successful in his administration of Egypt, would be anxious, Waghorn thought, to enter into an alliance with Great Britain which would compensate for Russia's increased strength. The pasha might even contribute troops for the defense of India, and the Russian bugbear be banished.¹⁰ The same general theory had long been urged upon the government in a less demagogic, but more convincing fashion, by the merchant house of Briggs and Company. While their efforts in behalf of Mehemet Ali achieved some success, Palmerston was less sympathetic than his predecessors, and the broader aspects of British policy rendered their attempt to guide it fruitless after 1841.¹¹ There was some discussion of the merits of a pro-Egyptian policy in the newspaper press, but in general the opponents of Russia advocated active British support of the sultan.¹²

More significant because apparently much more widely held was the point of view, already advanced by Cobden, which discounted the Russian threat and deprecated the Russophobia which had come to dominate British opinion. One of the most lucid statements of this nonalarmist attitude was that contained in a series of articles published between October 1838 and January 1840 by the *Foreign Quarterly Review*, which had recovered from the hysteria inspired by Urquhart in 1835. They dis-

cussed the size, condition, history, and intentions of Russia, with particular reference to Central Asia and to the Levant. Her great apparent strength was still recognized, but her poor means of communication, and her relative poverty were held now to constitute serious limitations to her ambition. Her recent conduct in Persia was thought to have a commercial, not a political motive, and it was asserted that British traders were superseding their Russian competitors. In Turkey Nicholas, who was much less grasping than his predecessors, was thought to desire merely a preponderant influence. The broad argument may be summarized in a sentence. *Of her power and projects we entertain no dread, even without the necessity of running to arm.*¹³ There were other statements of this essentially Cobdenite point of view.¹⁴

In the late spring of 1839, however, the general tone of the press, particularly of the newspapers, was one of real hostility to Russia. The *Times*, as before, led the chorus, maintaining that the sultan had been incited to an attack on his vassal and thus to the commission of virtual political suicide in the form of a second Russian protective expedition. *"Russia has tightened her gripe round the throat of Turkey, now in the agonies of dissolution, and may impose precisely whatever terms her own ambitious and grasping spirit may dictate"*.¹⁵ It deplored the British policy which had permitted such a fatal consummation of Russian plans, but, although it had predicted such a catastrophe since the first rumors of impending hostilities in the East, it had never advanced an alternative program. Equally ill disposed toward Palmerston and Russia, it had found in British policy an unfailing pretense for impartial calumny in which the like-minded *Standard* and *Morning Herald* were wont to join.¹⁶

The *Morning Chronicle* and the *Globe*, with their official connections, advocated the policy of determined support for the sultan which Palmerston had resolved to follow. The former, for instance, declared:

*If the other powers of Europe do not immediately interfere to save the Sultan from his rebellious Pacha, they will be too late to save him from the more dangerous friend on whom he is thrown by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi... Russia is not prepared for so bold a cast of the die [the seizure of Constantinople]; and were she so, never were the other powers better prepared or more resolved to prevent Russia carrying off the prize.*¹⁷

There is abundant evidence that in England there was an immediate realization that the outbreak of war in Syria had precipitated an international crisis of the first water. In the press as well as in the cabinet the news of the battle of Nezib excited a degree of attention incommensurate with that accorded to the consequences of the battle of Konieh in 1832. The details of the gradual reorientation of British policy, of the diplomatic revolution which culminated in the treaty of alliance signed in London on July 15, 1840, need not be recapitulated here, but the slow evolution of British official opinion has present pertinence. The situation created by the probable outbreak of hostilities had appeared to be so threatening that instructions were sent to Admiral Stopford to be fully prepared to support the sultan in concert with the French fleet, and thus to relieve him of the necessity of invoking Russian aid.¹⁸ While the surrender of the Turkish navy to the Egyptians appeared to Palmerston to require the dispatch to the British and French admirals of further and more stringent instructions, he was tremendously encouraged by the news of the joint note - advice to rely in the present crisis upon their common counsels - delivered to the Porte by the ambassadors of the five great powers.¹⁹ The embryonic conference at Vienna, to the establishment of which he had reluctantly assented, appeared to have justified itself already. Russia was associated in a common course of policy and her independent action under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi limited.²⁰ Encouraged doubtless by Lord Clanricarde's continued reports that the Russian government would be extremely loath to recognize a *casus foederis* and that neither the condition of the army nor the resources of the treasury permitted war, Palmerston availed himself of his lucky opportunity to rearrange the political order of the Levant to his own satisfaction.²¹ His diplomatic agents in St. Petersburg, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin were all instructed to urge upon the respective governments the more than ever urgent necessity of evicting the Egyptians from Syria.²²

Clanricarde's accounts of the disposition of the Russian government were no less reassuring. In the middle of July, a dispatch told of Nesselrode's satisfaction in the coincidence of British and Russian policy and his concurrence in Palmerston's opinion that Syria must be restored to the direct control of the Porte, in spite of his fear that the hereditary tenure of Egypt might not be an adequate inducement to secure the pasha's voluntary withdrawal. In August Clanricarde expressed the opinion that Russia would *always be guided by selfish views and... influenced by her fears*, but he added that *Russia might lean to her side. if England were to separate herself from France and Austria, or from France alone*. He declared that: *Russia fears England... and therefore she respects her... and is... inclined to*

court her. Later in the month he reported that Nicholas was so gratified by the coincidence of British and Russian policy that he had decided to send Baron Brunnow to London to expedite a settlement without pandering longer to France and her chambers.²³ Thus Palmerston was not unprepared for the suggestions made by Brunnow who reached London in late September. Although in July he had thought that the crisis constituted a *Triumph of Russian Intrigue*, he had probably come to realize, as had Nicholas' ministers, that Russia's solitary intervention would not compensate her for the probably consequent general war.²⁴ Brunnow's proposals were altogether satisfactory - the eviction of the Egyptians from Syria by force, should coercion be necessary, the nonrenewal of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the conclusion of a general convention guaranteeing the neutrality of the Straits. Only one modification of the terms of the Russian overture was required by the English statesmen. As a matter of principle and from deference to public opinion, they desired, should a Russian expedition to the Bosphorus be necessary, that an English squadron should simultaneously pass the Dardanelles.²⁵ At first Palmerston did not wish even this slight concession, believing, as he wrote to Bulwer, that:

*If the parts assigned to each Power were... determined by previous convention, each would act, not for herself, but for the whole, and exclusive influence no longer followed... There was no wise medium between confidence and distrust; and that if we tie up Russia by treaty we may trust her, and trusting her, we had better mix no evidence of suspicion with our confidence.*²⁶

The suggestion that a few ships of the other powers should enter the Dardanelles was made originally by the French ambassador, Sebastiani, and considered by Palmerston to be *childish*. The divergence of French and English policy, which had begun to be evident in August, rapidly became so great that the cabinet resolved to proceed without France if necessary, and the Russian proposals were approved without serious misgiving.²⁷ Thus a British desire to maintain the French alliance is the explanation of Brunnow's trip to St. Petersburg for instructions with regard to the passage of the Dardanelles by an allied fleet. Perhaps the known desire of the tsar for the isolation of France made the principle seem more important. Nicholas, however, seized his opportunity to disrupt the Anglo-French *entente*; Brunnow returned to London in late December and the Anglo-Russian accord was complete by the beginning of the new year. Even the news of the departure of an expedition to release Russian subjects enslaved in Khiva - generally recognized to be the Russian *riposte* to the British conquest of Kabul and judged by Palmerston, Hobhouse, and Clanricarde to be the first step in the establishment of a protectorate - failed to disturb the nascent alliance.²⁸

The final negotiation of the convention for the coercion of Mehemet Ali was long delayed by the lingering English desire that France be included. Throughout the protracted discussions Palmerston remained firm in his resolve to enforce in concert with Russia the Egyptian evacuation of Syria. Whatever hesitation the Khiva expedition might have induced must have been removed by the news of its failure and abandonment.²⁹ When clear evidence of French duplicity did not overcome the unwillingness of the Francophile members of the cabinet to proceed without France, Palmerston, unable to carry his policy by argument, forced its acceptance in July by a threat of resignation.³⁰ The dissatisfied group, headed by Holland and Clarendon, took the extraordinary course of recording their dissent in a memorandum addressed to the queen, but it is clear that they objected to the rupture of the *entente* with France, not to the establishment of one with Russia.³¹

Thus the English government, guided by the foreign secretary, executed in the latter part of 1839 a complete reorientation of its policy toward Russia. A state of quasi-war in Central Asia, accompanied by mutual recriminations over naval intentions and designs of aggression, was superseded by an *entente* which had its roots in the most severe of crises and its fruit in a formal alliance. Among Englishmen Palmerston must be given the major credit for the changed situation. His purpose remained constant; only his method of strengthening the Porte underwent a transformation. But the new situation implied a revolution in the relations of the two governments. If the alliance was an *ad hoc* arrangement for the settlement of an ephemeral problem and British distrust of Russia's eventual designs was not by any means altogether dispelled, the active cooperation of the moment allowed and, indeed, required an official cordiality in vivid contrast to the diplomatic bad manners of the immediate past. What of English public sentiment, however? Did it execute a comparable revolution; was there any abatement of the anti-Russian propaganda which had long pervaded the press?

In parliament there was apparently a realization that the government contemplated a significant change of policy. In the debates on naval supply and in frequent short discussions of foreign affairs, much regret was expressed over the growing estrangement from France. The ministry was subjected to an attack from the Tories, in which some radicals joined, for their imputed failure to maintain an ad

equate naval establishment. As in 1839, Russia was most commonly considered to constitute the major threat, but Palmerston, in contrast to his earlier tenor, was able to state that *it would be perfectly preposterous to ask the country to expedite a fleet against a power [i.e. Russia] to which no inimical intentions could be imputed*.³² With regard to the Levant, the burden of the attack fell on Hume - Attwood was no longer in the house - who persistently endeavored to extract information about the pending negotiations, which Palmerston just as steadily declined to supply. Hume's animus against Russia was not concealed; *he was sorry to say that . we had joined in supporting the policy of Russia, and that in so doing we had promoted and forwarded the ambitious projects of that power*. His major grievance, however, was the abandonment of the *entente* with France, and he appeared to subscribe to the theory, advanced by Waghorn and others, that Mehemet Ali was the best bulwark against Russian ambition. Little comment was excited even by Palmerston's statement, which the French cabinet would have done well to heed, that, valuable as the alliance might be, the interests of the two countries did not always coincide and that England's policy should be determined by her own welfare.³³ In short, the debates of parliament showed that although the members were not unaware of the nature of the negotiations in progress, their expressed opinions had little influence upon the formulation of policy.

In the press the predominant sentiment in the anxious discussion which from the outset attended the evolution of the crisis was equally anti-Russian. For instance, the *Chronicle*, chief journalistic prop of the cabinet and generally considered to be responsive to the ideas of Palmerston, rejoiced, as did all the other papers in July 1839, in the news of the capture of Kandahar. It subsequently continued to show its anti-Russian bias by demanding similar intervention in the imbroglio created by the battle of Nezib, the death of Mahmud, and the defection of the Turkish fleet.³⁴

Constantinople and the Divan will remain at the mercy of that Power which is most lavish of gold and most active in intrigue, in other words, of Russia. She will know how to suggest terms and bring about the conclusion she desires, unless England and France come to a speedy agreement, and, if necessary, send their combined fleets to Alexandria and dictate there just and equitable terms to the Pacha.³⁵

In the news of the collective note to the Porte, it naturally found corroboration of its demand for joint intervention. Three days later its discussion of Palmerston's explanatory reply to a question put to him in the commons by Hume appears certainly to reflect the growing belief in the foreign office that Russia did not contemplate an independent course of action.

We are fully persuaded that Mehemet Ali could not have thwarted the policy of Russia more than by pushing his hostilities to such an extent as must have applied a practical test to the validity of Unkiar Skelessi, so little disposed is Russia to avail herself of the opportunity which many people inconsiderately imagine she is looking for. An ostensible policy, therefore, separate from that pursued by the other Powers, Russia has not. She cannot occupy Constantinople, and failing this, she must join those Powers who determine that it shall not be occupied by another.³⁶

In September the changing diplomatic situation was further indicated by the *Chronicle* in editorial articles which argued that France and England could no more allow Russia's solitary intervention that she could tolerate their unlimited interference, and praised Palmerston's skillful diplomacy which had baffled Russia and nullified the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. In the middle of October, when Brunnow had completed his first mission in England, it recorded its pleasure over the harmony of the views of England and Russia, but a mild hostility was still apparent in its doubt whether England should enter into an alliance against France. A later statement that the best understanding existed among all the powers, France excepted, may have been based probably upon a direct communication from the foreign office. News of the capture of Kabul inspired the joyful comment that: *Our Indian empire has been saved for many years to come*, and a month later a long examination of the relations of India and Russia led to the conclusion that by *this bold and sagacious policy... an insuperable barrier has been raised against any ambitious designs on the part of Russia*. The new coöperation in the Levant had not yet removed all memories of past misunderstandings.³⁷

Further evidence of a close connection between the *Chronicle* and the foreign office may be found in an editorial article which announced Brunnow's return to London. The writer asserted that in the negotiations which had been suspended in October the powers, France excepted, had agreed upon the terms of a settlement to be imposed upon Mehemet Ali, and that only the method of its execution had still to be arranged. He then expressed the opinion, now known to have been that of the cabinet, that no one power, Russia particularly, could be permitted to effect the settlement, and that a British squadron must enter the Dardanelles if a Russian fleet anchored in the Bosphorus. The *Chronicle* con-

tinued to reflect the progress of negotiations in January, when an editorial article discussed the terms, almost precisely those finally accepted in July, of a reported agreement between Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

*If then a pacific arrangement of a satisfactory kind can be obtained, on no onerous or dishonorable condition, we do not see why it should be rejected because it is Russia that offers it, or because France, from hurt pride rather than hurt interests, refuses to join in it.*³⁸

There is here more than a suggestion of growing confidence in Russia and an anticipation of the enthusiastic support of Palmerston's policy which was given while the treaty was being executed.

All distrust of Russia was not abandoned, however, for the *Chronicle* continued to print and even to call attention to letters which advocated a policy of alliance with Mehemet Ali against Russia.³⁹ The news of Russian failures in Circassia and against Khiva was given prominence, and the suggestion of *Reformer* that an understanding with Mehemet Ali would permit the abolition of the fleet stationed at Malta evoked an editorial reply that such a policy would entail the destruction of Turkey and imperil the peace of Europe.⁴⁰ The *Globe* pursued a course very similar to that of the *Chronicle*, and its editorial articles likewise prepared the public for the diplomatic revolution of July 1840.⁴¹

The abandonment by the Whig papers of the journalistic battle against Russia was in striking contrast to the conduct of their antiministerial contemporaries. The *Times* and the *Herald* led the attack, and the *Standard* and the *Post* followed in their wake. Thoroughly representative of the alarmist point of view, in July 1839, the *Times* demanded the intervention of all the powers, for Russia notoriously and France professedly were impelled by self-seeking motives.⁴² In an attack upon the Palmerstonian policy, it concluded that there could be no *human being so credulous as to imagine that if Russia had in her heart desired to save the unfortunate Mahmoud from destruction, by rescuing him from his warlike demonstration against Egypt, he would have dared to resist her command*. But Russia had no such desire. She had obtained a strangle hold on the Porte and could impose whatever settlement her ambitions should dictate. France, with her influence over Mehemet Ali, might well make some arrangement with Russia and with Egypt, which would be highly injurious to British commercial interests. There was also the possibility that Russia and Mehemet Ali might conclude an agreement by which the pasha would be allowed to expand toward the east, while the tsar gained possession of Constantinople and the Straits, and Russia thus became a Mediterranean power. Britain, the *Times* thought, would be powerless to prevent such an arrangement.⁴³

During August and September, French accounts of Russian intrigue in Constantinople and *précis* of the speculation of Paris journals provided further inflammatory sentiment for the *Times* readers. If the news of the collective note received only a more than usually extensive summary of French editorial comment, two bitter attacks on Palmerston's policy revealed the journal's own attitude toward Russia. Palmerston, it thought, could have secured the abandonment of Mehemet Ali's pretensions with little difficulty, had he supported Austria, the only state which was capable and desirous of preserving the balance of power and the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Contrariwise, by adding English influence to that of France and Russia he had compelled

Prince Metternich, through dread of the Quadruple Alliances of the East and West, to become for the first time a party to the crimes of England, France, and Russia in the East, securing to himself the support in the Cabinet of a Confederation of Powers inimical to England, and placing that alliance at the disposal of the Emperor of Russia, who is already master of the Dardanelles, and, possessing within its impregnable barrier a squadron superior to either of his allies, commands by conferences and protocols at Constantinople the only British squadron afloat.

Brunnow's arrival in London did not receive editorial comment. Although Russia was accorded little direct attention, the *Times*'s disapproval of the nascent *rapprochement* was transparent.⁴⁴

In the absence of editorial discussions of the crisis, a series of letters signed *Anglicus* acquired quasi-editorial force. The continued publication of his comprehensive analysis of Anglo-Russian relations, which began in September and appeared at irregular intervals throughout the autumn, must imply the paper's sympathy with his point of view, even if his articles were unsolicited. *Anglicus* was H. H. Parish, one of Urquhart's disciples, and the *Times* had already adopted many of their tenets. By its coöperation in the *cause célèbre* of the *Vixen*, it had facilitated their efforts to rouse English opinion. In short, if the *Times* did not become in the autumn of 1839 the actual organ of the Urquhartite group, it certainly spread their theories broadcast.⁴⁵

In his first letter *Anglicus* expressed his horror at the prospect of a Russian alliance which would make England the dupe of the crafty diplomats whose insidious intrigues had had such remarkable

success. The history of the Greek revolution, of the Russo-Turkish war and the Treaty of Adrianople, were adduced to prove how effectively Russia had profited from an earlier alliance. It appeared to *Anglicus* that the plot consummated at Unkiar Skelessi foreshadowed an equally catastrophic conclusion of the present crisis.⁴⁶ Subsequent letters analyzed the course of British policy since the Congress of Vienna and attributed all its failures to Russian influence. Palmerston was accused of the deliberate falsification of documents with the intent of concealing the truth.⁴⁷

After having turned its attention during November and December to the inadequacies of the English navy,⁴⁸ which were about to be discussed again by parliament, the *Times* reverted to foreign affairs in the Spring. Although there were no new developments in the Levant, other problems forced the business of the foreign office before the public eye. War had been declared against China.⁴⁹ News arrived of the failure of the Russian expedition to Khiva.⁵⁰ The problem of the sulphur monopoly almost precipitated war with Naples, and, finally, there was the perennial Spanish civil war. All these questions invited editorial discussion which allowed the *Times* to include anti-Russian sentiments in its tirades against Lord Palmerston, his policy, and his methods.⁵¹ Circassia provided still another opportunity.

*Little notice has been taken for some time past of the progress slowly, but surely, making by the brave Circassians in resistance to the attempts of the Russians to possess themselves of that country, partly perhaps... from the conclusion which has been generally adopted, that the struggle on the side of the Russians had become a hopeless one, and that the end was a mere question of time, leaving the issue in no doubt whatever... As these exploits of the brave Circassians may open a new field, yet but partially explored, to British commercial enterprise, and tend moreover to check the progress of Russian aggression on the side of India, they become important events to this country on the score of national advantage alone, but they acquire a still higher interest as the record of another triumph on the part of a free and brave people over a reckless and unprincipled invader, whose march spreads despotism and puts a deadly extinguisher upon civilization.*⁵²

It was not a friendly estimate of Russia.

Had the editors of the *Times* had some premonition of the crucial event which was to occur in London on July 15, 1840, the columns of the paper would hardly have included, during that month, more items which concerned Russia - news, letters, and editorial articles - than were actually printed. Rumors of a settlement of the Eastern question became ever more frequent, and the Indian mail, which arrived in time for inclusion in the issue of July 4, contained alarming accounts of Russian advances in Central Asia and highly inflammatory articles from the Indian journals. The *Delhi Gazette* had declared on April 29:

*The chances are, therefore, that we may come in contact with them sooner than we had expected... Our Ambassador at St. Petersburg writes that the Russian force merely consists of 3,000 men. He appears to have been completely gulled by that old fox Nesselrode. In the event of an unsuccessful attempt by General Petrowski to restore Dost Mahommed, the whole transaction will, of course, be denied, and the denial received by my Lord Palmerston as an ample and satisfactory explanation.*⁵³

The fact that the *Times* should reprint such incendiary and clearly erroneous reports about Russia must be an indication that it still shared Urquhart's view and was ready to believe anything evil about her. An editorial article on the sixth is a very good summary of its opinion on the eve of the Treaty of July.

The questions of national rivalry and national interest which divide the empire of Great Britain from the empire of Russia, are so deeply seated and so essential a part of the existence and the policy of either nation, that the ephemeral expedients of our statesmen to ward off the collision are attended with the most absurd and transient results. Thus, with great sacrifices of dignity and consistency, and with no inconsiderable commercial losses, we have sometimes obtained a temporary concession, or far more frequently made a lasting and dishonourable one, for the purpose of preserving, what is least worth having, a hollow peace and a false ally. But after we have abandoned Poland and Circassia, after we have allowed the Black Sea to become a Russian lake, after we have almost lost Turkey, and (oh, shame) almost forsaken the sound and politic friendship of Austria, the same aggressions which we did not repel with boldness and resolution, when they could have been met and exposed with advantage, because they occurred in parts of the world accessible to our fleets, to our agents, and to public inquiry, are now renewed - say rather continued, in the remote deserts of Central Asia, on the banks of the Oxus, amongst the Khirghese hordes where we have no allies, no direct means of resistance, nor even of obtaining correct information of the progress of the invasion.

The editorial writer, however, knew the facts. The situation was very serious.

The Russians have well nigh mastered the whole of the northern kingdoms of central Asia,... they are in possession of the great lines of inland traffic, which once made Samarcand, and now make Bokhara, a position of first rate commercial importance; and... having crossed a vast tract of horrid desert, they now stand preparing

or prepared, whenever, be it sooner or later, opportunity will serve, to launch their armed hordes toward the more fertile regions of Hindostan.

British arms would undoubtedly prevail when the conflict came, but it was only past weakness and folly that had allowed Russia to become so formidable. The weakness, the folly, the mistakes were Palmerston's. The *Times* still felt that he was the evil genius of the ministry.⁵⁴

Similar to the *Times*, even to the extent of publishing in the spring of 1840 two series of pseudonymous letters which excoriated the Whigs and castigated Russia, the *Herald* may be passed over briefly.⁵⁵ Its general distrust and hostility, so great that it deplored the probable establishment of more friendly relations which was implicit in Brunnow's mission, were well exemplified in its pungent remarks about Russia in its discussion of the speech from the throne.

As to Russia, her assurances of unabated friendship to England have been lately reduced to practice in embroiling India, alienating Persia, and still more recently has she evinced her friendly intentions towards us, or rather is evincing them at this moment, by marching on Chiva, in pursuance of her grand plan of opening the road to Hindostan for future operations... The affairs of the Levant will remain unsettled until it pleases Russia to "settle" them to her own satisfaction.⁵⁶

In essence, the *Post* and the *Standard*, which gave affairs of the east much less attention than the other papers, were equally venomous both to the Whig cabinet and to Russia.

The extreme interest excited in England by the affairs of the East is well attested by the constant attention accorded them in the *Examiner*. That radical weekly, founded by Leigh Hunt and ably edited later by Albany Fonblanque, enjoyed an influence and respect which far exceeded the extent of its circulation. If in general it tended to treat more of domestic reform than of foreign affairs, on occasion it turned its attention abroad, notably at the time of the Polish revolution. Like most other organs, it reflected the influence of Urquhart in that it regarded the Circassians as a bulwark of liberty against despotism. The critical events in the Levant were given far more notice, however, than had been accorded any other question which involved Russia. Its general position was one of extreme hostility and after the conclusion of the Treaty of July its attitude was not unlike Urquhart's. It believed that the rupture with France had been effected by Russia in order that the consequent war in the west might enable her to pursue her own aggrandizement unhampered.⁵⁷ Perhaps its most trenchant remarks about Russia - an admirable example of its general attitude of contemptuous hostility - were devoted to the discussion of a rumor that, at the request of the Russian minister, the Bavarian government had destroyed a bust of Czartoryski.

*The grand victory over Czartoryski's bust at Munich compensates the defeats of Russia in Circassia. If the Circassians had been of bronze, instead of flesh and blood, if they had been busts - heads without arms to defend them - Russia would have broken them into atoms. If instead of mountain fastnesses, her field had been the floor of a museum, how terrible would have been Russia's vengeance.*⁵⁸

The persistent attack upon Russia by the major portion of the press and a large group in parliament may well have encouraged the French government and the Francophile members of the cabinet in their resistance to the proposed coercion of Mehemet Ali. Certainly it constituted strong evidence that the dominant public sentiment favored the *entente* with France and opposed a Russophile policy. Although Palmerston finally concluded the treaty between the four powers and Turkey, he endeavored to conciliate his opponents. Guizot was informed of the treaty in a carefully formulated note which was designed to propitiate France but also to justify the decision of the powers to proceed without her concurrence. His distress was acute, but his effort to effect a suspension of the treaty unavailing. In Paris dismay was mingled with anger, and the announcement of the isolation of the country inaugurated in the press an orgy of angry propaganda which excited the pride of the nation and threatened to precipitate war.⁵⁹

In England the first public intimation of the fruition of the protracted negotiation, so long the subject of anxious and often well-informed speculation both in parliament and in the press, was contained in the *Post*. There is reason for suspecting an official violation of confidence in the fact that the disclosure was made by the journal which ordinarily paid least attention to foreign affairs. A *distinguished correspondent* contributed to the issue of July 24 an article which was expressly disavowed by the editors. The correspondent asserted his knowledge of the secret signature of an agreement from which France was excluded because of her clandestine attempt to effect a direct agreement between the sultan and the pasha. His judgment of the procedure was expressed in no uncertain terms.

The effective means of coercion are in the hands of Russia alone... [Her navy] will drop down the channel to Constantinople. The folly of Lord Palmerston will have reached its climax and its consummation, and if the hith-

erto sluggish public spirit of England hold still any sway, Lord Palmerston and his colleagues will sink to rise no more.⁶⁰

Although the *Post*'s article was accurate in all essential detail, it was accorded little credence. The other papers ignored it, and, when in parliament that same evening Hume provoked a brief discussion of the negotiations between the five powers, no member alluded to it. Three days later, however, the rumor that there had been a serious quarrel between the French and English governments caused a minor panic in the City. On July 28, all the morning papers gave a prominent position to the news of the rage and consternation which had greeted the announcement in Paris of the Treaty of July 15. For many weeks thereafter all aspects of the Eastern question were discussed more or less intemperately and far more frequently than at any earlier moment.⁶¹

The Whig papers, having long expected the adoption of such a policy, were immediate in their praise. The attitude of the *Chronicle*, for instance, was a logical extension of the ideas which it had enunciated in January.

But the specific practical question which presses for immediate solution is this, whether it is more -for the interest of England that the great powers should interfere jointly, in order to restore to the Sultan an important province of his empire, to which his right is clear and undoubted, or that Russia should interfere single handed, and send another army to encamp under the walls of Constantinople, and to dictate another treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

Were we to have said to Russia, 'You shall not intervene to save Constantinople, nor shall we,' she would not have listened to us. She would have been in the right, and we completely in the wrong, forced to tolerate Russia's occupation, or make war with her for the aggrandizement of Mehemet Ali.

Palmerston's policy, it trusted, would avoid the general war which inevitably would have followed such a dog-in-the-manger attitude.⁶²

The antiministerial papers, however, found themselves between the horns of a dilemma. Palmerston had now determined to give Turkey the positive support for which they had long been clamoring. But his method had been that of Canning. Would the pupil be able to control the action of the tsar by a treaty of alliance when the master had failed?

The acute embarrassment of the anti-Whig journalists was most clearly shown by their failure to express any positive opinion at all. The *Times*, for example, contented itself with summarizing the fulminations of the French press and with printing letters from correspondents, one of the ablest of which was extremely favorable to the policy of the treaty.⁶³ Even as late as the third of August, its first real editorial article was extremely noncommittal.

*It is too late for remonstrance - it is too early to recriminate or to condemn... If... we find ourselves strangely combined with Russia in this particular treaty, that is no reason for laying aside our long vigilance of her designs, and our protestations against the spirit manifested by so many of her previous and her present actions. On the contrary, that vigilance requires to be redoubled, especially if we have to deal with her either as friend or foe single-handed. We have ere this contracted alliances with Russia from which she has extracted all the benefit she sought, we have ere this fought battles of which she has reaped the spoil. England is not more inclined now than she ever has been to tolerate Russian dominion in Constantinople; and, great as is the responsibility of those who have ventured on so bold a course for the attainment of its immediate object, that responsibility binds them under the heaviest and most solemn obligations to provide against the possibility of being deceived by its ultimate results.*⁶⁴

The *Herald* was even less articulate than the *Times*, while the *Post* printed a long castigation of Russia by its distinguished correspondent. The *Standard*, on the other hand, lent its grudging approval to the treaty because it had confidence in the wisdom of the Austrian and Prussian statesmen.⁶⁵

The hesitation of the Tory papers allowed Palmerston to justify his course of policy to the commons before English opinion had crystallized. On August 6 Hume based upon reports in the press a more than usually vehement plea for information. He deprecated an alliance with despots, fearing that Castlereagh's error interference in continental affairs - would be repeated. *He trusted that the noble Lord [Palmerston] would do nothing that would have the effect of promoting the views of Russia or advancing her progress in Asia Minor.* In reply, Palmerston announced the signature of a convention, but refused to make its text public before its ratification. Russia, he declared amid loud cheers, had agreed not to renew the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. He insisted that every attempt had been made to include France and that she had no reason to be surprised or to feel injured by her isolation. Only one other member, the radical Leader, pressed Palmerston for further information before the discussion was concluded.⁶⁶

The jubilation of the Whig papers which followed the announcement of the treaty was indulged almost daily throughout the autumn and naturally reached its high points when news was received of the capture of Beirut and Acre. A largely unsuccessful attempt was made to placate French wrath, but the general tenor of the editorial articles was one of unfeigned gratification in a glorious achievement, an attitude which the recent Whig futility had not often permitted. It is very significant, however, that neither the *Chronicle* nor the *Globe* ever adopted toward Russia a tone of real cordiality. The particular merit of the treaty continued to be its efficacy in rescuing the sultan from the clutches of the tsar. The *Globe's* discussion of Palmerston's speech on August 6, for instance, contained an undertone of distrust.

*Whatever were the intentions of Russia in concluding that treaty [Unkiar Skelessi], we were not without apprehensions of ultimate influences arising out of it, which would operate against the continuance of our pacific relations with that country. The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi is extinct. Russia has voluntarily consented to renounce the controlling position which that treaty gave her over the affairs of Turkey, and by so doing has given a pledge of her pacific disposition, which will be received with undiminished satisfaction, as an earnest, we trust, of yet further concessions to the force of opinions in other countries, among whom high moral character will ensure her a standing more honourable than mere extent of territory could confer.*⁶⁷

The *Chronicle* exhibited the same lack of real cordiality almost a year later in its panegyric on the conclusion of the Straits Convention in July 1841.

*But does not every one of the commonest sense perceive that but for the treaty of July, and the attainment of its ends, this new treaty or convention about the Straits would have been impossible. Were Mehemet Ali still in the Taurus, with his standing army of 100,000 men in Syria, where they would be, had French counsels been followed, who does not see that neither Turkey nor Russia would ever have let the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi expire without renewal?*⁶⁸

The hesitation of the *Times*, which continued for some days after the debate in the commons, was the result of its unusual situation. Aberdeen and Wellington, who had been confidentially consulted by the Whig leaders before they resolved to proceed without France, had approved Palmerston's proposals, and the former had promised to gain for them the support of the *Times*. Thus, although Barnes, the editor, had serious doubts of its expediency, he was unable to criticize the policy without departing from his informal alliance with the Tory leaders. Nevertheless, he accepted a series of articles by brilliant young Henry Reeve, who had recently been introduced to him by Charles Greville. These articles, the first of which was printed on July 31, became gradually more and more critical of the treaty. Greville and Reeve were engaged, in fact, in a serious attempt to reconstruct the *entente* with France. When the *Times's* editorial campaign failed to placate French feelings, Reeve went to Paris where with the collaboration of Greville in London he made himself the unofficial intermediary between the French ministers and the Francophile section of the English cabinet. In the early autumn the conspiracy almost effected the supersession of Palmerston and a modification of the treaty to meet French objections.⁶⁹

Meanwhile the Francophile articles in the *Times* became more and more critical of Palmerston and his policy. If their major interest continued to lie in the French aspects of the problem, after the middle of August, the *thunderings* against Russia became progressively more violent. An extreme, but nevertheless characteristic, example was an editorial published late in August.

*England may be a garden and a manufactory, but does that prevent Russia from being a camp? England may have free institutions, and an industrious people busied with their own concerns; but does that prevent Russia from having a bold and ambitious autocrat wielding the whole energies of the nation he rules for the purposes of diplomacy and war? England may boast of her past supremacy, but does that prevent Russia from undermining it? The strides which Russia has made during the last hundred years in extending her territories from the Vistula and the Danube to the Ural and the Araxes, are of far less importance than the political preponderance, we had almost said supremacy, which she has actually shown in the late arrangements of the treaty of London... Our safety rests on the promise of Russia, or on the moderation of France.*⁷⁰

The vendetta against Russia was so vehemently maintained all through the autumn that even the welcome news of the capture of Beirut and Acre and the increasing probability that the Treaty of July would be executed without either a Russian occupation of Constantinople or a war with France did little to mollify the *Times*.

It is difficult to judge whether the cumulative effect of the continuous stream of invective was convincing or tended to discredit the ideas set forth. But the *Times* remained consistent to the end. In a summary of the situation in May 1841, it still censured Brunnow's proposals for an Anglo-Russian treaty.

*They implied the sudden oblivion of all those differences which have for many years divided the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and St. James, from the shores of the Vistula to the sands of Khiva and the banks of the Indus ; they implied complete reliance on assurances which belied the whole tenour of Russian policy and Russian history; they assumed that the objects of a century would be abandoned by that Power in order to give to Great Britain the honour and glory of settling the question of the day... M. de Brunnow's arguments and M. de Nesselrode's assurances led Lord Palmerston to this conclusion. We know not whether they will have the same effect on the people of England.*⁷¹

Palmerston's justification in the successful negotiation of the Straits Convention meant the confusion of the *Times*. Unable to praise the success of a policy it had endeavored to obstruct, it was content with an announcement of the fact, but its valedictory, invited by the Whig defeat in the general election of 1841, rang true.

*The two main elements of change which may effect the balance of power and tranquility of Europe are the external policy of Russia and the internal condition of France; to the former of these influences Lord Palmerston's policy has prepared future opportunities more favourable to her ultimate designs than those which she has temporarily sacrificed.*⁷²

The editorial policy of the *Herald* was consistent in all respects with that of the *Times*. Like its more prominent contemporary, it hesitated for a fortnight after the announcement of the conclusion of the treaty, but once it had begun to vilify Palmerston and Russia, it poured forth a constant flood of invective against the policy of the treaty of July and its perpetrators. Aside from the particularly unmeasured terms of its articles, its most distinctive characteristic was its unparalleled attention to the endeavor of Urquhart and his followers to incite a national demand for the dismissal of the minister and the nullification of his measures. Its final diatribe, in January 1841, invites quotation as a typical example of the tone of its articles and as an indication of the degree to which it adopted Urquhart's preposterous opinions.

*When in the fulness of time, the Autocrat takes possession of Turkey in mortmain, as he has done, since the whigs came into office, of Poland, Syria must follow in due course, as it has, by our means, lost the energetic ruler that could have saved it from his grasp; why, then, should he not pay us for relieving him of all trouble, bloodshed and expense, in being obliged to undertake a siege of Acre himself, and a conquest of Syria, accomplished, perhaps, with as many reverses as have hitherto attended his efforts to reduce the independence of the brave and deserted Circassians.*⁷³

The other Tory papers, the *Post* and the *Standard*, followed an intermediate course. Like the Whig journals, they came to approve the policy which the treaty implied, but, like the *Times* and the *Herald*, they continued to abuse Russia. They consequently pleaded for the rapid execution of coercive measures, lest Russia be afforded an opportunity to reap selfish advantage from the confused situation. Perhaps of the many articles which appeared in the two papers one in the *Standard* may be cited as the best example of their general attitude. Unable to explain the origin of the brilliant course of policy - Palmerston was judged to be incapable of such a work of genius and Russia could not have opposed her own interests - it thought that an answer to the dilemma might be found in the glorious capture of Beirut.

*The allies are able to enforce the treaty without her [i.e. Russia's] consent, nay, in defiance of her opposition. For Russia to stand off from the treaty would be, therefore, to proclaim gratuitously, and therefore more impudently than she has yet done, her designs upon the Turkish empire, with the certainty of having her place in the engagement occupied by France. We regard the proceedings of Russian diplomacy with as much aversion and suspicion as Mr. Urquhart himself, we believe that the cabinet of St. Petersburg can scarcely originate any proposition without some sinister design; but being, in part at least, free from that able gentleman's monomania, we can understand that Russia may be made, by force of circumstances, to do things that cannot consort with her ambitious views; in short, we believe the Quintuple treaty to be the work of the Austrian cabinet, not the work of any one either in Russia or in England... She [Austria] has, by firm plain dealing, foiled the crooked ingenuity of Russia, fixed the wavering policy of Great Britain and placed France completely in the wrong.*⁷⁴

The policy of official friendship had an inconsistent influence upon English public estimates of Russia. It furnished many publicists an additional count in their indictment of Whig policy, and partisan zeal came to augment an already intemperate hostility. Even in those quarters, whether Whig or Tory, where the policy found favor, its greatest merit lay in its efficacy as a check upon Russia's ambition. The effect of the alliance was to stimulate, even among the supporters of the government, the expression of sentiments which, if not always positively hostile, were certainly not cordial to Russia. Her decision to act in concert with England was ordinarily considered to be rather a confession of weakness which invited contempt than a manifestation of amity which deserved respect, and if it allayed some apprehensions, it provoked among Englishmen few expressions of good will.

Underlying the anti-Russian agitation had been Urquhart, who had been remarkably successful in his propagandist campaign, if foiled in his plot to precipitate war. The *Vixen* had become a *cause célèbre* and had achieved for him prominence and the support in parliament of such a man as Stratford Canning. Convinced now of Palmerston's treason, Urquhart was not likely to be quiet in the circumstance in which the Eastern Question might develop just as he wished or might take a totally unsatisfactory turn.

Urquhart and his disciples followed a cleverly conceived strategy and tactic. Armed with letters of introduction, they approached prominent members of the mercantile class in provincial cities, and explained vividly the implications of the diplomatic history of the past decade. Not infrequently their tremendous enthusiasm sufficed to convince their new acquaintances that Russian intrigue underlay all England's reverses, that the Russians were striving insidiously and persistently to compass her ruin. Particularly appealing was the argument that Russia's high tariffs, by hampering British trade, were a fundamental cause of the prevailing commercial depression. Then the merchants were induced to arrange either a public meeting or a large banquet, sponsored often by the local chamber of commerce, at which Urquhart argued his thesis to audiences varying in size between a few hundred and several thousand. The success of some of these gatherings was attested by brochures, published at the expense of the chamber of commerce, which brought the speeches to a wider audience. Still greater publicity was achieved by the full reports printed in the local newspapers and occasionally in the metropolitan press.⁷⁵

The zealots did not confine their attention to the mercantile communities. When they failed to secure the capital for a proposed newspaper of their own, they resorted to the less ambitious and hitherto successful medium of pamphlets. Parish, who had published early in 1838 a polemical analysis of the diplomatic history of Greece, summarized its anti-Russian sentiments in his England in 1839. He capitalized the naval agitation then at its height, and showed how in every diplomatic dispute, in North America, in Europe, and in Asia, the disruption of English commerce had been followed by Palmerston's acceptance of a pernicious settlement. Westmacott's *Indian Commerce and Russian Intrigue* drew, with reference to the conflict in Afghanistan, a dire picture of the evil effects of Russian intrigue. Most inflammatory of all was Urquhart's own lengthy tract on the official bluebook, *Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan*. In his peculiar fashion, he derived from those documents proof that Palmerston must be a traitor in the pay of the tsar. The dispatches, he argued, showed that Palmerston had either ordered the British minister to cooperate with his Russian colleague and thus to aid Russia, or had been completely unintelligible and thus prevented the minister from taking the vigorous action necessary for the defense of English interests. He contended that, as presented to parliament, the documents were meaningless without close study and rearrangement, and could have been compiled only with an intent to conceal treason. The exposition was so lengthy and suffered so much from the obscurity of phrase imputed to Palmerston that it cannot have convinced many readers.⁷⁶

It is impossible to determine Urquhart's influence upon British opinion at this time, for other stimuli were impelling simultaneously the expression of similar, if less extreme, sentiments, but the wide and ordinarily favorable notice accorded to his pamphlets by the press attests the considerable success of his campaign against Russia. He was induced, moreover, to stand for parliament as a Tory candidate in a by-election in the London district of Marylebone. His victory in a constituency so devoid of the mercantile interest to which he made his greatest appeal was improbable from the outset, but his defeat may well have been rendered certain by a fortuitous event which drew his attention away from the election. Through one of his most loyal followers, a London barrister named Fyler, he became acquainted with several of the Chartist leaders. His personal magnetism enabled him to convince those quasi-revolutionary proletarians that the real cause of the economic and social ills from which they suffered lay not in the political system of the country but in the misconduct of her foreign relations. Belief in Urquhart's theories led them to appreciate the iniquity and futility of their subversive activity and to impart to him the secrets of their organization. Urquhart was appalled by the plans of the physical force wing of the Chartist body and immediately devoted his full attention to circumventing the revolutionary plot. His hatred of Russia and his conviction that the tsar's ubiquitous agents were endeavoring to compass the ruin of Great Britain were confirmed by his discovery that a Pole, who had admittedly been in Russian service, was a leading member of the Chartist secret supreme council.⁷⁷

Urquhart's method of combating this new threat to English security was twofold. First, he transmitted to Lord Normanby, the home secretary, his full information about Chartist plans. Not unnaturally a

minister whose own spies had secured probably fuller knowledge of the plot completely ignored a man who had just made a fantastic charge of treason against his colleague at the foreign office. However, it is only fair to Urquhart to note that he learned in advance of the rising at Newport which the government did not avert.⁷⁸

Second, abandoning his effort to instruct the mercantile community, Urquhart endeavored to wean the Chartists from their subversive activity and to convert them all to his own belief in Russia's iniquity. His success was by no means complete, but he did create within their ranks a dissentient *Foreign Policy* group.⁷⁹

After the failure of the Chartist plans, Urquhart resumed his interrupted campaign among the nation at large. His own clique, reinforced by several former Chartists and by a few other converts, notably Charles Attwood (the brother of Birmingham's Thomas), produced during the first six months of 1840 an impressive quantity of propagandist *critiques* of all phases of English foreign affairs. Once Urquhart himself had cast discretion aside by openly accusing Palmerston of treason, the scope of his writings was tremendously widened. In the series of pamphlets, *Diplomacy and Commerce*, published at intervals under his editorial supervision, there were many additions to the more obvious spheres of Russia's activity. Her sinister hand was shown to have been at work in the English dispute with the French and Neapolitan governments over the sale of sulphur. She was accused of having engineered the fantastic quarrel in North America over a Scotsman named Macleod which nearly precipitated war with the United States. Further manifestations of Russian intrigue were described in the pamphlets of one of Urquhart's more prolific collaborators, William Cargill, a Newcastle merchant whose business was jeopardized by his devotion to the cause. Cargill detected Russian inspiration behind the North German Customs Union which threatened to curtail English trade in Germany. Even the new commercial convention with Austria which appeared to offer English merchants greatly increased opportunities in the Balkan region seemed to Cargill to contain evidence of Palmerston's treachery. It is hardly necessary to state that the whole Near Eastern crisis was conceived by Urquhart and his followers to be simply a conspiracy between the tsar and the pasha for a partition of the Ottoman empire.⁸⁰

In the more active phase of their operations, the group convoked public meetings at Glasgow, Greenock, and Newcastle which adopted petitions to both houses of parliament and to the queen. There can be no doubt that with his group hurrying around the country arranging for propaganda of various descriptions, Urquhart's campaign assumed considerable proportions.⁸¹

The London papers, absorbed with news from abroad, gave it less attention than in earlier years and their editorial commentary tended to be less sympathetic. The extravagant notion of Palmerston's treachery apparently alienated observers not directly subject to Urquhart's engrossing enthusiasm. While his former activity had seemed to merit interest and even encouragement, his present ideas were ludicrous; there were quite enough counts in the indictment against Russia without the addition of such a fantastic charge as the incitation of rebellion in Canada.⁸²

On the other hand, the Chartist Northern Liberator, published in Newcastle, was converted in April 1840 to a belief in Palmerston's guilt and, during the last six months of its short life, chronicled the effort of Urquhart's group to create a public demand for a parliamentary inquiry into the accusation. From its foundation, in October 1837, the *Liberator* had displayed an anti-Russian bias hardly less pronounced than that of the initiated converts to the Urquhartite thesis. In the editor's opinion, Nicholas inflicted upon his own subjects the vilest of tyrannies, while abroad he schemed universal dominion, particularly the conquest of India. One editorial article may be cited as an example which, for its use of Russia as a tool for the castigation of the English government, was particularly characteristic of the *Liberator's* attitude and method.

*It has come out, or rather been let out as quietly as possible by the hack government prints, that the Russians are sending THIRTY THOUSAND MEN, with a whole army besides of engineers etc. into Persia. As the government of India is assisting those who are opposing the Schah, it seems probable to some that there may be a collision between British and Russian troops. We do not believe there will be any such collision. Those who do not know the wretchedly powerless and degraded state of this country - who are not up to the power of the 'HUNDRED AND FIFTY TWO' think a war between England and Russia 'inevitable'. Those who know anything know better than that. The 'monied interests' know precious well that the Emperor Nicholas or anybody, for him, might pull the noses of the Cabinet all around and be no nearer war than before.*⁸³

Subsequent news of Russian intrigues in Central Asia and of the progress of the British expedition against Kabul inspired the *Liberator* to level further attacks against the system and the policy which, it

was argued, would *probably open to the Persians and Russians, who have so long besieged it [Herat] in vain, the gates of this key to India.*⁸⁴ In the spring of 1839, it began to report and to discuss fully the activities of Urquhart's band. The progress of events in the Levant began its conversion to a belief in Palmerston's treason and finally it was convinced by Urquhart's persuasive pamphlet on the *Sulphur War*.⁸⁵

In the Treaty of July 15, 1840, the *Liberator* found proof of its views with regard to Palmerston and Russia. It asserted the absurdity of the supposition that Russia would allow Great Britain to settle the dispute in accordance with the terms of the treaty. The editors declared that France, having seen through the ruse, had refused to join the alliance, and they hoped, even prayed, that she would fight. They exhorted the people of England to rise, to demonstrate their friendship for France, and to join her in war with Russia. *THIS DAMNABLE SYSTEM could not survive such a war.* They believed that if France would only declare war, the English people would set themselves free, and that there might well be a similar revolution in Russia.⁸⁶

When the text of the treaty was published in September, the *Liberator*, like Urquhart and the *Herald*, found it to be a *scheme for authorizing a Russian army to occupy Constantinople, and to remain there as long as the Sultan, that is to say Nicholas, shall please.*⁸⁷ The news of October appeared to prove the depths to which the government had fallen. *Unless the English nation rouses itself, we shall see the damnable spectacle of a Russian fleet armed to the teeth and crammed with soldiers, daring to sail through the English channel, and probably to anchor at Spithead or Plymouth Sound!*

⁸⁸ The complete conversion of the *Liberator* to Urquhart's thesis was shown in an article on the connection between foreign policy and Chartism which argued that his effort to demonstrate the iniquities of Palmerston was the readiest means of destroying the system. It was the shortest way to the achievement of the Charter.⁸⁹

The adhesion of the *Northern Liberator* is not the only evidence that in the northern part of the United Kingdom Urquhart's propagandist campaign achieved a notable success. The *Morning Post*, for instance, remarked, with regard to a meeting held at South Shields to consider Palmerston's treachery:

In some of the great commercial towns of this empire, but especially in Glasgow and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, a most extraordinary conviction seems to have gained possession of certain leading persons ... public meetings are held and speeches made and openly published in the most widely circulated provincial newspapers.

*That which seems utterly extravagant to us in London will not be so regarded by the population of the provincial cities, when they find it expressly affirmed by men to whose information and position they are accustomed to look up with respect.*⁹⁰

Conscious of his not inconsiderable success in England, Urquhart found in the treaty of July 15 an incentive for an even more ambitious undertaking. He entrusted to his disciples the conduct of the campaign at home and escorted to Paris a small delegation which believed itself to be the chosen deputies of Newcastle and of England. They were received by Thiers and urged upon him the fact, of which he must already have been well aware, that a large portion of the English people deprecated the rupture of the *entente*. During his stay in Paris Urquhart found time to compose another pamphlet, *The Crisis: France in the Face of the Four Powers* which, originally published in French, constituted in translation the final number of *Diplomacy and Commerce*. Its argument was not without force.

England has come to a rupture with Persia; England has sent an army to Cabool; and the justification of the English minister for the rupture and the war has been that these two countries were subject to the influence of Russia; and at the very time that he makes the influence of Russia a cause of war with a third State he allies England to Russia for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and stipulates the occupation of Constantinople by Russians! Is it possible to imagine treason rendered more manifest by the contradictions of words and of acts - by the contradiction of intentions avowed and the results?...

The pretext of hostility against Russia in Central Asia, as of friendship for her in Turkey, is equally false; but equally serves through opposite means to assure the domination of Russia in the one country as in the other.

While the activity of the band of self-appointed diplomats was providing for the Paris correspondents of the London journals a comic element in their reports of martial enthusiasm⁹² - their attempt to re-construct the *entente* was even less efficacious than the simultaneous and comparable piece of amateur diplomacy undertaken by Reeve and Greville - the campaign against Palmerston and Russia was being conducted still more zealously in the commercial towns. A meeting in Birmingham, convoked by Charles Attwood, attracted a crowd of 10,000, but the Chartist leader Collins, just released from jail, succeeded in carrying a stultifying amendment to the motion that Palmerston's conduct be investigated with a view to his impeachment.⁹³ This failure, probably due in part to the ridicule invited by the extravagance of Urquhart's thesis, is significant, for on the same spot Thomas Attwood, only

seven months earlier, had chronicled in an eloquent farewell address to his constituents his persistent endeavor to awaken in the commons a comprehension of the menace of the Russian fleet.⁹⁴ If the zealots were unable to gain more than a hearing in Birmingham, it is clear that Urquhart had achieved only very moderate success in the Chartist phase of his campaign.

In Newcastle, however, where the ground had been prepared by earlier proselytism among the mercantile classes, a large public meeting carried with acclaim motions that the people demanded a thorough investigation of Palmerston's conduct and that they sympathized with France. Urquhart's little band of diplomats were accepted as the unofficial ambassadors of the people of England to the government and people of France.⁹⁵ In Carlisle, Leeds, and Sunderland, on the other hand, the assembled citizens expressed their sympathy for the French people, but showed their skepticism of the treachery of Palmerston by adopting resolutions comparable to those carried at Birmingham.⁹⁶ Urquhart was rapidly becoming ludicrous even in the eyes of men who shared his hatred of Russia. As early as May 1840, the *Manchester Guardian* had described in comic vein the events of his *carpet-bag plot*.⁹⁷

Nevertheless, the crusade was prosecuted in the face of discouragement. In the early months of 1841 more pamphlets continued to invite public consideration of all phases of British policy. The fantastic thesis became steadily more ridiculous as the triumphant foreign secretary slowly reconstructed the concert of the five powers, secured the adoption of the Straits Convention, and ended Russia's special position in Constantinople.⁹⁸

The critical state of affairs in the Near East evoked diverse publications by men quite unconnected with Urquhart. Lieutenant Colonel Sir Frederick Smith, for example, appended to his translation of Marshall Marmont's *Present State of the Turkish Empire* some *Notes and Observations on the Relations of England with Turkey and Russia*. He concurred in McNeill's opinion - *first the subjugation of Turkey, and then the conquest of India, are the objects. in view* - and feared that she might add Turkey, Circassia, Persia, and India to her past acquisitions. He urged that England force the Straits and preserve the independence of the first two of those peoples. With regard to Syria, he advocated precisely the policy which Palmerston pursued a year later."

Adolphus Slade, discussing the political situation in the Levant in a second narrative of his travels, advocated a policy of support for Mehemet Ali.

Russia's prayer is for time, and Europe kindly offers it to her; time to be ready for the splendid inheritance; time for the status quo to work its unerring effects in increased anarchy and diminished Mussulman resources and population; time for Mehemet Ali's organization to disappear, on which Europe might now raise an effectual barrier against her. Russia dreads precipitation; everything at Constantinople is tending to the accomplishment of her views; she wishes to retard, rather than to accelerate, the march of events.

Many agreed with his opinion that the enthronement of Mehemet Ali, as sultan, and the fortification of Constantinople would eradicate the menace.¹⁰⁰

Another point of view was that argued in John Reid's *Turkey and the Turks*. Reid wished France and England to insist upon the complete and immediate emancipation of the sultan's Christian subjects and the adoption of a complementary policy of rejuvenation through reform.

Such a course of procedure would, undoubtedly, draw down the wrath of the autocrat, as it would mar the designs already formed at St. Petersburg, and almost matured at Sebastopol and Odessa; but it is better that England and France grapple with the difficulty in its infancy than wait until the designs of their enemies are matured and invincible. Let the half of the combined fleet, on the first motion of the Muscovite, proceed up the Black Sea, take, burn, or destroy the Russian fleet; the consequence will be that the Circassians and other tribes between the Euxine and Azoph, and all those to the east of the Euxine, as far as the Caspian, will, unaided, recover their independence, and the question of Russian occupation of India will not be heard of for at least twenty years, more probably never at all.

In the event of a French failure to coöperate, Reid advocated solitary English action, for the *Vixen* affair had been *a foul deed yet unatoned for in the Black Sea*. Should Turkey refuse to be reformed, he suggested that England should assist the Christians to establish independent governments and drive the Turks into Asia.¹⁰¹

The war in Afghanistan was the subject of several works published during the course of 1840, some written by men who had taken part in the expedition. The authors made varying estimates of the possibility of a Russian invasion of India, but the tone of their books was uniformly hostile. Count Björnsterne, the Swedish ambassador in London, expressed, for example, the unusual opinion that even

should Russia win the ready coöperation of Persia and Afghanistan, the Indian army would prove to be adequate for the defense of the country. Nevertheless he advocated preparedness. *Si vis pacem, para bellum.*¹⁰²

The uniformly inimical tenor of the plethora of propagandist literature was given emphasis by the solitary pamphlet which approved the alliance of 1840. In his *Remarks on the Alliance with Russia*, G. Jones denied the prevailing view that England properly belonged to a western, liberal alignment. Russia, which had demonstrated her loyalty to the great principles of conservatism and made a sacrifice no less noble and immense at the time of the French revolution, was, he argued, Britain's natural ally, not her rival.¹⁰³

A survey of the articles which appeared in magazines and reviews during these two critical years serves to confirm the judgment that whatever the estimate of her power and policy, Russia was almost universally repugnant to Englishmen. The notions adumbrated were even more diverse than those expressed in pamphlets and travel books, ranging all the way from the Urquhartite position of the *British and Foreign Review* to that set forth at one time in *Blackwood's. Russia and England, we repeat, cross each other in no quarter of the globe. Both must go out of their proper path to come into collision. To find any opportunity of contest, they must wilfully create it.*¹⁰⁴

There were equally varied opinions about the feasibility of her invasion of India and the most expedient English policy in the Levant, but of the major periodicals, only *Blackwood's*, and that one only under the influence of the glorious victories at Beirut and Acre, showed any real cordiality toward Russia. In January 1841 it contained a survey of England's possible allies which concluded that Russia was a hopeful prospect. But by August of the same year it was again discussing the evils of Russian intrigue.¹⁰⁵ Probably the general drift of British opinion is as well indicated by the *Foreign Quarterly Review* as by any single periodical. In the earlier phases of the development of Russophobia it had been notable for its nonalarmist attitude. In 1835 it responded sympathetically to Urquhart's first intensive propagandist activity. Later its views became more temperate, but in July 1840 it remarked in a footnote to an article on Sweden that:

*The silent and yet alarming progression of Russia in every direction is quite evident now, and we do not know one European or Asiatic power on which she does not meditate similar incursions. Poor Turkey is almost her own; and so is Greece. Circassia holds her at bay, but will share the fate of Poland, if not assisted. Persia is with her, India and China are obviously next in contemplation; Prussia and Austria must keep a sharp lookout, and even France is narrowly watched, in the hope of some convulsion in the unpopular dynasty of Orleans, to push forward a candidate for the throne, such as Prince Louis Napoleon... We shall never cease to point attention to the extreme danger to be apprehended upon every point of European or Asiatic territory.*¹⁰⁶

Of the myriad periodical discussions of Anglo-Russian affairs at this time, those printed in the *Quarterly* and in the *Edinburgh* were, from their semiofficial nature, far the most interesting. In December 1840 the *Quarterly* contained an article on *Foreign Policy* by J. W. Croker, which was pronounced by the Duke of Wellington, who had given his approval to the policy of the Treaty of July, to be an *admirable review*. Croker attacked bitterly the general policy of a renegade Tory whose sole qualification for the foreign office was his advocacy of nonintervention in 1828-29, but who had intervened subsequently on the slightest pretext, in Holland, Portugal, Spain, and the Levant. Another charge was his *indiscrete and worse than indiscrete patronage of Mr. Urquhart - a gentleman... [who had] no other recommendation than his denunciations of Russian ambition, perfidy, and so forth, and the publication... [of] the Portfolio* But in spite of the errors of his past policy, Croker approved Palmerston's conduct in the recent crisis.

We are not... amongst those, few we believe in number, who disapprove of the general policy which England has adopted in the questions between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and still less do we belong to the more numerous and noisy sect which produced the majority of the pamphlets... [reviewed in the article], who talk of Lord Palmerston as 'a tool of Russia, and a traitor to England'

Croker then compared Russia's expansion to that of England and concluded that each had been forced to advance, for the most part, in order to protect areas already civilized. His considered judgment of Russia was moderate.

Unpopular as it may be, we hesitate not to say that we have little fear of Russia - she is a great power, but she is not so great as she appears. Her limbs are too large for her muscles; and we believe she would be weaker and less formidable, if she were so ill advised as to possess herself of Constantinople, than she is at this hour.

Croker concluded with the confident prediction that the accession of the Tories to power would soon solve the nation's international problems.¹⁰⁷

The article in the *Edinburgh* in January 1841 was an official apology. Written by Henry Lytton Bulwer, at that time charge in Paris, and revised by Palmerston, it constituted a reasoned justification of the policy of the Treaty of July. Since the major criticism had been based upon its rupture of the French *entente*, the article dealt almost entirely with that aspect of the question. The general tone, one of moderate triumph, was calculated to sooth injured feelings, particularly French. Russia was treated as a loyal ally and the point made that in 1833 she had gone to the aid of the sultan only after England, to her regret, had declined to undertake that responsibility. It is significant that the article contained no intimation that the alliance with Russia might be transformed from an *ad hoc* into a permanent arrangement. Just such a suggestion had been made by the government in St. Petersburg and courteously rejected in London.¹⁰⁸

To Palmerston belonged the credit for the removal of the protectorate over Turkey from the sole aegis of Russia to that of the five great powers which had dominated European affairs since the Congress of Vienna. By the reconstitution of their concert and the simultaneous expiration of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi there was created in the Near East a status which differed fundamentally from the unstable equilibrium which succeeded the Treaty of Adrianople. Although the basic problem, the division of the legacy of the sick man of Europe, was not resolved, the enhanced possibility of his recovery and rejuvenation rendered it less acute.

¹ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 92-110, quoting (p. 92) Palmerston to Campbell, 7 July 1838; C. K. Webster, *Palmerston, Metternich and the European System* (London, 1935), pp. 28-30; P. E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge, 1934), chap. v.

² G. D. 29/14, Palmerston to Granville, 27 May 1839; Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 287, Palmerston to Bulwer, 22 Sept. 1838; Rodkey, "Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey," *passim*.

³ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 34-39, 407-409; Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy*, pp. 93-102; F. S. Rodkey, "Col. Campbell's Report on Egypt in 1840, with Lord Palmerston's Comments," in *Cambridge Historical Journal*, III, no. 1 (Cambridge, 1929).

⁴ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 94-96; H. L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* (New York, 1928), chap. xi.

⁵ G. D. 29/14; F. O. 27/575, no. 265, Palmerston to Granville, 10, 29 June 1839. The former letter is quoted in part in Temperley, *Near East*, p. 89.

⁶ Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 281, 282, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 13 Sept. 1838; G. D. 29/14, copy of Palmerston to Beauvale, 20 June 1839; Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy*, chap. v.

⁷ G. D. 29/14, Palmerston to Granville, 21 June 1839; /9), Holland to Granville, 1, 14 Jan., 15 Feb., 5, 8 March 1839; cf. *supra*, p. 219.

⁸ *Edinburgh*, Jan. 1839, LXVIII, 526-527, cf. *supra*, p. 221.

⁹ E.g., *Blackwood's*, July 1839, *British and Foreign Review*, July 1838, Jan. 1839.

¹⁰ Hoskins, *Routes to India*, pp. 227-230; D. N. B., "Thomas Waghorn"; Thomas Waghorn, *Egypt*, in 1837 (London, 1837), particularly p. 22, *Egypt*, in 1838 (London, 1838).

¹¹ F. S. Rodkey, "The Attempts of Briggs and Company to Guide British Policy in the Levant... 1821-41," in *Journal of Modern History*, Sept. 1933, v, 324-351.

¹² E.g., *Times*, 13 Sept. 1838 (Letter of Adolphus Slade; the *Times* itself dissented), 20 Sept. 1838; cf. C. Rochfort Scott, *Rambles in Egypt and Candia* (London, 1837).

¹³ *Foreign Quarterly Review*, Oct. 1838, April, July 1839, Jan. 1840. The first article contained the fullest statement of the general position and the quotation is from it: XXII, 213.

¹⁴ E.g., *Dublin Review*, April, July 1837; *United Service Journal*, Feb., May 1839.

¹⁵ *Times*, 25 July 1839.

¹⁶ E.g., *Times*, 20 Sept., 8 Oct. 1838, 4 Jan. 1839; *Herald*, 18, 24, 26 July 1839; *Standard*, 12 Aug. 1839.

¹⁷ *Chronicle*, 27 June, 29 July 1839; cf. *Globe*, 24 July 1839.

¹⁸ F. O. 65/250, nos. 107, hi, Palmerston to Clanricarde, 9, 22 July, enclosing copies of instructions to Stopford, dated 23, 25 June, 3, 15, 18 July 1839; F. O. 78/353, nos. 92, 96, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 5, 18 July 1839.

¹⁹ F. O. 78/353, no. 122, Palmerston to Ponsonby, 21 Aug. 1839. 20 Webster, "European System", p. 29; Temperley, *Near East*, p. 106; F. O. 65/250, nos. 108, 121, Palmerston to Clanricarde, 9, 30 July 1839.

²¹ F. O. 65/252, nos. 55, 65, 82, 89, Clanricarde to Palmerston, 8 June, 8 July, 3, 17 Aug. 1839.

²² F. O. 65/250, no. 133, Palmerston to Clanricarde, 27 Aug. 1839; F. O. 27/577. nos. 14, 27, Palmerston to Bulwer, 27 Aug., 10 Sept. 1839; Temperley, *Near East*, p. 108.

²³ F. O. 65/252, nos. 68, 89, 7253, no. 94, Clanricarde to Palmerston, 15 July, 17, 22 Aug. 1839.

²⁴ G. D. 29/14, Palmerston to Granville, 23 July 1839; Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy*, p. 135.

²⁵ F. O. 65/250, no. 152, Palmerston to Clanricarde, 25 Oct. 1839, enclosing a copy of Brunnow to Nesselrode, 8 Oct. 1839.

²⁶ Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 299-303, Palmerston to Bulwer, 24 Sept. 1839, outlining a conversation with Sebastiani; italics Palmerston's.

²⁷ Bell, *Palmerston*, I, 297-301; F. O. 27/577, no. 27, Palmerston to Bulwer, 10 Sept. 1839.

Hobhouse recorded in his diary a cabinet discussion over the tension with China and referred to the Eastern problem as an incidental element in a joke made to Macaulay, *Recollections*, V, 227-229.

²⁸ F. O. 65/253, nos. 124, 132, /260, nos. 3, 17, Clanricarde to Palmerston, 18, 30 Nov. 1839, 14 Jan., 24 Feb. 1840, /25s, nos. 13, 14, 50, Palmerston to Clanricarde, 24 Jan., 3 Feb., 24 March 1840.

²⁹ F. O. 65/260, nos. 24, 69, Clanricarde to Palmerston, 13 March, 26 May 1840.

³⁰ Bulwer, *Palmerston*, II, 356-363.

³¹ Bell, *Palmerston*, I, 301.

³² Hansard, lords, 6 Feb. 1840; commons, 21 Feb. 1840, quotation, col. 485.

³³ Hansard, commons, 27 March, 4 May, 1 June (quotation, col. 782, Palmerston's statement, 784-788), 27 July 1840.

³⁴ *Chronicle*, 16, 19, 24, 29 July 1839.

³⁵ *Chronicle*, 5 Aug. 1839.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 20, 23 Aug. 1839; Hansard, commons, 22 Aug. 1839, col. 490.

³⁷ *Chronicle*, 11, 12, 31 Oct., 28 Nov. 1839.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 11 Jan. 1840.

- ³⁹ E.g., letters from "P." and from Waghorn, *Chronicle*, 1 Jan., 19 May 1840.
- ⁴⁰ *Chronicle*, 27 Feb., 12, 25 March, 34 April, 21 May, 5 June 1840.
- ⁴¹ E.g., *Globe*, 24 July, 23 Aug. 1839.
- ⁴² *Times*, 4, 5, 18, 24 July 1839.
- ⁴³ *Times*, 25 July 1839.
- ⁴⁴ *Times*, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 30 Aug., 11 Sept., quotation, 2 Sept. 1839.
- ⁴⁵ E.g., *Times*, 25 Oct., 14 Nov. 1839. The identity of "Anglicus" is revealed in a letter from Parish to Stratford Canning, 19 July 1840, F. O. 352/26.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 18 Sept. 1839.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 28 Sept., 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 16, 18, 24, 26, 30 Oct., 2, 8, 21, 26 Nov., 14 Dec. 1839.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 14 Nov., 17, 18, 21 Dec. 1839.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 12 March 1840.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 28 April 1840.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 7 April, 25 May, 4, 5, 10, 17, 24 June 1840.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 25 May 1840; cf. 29 June 1840.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4, 11, 13, 17, 22 July 1840.
- ⁵⁴ *Times*, 6 July 1840.
- ⁵⁵ Papa Nicholas," and "Mr. X., *Herald*, 1840, *passim*.
- ⁵⁶ *Herald*, 17 Jan. 1840.
- ⁵⁷ E.g., *Examiner*, 17 April 1831, 9 June 1833, 3 Jan. 1836, 8 Sept. 1839, 11, 18 Oct., 1, 8, 22, 29 Nov. 1840.
- ⁵⁸ *Examiner*, 31 May 1840.
- ⁵⁹ Temperley, *Near East*, p. 130; Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, chap. v; Bell, Palmerston, I, 301-304.
- ⁶⁰ *Post*, 24 July 1840.
- ⁶¹ *Times*, 28 July 1840.
- ⁶² *Chronicle*, 31 July, 5 Aug. 1840.
- ⁶³ "Analysis" in *Times*, 1 Aug. 1840.
- ⁶⁴ *Times*, 3 Aug. 1840.
- ⁶⁵ *Post*, 28 July 1840; *Standard*, 31 July 1840.
- ⁶⁶ Hansard, commons, 6 Aug. 1840, cols. 1366-1378; *Times*, 7 Aug. 1840. Palmerston's refusal to publish the text of the treaty was hardly ingenuous since it provided that its execution should not wait upon its ratification.
- ⁶⁷ *Globe*, 7 Aug. 1840.
- ⁶⁸ *Chronicle*, 23 July 1841.
- ⁶⁹ *History of the Times*, 379-386; Sir Herbert Maxwell, *Life and Letters of... Clarendon* (2 vols., London, 1913), I, 208-209; A. H. Johnson, ed., *The Letters of Charles Greville and Henry Reeve* (London, 1924), pp. 3-56; Bell, Palmerston, I, 300-317; Rodkey, *Turco-Egyptian Question*, chap. v.
- ⁷⁰ *Times*, 29 Aug. 1840.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 1 May 1841.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 30 July 1841.
- ⁷³ *Herald*, 27 Jan. 1841.
- ⁷⁴ *Standard*, 8 Oct. 1840.
- ⁷⁵ *Herald*, 28 Nov. 1838; this issue contained a news account and an editorial commentary upon the dinner held at Newcastle, 24 Nov. 1838. *Ibid.*, 16 Jan., 15 April, 10, 11 June 1839; *Globe*, 22 Nov. 1838; *Post*, 10 Jan. 1839; *Times*, 9 Feb. 1839.
- ⁷⁶ H. H. Parish, *The Diplomatic History of Greece* (London, 1838), *England in 1839* (London, 1839), *passim*; G. E. Westmacott, *Indian Commerce and Russian Intrigue* (London, 1838), *passim*, particularly pp. 22-23; David Urquhart, *Exposition of Transactions in Centred Asia* (London, 1841).
- ⁷⁷ Robinson, *Urquhart*, chap. iv.
- ⁷⁸ Urquhart Mss.
- ⁷⁹ Mark Hovell, *The Chartist Movement* (Manchester, 1918), pp. 175-185; Julius West, *A History of the Chartist Movement* (London, 1920), pp. 155-156.
- ⁸⁰ Urquhart Mss.; *Diplomacy and Commerce* (1840), *passim*; David Urquhart, *The Case of Macleod* (4th ed., London, 1841); William Cargill, *An Examination of the Origin, Progress and Tendency of the Commercial and Political Confederation against England and France called the "Prussian League"* (Newcastle, 1840); *The Austrian Treaty Analyzed and Its Baneful Tendency Exposed* (London, 1841).
- ⁸¹ Urquhart Mss.
- ⁸² It is a curious coincidence that the Russian consul in Boston was arrested in Montreal on just such a charge; F. O. 65/357, copies of reports to the colonial office in April 1839.
- ⁸³ *Northern Liberator*, 6 Oct. 1838.
- ⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 12 Jan. 1839.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 11 May, 3 Aug. 1839, 25 April, 30 May, n, 25 July 1840.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 1, 8, 15, 22, 29 Aug. 1840.
- ⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 26 Sept. 1840.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 3 Oct. 1840.
- ⁸⁹ *Liberator*, 10 Oct. 1840.
- ⁹⁰ *Post*, 13 May 1840; cf. *John Bull*, 3 May, 21 June 1840.
- ⁹¹ David Urquhart, *The Crisis* (1840), pp. 57-58.
- ⁹² E.g., *Herald*, 20 Oct. 1840; *Globe*, 4, 5 Nov. 1840; *Birmingham Advertiser*, 8 Oct. 1840.
- ⁹³ *Herald*, 10, 11 Aug. 1840; *Globe*, 11, 12, 14, 17 Aug. 1840; *Birmingham Journal*, 8, 15 Aug. 1840; *Birmingham Advertiser*, 13 Aug. 1840; *John Bull* 23, 29 Aug. 1840.
- ⁹⁴ C. M. Wakefield, *Life of Thomas Attwood* (privately printed, London 1885), p. 361.
- ⁹⁵ *Liberator*, 29 Aug. 1840; *Newcastle Courant*, 28 Aug. 1840.
- ⁹⁶ *Liberator*, 31 Oct., 7, 14 Nov. 1840.
- ⁹⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, 16, 30 May, 15 Aug. 1840.
- ⁹⁸ William Cargill, *The Foreign Affairs of Great Britain* (London, 1841); Robert Monteith, *Reasons for Demanding an Investigation into the Charges against Lord Palmerston* (Glasgow, 1840).
- ⁹⁹ Sir Frederick Smith, trans., *Present State of the Turkish Empire* (London, 1839), particularly pp. 316-338.
- ¹⁰⁰ Adolphus Slade, *Travels in Germany and Russia* (London, 1840), *passim*, quotation, p. 262.
- ¹⁰¹ John Reid, *Turkey and the Turks* (London, 1840), *passim*, quotation, pp. 77-78.

¹⁰² Henry Havelock, *Narrative of the War in Afghanistan in 1838-39* (2 vols., London, 1840); William Hough, *A Narrative of the March and Operations of the Army of the Indus* (London, 1841); W. G. Godolphin, *Court and Camp of Runjeet Singh* (London, 1840); James Outram, *Rough Notes on the Campaign in Scinde and Afghanistan in 1838-39* (London, 1840); M. F. F. Bjornstjerna, *British Empire in the East*, trans. by H. E. Lloyd (London, 1840), quotation, p. 245.

¹⁰³ G. Jones, *Remarks on the Alliance with Russia* (London, 1840).

¹⁰⁴ *Blackwood's*, Oct. 1840, XLVIII, 554.

¹⁰⁵ *Blackwood's*, Jan., Aug. 1841.

¹⁰⁶ *Foreign Quarterly*, XXV, 309.

¹⁰⁷ *Quarterly*, Dec. 1840, LXVII, 253-302, quotations, pp. 258, 291; Add. Ms. 34621, fos. 258-260; L. J. Jennings, *Correspondence and Diaries of... Croker* (3 vols., London, 1884), II, 365, 374.

¹⁰⁸ *Edinburgh*, Jan. 1841, art. IX; Add. Ms. 34621, fo. 441, Macaulay to Napier, 28 Dec. 1840; F. S. Rodkey, "Anglo -Russian Negotiations, 1840-1841" in *American Historical Review*, Jan. 1931, XXXVI, 343-349.

X. RUSSOPHOBIA

The peaceful *dénouement* of the Near Eastern crisis of 1839-1841 robbed the development of British Russophobia during its first phase of the satisfying logical outcome which a war between the two powers would represent. This anticlimactic quality renders a just appraisal of the phenomenon some what more difficult and gives a superficially arbitrary appearance to the moment which has been adopted for a conclusion of the present study. Should the analysis not be continued to the outbreak of the Crimean War? Would not the subject then stand forth in truer perspective? Is it possible that anti-Russian sentiment was not yet firm enough to exert a decisive influence over British policy? The answer to these questions is in the negative, partly because of considerations which will be discussed shortly in connection with a conclusive estimate of the stature of Russophobia in 1840, and partly because of the fact that the signature of the Straits Convention in July 1841 inaugurated a new and significantly different phase in Anglo-Russian intercourse and in British opinion with regard to Russia.

The new Anglo-Russian cordiality derived from several sources. The cooperative settlement of the problems of the Near East was a positive demonstration of the ability of the two powers to work in harmony. The defeat of the Whigs in the general election of 1841, in spite of the recent victory over Mehemet Ali, brought the Tories into office with Sir Robert Peel as prime minister and the urbane Earl of Aberdeen at the foreign office in the place of the more fractious Viscount Palmerston. In the Near East there ensued an unwonted calm which lasted until 1849. Elsewhere there arose no serious divergence between British and Russian interests. Circumstances were thus propitious for a strengthening of the *entente* which the crisis of 1839 had induced. In 1844 both the tsar and Nesselrode paid visits to England during which they discussed the condition of the Ottoman empire with Peel, Aberdeen, and others. There resulted an agreement that both governments would endeavor to preserve its independence and integrity and, should those efforts fail, that they would concert a common policy. The decision was reduced to writing in two highly secret documents, the so-called Nesselrode Memorandum and Aberdeen's somewhat ambiguous reply.¹ At the moment this interchange of views enhanced friendly relations between the two governments although later it contributed to the misunderstanding which precipitated the Crimean War. Anglo-Russian cordiality here reached its highest point during the nineteenth century.

Even the return of Palmerston to the foreign office in 1846 did not immediately disrupt the harmony although Great Britain shortly protested against Austria's annexation of the free city of Cracow - last vestige of an independent Poland - in which Russia along with Prussia was some sort of sleeping partner. Then the revolutions of 1848 rendered acute the latent antagonism of the liberal and autocratic elements in Europe. So complete, however, was the early, though temporary triumph of the liberal forces that there was at first no Russian intervention. But in 1849 a Russian army played a major part in the suppression of Hungarian independence. A new group of refugees from Russia's military might, some of whom later visited England, was added to the surviving Polish exiles. Many of the Hungarian leaders originally sought safety in Turkey, and Russia joined Austria in demanding their surrender by the Porte. Great Britain encouraged a refusal and even sent a naval squadron to the Straits. On this occasion it was Russia and Austria which failed to resort to force in support of the words of their diplomatists.² Nonetheless, once the crisis had been surmounted, Russia and Great Britain resumed reasonably amicable official intercourse though new lines had been added to Russia's unsavory reputation. In short, Anglo-Russian relations between 1841 and 1853 were not merely a continuation of those of the thirties. They formed a distinct and largely separate chapter in a continuing narrative.

Under these circumstances the output of anti-Russian propaganda in Great Britain was very much reduced. A few, but only a few, books about travels in Russia were published. Some controversy was aroused by the publication in 1843 of a translation of the Marquis de Custine's *La Russie en 1839* which had appeared in Paris earlier in that year. The apposite events of the time - the annexation of Cracow, the suppression of the Hungarian revolution and the refusal of the Turks to surrender the refugees - were discussed in terms which showed that the basic character of British opinion had not changed. But while David Urquhart was elected to parliament in 1847 and continued to enjoy such prominence that in March 1850 the *Quarterly Review* devoted an extensive article to him and to his work, his prolific pen was busied with other topics. Thus there was a marked retrogression in anti-Russian propaganda. Unfortunately it cannot be illustrated in detail since it was negative in character,

consisting more in the disappearance of anti-Russian polemics than in the articulation of pro-Russian sentiments. Yet the stereotyped estimate of Russian character and purpose persisted, hibernating until a new crisis developed in 1853. Then the presses began again to pour forth articles and pamphlets. Urquhart returned to the subject which he had made peculiarly his own.³ He and others refurbished for the new situation the sentiments which had dominated British thought in the thirties.

Nonetheless the year 1841 is an appropriate place to conclude a study of Russophobia in its first phase. The signature of the Straits Convention established a status for the thorniest aspect of the Near Eastern question which endured essentially unaltered until 1914. The Crimean War itself was only an episode, and indeed a highly inconclusive one, in the continuing process of Anglo-Russian intercourse.

The diplomatic relations of the two powers which were resumed in the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Paris in 1856 continued to be characterized by persistent antagonism and to be punctuated by recurrent crises. The Near Eastern settlement established by that treaty proved to be less durable than the status which had been achieved in 1841. By 1880 Russia had regained the ground which she surrendered in 1856. Not indeed until the *entente* of 1907 was there as sharp a reorientation of Anglo-Russian relations as occurred between 1839 and 1841. Antipathy likewise continued to be the dominant element in British opinion toward Russia down to the conclusion of the *entente* and was re-born in markedly altered, but recognizable form a decade later. Up to the present moment the progress of events has provided no termination for an account of the intercourse of Great Britain and Russia, either in the realm of diplomacy or in that of opinion, which is not in some measure arbitrary. It is a specious logic which indicates the onset of the Crimean War as the appropriate end of a study of the early development of Russophobia.

The extension of the present work either to 1854 or to some subsequent date would, moreover, inflict upon its readers the excessive burden of digesting many, many selections from the newspaper and periodical presses, each highly repetitious of those which had gone before, to say nothing of imposing upon the author the staggering task of mastering not only an extensive diplomatic correspondence but also the stupendous contents of the constantly expanding files of the newspaper press. Even if this latter labor proved to be within one man's physical capacity, it may be doubted whether the result would be of commensurate value.

Anglo-Russian relations during the nineteenth century partook of the nature of an ambitious musical composition. If the variations upon a few fundamental themes were great enough to provide a sustaining interest for students of diplomatic history and were further enlivened by a generous element of intrigue and melodrama, these latter qualities are entirely lacking in the study of opinion and the variations themselves are highly monotonous. Thus the substitution of revolution in Serbia and Bulgaria for rebellion in Egypt or of an advance toward Merv for one on Khiva provides enough variety of geographic and political setting so that the narrative of the Near Eastern and Central Asian questions enjoys a good measure of suspense. But in the polemics of propagandist literature the differences can be of little moment and scant interest. Even within the slender scope of the present study it has been impossible to avoid much repetition. Articles on Russia's villainy in Circassia were much of a kind with those on her conduct in Poland. There was marked similarity between the remarks of the *Times* and those of other metropolitan journals or between those in the *Edinburgh* and in the *Quarterly*. Unfortunately this repetition could have been eliminated only at the cost of a failure to show just those similarities, to demonstrate the degree to which the reading public was subjected to a barrage of anti-Russian sentiment and to indicate the relationships between party politics and propagandist activity, between policy and opinion. Furthermore, only by submitting to a somewhat comparable bombardment may a later reader readily appreciate the impact which this propaganda must have made upon contemporaries.

Still another reason for stopping the study of Russophobia short in 1841 is the fact that its continuance would involve the repetition of much work which has already been done. The background of the Crimean War has been carefully analyzed by Mr. B. Kingsley Martin in his *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston*. It is there his thesis that the crystallization within the United Kingdom of certain notions, or stereotypes, with regard to Russia, a process in which Lord Palmerston played an important role without perhaps entirely foreseeing its result, was an essential element in bringing on the Crimean War. He shows that, aside from inevitable differences in detail, there was created a state of opinion very similar to that which has been here shown to have existed twenty years earlier. Since Martin did not carry his study back to the thirties, he probably did not realize how similar to the earlier one was

the development which he surveyed. It seems fair to suggest, even, that the solidification of a hostile stereotype with regard to Russia occurred in 1853 as rapidly as it did only because its mold had been well fashioned two decades before. Perhaps the Russophobia of the thirties was as important in precipitating the Crimean War as was that of 1853. Martin writes:

*The picture of the Eastern struggle, misty and diverse at first, has settled in hard and vivid outline... In the minds of thousands is the same set of images and the same reaction. Russia, as becomes a villain, is diabolic, duper, yet somehow easy to defeat by courage and a fleet; Turkey, the distressed maiden, bravely bids the ravisher defiance; the suggestion that England shall complete the romance in the role of the gallant Knight-errant is overwhelming. The voices of honour and self interest are indistinguishable...*⁴

Since Martin selected for his investigation the single phase of Russophobia which did eventuate in war, his foregoing characterization benefited by one element which was lacking two decades earlier, that of a generous England actually going to the rescue of a distressed Turkey. His picture could thus be drawn in more picturesque detail. But the other portions of his description are all familiar. The full degree of similarity becomes apparent from a reading of *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston*.

The fact that war was not the *dénouement* of the earlier crisis is in fact a positive advantage in evaluating the development of Russophobia in its first, and, may it be suggested, its crucial phase. The two disparate manifestations of the same process provide for the historian an approximation to the laboratory of the physical and biological scientist which he rarely enjoys. While it is first necessary to appraise Russophobia as it existed in the latter part of the thirties in more detail, there is offered thus an unusual opportunity to assay the general relationship between policy and opinion.

There can be no question that by 1840 the suspicion and antipathy which had generated in so many and such diverse sources had become a real hatred. The virtual unanimity shown both in the press and in the surviving judgments of individuals is conclusive evidence. Opposed to the chorus of hate only two significant voices were raised in public. Lord Londonderry found Russia praiseworthy, but the general disapproval which greeted his nomination to the embassy in St. Petersburg is proof that his opinions were not widely shared. The vehemence of the opposition was such, furthermore, as to induce his resignation.⁵ It was a highly unusual turn in British political life, which shows that on occasion public opinion, in this case hostility toward Russia, could affect the course of events in unambiguous fashion.

Richard Cobden also deprecated the prevailing hostility, but contempt was the foundation of his judgment. If he hoped to calm English fears, the tone of his argument was not such as to nourish cordiality toward the empire of the tsars.⁶ In private several of the British envoys to St. Petersburg - and presumably other men, evidence of whose opinions has not survived - endeavored to mitigate the prevalent enmity. But their efforts, even those of Lord Durham, achieved little success in official circles.⁷ Since their ideas never reached the public, Russia had no effective apologists. Possessed of no other source of information, the politically alert ordinary citizen could not remain immune to the views of articulate opinion which displayed rare unanimity. Had there been such a canvass of opinion as has been devised in the twentieth century, its significant disclosure could have been only the proportion of the population which had no opinion, which was unaffected by the polemics of the Russophobes.

What impression did the anti-Russian propaganda make upon the mass of the British people? This question is not capable of precise answer. In contemporary pamphlets and periodicals are to be found many references to a prevailing apathy toward all foreign affairs, and the widespread illiteracy of the day shielded much of the nation from the fulminations of the press. Circulation figures indicate that only a small minority of the population can have read any newspaper. Although the essential agreement of all journals with regard to Russia robs these statistics of their value as a comparative index, they merit summary in the present context. In 1840, the *Times* averaged nearly 16,000 copies of each issue, while the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Morning Herald*, its closest competitors, sold between 6000 and 7000. The weekly *Examiner* and the semiweekly *Manchester Guardian*, already much the most prominent of the provincial papers, each distributed not quite 6000 copies of an issue. Few other papers attained even half that figure. The *Edinburgh Review*, the *Quarterly Review*, and *Blackwood's Magazine*, altogether in a class by themselves, had circulations of about 10,000 copies.⁸ Even if each copy of both newspapers and periodicals reached a dozen or more persons, the total number of readers remained a very small fraction of the population. However, the subscription lists included many coffee houses and other places of public resort, and there can be little doubt that the ideas expressed in the press permeated, in incomplete and modified form at least, all that portion of the British public which was politically alert.

Yet this is not the significant consideration. Inarticulate opinion can exert at best a negative influence over events. It is articulate sentiment which counts and virtually all such opinion, that of statesmen as well as that of the public, was firmly anti-Russian. Although it is not unlikely that on a percentage basis the fervent Russophobes constituted a minority, even a small minority of the nation, British policy was in fact directed in accord with their views. This is what mattered. Policy was consciously anti-Russian, contemplated without hesitation the possibility of war, and remained pacific only because Russia did not actively resist the achievement of its purpose. In short, in terms of the statesman's calculus, by which opinion can best be assayed, Russophobia had matured during the 1830's and by 1840 was pragmatically complete.

Since there have been few studies of such phenomena as Russophobia, it seems wise to examine the implications of the phrase, *pragmatically complete*. Dislike of at least a mild sort for things remote and unfamiliar is an almost universal human attitude, perhaps even an instinct. Thus the world abroad is at all times regarded with some measure of disapprobation by all men except sentimental expatriates. Although in relatively few cases is it appropriate to describe this common feeling as a phobia, almost all efforts to assay opinion with regard to foreign relations must consist in the problem of proper placement on a scale of disfavor. In the case of British opinion with regard to Russia during the 1830's, the proper place is certainly near the limit of extreme hostility. The word, *phobia*, has been used here to describe the situation partly because the prevalent attitude toward Russia became so intense as to render the term appropriate, but also because that was the word which was used contemporaneously and has since been customarily applied.

But at what point may a *phobia* be considered to be *pragmatically complete*? In the first chapter it was suggested that the statesman's attitude might be a useful guide for historical study. From his point of view antipathy toward a foreign power surely reaches the critical point when it becomes so extensive and so intense that the nation is psychologically ready for war provided the attendant political conditions, that is, the diplomatic and military situation, seem to warrant resort to that expedient. The definition of the point is no simple matter. It undoubtedly varies with period, place, polity, and people. Yet when it is reached, the hostility or phobia may certainly be described as pragmatically complete. Such, it would appear, was not the situation in Great Britain in 1829 at the time of the Treaty of Adrianople.⁹ Evidence is lacking to show just how soon thereafter Russophobia became *complete*. A judgment of that nature must in any case be a highly individual matter and the diagnoses of different statesmen or of different historians would certainly differ. But that by 1840 British Russophobia had attained such stature can hardly be doubted.

This judgment is corroborated by a comparison between the circumstances of 1839-40 and 1853-54. In one crisis the outcome was alliance, in the other, war. The contrasting *dénouements* represent respectively the success and the failure of the processes of diplomacy. Are they attributable to differing states of British opinion?

One noteworthy difference between the two situations is the duration of the periods during which serious antagonism existed. In the earlier case pronounced diplomatic tension developed immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi in July 1833, and lasted at least until the arrival of Baron Brunnow in London in September 1839. Other matters - the legacy of the Polish Revolution, the size of the rival naval establishments, and the Persian attack on Herat - magnified the hostility, but the Near Eastern issue was paramount. In the latter case, although the dispute between France and Russia over the Holy Places began as early as 1850, Great Britain did not play an important part in the imbroglio until July 1853, when the Mediterranean squadron was ordered to the Straits. Then in the space of no more than six months public sentiment became so inflamed as to disturb the efforts of diplomatists. It is Kingsley Martin's contention that to this excitement may be ascribed the failure of negotiations which otherwise might probably have succeeded.¹⁰ It must be conceded that, in contrast to the earlier period, the original problem, that of the Holy Places, was only indirectly associated with British interests and that the orientation of British policy was at first not so much anti-Russian as pro-Turkish or perhaps just pacificatory. These circumstances - the apparent influence of public opinion upon British policy and the lesser direct interest of Great Britain - seem to suggest that the Russophobia of 1853 was more intense than that of 1839-40. Even if this conclusion be just, as, for the months immediately prior to the declaration of war in March 1854, it may well be, it tends to confuse the problem of basic present concern, that is, the relationship between policy and opinion in 1839-40. Aroused British opinion insisted in 1853 that Turkey be supported, not that Russia be defeated. This latter eventuality was a means, not an end.¹¹ Had Russian policy been as conciliatory as it was in

1839, there would have been no war in the Crimea. One reason for the different tenor of Russia's policy on the two occasions is the fact that in 1839 the Russian statesmen knew that the British ministry were at least as suspicious of their purposes as was the general public, while in 1853 they believed, as a result of the negotiations of 1844, that they enjoyed Lord Aberdeen's confidence in their fundamental purposes and that they could rely upon him, as prime minister, to temper parliament and British opinion.¹² Hence the crucial difference between the two situations is the contrasting character of Russian policy, which may be explained in some measure by divergent Russian estimates of the role which British opinion might be expected to play. The conclusion follows that the peaceful outcome of the crisis of 1839-40 must be regarded as evidence for, rather than against, the maturity of Russophobia at that time. That sentiment was, in short, pragmatically complete.

Now that the stature of Russophobia in 1840 has been assayed there remain to be examined two highly significant matters, the influence of public, as distinct from individual, opinion over the determination of policy, and the nature and importance of the several forces which created Russophobia. Available evidence indicates that in general the course of British policy was dictated by the judgment of the statesmen responsible for its conduct. It has been shown that, except with regard to the Polish revolution, the cabinet was consistently in advance of the public from the beginning of the Greek revolution to the signature of the Straits Convention. Canning worked out the details of his policy with an enviable self-confidence. He was not seriously perturbed by a disagreement with Alexander and correctly predicted that the tsar would renew negotiations with Great Britain. Wellington and his colleagues became alarmed more quickly and more seriously over the events of the Russo-Turkish war than did any other significant group, whether parliament, the Whig leaders, or journalistic publicists. Likewise the implications of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi were appreciated more promptly and more fully by Palmerston and his associates than by most Englishmen. Although it is probable that the growing vehemence of popular sentiment, as expressed in the press, confirmed and even strengthened the anti-Russian opinions of statesmen, actual policy was determined by the foreign secretary, the prime minister, and the cabinet, not by parliament, the newspapers, or the public. All were concerned with British interests and none desired a war unless those interests allowed of no alternative course of action. When the crisis developed in 1839, there was no war chiefly because Russia pursued a policy altogether consistent with British purposes. Melbourne's cabinet, and the Tories whom they took into their confidence, were happy to secure in cooperation with her just that modification of conditions in the Near East which earlier had seemed to be the required safeguards against Russian ambition, although a minority thought that a rupture of the *entente* with France was too high a price to pay. Again the cabinet were in advance of public sentiment. This situation should occasion no surprise since only to men in official position who enjoyed full knowledge of the Russian proposals could the paradoxical policy of checking Russia by cooperating with her easily appeal. Indeed the hostility expressed by the press continued almost unabated even when the success of the new policy became apparent. Russophobia was too firmly established to be dissipated by a sudden, ambiguous, and possibly temporary turn of events.

Because policy was in fact determined by statesmen, it should not be concluded that public opinion was of no importance. In a free polity policy, while not necessarily dictated by public sentiment, must in general be consistent with it. Thus Palmerston had considerable difficulty in securing approval both within and outside the ministry for the sudden *rapprochement* with Russia in 1839-40. Only by the threat of his resignation, which would have disrupted the weak Melbourne government, did he win the acquiescence of the Francophile wing of the cabinet in his determination to conclude the Treaty of London of July 1840, without French participation.¹³ It was Melbourne's opinion that, *If Palmerston, in the Syrian affair, had not had as devoted an assistant as the Morning Chronicle he hardly would have been able to carry through his measures.*¹⁴ Like some other statesmen, Palmerston sedulously cultivated connections with the press. Sometimes he concerned himself with specific articles in the *Chronicle* or in other journals, and, as has been noted, on two occasions at least in the *Edinburgh Review*.¹⁵ And even in 1840 Palmerston's purpose remained anti-Russian when his method became less hostile. An Englishman of Englishmen, he was still in sympathy with the notions of his countrymen. He needed no prodding from the press and his policy remained within the limits set by public opinion. In short, Russophobia was a firmly established element in British thought with regard to foreign affairs, not the inspiration of a particular course of action. Such a judgment in no wise detracts from its importance.

What, then, were the roots of Russophobia? What were the parts played by private interests, by domestic politics, by the character of the information available about Russia, by personalities, by propaganda, by the accident of event, by social and political philosophies?

The influence of economic forces was of a negative character. At a moment when foreign trade was expanding rapidly and assuming major importance in British economy and in the determination of policy, Anglo-Russian commercial intercourse decayed progressively. Little attempt was made by British statesmen to augment the direct exchange of goods, while, in the Near and the Middle East, there developed an active competition between the interests of the two nations. The disintegration of a potentially great economic bond was primarily the result of protective tariffs adopted by each state with little regard for its relations with the other, but it is significant that Urquhart enjoyed his greatest success in the commercial communities of Newcastle and Glasgow. Pro-Polish sentiment was strongest in those cities and in Hull and Manchester.¹⁶ Thus it seems fair to conclude that economic forces exerted an important if incalculable influence upon the growth of hostile sentiment.

Domestic politics played a comparable role. After the democratic implications of the Reform movement had destroyed the momentary cordiality of 1830, such issues as the nomination of Lord Londonderry as ambassador and the affair of the *Vixen* offered the members of one party excellent opportunities to discredit their opponents. The superficially passive policy of Palmerston was employed similarly by Tory journalists; violent attacks upon Russia were mingled with their denunciation of the Whig ministry. Thus the exigencies of partisan conflict induced both publicists and politicians to utilize the accidents of foreign affairs, and so, in this instance, to magnify a serious but otherwise less alarming menace. Party rivalry was an appreciable factor in the growth of Russophobia.

After 1815 the information about Russia and her neighbors available both in private and in official circles increased greatly. Returning travelers published graphic descriptions of an uncongenial social and political system, giving particular attention to the vices of the nobility, the unhappy lot of the serfs, and the tyranny and corruption of the government. The accounts of explorations in Central Asia all discussed the likelihood of an invasion of India, and many of them emphasized the commercial rivalry of the two countries. Other books made the Circassians almost as well known as the Poles. To official circles comprehensive reports of Russia's military and economic conditions were available, but the potentialities of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets attracted more interest. In short, the growth of knowledge about Russia tended to make her threat seem more concrete and more imminent, but was not sufficient in most quarters to demonstrate her weakness. It contributed notably to the developing stereotype. Personalities and propaganda were still more important. Nicholas' character was well adapted to the inflammatory purpose of Urquhart. He was the oppressor of the Poles, the would be conqueror of the Circassians, of the Straits, and of India. In his Warsaw speech he gratuitously provided his detractors with a most effective weapon. But even had Nicholas' character been more sympathetic, the activity of propagandists must have consolidated the latent antipathy which developed after 1815 and was augmented by the Russo-Turkish war. The Polish revolution provided materials for the first organized propaganda which vilified the Russians. It added many lines to the evolving un savory picture. David Urquhart and his clique set to work to build on the foundation thus laid. They succeeded in making the accusations against Russia much more tangible and more easily comprehended than heretofore. Under their stimulus all the organs of opinion began anxiously to analyze the menace. The increase in unfriendly propaganda is not capable of significant statistical summary, but its import is clear, for no major organ was wholly unaffected. Even when the conclusions repudiated Urquhart's thesis, the arguments made it more familiar and identified the general antagonism more closely with him. Almost unaided he created a byword in the affair of the *Vixen*. Soon the excited discussion of the condition of the navy solidified hostile sentiment. There were other independent indictments of Russia, but most of the pamphlets, many of the periodical articles, and much of the contents of the newspapers - the letters of *Anglicus* in the *Times* and the dispatches of the Constantinople correspondents of several papers - may be traced to his group. The anti-Russian sentiment of the period bore Urquhart's stamp. More than any one man he was responsible for the character not of British policy but of British opinion about Russia during the growth of Russophobia to maturity.

Of the other influences which determined the opinions articulated in the press, partisan allegiance was the most compelling. Although on occasion the journals and even the reviews bestowed praise upon the measures of their rivals, their attitudes were ordinarily dictated by an intent to support the position of one party and to undermine that of the other. Thus in 1829 the ministerial papers declaimed the Russian menace, while the *Chronicle* and the *Globe* minimized the danger. On this issue

the antiministerial *Times* joined with its Tory contemporaries. Similarly in the months before the initiation of the Afghan campaign, the Tory papers denounced the government's quiescence, while later they were less alarmist than the Whig organs. Relatively immune from purely partisan purpose were the *Morning Post*, whose ultra-conservative philosophy rendered it little disposed to find fault with absolutist Russia, and the *Times*, which in this regard as in general was independent of fixed party affiliation. But the columns of the *Post* did not remain free from anti-Russian sentiment, and the *Times* was, after 1829, consistently alarmist, and of the major journals it most fully adopted Urquhart's theories. Yet such considerations are of small significance, for the differences of opinion were expressed over the details of policy rather than over its general course. If there was disagreement about the imminence of the Russian danger, there was essential accord between Whig and Tory in a serious distrust of Russia's ambition.

The accident of events certainly contributed to the growth of Russophobia. During the critical decade of the thirties Russian policy aimed consistently at the preservation of the independence of the Ottoman empire. British distrust, however, was nourished by a superficial inconsistency between Russia's word and her deed. In the protocol of St. Petersburg of April 1826, and in the Treaty of London of July 1827, Russia made a solemn engagement to seek in the Greek imbroglio no special advantage. Yet by the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople she extracted from the Porte a large indemnity and the recognition of her possession of the eastern shore of the Black Sea. If a good case could be made that those advantages were not comprehended in the foregoing engagements, it was possible, on the other hand, to argue plausibly that they were violations of the spirit, if not of the letter of her obligations. If Russia's conduct in Persia in 1826-28, in Turkey in 1828-29, in Poland in 1831-32, in Constantinople in 1833, and again in Persia in 1836-38 be regarded as a whole, as it was by Palmerston and his contemporaries, it is not difficult to understand the British disinclination to lend credence to her denials of ambitious purpose. It is now apparent that the two Persian affairs, the Turkish war, the subjugation and incorporation of Poland, and the quasi-protectorate over Turkey were all essentially independent episodes in the minds of Russian statesmen. But to Englishmen who were acutely aware of the enormous expansion of Russia since the reign of Peter and of the admittedly ambitious policy of Catherine, these events seemed naturally to be parts of a carefully conceived program of aggrandizement which threatened British power in the East. The Russian adventures occurred with such regularity, and at such brief intervals, that they appeared to reveal, if not a Machiavellian policy, at least a uniform, insidious, and unaltered tendency in Russian affairs.

Like the adventitious concatenation of events, the differences between the Russian and the British political and social systems were beyond the control of individuals. Yet they too contributed to Russophobia. The United Kingdom was a democratic and parliamentary, the Russian empire an autocratic and authoritarian, polity. Both British and Russian statesmen knew that British policy was subject to popular sanction and must be consistent with public sentiment, while Russia's could be formulated and executed in strictest secrecy. Herein lies an explanation of the fact that the Russians seem not to have attributed to their British contemporaries a policy of aggressive hostility toward Russia in spite of the vigor with which Russian action in Constantinople, Circassia, Persia, and Afghanistan was thwarted, in spite of a course of policy which was in fact more inimical both in deed and in purpose than was Russia's. Thus the character of Russia's polity is a partial explanation of the suspicion with which her policy was regarded both by the British statesmen and by the British public.

This examination of British Russophobia thus leads to a problem of fundamental import to everyone who enjoys any influence, however small, over the course of international politics. Are the harmonious relations of independent political entities dependent upon sympathetic political and social philosophies? Doubtless the story of the development of British Russophobia between 1815 and 1841 does not provide a full answer to that question. But it does suggest certain considerations which are germane to the issue. During the years in which it evolved, there was current the notion of an inescapable *guerre des idées* between the liberal west and the autocratic east of Europe. It is probable that the repugnance with which Russia's political institutions and social system were regarded by virtually all Englishmen contributed to the nascent antagonism between the two countries - here the pragmatic calculus of the statesmen must needs be fortified by the techniques of the psychologist - but the evidence at hand seems to show that British opinion derived in the main from more tangible sources. It was trade rivalry, the absence of profitable and waxing commercial intercourse, the accident of event and personality, the pursuit of policies which appeared to conflict in execution even if their basic inspiration did not, and the genius of those men who happened to possess political author

ity or to play an important part in the formation of opinion that made a ponderable contribution to the process of Russophobia.

One other highly intangible factor demands comment. Great Britain and Russia emerged from the Napoleonic wars as the preeminent powers in the European world. Among the great states they alone had escaped the tyranny of the Corsican. Likewise they alone controlled significant extra-European territories. If the concept of the balance of power had any force in shaping events - the whole history of international relations seems to suggest that it is inherent in a system of sovereign states - they were inescapably cast as rivals. For Great Britain Russia was the only source from which significant danger could threaten, with the possible exception of France. But in 1815 and for some time thereafter, France was prostrate, not a fullfledged member of the European states system, hardly a great power. As has been shown by quotations from propagandist articles, the Russophobes recognized and to some extent capitalized the natural competition between Great Britain and Russia which their mutual preeminence seemed to decree. But it was not made a major count in their indictment, and there is no evidence that it exerted more than a very subtle influence upon the thought of British statesmen. By 1830 the revival of France and other changes in the European scene had diminished the earlier mutual preëminence. Her geographic situation and her navy in fact rendered Great Britain secure from direct attack by Russia. As Bismarck later observed, it is not easy for an elephant to battle with a whale. The age was that of the *pax Britannica* during which the British Isles enjoyed a military security almost without parallel. Thus the rivalry of the two states and with it the propaganda of the Russophobes was centered on remote, more or less colonial, areas. The competition was of a kind with that between two less Gargantuan powers. Their special stature is not the explanation of their rivalry.

Ultimately, then, the growth of Anglo-Russian hostility must be attributed to the failure of both Englishmen and Russians to preserve the agreement with regard to major purpose which had existed during the struggle against Napoleon. In the absence of common intent, essentially minor disagreements assumed an intrinsically unmerited importance. Differences with regard to method appeared to reveal divergence of aim. Lack of sympathy induced distrust, suspicion fostered jealousy, alliance was transformed into rivalry. Such was the soil in which well-intentioned patriots, Nesselrode, and the tsar, Urquhart and Palmerston, planted the seeds from which grew Russophobia. It is the soil of all in international relations and its crop is the fate of mankind.

¹ Temperley, *Near East*, pp. 253-257.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 257-268.

³ E.g., David Urquhart, *Progress of Russia in the West, North and South* (5th ed., London, 1853), *Recent Events in the East* (London, 1854).

⁴ B. Kingsley Martin, *The Triumph of Lord Palmerston* (London, 1924), p. 45.

⁵ *Vide supra*, pp. 164, 165.

⁶ *Vide supra*, pp. 184, 185.

⁷ *Vide supra*, pp. 172, 173.

⁸ Parl. Papers, 1841, XIII, paper no. 407; *Cambridge History of English Literature*, XII (Cambridge, 1915), 158, 166; Margaret W. Oliphant, *Annals of a Publishing House* (3 vols., Edinburgh, 1897-98), II, 102, 108.

⁹ *Vide supra*, Chap. IV.

¹⁰ Martin, *Lord Palmerston*, *passim*.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, chap. 7.

¹² Temperley, *Near East*, p. 299.

¹³ *Vide supra*, Chap. IX.

¹⁴ *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, ed. by A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher (1st series, 3 vols., London, 1908), I, 375.

¹⁵ C. K. Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work," in *Politico*, Aug. 1934, I, 143; *supra*, 124, 271.

¹⁶ *Vide supra*, Chaps. III, V, VII.

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Adrianopel, treaty	1829, OsmE; peace treaty between Rus and OsmE (= Edirne, TR)
Aix, Aachen, congress	1668, peace conference F x Sp (mediated by NL, GB, SW)
Akkon	city in Galilee, OsmE, act. Isr
Alexander I	1777-1825, Rus. emperor / tsar 1801-1825
Bosphore	Strait btw Asia Minor and Europe, OsmE / TR, entry to Black Sea
Buchara	city on the antique silkroad, Usbekistan (= Bokhara, Buxoro)
Canning, George	1770-1827, GB, PM 1827 (Whig)
Canning, Stratford	1786-1880, GB, diplomat, mostly OsmE;
Castlereagh, Visc.	(= Robert Stewart)
Charles XII	1682-1718, SW, Sweden. King, Karl XII
Chartist	GB, contemporary workers movement
Chiwa	city on antique silkroad, (Usbek. Khiva, Xiva) rus. Exped. 1839-40
Circassia	Rus. region in Caucasus
Crimea, war	1853-1856, Rus x OsmR/F/GB/Sard-Piemonte
Czartoryski	pol. noble family
Dardanelles	Strait btw Asia Minor and Europe, OsmE / TR, entry to Marmara Sea
Decabrist Revolt	1825, December, revolt (in Rus)
Disbrowe Edward Cromwell	1790-1851, GB, politician, diplomat, Rus.
Dost Mohammad Khan	1792-1863, Afgh. Emir
Durham, Earl of	1792-1840, GB, title, created in 1833 for John Lambton
Evans, Col. George de Lacy	1787-1870, GB, General,
Ferdinand VII	1784-1833, Sp, King
George IV	1762-1830, GB, prince regent, King
Grey, Earl Charles	1729-1807, GB, Lieutenant-General, PM 1830-34
Guizot F.P.G.	1787-1874, F, historian, statesman PM 1847-48
Gulistan, treaty	1813, peace treaty between Pers and Rus
Holy Alliance	Alliance Rus, A, Pr, F created at congress of Vienna, conserv.
Hindustan	persian word for India
Hume, Joseph	1777-1855, GB, politician radical, expert for Pers, Ind, Bengal
Ibrahim Pascha	1789-1848, Egy/OsmE Wali, Khedive of Egy. and Sudan
Iwan IV	1530-1584, Rus. 'Iwan the terrible'
Jenkinson, Robert	1770-1828, GB, PM Whig, 1812-27
Kamran Shah	Kamran Mirza Durrani; Herat, Afgh/Pers.
Katherina II	1729-1796; Rus. tsar 1762-96
Konya, battle	1832, Syr, OsmE x Egy
Kosciusko A. Tadeusz	1746-1817, pol. national hero (died in Solothurn)
Kutahya, treaty	treaty after 1. egypt-osman. war
Lamb, William	1779-1848, GB, PM Whig 1834, 1835-41
Levante	eastern coastline of the Mediterranean (act. Syr, Lebanon, Isr)
Lieven, Prince C. Heinrich	1774-1838, Rus. diplomat
Lieven, Princess Dorothea	1785-1857, Rus. diplomat
London treaty	1827, GB, F, Rus concerning Gr - OsmE
Londonderry Marquess of	(= Robert Stewart)
Mahmud II, Sultan	1785-1839, OsmE, Sultan, OsmE
McNeill, Sir John	1831-1904, GB, Major-General
Mehemet Ali, Pascha	1770-1849, Egy. Wali of the osman province Egy
Melbourne, Viscount	(= William Lamb)
Metternich, Prince	1773-1859, A, statesman, different functions
Navarino, battle	1827, Gr., gr. Independence war (→ Pylos)
Nesselrode, Karl Robert	1780-1862, Rus, Foreign Minister
Nezib, battle	1839-1841, OsmE, OsmE x Egy (→Nizip)
Nikolaus I	1796-1855, Rus tsar 1825-55
Palmerston Lord	1784-1865, GB, PM 1859-1865 Henry J. Temple
Paul I	1754-1801, Rus, tsar 1796-1801
Peel, Sir Robert	1788-1850, GB, PM conserv. 1834-35, 1841-1846
Pitt, William (younger)	1759-1806, GB, PM, Whig
Polonian Revolt	1830-31, Pol. revolt against rus. oppression (November revolt)
Ponsonby, Lord	1770-1855, GB, MP, diplomat
Porte Sublime Porte	OsmE access porte to Topkapi-Palace, means seat of the Sultan
Pozzo di Borgo	1764-1842, Rus. diplomat, friend of Napoleon

Punjab	region in India, act. Pakistan/India (region of Indus river)
Robinson F.J.	1782-1859, GB, PM 1827-28 (Earl of Ripon, Viscount Goderich)
Samarkand	city on the antique silkroad, actual Usbekistan
Seven years' war	1756-63, different wars in Europe
Sheil, R. L.	1791-1851, GB/Irl. Politician and author
Simonitsch, Graf	? rus diplomat, supreme commander over pers. army
Singh, Ranjit	1780-1839, Maharadshah of Punjab ,Lion of Panjab'
Stewart, Robert	1769-1822, GB, PM 1812-22
Strangways, H. R. Fox	1859-1948, GB, musician, translator
Stuart, Lord Dudley,	1803-1854, GB, politician, pro Pol
Sultan	here: Leader over OsmE, in Constantinople
Tory, Tories	Party in GB
Troppau, congress	1820, (Opava; Rus, Pr, A, F, GB)
Turkmanchai, treaty	1828, peace treaty after rus.-pers. war 1826-1828
Unkiar Skelessi,	1833, Hünkâr Iskelesi, defens.coalition. btw. Rus and osmE
Urquhart, David	1805-1877, GB, pro-OsmE and anti-Rus
Verona, congress	1822, last congress of the Holy Alliance (A, Pr, Rus / F, GB)
Vienna, congress	1815, new order of Europas after Napoleon
Vixen	vessel, used by Urquhart as bait, object of the Vixen-affair
Wellington, Duke	1769-1852, GB, (Arthur Wellesley) PM 1828-30; 1834
Whig, Whigs	Party in GB
Wilhelm IV	1795-1861, Prussian King
Wilson, Sir Robert	1777-1849, GB, General
Witkewitsch, J.W.	? Rus → Mediator between Afgh and Rus
Woronzow, Graf M.S.	1782-1856, Rus, Field marshal, general governor, Vice-Tsar

A: Austria
Afgh: Afghanistan
Egy: Egypt
F: France
GB: Great Britain
Gr: Greece
Irl: Ireland
Isr: Israel
Leb: Lebanon
MP: Member of Parliament
NL: Netherlands
OsmE: Osman Empire
Pers: Persia
PM: Prime Minister
Pol: Polonia
Pr: Prussia
Rus: Russia
Sp: Spain
Syr: Syria
TR: Turkey